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Abstract 
 This dissertation explores how an interdisciplinary analysis may contribute insight 
into how literary and policy discourses construct the life experiences of people who have 
mental disabilities that impair their ability to communicate their own life stories.  Chapter 
One explains why a more comprehensive understanding of the cultural construction of 
mental disability may be achieved by exploring interdisciplinary relationships between 
social work, disability studies and literary theory.  Subsequent chapters examine 
theoretical assumptions and frameworks associated with these contributing disciplines in 
greater detail, across systematic and interpretive analytic approaches.  In addition, key 
concepts and questions relevant to constructing a vocabulary that facilitates collaboration 
between the contributing disciplines are considered.  This literature review informs a 
methodology for undertaking an interpretive discourse analysis of pertinent policy and 
novels that depict disability within the context of Ontario‘s ‗Institutional Cycle‘.  
Specifically, the research attempts to answer the following questions:  What is the 
relationship between the representation of mental disability in literary narratives and 
public policy discourses about mental disability; and, how may an interdisciplinary 
analysis of literary and policy discourses inform policy planning and the provision of 
services for people with mental disabilities in Ontario?  Chapters 6-8 analyze the literary 
and policy data across Establishment, Reform and Dismantlement phases of the 
Institutional Cycle to arrive at a set of findings and recommendations that explain 
relationships between policy and novels across the phases of the Cycle.  Finally, key 
themes for consideration in policy planning for people with mental disabilities are 
identified as priorities for action in an emerging ‗post-institutional‘ era, in Ontario.   
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CHAPTER 1- Interdisciplinary Inquiry 
 
Introduction 
 Disability is a social construction (Dunn 413; Michalko 174; Prince 6; Scull 8); a 
concept that is represented, challenged and revised across different cultural texts, 
including literature and policy (Mitchell & Snyder 205).  According to Tanya Titchkosky, 
―disability, made by culture, is a prime location to reread and rewrite culture‘s makings‖ 
(12).  Mental disability, specifically, poses definitional challenges because the nature of 
associated impairments is not always immediately identifiable, and may be interpreted 
from a range of theoretical perspectives.   For this reason the representation of mental 
disability lends itself to interdisciplinary investigation.  Different perspectives and 
representations of mental disability have particular implications for people whose ability 
to speak for themselves is impaired.  The manifestations of severe disability also pose 
challenges for social workers who are mandated to work for the best interests of their 
client as their ―primary professional obligation‖ (Ontario College of Social Workers and 
Social Services Workers, 1).  The responsibility attached to their role is magnified when 
social workers are called upon to speak for their clients instead of working collaboratively 
with them to advocate for appropriate services and supports so that they may assume their 
rights and responsibilities as social citizens (Drover, 2000, 37).  In carrying out this role, 
social workers in all fields of practice, including direct intervention with individuals, 
service administration, social planning, policy development and analysis, need to look 
outside their own professional theories if they wish to challenge dominant cultural 
assumptions that have marginalized clients‘ expertise in relation to their own life 
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experiences (Bagatell 414; Beresford & Croft 299; Cambridge & Parkes 713; Cushing 
160; Peat 657-658).  By reading widely from both literary and policy texts, and thinking 
in an interdisciplinary way about the social and cultural space between these discourses, 
social work researchers and practitioners may contribute to a richer representation of the 
life experiences of people with mental disabilities.  An interpretive discourse analysis of 
the ways that literature and policy intersect to construct mental disability may, in turn, 
help social workers better provide personal supports, advocacy, program or policy 
development for people who cannot speak for themselves, or who are not recognized as 
reliable self-advocates.  
 
 Interdisciplinarity between Social Work and Literary Studies 
 The study of literature seems to readily accommodate an interdisciplinary 
approach because humanities disciplines tend to be less tightly bound to prescriptive 
theory (Goldstein 41; Iyer 127; Riessman & Quinney 407; Whalley 242-243).  Julie 
Thompson Klein explains that ―literature assumed early prominence in the history of 
humanities, it was a primary site for importing new developments, and it has been a major 
locus of interdisciplinary theorizing‖ (2005, 83).  Because many kinds of knowledge can 
be communicated as story, literary narrative can adapt itself to many kinds of inquiry, 
including social work.    
 On the other hand, the interdisciplinary potential in social work lies, at least in 
part, in its history as a kind of hybrid discipline that has tried to be both science and art 
(Howe 518).  Social work has been drawn to a scientific justification for its interventions 
for the same reasons that the social sciences, generally, have tried to gain legitimacy 
through adopting scientific models.  Glenn Drover (1998, 84) argues that, from the outset 
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in Canada, social work emphasized the importance of scientific diagnosis in order to 
legitimize the profession as something more substantial than a moralizing charitable 
organization society.  As Howard Goldstein observes, ―within a society that was 
enthralled with the aura and the remarkable benefits of the new sciences and technologies, 
certain leaders… departed from the profession‘s humanistic roots and elected to define 
social casework as a science‖ (33).  Over time, this scientific approach to managing 
human need has not co-existed easily with social work‘s other founding humanistic 
influences.   
 Social workers who tried to defend social work‘s humanistic roots have, until 
relatively recently, not been taken very seriously.  Still, some persevered in arguing 
against so-called rational methods that attempted to reduce social work interventions in 
terms of quantifiable outputs.  Lydia Rapoport notes that  
          [s]ocial work, like art, is engaged in problem solving, be it the problem of 
          expression, communication, transformation, or change.  Both deal with human  
          materials or human themes and both require an intimate ‗knowing and   
          contact‘.  Both call for creative and imaginative use of self.  Both require a  
          special kind of distance and objectivity. (151)   
This humanist approach to professional social work practice articulates the relationship 
between worker and client as something that cannot be explained by rational theory.  
Many social workers who recognize the dynamic and interpretive aspects of their 
relationships with individuals and client constituencies employ metaphors of art and 
drama in order to fill knowledge gaps that science cannot address (Martinez-Brawley & 
Zorita 205).   
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 Story is also utilized as method by some social work practitioners and theorists, 
including Applegate, who believes that ―[e]ach case history is a story and, from a posture 
of respectful curiosity, [social workers] try to help the client tell that story in her own 
voice‖ (151).  Goldstein brings together the ideas of drama and story in observing that 
―[c]lients recount a story—a narrative of how they believe things came to be, how they 
ought to be, perhaps how things might yet be.  Entering into the context of the client‘s life 
is not far removed from witnessing (and respectfully becoming part of) a drama replete 
with plot, protagonists, antagonists, crises, and critical choices‖ (30).  The concept of 
social workers inviting clients to tell their life stories has contributed to a number of 
therapeutic interventions that adapt the language of literature to meet therapeutic ends.  
These include some narrative approaches, bibliotherapy and cognitive behavioural 
approaches where clients are taught skills to ―re-story‖ problematic personal plotlines 
(Applegate 150).   
 This interest in story and the language of literary theory is not confined to social 
work practice with individuals.  Along with the art and science tension, social work is a 
profession that concerns itself with both individual and larger institutional change.  
Structural social workers ―embrace both the judicial and the therapeutic in single acts of 
intervention—they judge and they treat; they control and they cure.  In this way private 
and personal experiences are politicized‖ (Howe 517; emphasis in original).  In 
professional practice, social workers are educated to recognize a relationship between 
personal stories and larger cultural narratives:  ―The interpretation of personal experience 
is always embedded in the larger stories, myths and normative structures that permeate 
Canadian society‖ (Neysmith, Bezanon & O‘Connell 19).  Social policy responds to these 
larger stories and contributes to those normative structures in the form of legislative, 
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policy, and planning texts.  Reissman and Quinney point out that, ―[a]s individuals 
construct stories of experience, so too do nations, governments, and organizations 
construct preferred narratives about themselves‖ (393).   Success in social policy planning 
may be determined by how well policy makers interpret individual stories that are woven 
together into cultural narratives, as a culture‘s legal and narrative discourses mutually 
inform each other (Couser 2007, 81-83).   
 Narratives are legitimized to the extent that they succeed at representing cultural 
attitudes, values and storylines with which the reader can identify (Cohen 51; Holland 
212; Lyle & Gehart para. 18-23).  Therefore, literature ―by its very nature is the opposite 
of an escape: imagination is a realising-process, making the world real, making us real‖ 
(Whalley 199).  If literature may be read as interpretations of the world we live in, for 
some theorists it follows that literary narrative is inevitably political:  
          What is literature?  It is a discourse which exploits in periods of economic and  
          institutional disengagement the fictiveness of utterance by announcing that  
          fictiveness, and thus has the capacity to maintain the redundancies of its  
          culture, to modify those redundancies, and to undermine them.  Thus it has  
          the capacity to support the economic interactional patterns of its culture, to  
          modify them, and to destroy them. (Peckham 228)   
An explicit relationship between literature and policy can be traced back to the origins of 
political satire.  Eighteenth century literature is particularly renowned for its satirists, and 
Klein reflects upon this period to consider how satire may be seen in terms of an 
interdisciplinary relationship between literature and matters of social welfare and political 
economy where 
          Jonathan Swift connected madness and the theory of sublimation to the 
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          realms of empire, philosophy, religion, poetic convention, female beauty, and 
          human pride.  Alexander Pope explored a theory of ideology that situated  
          poetry in its socioeconomic context as a coordination of aesthetic value and  
          exchange.  The force of Pope‘s insight into the commodity status of poetry  
          depended on the premise that economy and poetry were divergent spheres.  
          (2005, 20) 
While satire explicitly undermines social conventions, political ideologies and cultural 
values by exaggerating and undermining them with humour, literature‘s political import is 
by no means confined to satirical narrative genres.  Martha C. Nussbaum focuses on the 
novel, specifically, as an accessible, current narrative genre that has much to contribute to 
the process of policy making, generally.  She believes that, 
          the novel constructs a paradigm of a style of ethical reasoning that is context- 
          specific without being relativistic, in which we get potentially universalizable  
          concrete prescriptions by bringing a general idea of human flourishing to bear  
          on a concrete situation, which we are invited to enter through the imagination.   
          This is a valuable form of public reasoning, both within a single culture and  
          across cultures.  For the most part, the genre fosters it to a greater degree than  
          classical tragic dramas, short stories, or lyric poems. (8)     
The historical context for the rise of the novel as a literary genre, and changes in the 
social construction of mental disability are, in fact, related.   
 Patrick McDonagh looks primarily at novels to inform his historical analysis of 
the construction of mental disability in Western culture.  He finds that ―social concerns 
can be reproduced in literary works, making literary documents important sources of 
information regarding the symbolic or ideological function of people with learning 
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disabilities at the time of the composition of the text‖ (2000, 49).  McDonagh‘s literary 
analysis culminates in the finding that the symbolic representation of mental disability in 
literary texts continues to both validate and challenge dominant social discourses about 
mental disability and gender which, in turn, shape policy positions that can exercise 
influence over real people‘s personal narratives.         
 According to Lennard Davis (1997), the political and scientific advances 
associated with industrialism contributed to the evolution of the novel in the nineteenth 
century, and also influenced the representation of disability:   
          I am not saying simply that novels embody the prejudices of society toward  
          people with disabilities.  That is clearly a truism.  Rather, I am asserting that  
          the very structures on which the novel rests tend to be normative, ideologically  
          emphasizing the universal quality of the central character whose normativity  
          encourages us to identify with him or her.  Furthermore, the novel‘s goal is to  
          reproduce, on some level, the semiologically normative signs surrounding the  
          reader, that paradoxically help the reader to read those signs in the world as  
          well as the text.  Thus the middleness of life, the middleness of the material  
          world, the middleness of the normal body, the middleness of the sexually  
          gendered, ethnically middle world is created in symbolic form and then  
          reproduced symbolically.  This normativity in narrative will by definition  
          create the abnormal, the Other, the disabled, the native, the colonized subject  
          and so on. (22) 
Social work evolved at the same time as the novel, as a result of the same influences, to 
realize similar objectives.  Darwin‘s theory of evolution, the development of statistics as a 
scientific tool and Quetelet‘s calculation of the ―normal man‖ all contributed to a politics 
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of eugenics (Davis 1997, 11) that is evident in early Canadian social policy designed to 
segregate those designated as ―feeble minded‖ from mainstream (normal) society 
(Simmons 1982, 53-58).  Those assumptions inherent in policy decisions regarding 
people with mental disabilities were reinforced by traditional literary stereotypes attached 
to disability-- the monster, the villain, the fool, the martyr (Margolis & Shapiro 18-21; 
McDonagh 2000, 50-53; Mitchell & Snyder 208-209).  If it is true that ―all fairytales tell 
us something about reality‖ (Scholes 247), then policy attempts to establish the terms and 
conditions for how we live in the real world.     
 Given the political underpinnings that determine social work practice, as well as 
literature, it is possible that a more comprehensive understanding of the social 
construction of mental disability may be realized by studying relevant literary and policy 
discourses together (Fig. 1), provided a method can be found to facilitate communication 
between disciplinary languages.  Emery Roe suggests that a relationship between literary 
and policy theory may be forged through construction of a metanarrative that manages to 
meet the epistemological requirements of all contributing perspectives.  This, however, 
can be problematic in interdisciplinary research where, typically,  ―literary theorists don‘t 
know much about policy, and practicing policy analysts certainly don‘t know much, if 
anything, about literary theory‖ (Roe xiii).  At the same time, there are differences in how 
language is used in different disciplines (Yanow 2000, 64).   
          Roe‘s theory of narrative policy analysis begins with the observation that language 
is not neutral, nor is it particularly easy to translate key concepts such as text, narrative, 
discourse, or story between disciplines.  George Whalley elaborates on the 
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Figure 1-  Interdisciplinary Construction of Disability 
 
challenges of using the same language to communicate poetic and political purposes, 
noting that  
          ‗[o]fficial‘ and political writing, earnest and impersonal in tone and of modest  
          literary accomplishment, may seem to be assailable only in its ‗ideas‘ and  
          logical connections.  Yet, couched in language, it must be criticized and  
          analysed in terms of the way we know language functions, confident that we  
          can see why it was written in that way and no other way. (86) 
The interdisciplinary researcher must have enough expertise in all contributing disciplines 
to at least be familiar with their respective ‗languages‘ in order to achieve a satisfactory 
breadth of understanding to communicate between them.     
 Patsy Healey demonstrates how the ability to communicate between different 
types of texts is a fundamental aspect of policy planning:   
          Planning is an interactive and interpretive process… Planning processes  
          should be enriched by discussion of moral dilemmas and aesthetic experience  
          using a range of presentational forms, from telling stories to aesthetic  
          illustrations of experiences.  Statistical analysis coexists in such processes with  
          poems and moral fables… Planning involves invention. (242)   
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Introducing terms like invention in relation to policy planning speaks to the creative 
aspects of interpretation in relation to the construction and evaluation of policy texts.  In 
the construction of texts, be they policy or literary, an imposed structure can only take the 
author so far, and writers are always ‗going outside the lines.‘  For example, any theory 
that attempts to define ‗what is literature‘ is simply an invitation to challenge and re-
invigorate prevailing critical assumptions (Davenport 44-46).   
 Healey‘s endorsement of diverse sources to inform policy planning opens the door 
to a wider range of stakeholder perspectives.  Social welfare advocates argue that the 
consumers of social services have a relevant expertise to contribute to social planning and 
policy development (Beresford & Croft 302; Couser, 2007, 73; Friedman 114; Healey 
236-237; Hudson 389).  Unfortunately, social work has had a rather poor track record in 
recognizing, much less incorporating, the expertise of service users in general (Beresford 
& Croft 300; Gambrill 169; Hawkins, Fook & Ryan 10).  Even when social workers are 
inclined to work in ways that respect and incorporate client knowledge, the inevitably 
subjective elements associated with any interpretation make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to generate a social work theory that is capable of providing a reliable model of practice 
for representing the life experiences of people with severe mental disabilities.   
 In working with people who have significant intellectual or mental health 
impairments, it is far too easy for social workers to make false assumptions, or produce 
what Claudia Malacrida refers to as ―sanitized memories‖(403): historical accounts or 
client memoirs that minimize or overlook evidence of oppression and abuse.  Therefore, it 
is incumbent upon the social worker to try and find direction from other narratives in 
order to ―develop skills in translation, in constructive critique, and in collective invention 
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and respectful action to be able to realize the potential of planning‖ (Healey 248).  
Training in literary theory may facilitate the development of these kinds of skills.   
 The variety of theoretical perspectives informing the substantial professional 
practice of social work makes it difficult to define its disciplinary boundaries.  As 
Adrienne Chambon observes, ―the accepted terminology of social work is always at a 
difficult crossroads as it accommodates a diversity of logics and languages into a single 
professional field‖ (67).  Just within the branch of social work that specializes in 
planning, Rothman and Zald identify several disciplinary influences, including 
―sociology, political science, anthropology, economics, organizational theory, as well as 
psychology and social psychology‖ (145), which they see as contributing to an absence of 
―a specific theoretical knowledge base‖ in planning.  Therefore, the interdisciplinarian‘s 
preoccupation with communicating between disciplines should not overlook important 
debates that regularly occur within disciplines about what constitutes appropriate method 
or theory.   
 Even though there is no consensus about a comprehensive theory of literature or a 
theory of social work, each set of disciplinary discourses serves a normative function.  
Furthermore, literature and social policy both influence the emerging discipline of 
disability studies: ―one bridge connecting conventional policy analysis and contemporary 
literary theory is the importance both place on the role of stories and storytelling in 
securing and endorsing the assumptions needed to make [planning] decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty and complexity‖(Roe 9).   Social work‘s affinities with the 
humanities, and literary studies specifically, are not as widely recognized as its 
relationships with disciplines in the social sciences, and even natural sciences.  Exploring 
social work theory and literary theory together, in an interdisciplinary fashion, may result 
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in an enhanced critical analysis of narrative and story in both disciplines, inform an 
approach to disability studies, and also a process for accessing life narratives that belong 
to people who have limited or no ability to speak for themselves.    
13 
 
 
 
CHAPTER  2- Literary Theory 
 
What is Literature?  
 Given that this interdisciplinary study aspires to look at theories of literature 
together with disability, social policy and planning, it is useful to try and organize a 
literature review within a framework that can accommodate a spectrum of perspectives 
across the contributing disciplines.  Jerome Bruner (1993) differentiates between 
explanatory and interpretive theoretical paradigms because he believes that while 
interpretation may fall outside the realm of systematic accountability, he also knows that 
―what is not subject to the constraints of conventional computability is not ‗outside‘ the 
grasp of the human sciences‖ (126).  In that spirit, questions of literary, disability and 
policy theory will be considered from different perspectives, ranging from those that 
attempt to establish a systematic approach to theory, to those that lay more emphasis on 
how interpretation of different types of discourse informs analysis and determines what 
constitutes knowledge. 
 Ever since Aristotle described the elements of tragedy in the Poetics, philosophers 
have attempted to organize literary discourse into distinct categories or genres.  Similarly, 
literary critics are also identified as belonging to different theoretical traditions, and 
consensus between critical perspectives fails to occur, perhaps because a    
          theory of literature is logically impossible, for there are no necessary and 
          sufficient conditions for counting a piece of discourse as a work of literature.   
          The concept is ‗perennially debatable‘:  every proposed condition ‗is always  
          open to fundamental question, challenge, rejection, and replacement‘… No set  
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          of properties is shared by all pieces of discourse counted as works of  
          literature; there is only a set of ‗family-resemblance‘ properties, some present  
          in every work of literature, but none in all.  Further, the concept is  
          ‗perennially flexible‘:  new conditions are always possible to accommodate  
          works possessing not only some of these family-resemblance properties but  
          other properties as well… At best a theory of literature can only be a  
          recommendation to give the greatest weight to certain conditions or  
          properties. (Brown & Steinmann 42)   
Paul Hernadi agrees that many critics doubt the feasibility of defining literature at all 
(1981, 100), and these positions do not even take into account the evolution of electronic 
mediums that can make anyone with access to the internet an author with access to a 
potential audience of millions.  This contemporary reality only further reinforces 
Davenport‘s position that the concept of literature is now just too broad, and incorporates 
too many genres and experiences to accommodate any coherent theory:   
          Theory cannot be comprehensive, since the morrow may always bring a new  
          work of literature which does not fit the theory.  Second, the attempt at  
          comprehensive theory, given that it is impossible, is not only fruitless but  
          destructive of literature itself, since theories will tend to serve as public  
          prohibitions against certain kinds of experiments. (41) 
Attempting to articulate a theory of literature, even one that focuses exclusively on all the 
different ways narrative literature is constructed must produce a model so broad that it 
cannot really communicate anything meaningful.  As a result, ―[w]e know what literature 
is only vaguely, so that any attempt to remove that vagueness in a definition actually 
falsifies our knowledge of the word, rather than clarifies it.  To define is to mark off 
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boundaries distinguishing what is literature from what is not, but our knowledge of 
literature has no such defining boundaries‖ (Hirsch 26).  Still, even after taking into 
account the enormous breadth and depth of the literary canon, the researcher must take a 
stand, somewhere, before any meaningful analysis can proceed.   
 
Mimetic and Structural Literary Theory  
 As this research proposes to undertake an analysis of how mental disability is 
constructed in narrative and policy discourses, it makes sense to explore literary theory 
that focuses on narrative as both a representation of human experience and as a language 
construct.  This starting point correlates well with Paul Hernadi‘s premise that literary 
criticism is primarily preoccupied with structural and mimetic aspects of  the text:   
          Some critics see literary works merely as instruments of mimesis: words 
          representing worlds.  Others see them mainly as instruments of  
          communication: messages from authors to readers.  Because all instances of  
          spoken and written discourse potentially represent and communicate at the  
          same time, it seems unwise, if not self-deceiving, to restrict one‘s concern to  
          what the work is or how the work functions. (1981,107)   
While many people think of reading as a private and personal experience (Ohmann 91), 
an examination of both the mimetic (interpretive) and communicative (structural) 
functions of literature elucidates the social function of literary narrative in terms of its 
capacity to influence the construction of cultural concepts and categories, including 
disability.   
 In the Poetics, Aristotle takes considerable pains to articulate the mimetic quality 
of the different poetic arts.  Aristotle sees the process of imitation as one that is natural to 
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mankind, as ―all men find pleasure in imitations‖ (44).  For him, ―the capacity to produce 
an imitation is the essential characteristic of the poet‖ (43).  Thus, it would seem that a 
great capacity for imitation must go hand in hand with extraordinary insight into the 
world being portrayed in a narrative work.   
 As David Lodge observes,  ―[i]t is a commonplace that the systematic study of 
narrative was founded by Aristotle, and scarcely an exaggeration to say that little of 
significance was added to those foundations until the twentieth century‖ (24).  Therefore, 
it is hardly surprising that many theorists continue to identify Aristotle‘s concept of 
mimesis as a defining feature of a literary text:  
          ―Mimesis‖ as used, for example, by Aristotle… still carries some of the force of  
          its origin in dance or mime.  Mimesis is an inward act of reproduction  
          whereby the thing imitated is internalized by the imitator and so learned.  In  
          mimesis the thing imitated is then turned into an action and thereby  
          externalized, brought out into the open for the imitator or for those who watch  
          the imitation.  In mimesis the imitated becomes exposed to knowledge. (Miller  
          158)   
Aristotle‘s rationale further prescribed how different genres are most appropriate for 
reproducing different kinds of human behaviour.  He assigned the dramatic genres of 
comedy and tragedy so that ―the former takes as its goal the representation of men as 
worse, the latter as better, than the norm‖(Aristotle 43).  There is little room for ambiguity 
in designating the type of story and its appropriate genre.   
 Contemporary allusions to mimesis may emphasize how words represent worlds 
by portraying a fictional experience in a realistic and convincing manner.  For example, 
Altieri‘s definition of mimesis takes both language and the narrative world that 
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contextualizes it into account:  ―[l]iterature can be called mimetic—not because it copies 
experience but because it directs us to recreate imaginatively a world in which the speech 
acts presented would be significant‖ (68).  Raymond Mar and Keith Oatley begin their 
analysis of the function of fiction from a mimetic theoretical orientation, arguing that 
―stories model and abstract the human social world.  Like other simulations (e.g., 
computer models), fictional stories are informative in that they allow for prediction and 
explanation while revealing the underlying processes of what is being modeled (in this 
case, social relations)‖ (173).  They attempt to construct a rationale for linking the 
imaginative content of stories with a predictable system of analysis for articulating the 
function of  fictional narrative in people‘s lives.  Their position is that human beings 
possess a kind of ―schema‖ (177) for stories that is hardwired into us.   
 Likewise, Jerome Bruner (1993) finds that ―we have access to some sort of mental 
narrative generator very early on, one primed to incorporate the forms of story on offer in 
the culture, but which nonetheless may be characterized by some universal architecture‖ 
(134).  This architecture is vital, but it is not the entire explanation for our comprehension 
and appreciation of narrative:     
          Struggles with order-preserving transformations, with deletion rules and  
          caselike grammars, may help us toward a formal grammar and something  
          approximating computability.  But… I doubt this will take us all the way.  For  
          I doubt whether the hermeneutic process, given the complexities already  
          mentioned, is reducible to computable steps.  More likely, it is upon the  
          development of an interpretive anthropology and counterpart cultural  
          psychology that we shall have to depend for elucidation. (Bruner 1993, 135)   
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Mar and Oatley‘s ‗architecture‘ make it possible to take complex social relations and, 
through a process of selecting what details to incorporate, contain them in a story that 
―can be seen to generalize from one instance to many similar instances‖ (177).  Decisions 
around what information to incorporate and how to present it, however, are a matter of 
authorial selection in order to tell a certain type of story, as Aristotle indicated in his 
explanation of different poetic genres.  An authorial representation of an idea or 
experience is, in turn, subject to subsequent interpretations by readers that are based on 
their own experiential resources.  From this perspective, all stories can be understood as a 
triangle of binds between author and reader, reader and protagonist, protagonist and 
author (Manguel, 67).   
 Mar and Oatley‘s argument leads them to propose that ―[t]he debate on what 
constitutes a useful categorical definition of a narrative may be a conceptual dead end.  
Perhaps it is not how a text is structured that really defines narrative, but its content and 
our responses to this content.  A prototypical-content approach, rather than a categorical-
structure approach could thus provide greater utility‖ (174).  In other words, the structure 
of a literary work is useful for categorizing it, but it soon becomes apparent that literature 
cannot be fully comprehended by explaining its components:  the literary work is more 
than the sum of its parts.   
 This view invites a critical impatience with Aristotle on the part of some 
contemporary theorists, including Edward Davenport, who finds that  Aristotle‘s theory 
of the poetic arts is, ultimately, irrelevant to determining contemporary definitions of 
literature: 
          Aristotle… was ignorant of the literature of the past two millennia.  It is even  
          said that Aristotle was not trying to give an answer to the question ‗What is  
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          literature?‘, but was only giving a description of the particular drama of his  
          own time; according to this argument Aristotle had nothing to say about what  
          makes literature great or second rate, but only explained how to tell when a  
          play diverged from the norms of his time. (40)  
Aristotle‘s pervasive influence on literary theory endures, however, because his dramatic 
method has been abstracted to the much wider range of genres familiar to contemporary 
readers, and it has informed what Lodge identifies as an evolving ―poetics of fiction‖(24).  
Thus, Mar and Oatley have no qualms about linking Aristotle‘s theory of tragedy to the 
more general category of story.   
 As different kinds of action are the focus of different classical literary genres, so  
language is utilized in deliberate ways to facilitate the representation of different types of 
action.  These distinctions of language assigned to identified literary genres have invited a 
systematic analysis of language and its components.  Roland Barthes (1989) believes that 
a ―genuine‖ theory of language that we understand as rhetoric came to literature  
          from antiquity, [and] reigned in the Western world from Gorgias to the  
          Renassiance—for nearly two thousand years.  Threatened as early as the  
          sixteenth century by the advent of modern rationalism, rhetoric was  
          completely ruined when rationalism was transformed into positivism at the  
          end of the nineteenth century.  At that point there was no longer any common  
          ground of thought between literature and language. (42) 
Barthes draws upon the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, among others, to articulate a 
renaissance in language in what he sees as a ―new union of literature and linguistics‖ (43) 
that he refers to as semio-criticism.  This approach is grounded in an understanding of 
writing as a system of signs: a perspective that ―does not imply a lack of interest in 
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language but, on the contrary, a continual return to the ‗truths‘—provisional though they 
may be—of linguistic anthropology‖ (43).  The ‗truths‘ that Barthes depends upon in 
language were articulated by Saussure in a theory of semiotics to explain how words 
communicate meaning in language.   
 Saussure understands language as comprised of signs: ―unions of meanings and 
sound-images‖ (1985, 34) that are inextricably linked, like two sides of a coin.  There is a 
relationship between a concept (signified) and a word-image (signifier) that combine to 
construct a sign that is both arbitrary, yet incontrovertible:  ―the signifier chosen by 
language could be replaced by no other‖ (1985, 40).   According to Bruner, this aspect of 
language liberates narrators from ―the more binding restrictions of pure mimesis‖ (2002, 
96), as signs do not have to resemble their referents.   
 Furthermore, Saussure‘s distinction between langue and parole in language 
concretizes a system of understanding that inheritors of language need to be able to 
internalize in order to communicate narrative, even if it is not done consciously.  ―Langue 
is the system of language, the system of forms (the rules, codes, conventions) and parole 
refers to the actual speech acts made possible by the langue.  Utterances (paroles) are 
many and varied and no linguist could hope to grasp them all.  What linguists could do 
was to study what made them all possible‖ (Rice & Waugh 7).  Knowing how a system of 
language operates may enrich a critical understanding of the choices made by authors in 
the construction of different types of narratives.    
 As a leading thinker in a structural approach to language, Saussure‘s theory of 
language may be considered as a major contribution to a system of narratology.  Oliver 
Sacks adapts this concept in an interesting way, identifying it as a necessary approach to 
understanding his patients who had severe mental disabilities.  He says that in trying to 
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test the functioning ability of patients ―we were far too concerned with ‗defectology‘, and 
far too little concerned with ‗narratology‘, the neglected and needed science of the 
concrete‖ (1998, 183).  Indeed, narratology does concern itself with the concrete 
structures of language, upon which all interpretation must ultimately hang.  David Lodge 
further elucidates the aims of narratology by pointing out that  
          [i]t is often said that this kind of approach is more rewarding when applied to 
          narratives of a traditional, formulaic and orally transmitted type rather than  
          sophisticated literary narratives; and the exponents of narratology themselves  
          frequently remind us that their aim is not the explication of texts but the  
          uncovering of the system that allows narrative texts to be generated and  
          competent readers to make sense of them. (26)   
This entails drawing the literary critic‘s attention to factors that are vital to reading 
narrative.  Because many readers just internalize the narrative conventions appropriate to 
their own culture, ―we stumble when we try to explain, to ourselves or to some dubious 
other, what makes something a story rather than, say, an argument or a recipe‖ (Bruner 
2002, 3-4).  Just as native speakers of a given language generally understand its rules of 
grammar without necessarily being able to explain them, so too do we tend to understand 
narrative conventions without necessarily being able to articulate them.   
 Peckham agrees with Saussure when he argues that ―[a]ny individual is a 
precipitate of the indescribably complex control system which is language; with infinitely 
rare exceptions, his presence or absence, his existence or nonexistence, makes no 
difference‖ (226).  However, Peckham then proceeds to point to a possible explanation 
for the lack of consistency within language when it comes to defining abstract concepts.  
He suggests that although behaviour is controlled by one‘s language system, ―the brain‘s 
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capacity for random response, deviance (innovation, creativity, the imagination) is 
constantly being introduced in, on the whole, minute and statistically insignificant 
amounts‖ (226).  Small differences of interpretation between individuals are magnified 
within academia where communities of thinkers who share knowledge of specific 
disciplines use language in distinct ways that may not be consistent across different 
disciplinary cultures.  This creates challenges for interdisciplinary researchers trying to 
generate a vocabulary to effectively communicate knowledge across contributing 
disciplines.   
 As a result, some interdisciplinarians may be tempted to accept Robert Scholes‘ 
position, which argues that Saussure‘s assertion of an ―unbridgeable gap between words 
and things, signs and referents‖ (238) has been dismissed by French structuralists and 
their followers for being ―too materialistic and simple-minded.  Signs do not refer to 
things; they signify concepts, and concepts are aspects of thought, not of reality‖ (238).  
In Scholes‘ view, ―if language were really a closed system, it would be subject, like any 
other closed system, to entropy.  In fact, it is new input into language from non-verbal 
experience that keeps it from decaying‖ (238).  Saussure distinguishes between concepts 
and the signs used to identify them, but he fails to acknowledge how language is actually 
a porous system, and the product of an extra-linguistic reality, which is not static.  
Language does change over time, along with changes in cultural values.  In an age of 
electronic communication media that connects diverse cultures in ‗real time‘, the stability 
of any language system is, arguably, even less predictable than it has ever been.  
Therefore, a semiotics of literature cannot completely account for how narrative is 
communicated and understood.   
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 Saussure (1989) does acknowledge that while meanings of concepts are consistent 
across a language, their value is determined in terms of their relationship to other 
concepts:  ―If I state simply that a word signifies something when I have in mind the 
associating of a sound-image with a concept, I am making a statement that may suggest 
what actually happens, but by no means am I expressing the linguistic fact in its essence 
and fullness‖ (13).  Michael Holquist‘s theory of language may assist in further clarifying 
this distinction between meaning and value where he refers to  Karcevskij‘s semiotic 
model:  
          ―In a ‗complete‘ sign… there are two opposed centers of semiotic functions,  
          one for formal values, the other for semantic values.  The formal values of a  
          word (gender, number, case, aspect, tense), represent aspects of signification  
          known to every speaking subject which are more or less safe from any  
          subjective interpretation on the part of interlocutors; they are assumed to  
          remain identical to themselves in all situations.  The semantic part of a word,  
          in contrast, is a residue resistant to any attempt to decompose it into elements  
          as ‗objective‘ as formal values‘‖. (205)   
From this perspective, signs have both enduring, objective qualities, but also possess a 
―residue‖ that defies categorization.  This residue may further account for the dynamic 
aspect of language over time, as well as the lack of consensus around the meaning of 
abstract concepts, such as disability.   
 Sacks also refers to the residue of lived experience that is lost when physicians 
and other researchers attempt to write about disease or disability in an  ―‗objective‘, 
styleless style‖ (1990, 230).  In reviewing such texts, he laments that ―nowhere, nowhere, 
does one find any colour, reality, or warmth; nowhere any residue of the living 
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experience‖ (230 emphasis in original).  This observation draws attention to how 
language may just as effectively be employed as a means of control and oppression as it 
can to facilitate enlightenment, which is why Peckham believes that  ―[i]t is a 
sentimentality to conceive of language as ‗communication‘.  Rather language organizes, 
directs, controls, and modifies behavior‖ (225).  This insight does not contradict a 
structural theory of language, but it does demonstrate that communication and shared 
knowledge is not the inevitable outcome when language is employed in sophisticated 
ways.      
 Other theorists elaborate further upon the autonomy or authority of the narrator to 
undermine the conventions of language, at least to some extent, in order to communicate 
his or her story in an original way.  The unpredictability of human experience, along with  
the innovative ways that language may be utilized to interpret and communicate that 
experience as narrative or story, leads Bruner to believe that ―[e]fforts to write generative 
narrative grammars have not been notably successful, for stories are too dependent upon 
the context of the telling, too susceptible to what seems like unprincipled recursion, too 
lacking in either a standard lexicon or in definable story parts‖ (1993, 135).  There is 
enough flexibility or discretion within our language system that words may often be 
interpreted in multiple ways, in different contexts without making them unintelligible to 
others who share the same language.  As a result, Whalley emphasizes the intention of the 
author as a determining factor of meaning in how language is used to construct a 
narrative:  
          Here we come upon the peculiar nature of language—the fact that we discover  
          our meaning in the wording of it; for it is persons, not words, that mean.  In  
          matters of spelling, in identifying parts of speech, and even in classifying  
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          figures of speech, we may be able to speak of ―right‖ and ―wrong‖ (i.e. correct  
          and incorrect), but as soon as we are dealing with syntax and style we are  
          dealing with the judgement of what ―works‖, what is ―exactly right‖, in an  
          actual context… ―rules‖ are indications, navigational instruments, not  
          immutable imperatives.  Here the only test is whether in fact a certain wording  
          ―works‖, whether it is the best words in the best order—and perhaps nobody  
          can say that for sure except the writer. (141)       
For Whalley, judgments about how to organize language are inevitably subjective and not 
predictable in accordance with a systematic theory of language.  However, a perspective 
that emancipates the narrator from the confines of a language system can be taken only so 
far, as there are obviously limits to how much an author or narrator can flout the rules of 
language and still be comprehensible. 
      Lodge identifies the emergence of the realistic novel as the historical point where 
structural theory ceases to adequately account for narrative, claiming that    
          [t]he rise of the novel as a distinctive and eventually dominant literary form  
          finally exposed the poverty of neoclassical narrative theory, without for a long  
          time generating anything much more satisfactory.  The realistic novel set  
          peculiar problems for any formalist criticism because it worked by disguising  
          or denying its own conventionality.  It therefore invited—and received— 
          criticism that was interpretive and evaluative rather than analytical. (24)      
While Lodge recognizes the contribution that narratology can make to the enriched 
comprehension of narrative texts, he also admits that ―the structural coherence of 
narratives is inseparable from their meaning, and reading them is inseparable from 
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forming hypotheses about their overall meaning‖(27).  Thus, the mechanics of language 
and narrative structures are perceived to be inevitably enmeshed in interpretation.   
 The novel also introduced a democratization of literature, making it accessible to 
an increasingly literate population, representing a wider range of experience.  Lennard 
Davis emphasizes how ―the novel was historically an early modern form dependent upon 
early modern technologies… participating, both collusively and transgressively, in the 
transformation of social, political, and cultural life‖ (1998, 318).  If this is true, then  
literature not only creates worlds, but also has the capacity to change the way we see our 
real world existence.  Therefore, Richard Ohmann believes that  
          [t]he definition of Literature, capital L, is a social process.  In it, as in all social  
          processes, some groups participate more actively than others; some do not 
          participate at all.  The exercise of power is involved in the process; therefore,  
          so is conflict.  We don‘t generally notice the power and the conflict except  
          when some previously weak or silent group seeks a share of the power… The  
          social definition of literature is always, among other things, a contest for 
          cultural dominance. (90) 
Returning specifically to the concept of disability, traditionally literature has tended to 
reinforce attitudes of condescension, dominance over, ambivalence and fear about 
physiological or mental difference (Couser 2002, 109-110; Davis 1998, 330; McDonagh 
2000, 50; Mitchell & Snyder 205-209).  On the other hand, literature has the capacity to 
do much more than pander to the status quo.  We know that powerful narratives challenge 
cultural complacency and can be downright ‗subversive‘ of popular beliefs (Bruner 1993, 
136; 2002, 11; Peckham 228), and they also contribute to a record of the past that can 
help predict the future (Mar & Oatley 177).   
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Fiction and Nonfiction 
 Some literary theorists devote considerable effort to articulating a boundary  
between fiction and nonfiction narratives.  Best-seller lists make this distinction seem 
deceptively simple; however, if authors are moved to write stories that are inspired by 
personal experience, at what point does fiction become autobiographical?  For that matter, 
to what extent are nonfiction texts influenced by the author‘s selection of what ‗facts‘ to 
emphasize and overlook in order to make the narrative interesting or meaningful?  When 
does history or biography become a story that may be largely fictitious from another‘s 
perspective?  Bruner says that ―[w]e know in our bones that stories are made, not found in 
the world.  But we can‘t resist doubting it.  Does art copy life, life art, or is it a two-way 
street?  Even with fiction we wonder what a story is based on, as if it could not really be 
just made up‖ (2002, 22; emphasis in original).  Is a true story necessarily one that can be 
documented as having actually occurred?    
 Fictional literature is defined by Mar and Oatley as a genre that allows the reader 
to approach ―distant worlds that would otherwise remain unknown.  Fictional stories not 
only allow us access to environments and situations that are difficult to experience 
firsthand, such as faraway countries and cultures, but it [sic.] also takes us to places that 
are impossible to reach, such as past societies‖ (181).  If George Whalley is correct in his 
assertion that literature, by its very nature, ―is the opposite of an escape: imagination is a 
realising-process, making the world real, making us real‖(199), the escape that it does 
provide is from the limitations of our own experience.  Reading fiction allows the reader 
access to worlds and experiences that would otherwise remain foreign.   
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 Mar and Oatley‘s theory of fiction argues that ―literary fiction is largely about 
people and the problems that arise when their desires, emotions, and goals come into 
conflict.  We are attracted to literature because we are social creatures who are interested 
in one another‖ (182).  While it may be true that works of fiction have the capacity to 
―leave us feeling that we know what we may never have seen‖ (Iyer 127), this 
explanation for the attraction of fiction does not necessarily distinguish it from nonfiction 
narratives, which often address the same concerns.  Throughout their analysis, Mar and 
Oatley describe fiction as serving a unique social function, which could actually be 
ascribed to narrative more generally.  For example, fiction is described as  
          a laboratory that allows us to experiment in a controlled and safe manner with 
          intentions, emotions, and emotion-evoking situations that would be impossible  
          and often highly undesirable in the real world.  In narrative fiction, we can  
          explore what it would be like to be a participant in a war for example, without 
          the risk of injury or posttraumatic stress disorder. (183)   
Unfortunately the authors do not make clear how a fictional account of being in a war 
offers a vicarious experience of combat that other types of narrative would not.   
 This position might make sense if the authors took a philosophical stance that all 
representations are ultimately fictions, which is the view held by Morse Peckham.  He 
asserts that ―[t]he definition of whether a discourse is fictive or non-fictive is… a matter 
of someone‘s judgment.  And indeed the history of science itself is filled with statements 
originally judged to be non-fictive but now judged to be fictive‖ (224).  However, this is 
not Mar and Oatley‘s view, as they do take pains to distinguish fictional narrative from 
other kinds of discourse.  In this case, they argue that ―reading purely expository 
nonnarrative accounts of a war in charts and tables of death tolls does not have the same 
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effect‖ (183).   What they seem to be implying is that only fiction can be communicated 
through narrative.   
 This is a very narrow interpretation of narrative that is not widely shared by 
theorists across a range of academic disciplines, including Bruner, who explains that a 
―narrative models not only a world but the minds seeking to give it its meanings.  And 
this restless dualism is not confined to drama and fiction: it also plagues the lawyer telling 
his law stories and the autobiographer trying to construct a self‖ (2002, 27).  
Comprehensive historical accounts, documentary journalism, editorials, and internet 
blogs are all categories of nonfiction narrative that can have an emotional impact on 
readers, an impact that may even be more compelling because these narratives are 
assumed to be true.   
 For some, autobiography represents a particularly contentious genre for locating 
true stories.  Couser (2002) quotes James Olney, who says that ―‗autobiography-- the 
story of a distinctive culture written in individual characters and from within—offers a 
privileged access to an experience… that no other variety of writing can offer‘‖ (109).  
Bruner agrees, but also cautions that  ―no autobiographer is ever free from questions 
about which self his autobiography is about, composed from what perspective, for whom.  
The one we write is only one version, one way of achieving coherence‖ (2002, 74; 
emphasis in original).  Similarly, when a narrator sets out to tell any ‗true‘ story, that truth 
is represented through the lens of one perspective that is determined by only those details 
remembered and selected for telling and, according to Andrew Scull, ―all memory is built 
upon a foundation of forgetfulness (a forgetfulness, one must add, that is anything but 
random)‖ (6).  Cognitive anthropologists believe that the selectivity of memory is more 
than a matter of conscious manipulation undertaken to tell one‘s story in a way perceived 
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by the narrator as most fitting for the occasion.  William J. Dewan cites Robert Schrauf, 
who argues that 
          recollections of past memories are not mental copies of stored originals.   
          Rather, they are schematized, mental reconstructions of past events that are  
          reassembled in particular circumstances for particular purposes… The  
          cognitive analysis of autobiographical memories reveals several key elements:  
          ‗Recollection of the personal past is (1) essentially a reconstruction of the past,  
          (2) prompted by a person‘s affective states and ongoing beliefs and goals, and  
          (3) constituted by the sociocultural world of the rememberer‘. (188)   
Thus, the stories of our lives that we tell may be true, but that does not mean they are 
complete or incontrovertible. 
 In some cases, autobiography is a particularly important genre for countering the 
self that is socially constructed from the outside (Bruner 2002, 100).  In fact, a number of 
terms are used in reference to stories told about the self.  Along with autobiography, 
narrators refer to life history (Di Terlizzi 501), life writing (Couser 2006, 399), and life 
narrative, which for Sacks (1998) is ―an inner narrative—whose continuity, whose sense, 
is our lives.  It might be said that each of us constructs and lives, a ‗narrative‘, and that 
this narrative is us, our identities‖ (110; emphasis in original).  Irene Rose, also chooses 
to refer to the life narrative that she understands as a genre that may 
          include traditional autobiography, but work[s] to unseat the master narrative  
          of the ‗sovereign self‘ that traditional autobiography elevates.  The concept  
          thereby recognizes a wide variety of autobiographical  textual forms and  
          prompts investigation into the component parts of autobiographical acts and  
          the cultural sites and structures that motivate their telling. (44)   
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Couser, Di Terlizzi and Rose all believe that these genres offer the potential for a less 
restrictive, sometimes less structured narrative medium that creates a space for people 
with some kinds of disabilities to have voice outside the typically narrow and, arguably, 
exclusionary criteria typically employed in determining what counts as literature 
(Manguel 124-125; Wellek 16-17).   
 Disability studies rely heavily on the autobiographical account to interrogate 
assumptions about disability, which have been heavily influenced by fictional 
representations that both shape and reflect how society views individuals with disabilities 
(Iyer 127), along with a medical perspective that tends to perceive the life of a person 
with disabilities exclusively in relation to the impairment.  Thus, Couser (2008) observes 
that ―[a]utobiography is a particularly important form of life writing about illness and 
disability because by definition it involves self-representation‖ (352).  This kind of 
counter-narrative has a strong tradition in feminist scholarship and other minority 
discourses that challenge the qualifications of experts who do not share the identity of the 
subject populations that they write about.   
      The integration of minority discourses into mainstream publishing has also 
contributed to growing awareness within the medical community that it does not serve the 
ends of science or humanity to attempt to separate disease or disability from the lives that 
contain it. Oliver Sacks is a neurologist who gained renown for publishing biographical 
narratives about his patients in order to demonstrate the complexity of their clinical 
diagnoses and contextualizing disability as an aspect of life.  He claims, categorically, 
that ―the on-going nature of neurotic illness and its treatment cannot be displayed except 
by biography‖ (1990, 229; emphasis in original).  As Sacks identifies the essential 
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function of biographical narrative to make the practice of medicine effective, Bruner 
makes a similar case in relation to fictional narrative and law:    
          Writs were hardly ever isolated from the way people in general viewed the  
          nature of an orderly (or disorderly) world.  The conditions they dealt with also  
          found expression in literature, not just in the novels of Dickens or Trollope or  
          in Blake‘s Songs of Experience but in newspaper stories and tavern tales.  
          Eventually these voices also found their way into the corpus juris, much as the  
          narrative voices of  the Harlem Renaissance or the ‗reality‘ of Harriet Beecher  
          Stowe‘s Uncle Tom’s Cabin crept into the body of American law. (2002, 59-60)       
Bruner demonstrates how cultural narratives contribute to legitimizing a legal system, as 
Sacks argues that personal narratives should direct how doctors treat a person with a 
disabling condition.  A necessary tension can be seen to exist between stories and other 
discourses: scientific, legal, and political.  The authority of law and medicine is 
disseminated, and challenged or sanctioned through both nonfiction and fictional 
narratives.   
 Mar and Oatley offer an explanation for the function of narrative in fields of law 
and science where advocacy is undertaken on behalf of a treatment, or a decision outside 
the realm of common practice.  They believe that ―fictional stories may be especially 
persuasive for those who hold strong countervailing attitudes, because the ideas 
embedded in a story are implied rather than explicitly stated, and the simulation 
demanded by stories leaves few resources for counterarguing‖ (84).  No evidence is cited 
to support this claim, thereby leaving unarticulated an equally plausible counter-claim 
that many other people will read a story about values or ideals that oppose their own and 
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simply dismiss it as a bad story.  If fiction can persuade, surely it also has the capacity to 
afford the reader an ‗out‘ by being able to say in the end that it was not a ‗true‘ story.   
 It is interesting that Mar and Oatley decline to elaborate on the function of life 
narratives on the grounds that this would not be ―appropriate‖ in a paper devoted to 
―literary narrative‖ (184).  This raises the question about how life narratives can be so 
summarily excluded from what is literary.  The answer may be found in their definition of 
life narrative, which contrasts sharply with Couser‘s and demonstrates the interpretive 
judgment (or bias) inherent in distinguishing what does and does not qualify as literature:  
          Life narratives and literary narratives are similar with regard to only the most  
          superficial aspects, whereas the qualities of literature that make it most  
          interesting (e.g., its careful construction and fictive imagining) do not apply to  
          the stories we tell about our own lives.  The simulative experience evoked by  
          literature and the careful writing and rewriting that takes place during  
          composition, including the construction of imagery-related tropes, are among  
          the important and unique aspects of fiction literature… (Mar & Oatley 185).   
This position is, arguably, rather hasty in its conclusion that life narratives and literary 
narratives are only ―superficially‖ similar.  Furthermore, the conclusion of this passage 
perpetuates Mar and Oatley‘s tendency to categorize all literary narrative as fiction.  What 
actually makes a story ring true may not necessarily determine its status as fiction or non-
fiction.   
 Sacks offers an intriguing example that suggests that sometimes a fiction can be 
more ‗true‘ than the event that inspired it.  Harold Pinter wrote a play, A Kind of Alaska, 
based upon his reading of  Awakenings eight years before.  Sacks says that ―Pinter had 
never seen my patients, nor even their images in the documentary of Awakenings; and 
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yet--  I was in total agreement with Margie—what he had written, uncannily, was just like 
the truth.  …I felt Pinter had somehow perceived more than I had written, had penetrated, 
divined, inexplicably into the heart of the matter, the inmost truth‖ (1990, 370).  Many 
different representations of Sacks‘ biographical case studies have been undertaken.  His 
patients make fascinating subjects, yet the most meticulously researched efforts are not 
necessarily, in Sacks‘ view, the most real or true.  Returning to Pinter‘s play, Sacks 
concludes that ―[r]eality is conferred, re-conferred, by every original representation.  I felt 
Pinter had given me as much as I gave him: I had given him a reality—and he had given 
me one back‖ (371).  If nothing else, this illustration suggests that ―truth‖ is not the 
exclusive terrain of either fictional or nonfiction narrative.   
 Just as fictional discourses may succeed in being true to life, critical readers 
should also be cautious about accepting nonfiction discourses at face value.  The most 
simple distinction between fiction and nonfiction is determined by the author‘s intention.  
Iyer claims that ―the primary purpose of fiction is narration not instruction.  The narrative 
is influenced not only by writers‘ factual information but also by the story they want to 
tell‖ (127).  This again implies a misleading assumption about fiction and nonfiction.  A 
culture‘s myths and fairytales were intended to instruct as well as entertain, and many 
nonfiction accounts tell beautiful stories.   
 Furthermore, narrators are not neutral observers of the phenomena they describe, 
or re-construct.  The criteria for truth are inevitably shaped by the experience and 
expectations of the author (Harding 383-388; Howe 520-521; Irving 33-34; Murphy 157; 
Scholes 248; Yanow 2000, 60).  In turn, the reader‘s experience will determine the extent 
to which she or he accepts the representation as true:   ―[to] the extent that a work of 
literature points toward our experience as living human beings, we may value it for what 
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we call its ‗truth‘ or ‗rightness‘‖ (Scholes 248).  This is the nature of the relationship 
between the narrator and his or her audience. 
 Bruner (2002) argues that ―[t]he human mind, however cultivated its memory or 
refined its recording systems, can never fully and faithfully recapture the past, but neither 
can it escape from it.  Memory and imagination supply and consume each other‘s wares‖ 
(93).  This is why any ‗true story‘ can be contested; but what is more significant is how 
the interplay of the fictional narrative and the recall it stimulates in the reader may 
culminate in a reading that creates the potential for individual growth and change.   
Mar and Oatley argue that ―individuals who have been exposed to more fictional 
literature tend to exhibit better empathic abilities‖ (182).  This view is re-affirmed by Ted 
Cohen, who believes that ―[t]here is a connection… between the ability to fully appreciate 
narrative fiction and the ability to participate in the morality of life, precisely because the 
ability to imagine oneself to be someone else is a prerequisite for both‖ (73).  This is 
facilitated, in part, through the way people process their own life stories in order to give 
their lives unity and purpose.  Of course, the ability to imagine oneself as another is not 
the exclusive purview of fiction.  At the same time, not all people who read fiction are 
particularly moral, and many people who will never read a novel still possess an innate 
sensitivity to the needs of others.  However, reading widely may enhance whatever 
existing capacity for empathy resides within the individual.  Cohen also says that 
―[s]tories move us, excite us, instruct us, and, in the first instance, in the dynamics of this 
effect, it does not seem to matter whether the story is thought to be true‖ (27).  The 
plausibility of a narrative:  the extent that the reader believes that it could be true, may be 
more important in story-telling than whatever experiences or flights of imagination 
inform the narrative.      
36 
 
 
 
Narrative and Story 
 Narrative and story are both terms that are comprehensive enough to bridge fiction 
and nonfiction categories of discourse.  For example, Bruner observes that ―the medium 
of narrative [is] a form that keeps perpetually in play the uneasy alliance between the 
historically established and the imaginatively possible‖ (2002, 62).  In another paper he 
explicitly defines story in similar terms:  ―[s]tory, whether purportedly real or fictive, 
requires temporary suspension of disbelief, but because at the end it will not be fully 
verifiable, it must justify this suspension by exhibiting verisimilitude‖ (1993,134). 
Given that story is also used to refer to fiction and nonfiction discourses across a range of 
cultural and professional domains (Applegate 142; Couser 2007, 166; Goldstein 30; Lyle 
& Gehart para. 23; Malacrida 400; Neysmith, Bezanon & O‘Connell 19; Pechter 51; 
Riessman & Quinney 393; Roe 9; Sacks 1990, viii; Yanow 57-58), it is notable that it is 
much less commonly identified as a concept in literary criticism.   
 While most literary critics address their analysis to narrative instead of story, 
Kenneth Burke is a rhetorician who does theorize about story, albeit not as a concept 
distinct from narrative.  He designates story as a ―realm of symbolic action, a realm that 
duplicates the realm of non-symbolic motion, but is not reducible to it (though not 
possible without it)‖ (43).  Burke begins with the observation that language evolved as a 
system for imitating memory; that we experience the world through our senses and 
memory stores these sensations.  Thus, ―the taste of an orange is a sensation. The words 
‗the taste of an orange‘ tell a story‖ (43; emphasis in original).  Others who understand 
story as a more complex structure, containing a beginning middle and end, might argue 
that Burke is merely suggesting a genesis for story.  His theory of story is essentially 
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about how language makes the concept possible.  Burke proceeds to write about story as a 
tool unique to humanity:  ―[b]y this resource, which adds narration to speechless nature, 
there arise in time stories of the Supernatural, or astrology, astronomy, alchemy, 
chemistry, geology, biology, geography, history, myths and rituals, ideologies and 
routines etc.‖ (43).  From this perspective, it would appear that virtually all narrative and 
expository texts can be accommodated within the category of story.    
 Mar and Oatley introduce a more specific concept that they refer to as ―literary 
stories‖, which they define just about as broadly, as ―simulations of selves in the social 
world‖ (173).  The implication seems to be that there are other kinds of stories that are not 
literary, but their analysis does not clearly articulate what these other types of stories may 
be.  However, the cohesiveness of the narrative is clearly a fundamental criterion:   
          everything included in the story is relevant and… all the elements of a story are 
          coherent … Aristotle…made such an observation in Poetics, noting that each  
          constituent of a narrative should be integral to the whole so that any removal or 
          reordering would disrupt the representation. Coherence is thus a defining feature of  
          narratives. (176)   
Mar and Oatley‘s definition does not distinguish story as a particular kind of narrative, as 
throughout their paper they use the terms story and narrative interchangeably, without 
qualification or explanation. 
 At the same time however, they do identify literature as a distinct category of 
narrative:  ―[w]ith respect to the various instantiations of narrative, literature is unusual.  
It could be considered the most abstract of narrative forms, providing readers with a 
purely symbolic and nonrepresentational portrayal of the social world and its intentional 
agents‖ (186).  It is unclear what literature is if it is ―nonrepresentational,‖ but yet 
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―symbolic.‖  Symbols must represent something (Yanow 14).  In their explanation Mar 
and Oatley, are separating literature from other narrative forms that have visual and 
auditory interpretational cues, such as dramatic interpretations on stage and screen (Mar 
& Oatley 173), yet all of these narrative genres still aspire to communicate a story.   
 Riessman and Quinney express frustration that narrative has ―come to mean 
anything and everything‖ and they remind the reader that  ―[a]ll talk and text are not 
narrative.  Developing a detailed plot, character, and the complexities of a setting are not 
needed in many communicative exchanges‖ (393).  These are similar to the  criteria that 
many other literary theorists use to describe story (Bruner 2002, 16-17; Goldstein 30; 
Kaplan 172; Mar & Oatley 174; Roe 36; Yanow 57-58).  This apparent fluidity in the 
language of literary discourse may not be an outcome of careless writing.  In Bruner‘s 
1993 essay, he takes pains to communicate how he deliberately chooses his terms:   
          I use the word ‗story‘ advisedly.  For that seems to be how human beings use their  
          minds when faced with cultural-personal matters.  We are given every cultural  
          encouragement to do so, to encode in narrative.  For the narrative is our natural as  
          well as our conventional way for dealing with issues involving intentional states,  
          desires, values, negotiations, and so on. (133)   
Here story is a deliberately chosen concept, which Bruner then proceeds to define as 
narrative.  Again, story is offered as a synonym for narrative, rather than a distinct 
category of narrative.    
 However, in a subsequent publication Bruner does qualify this position somewhat 
when he asks:  ―Do we need another book about narrative, about stories, what they are 
and how they are used?‖ (2002, 3).  Here he understands story as a ‗form‘ of narrative, 
albeit a form that seems to be quite flexible:  
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          [w]e know that narrative in all its forms is a dialectic between what is expected and  
          what came to pass.  For there to be a story, something unforeseen must happen.   
          Story is enormously sensitive to whatever challenges our conception of the  
          canonical.  It is an instrument not so much for solving problems as for finding  
          them.  The plight depicted marks a story‘s type as much as the resolution.  We  
          more often tell stories to forewarn than to instruct.  And because of this, stories are  
          a culture‘s coin and currency. (2002, 15)  
In this passage Bruner seems to be suggesting that a narrative may constitute a story on 
the basis of the single criterion of something unexpected occurring:  what Aristotle 
referred to as peripateia (Bruner 2002, 16-17), which is translated in some editions as a 
reversal (Aristotle 50).   
 Dvora Yanow explores a method of interpretive policy analysis that draws upon 
narrative and story.  She does distinguish between the concepts by explaining that 
―‗[n]arrative‘ focuses on structures and sequences: what meanings, made by whom, with 
what congruences and conflicts among them?  ‗Story‘ focuses on plot and on the acts of 
telling and hearing—on intentions and attentions—helping policy analysts explore 
relationships between language and action‖ (61).  It is not an entirely satisfying 
distinction, as it is problematic to understand how ―plot and the acts of telling and 
hearing‖ can be understood separately from ―structures and sequences‖.  Still, Yanow‘s 
definition does stand out as an attempt to distinguish between concepts that many other 
theorists use interchangeably.     
 Emery Roe is another policy theorist who deliberately identifies story as a distinct 
narrative category.  He explicitly states that ―stories are not the only kind of narrative‖(3), 
and proceeds to support his claim in relation to narrative policy analysis by asserting that:  
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―there are also nonstories, counterstories and metanarratives.  The analyst‘s second step is 
to identify those other narratives in the issues that do not conform to the definition of 
story or that run counter to the controversy‘s dominant policy narratives.  The former I 
call nonstories; the latter, counterstories‖ (3; emphasis in original).  Roe does not clearly 
explain how counterstories and metanarratives are different from stories, although he 
defines the metanarrative as that which takes the polarized positions of a policy issue and 
―turns this polarization into another story altogether, one that is more pliable to policy 
intervention, however temporary that intervention may be‖(4).  Essentially, what Roe is 
doing here is creating categories to contain different types of stories rather than 
distinguishing between discourses that may be called stories, and those that are not .   
 Roe invokes Aristotle‘s explanation of narrative cohesion in the Poetics by 
defining a nonstory as a ―circular argument, for example, [which] has no beginning, 
middle, and end of its own‖(3).  However, not all stories are linear in their structure 
(Basting 26).  Therefore, while it is fine to believe in ‗beginnings, middles and ends‘ they 
do not necessarily need to occur in that order (Davenport 44; Pechter 48).   
 Writing from his experience as a policy analyst, Roe explains his narrative method 
through a series of case examples that he refers to as stories.  At the same time, literary 
criticism does not generally seem interested in distinguishing between ‗narrative‘ and 
‗story‘.  However, in considering how other disciplines tend to employ these concepts it 
may be speculated that perhaps ‗story‘ is a term that is most familiar in contexts where 
people are engaged in a direct or personal way with the narrative, rather than in terms of 
abstract theory or critical analysis.  While it is difficult to find decisive evidence to 
support a preference for the term story over narrative to explain the discourses people 
generate about their lives,  in every day language we do more typically say we ‗tell 
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stories‘, rather than ‗tell narratives‘.  Parents tell their children ‗bedtime stories‘, as 
opposed to ‗bedtime narratives‘, which may communicate the intimacy of relationship 
generally experienced between teller and receiver of these narratives.  In a similar vein, 
the word ‗story‘ may also communicate greater personal attachment for a reader to a 
particular narrative.  Bruner‘s answer to his question, ―What, then, is a story?‖ (2002, 16) 
lends some credibility to this hypothesis when he answers his own question by moving 
from discussion of story as an abstract concept, to an analysis of a particular narrative that 
has personal meaning for him.    
 At the same time, we more typically refer to those narratives with which we are 
most intimately acquainted as our ‗life story‘.  Pamela Cushing defines narratives as 
stories (161) and explains how ―everyday narratives in L‘Arche… function for 
sociability—either in relationship building, as humour, or as a way to give or elicit 
support from others.  Another less explicit function of telling stories is to craft one‘s 
identity for others‖ (163).  In a more formal professional context, it is not unusual for 
social workers to refer to client life stories that are shared within counseling relationships:   
          Stories we draw on in our clinical work are texts written by authors whose place in 
          historical time, life experience, and personal proclivities shape both the plot of the  
          story and the way it is originally told.  Moreover, depending on our own interests,  
          life histories, and dynamics both conscious and unconscious, we are attracted to  
          certain stories more than others. (Applegate 142) 
Again, the impression that story may suggest a more intimate and possibly informal 
relationship between reader and text, or narrator and audience is, admittedly, speculative 
because the comparative meaning and value of these concepts does not appear to have 
been deeply interrogated at a theoretical level.   
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 In the end, whether we refer to narrative or story, they have the capacity to 
challenge the reader‘s personal assumptions about the world:  
          it may… be the case that transportation into a narrative can help us learn to 
          empathize with types of individuals with whom we have no personal experience.   
          For this reason, literature may be helpful for reducing bias against outgroup  
          members.  To comprehend such narrative fiction, we must acknowledge the  
          common humanity present between ourselves and dissimilar others.  Without the  
          reader assuming the same (or similar) emotions, desires, and beliefs as the  
          protagonist in the story, the phenomena of transportation, enjoyment, and  
          ultimately understanding will remain elusive. (Mar & Oatley 181)   
At the same time that a story has the capacity to transport the reader into new worlds of 
experience, the simultaneous distance that narrative affords allows the reader the security 
of a position of safety to better open herself up to empathy.  This capacity for empathy is 
important if Bruner is correct in his belief that ―great narrative is an invitation to problem 
finding, not a lesson in problem solving.  It is deeply about plight, about the road rather 
than about the inn to which it leads‖ (2002, 20).  The narrative provides the journey, the 
responses it may provoke depend upon the story‘s ability to move the reader, or listener.  
For when new stories are embraced by large numbers of readers-- or perhaps even a small 
number, provided those readers or listeners have significant power to influence--  the 
cultural values that determine social norms may undergo a shift:  ―Our stories, finally, 
may come to change the cultural world into which they are launched‖ (Bruner 1993, 136).  
In this way, new stories can revise dominant cultural narratives about all kinds of socially 
constructed categories, including disability.     
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CHAPTER 3- Disability Theory 
 
What is Disability?    
 When a reader considers Bruner‘s observation that ―[t]here is now evidence that if 
we lacked the capacity to make stories about ourselves, there would be no such thing as 
selfhood‖ (2002, 86), what does this imply?  Here Bruner is referring to one of Sacks‘ 
narratives about a patient with a syndrome that so severely impaired his memory that 
Sacks describes this patient as ―scooped out, de-souled‖ (qutd. in Bruner 2002, 86).  
Citing other critical theorists, Bruner concludes that ―the construction of self-hood, it 
seems, cannot proceed without a capacity to narrate‖ (2002, 86).  What are the 
implications of not being able to narrate one‘s own life story?  Different theoretical 
models of disability influence responses to this question.   
 
Disability as Deficit and as an Aspect of Human Diversity 
 Disability is sometimes conceptualized across a spectrum of theoretical 
frameworks ranging from models that see disability as a deficit contained within the 
individual that needs to be cured, or at least controlled, to a human rights model that 
constructs disability as simply another aspect of human diversity, such as gender, or 
ethnicity.  Table 1 briefly describes a spectrum delineated by the Roeher Institute (1996), 
which can accommodate most theories of disability because these are not mutually 
exclusive categories, and many representations of disability are influenced by more than 
one paradigm.   
 Table 1 
Theoretical Frameworks of Disability 
← Disability as Deficit/ Disability as Diversity → 
Moral Medical Functional Environmental Social 
Justice/Rights 
Outcome 
 Seeks a religious, 
cultural or 
supernatural 
explanation for 
disability 
 A gift or a curse 
bestowed upon an 
individual or 
family 
 Disabled 
individual may be 
seen as responsible 
for his/her own 
condition 
 Perceptions may 
range from ―God‘s 
chosen ones‖ to 
―demon spawn‖ 
 Emphasis on cure, 
or minimizing 
impairment, and 
prevention 
 Disability needs to 
be treated or 
managed via 
medical expertise 
 Doctors dominate 
care team 
including 
determinations 
around eligibility 
for home care and 
other services 
 Emphasis on 
integrating the 
disabled individual 
into existing social 
networks 
 Promotion of 
‗community 
living‘ and 
‗normalization‘ 
 Personal choice 
may be consulted 
but still primarily 
managed by 
professional 
expertise 
 Social assistance 
geared to 
supporting 
individual in 
existing 
environments 
 
 Recognition that 
environmental 
structures and 
attitudes need to 
be adjusted to 
accommodate 
integration of 
disabled 
individuals    
 Advocates for 
accessible public 
spaces and transit 
services 
 Endorses policies 
that facilitate 
access to public 
spaces and 
programs that 
allow individuals 
to participate in 
the labour market 
 Disability is as 
much a social 
construct as a 
physiological one  
 Disability is 
compounded by 
social stigma and 
ignorance similar 
to other 
marginalized 
populations 
 Disability as 
diversity, rather 
than personal 
deficit 
 All barriers are 
manifestations of 
discrimination 
 Emphasizes legal 
and political action 
 Institutional rather 
than individual 
change 
 
  Moral models of disability predate scientific or systematic analysis of impairments 
that result in cognitive or physical differences from the mainstream population.  Before 
the evolution of emancipatory theories regarding human rights, mythology and religion 
were the primary discourses for transmitting cultural values.  In different places and times 
physical or mental deviance from the norm were associated with cultural taboos 
(Devlieger 1995); people were shunned, or perceived as ―holy innocents‖ (McDonagh 
1997, 270) that were worthy objects of charity.  Today, at least in secular, Western 
societies, most moral and mystical explanations of disability come to us from mythology, 
religious parables and allegories.  Margolis and Shapiro explain that ―[t]he appearance of 
disabled characters in literature has its roots in mythology, the Bible, and fairytales.  
Mythical descriptions of disability are always essentially negative‖ (21).  Although the 
assumptions that contributed to these explanations of disability are no longer dominant, 
vestiges of these beliefs may endure.  Margolis and Shapiro, for instance, believe that 
classical representations of disability ―are durable and remain in our memories long after 
the storyline is forgotten‖ (21).  Further, they cite Bowe (1978) who asserts that ―[o]ur 
memories of these and other characters often become indelible, impervious to any 
experiences we may have with disabled individuals in real life.  Somewhere in the back of 
our minds we associate disabilities with sin, evil, and danger‖ (21).  Certainly these 
ancient ideas about disability contributed to past attempts to cure people of their 
‗madness‘ via purging, sensory deprivation and aversion therapy that informed early 
medical intervention with mental disability (Scull 61).          
 Couser explains that disability has been typically represented as essentially an 
individual problem; and the medical model for defining and responding to disability has 
emphasized this perspective of individual bodily or cognitive deviance (2008, 354).  The 
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medicalization of disability has, in many cases, contributed to the cure, prevention or 
management of many disabling conditions, thereby extending life expectancy and quality 
of life for many people.  Medical models of disability are heavily invested in science and 
the perceived objective expertise of doctors.  As a result, it is not surprising that, until 
relatively recently, very little has been recorded ―about the perspectives and experiences 
of psychiatric patients‖ (Reaume ix) and other people with disabilities.  Despite the 
curative intentions of medical science, many disabilities are chronic in nature and not 
necessarily the result of illness.  Therefore, medical models, on their own, cannot 
satisfactorily account for the experience of disability. 
 Hand in hand with the curative objective of a medical model goes the promotion 
of functionalism: life-skills training and behaviour modification to make the person with 
disabilities resemble the mainstream population as much as possible (Roeher Institute 15).  
A central component of this framework is to implement life-skills programming where 
success ―is measured by how closely people who use services can approximate the lives 
of ‗normal‘ people‖ (Roeher Institute 15).  This was the early objective of 
institutionalization in Ontario where the original intention was to rehabilitate and cure 
mental disability (Simmons 1982, 3).  In reality, people with chronic disabilities often 
spent most of their lives in these facilities, or required supported community care.  Still, 
the goal of functionalism is to promote the fullest degree of independent living that the 
individual can achieve.  The operating assumption within functionalist theories of 
disability is that it is in every individual‘s best interest to integrate into society as 
‗normally‘ as possible.   
 At the other end of the spectrum outlined in Table 1, emphasis moves increasingly  
from deficit-based theories to philosophies that perceive disability as a natural 
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manifestation of  human diversity.  Both environmental and social justice models of 
disability recognize that there is structural discrimination in the way that communities are 
built, which is disabling to many who navigate the world differently than the mainstream 
(Beresford & Croft 307-308; Dunn 424; Michalko 151; Sacks 1990, 228).  This has 
generated advocacy that calls for raising public awareness and specifically calls for 
making public spaces accessible for all people.  ―The goal is to eliminate or modify 
environmental factors that hamper participation‖ (Roeher Institute 16).  In Ontario, this 
advocacy movement has brought about the passage of the Accessibility for Ontarians with 
Disabilities Act, 2005, which sets accessibility standards for public spaces, and deadlines 
for reaching them (I-1).  Advocacy for environmental change entails calling for 
reconstruction of built spaces to promote accessibility for all people and make 
physiological diversity more visible in the community.  While these are commendable 
objectives, some observe that they are most meaningful for people with physical 
disabilities.  Eva Feder Kittay points out that ―the impairment of mental retardation is not 
easily addressed by physical changes in the environment‖ (558).  As a result, people with 
disabilities and their advocates are increasingly looking to a human-rights model to 
enforce their citizenship rights.   
 As people with disabilities and their advocates come to increasingly resist the 
interpretation of disability as exclusively an individual problem, the political dimension 
of disability is emphasized.  Lobbying and campaigns to raise public awareness are 
undertaken in order to change policy that is perceived to have effectively excluded some 
members from actively participating in their communities:  ―The rights-outcome 
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approach
1
 looks beyond particular environments to focus on broad systemic factors that 
keep certain people from participating as equals in society, and enable equality of well-
being as an outcome‖ (Roeher Institute 17).  Accessibility is no longer perceived as an 
issue of accommodation, but the entitlement of all citizens.  Disability theorists, arguing 
from a human-rights perspective, assert that citizenship rights are being undermined 
because ―[c]itizenship itself [is] increasingly conditional on conformity with the ideal, 
able, and employed individual who places no demands upon the fiscal resources of the 
state‖ (Chouinard & Crooks 31).  The most radical expressions of the rights-outcome 
approach argue that it is the institutional systems that are ‗disabled‘ for abrogating their 
responsibilities to a diverse citizenship.      
 Harlan Lane further criticizes what he refers to as ―troubled-persons industries,‖ 
which he believes to have a vested interest in perpetuating the concept of disability as a 
problem that requires extensive professional oversight (81).  Oliver agrees with this 
perspective, adding that  
          disability is structurally represented by the vocations of doctors and the para- 
          medical professions, and we load responsibility for the restrictions that disabled  
          people experience on to disabled people themselves, who are restricted because of  
          the functional or psychological limitations imposed by their individual impairments  
          rather than by the social restrictions imposed by society. (58)  
In Awakenings, Sacks explains that this tendency to understand individuals exclusively in 
terms of their medical diagnosis ―forecloses the possibility of learning anything new, and 
prevents the possibility of forming a picture, or pictures, of what it is like to be as one is‖ 
(1990, 225).  Sacks is advocating for doctors to interact with patients in a way that is 
                                               
1 More typically referred to as a social model of disability theory 
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similar to Goldstein‘s understanding of how social workers should engage with clients: 
―In assuming his or her role, the social worker surely is an expert about many things that 
need to be known or provided; the client, however, remains the expert about his or her 
reality, which includes the beliefs, values, culture, goals, and other subjective factors that 
give life meaning and purpose‖ (38).  Especially in relation to people whose disability 
limits or precludes verbal communication, it is incumbent upon any doctor or social 
worker to know his or her client very well in order to bridge the divide between 
professional expertise on the science of the disorder, and the individual‘s expertise on his 
or her own life experience.   
 Medical and functional models of disability aspire to normalize the afflicted 
individual, and those services that promote a functional approach to ameliorating 
impairments tend to require extensive resources.  For example, in his 1982 book about  
Ontario‘s institutional system, John Marshall includes an Appendix that depicts a training 
program for an individual to learn how to put on his own shirt in the morning.  The 
procedure includes twelve steps.  Step seven is broken down into thirteen parts.  The one-
on-one time that often needs to be invested in such programs is enormous, and not usually 
feasible in relation to the staffing complements of any supported living facility.  Today, 
there is considerable debate within disability circles about whether this is the most 
effective investment of finite resources:  Whose interests or priorities are paramount in 
pursuing a program of normalization?  Should the emphasis be on assimilation or 
supporting cognitive difference?     
 Michalko believes that ―[t]he ‗natural inclination‘ to norm human life is what 
provides for the possibility of seeing any impairment as biology gone wrong.  It also 
provides the impetus for seeing disabled people within the contemporary dichotomy of 
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the heroic and the tragic‖ (170).  Of course, the existence of norms is dependent upon a 
corresponding understanding of what is abnormal or deviant.  The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM) is a primary resource for doctors and other human services 
professionals for diagnosing abnormal human behaviours, but the science of the DSM 
needs to be challenged and revised on an ongoing basis.  Geoffrey Nelson points out that 
the ―DSM has both a cultural and gender bias with white, male, North American 
psychiatrists deciding who and what is viewed as ‗crazy‘‖ (247).  Crowe argues that the 
DSM-IV is encroaching into more and more aspects of people‘s everyday lives (6); and 
Lewis agrees, asserting that half of all Americans will, at some point in their lives, meet 
the criteria of a DSM disorder (349).    
 The contemporary understanding of ‗normalcy‘ is linked to an individual‘s ability 
to be self-sufficient in a competitive, market economy:  ―A ‗normal‘ citizen is first and 
foremost constructed as an individual participant in the labour market.  This individual is 
also expected to translate his/her needs into market-oriented behaviour, for instance, 
conceiving of self as a care consumer in the market of caring services‖ (Neysmith, 
Bezanson & O‘Connell, 13).  Evolving in step with the Industrial Revolution, the science 
of normalcy began in the nineteenth century, with Adolphe Quetelet‘s ―notion of the 
normal as an imperative‖, and the development of the branch of knowledge known as 
statistics that was incorporated to inform and justify state policy (Davis 1997, 11).  Where 
once disability was generally unremarkable, and was even accommodated in small 
communities and extended kinship networks, it becomes politicized with the evolving 
social identity of the individual as worker and consumer.     
 The emphasis on economic productivity as normal makes many people with 
disabilities feel pressured to minimize the extent of their impairments in order to gain 
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economic security and social acceptance.  Michalko finds that ―[d]isabled people are 
heroic as long as we imitate the natural and the norm through our display of a 
commitment to it.  So long as we act as if we are ‗normal people,‘ albeit with an 
‗abnormal biology,‘ and so long as we adjust to this biology and do things, albeit 
differently, we are heroic‖ (171).  At the same time, there are social sanctions attached to 
not aspiring to the heroic.  J. Murphy observes that  
          [t]hose who claim discrimination at the marketplace or their jobs… are labeled as  
          unprincipled and a threat to the common good.  They are complainers who cannot 
          deal with their failures and place their desires above those of society.  Persons with 
          disabilities are often viewed as complainers who cannot deal with the problems   
          related to their disabilities. (161)   
Given that people with disabilities already experience higher rates of unemployment than 
people without disabilities (Canadian Council on Social Development 6), and that labour 
force participation is an important determinant of happiness for people with disabilities 
(Uppal 530) there is strong incentive to try to adapt to cultural norms.   
 However, dominant cultural constructions of disability are being challenged in 
human rights policy, as well as other cultural texts.  Because a ―culture is partially 
constructed through ongoing, changing stories‖ (Cushing 166), some disability theorists 
argue that changes in the cultural construction of disability need to include a shift in the 
representational function of disability in literary narratives.  David Mitchell and Sharon 
Snyder explain that ―people with disabilities have been the object of representational 
treatments, but… their function in literary discourse is primarily twofold: disability 
pervades literary narrative, first, as a stock feature of characterization and, second, as an 
opportunistic metaphorical device‖ (205).  Mitchell and Snyder refer to the literary 
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dependence upon disability metaphors and symbolism as ―narrative prosthesis‖: a 
narrative device that serves a symbolic or metaphorical role in narrative without 
challenging any of the conventional assumptions, or stereotypes surrounding disability 
(205-210).  For example, Bertha Rochester fulfills the function of narrative prosthesis in 
Charlotte Brontë‘s Jane Eyre.  Her degenerate mind and bloated features further function 
to emphasize the heroine‘s plain but unblemished figure, and a strong mind that masters 
passion.       
 One way to attempt to transcend stereotypical assumptions about a condition or 
category is to work to change the language associated with it.  In order to challenge 
stereotypes attached to longstanding labels, efforts are often made to reform or update the 
language used to identify specific populations.  However, changes in language do not 
necessarily correspond with changes in understanding about disability, or more inclusive 
attitudes toward diversity.  A hundred years ago, it was considered entirely appropriate to 
assign people to services designed for idiots, imbeciles, the infirm, curably or incurably 
insane (Simmons 1982, xiv), according to a process of very arbitrary diagnosis (Reaume 
28).  Until the 1980s, advocacy groups and policy makers still designed services for the 
mentally retarded, which today is a term considered offensive by many people with 
mental disabilities and their advocates.  In fact, Michael Prince finds that ―[a]s recently as 
2007, provincial laws contained such terms as ‗idiot‘ and ‗moron‘ to describe people with 
mental health conditions‖ (7).  Realistically, defining disability is not so much dependent 
upon the words that are used, but more specifically on the cultural value attached to them.  
 Saussure‘s principle about the  arbitrary nature of the sign (1985, 37-38) is evident 
when the person once signified as ―retarded‖ is now referred to as ―challenged‖, yet the 
signifier calls up the same concept.  Language changes with regard to disability are 
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intended to communicate sensitivity toward difference and an enhanced spirit of 
inclusiveness, but John W. Murphy argues that this change in rhetoric typically represents 
a very superficial endorsement of social pluralism (154-161).  Referring to people with 
disabilities as ―challenged‖ does a disservice to people who face formidable obstacles in 
getting through their day-to-day lives.  Everyone encounters challenges in life, but mine 
are not the same in kind or degree as someone who faces physical and social barriers in 
getting to school, holding a job, getting her daily care needs met, or being heard.  As long 
as individuals and groups do not define themselves, it is likely that the ‗progressive‘ 
nomenclature of today will be perceived as offensive at some point in the future.   
 Using language to attempt to diminish the negative associations attached to 
disability is to minimize differences between people who do not have disabling conditions 
and those who do.  Not acknowledging disability, or embracing a ‗we‘re all the same‘ 
attitude toward physiological or mental impairment may be perceived as communicating 
an egalitarian philosophy.  In reality, ignoring or being oblivious to disability does not de-
stigmatize it.  It may, in fact, actually compound oppression  and marginalization.  This 
sometimes becomes apparent where a strong identification with a specific disciplinary 
expertise leads to the presumption that the way of knowing that seems to be natural to 
oneself is necessarily natural to everyone.  For example, Bruner finds that the capacity to 
narrate is a necessary condition of self-hood (2002, 86); and Ian Robinson argues that, 
―[i]t is our nature to think and to talk, and if we didn‘t we wouldn‘t be somehow 
pristinely natural, we‘d be sub-human‖ (10; emphasis in original).  This sort of limited 
awareness of the complexity of the human condition does not in itself constitute active 
discrimination.  However, because of its prevalence, ignorance can perpetuate 
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stigmatization by people who have power and influence over others who are only equal in 
theory.     
 That being said, even disability researchers often look through a narrow lens when 
it comes to making pronouncements about the appropriate parameters of disability 
discourse.  Simi Linton, for example, suggests that the ―question of who ‗qualifies‘ as 
disabled is as answerable or as confounding as questions about any identity status.  One 
simple response might be that you are disabled if you say you are… The degree and 
significance of an individual‘s impairment is often less of an issue than the degree to 
which someone identifies as disabled‖ (163).  At first glance, this reads as an inclusive, 
empowering statement, but it does not take into account Bruner‘s valid observation that 
identity is also constructed ―from the outside in‖.  Many advocates continue to overlook a 
significant segment of the population of persons with mental disabilities when they assert, 
without qualification, that people with disabilities need to be the ones to determine the 
parameters of disability discourses.  As Eva Feder Kittay points out, ―[m]any people with 
mental retardation, especially when it is severe or profound or compounded by other 
disabilities, have been unaffected by the important strides made by other people with 
disabilities… Of all disabled people, the severely mentally retarded have least benefited 
from the inclusion fought for by the disability community‖ (558).  This exclusion is 
apparent in Davis‘ introduction to his Disability Studies Reader where he celebrates the 
evolution of the disability movement:  ―there have been people with disabilities 
throughout history, but it has only been in the last twenty years that one-armed people, 
quadriplegics, the blind, people with chronic diseases, and so on, have seen themselves as 
a single, allied, united physical minority‖ (2006, xvi).  Where are the people with mental 
disabilities with severe communication impairments that preclude their active 
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participation in this alliance?  Presumably, they are included in the ―and so on‖.  These 
are the people who will never have the option of speaking for themselves.     
 Unfortunately, communication barriers that exist for people with certain mental 
impairments leaves them very vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.  For example, in his 
historical analysis of institutional life at the Toronto Hospital for the Insane, Geoffrey 
Reaume finds that, ―[p]atients who were unable to communicate their needs to staff 
because of their mental disturbance, lack of verbal skills, or ‗incoherence‘ to those around 
them would have been far more disadvantaged and frustrated in relations with staff, even 
to the point of being terrified, as they were truly alone in trying to make themselves 
understood‖ (75).  However, despite the challenges of generating a counter-narrative to 
the perspectives of professional care-givers, personal relations and advocates, it is 
important to realize that, whether or not we can articulate a narrative, all people 
communicate in some way.   
 Jean Vanier has devoted his life to creating L‘Arche communities of people who 
have profound intellectual disabilities, and he writes of many of the friendships he has 
formed with their members.  For instance, he tells of a woman, Ghadir, who ―suffered 
from cerebral palsy and couldn‘t speak, but her smile, her trust, and her shining eyes 
welcomed me each time I came.  Through her body, she ‗spoke‘ so lovingly‖ (Vanier 37).  
The Habilitative Mental Health Resource Network (2002) has developed a model that  
conceptualizes the range of ways that people may express themselves, outside of narrative 
(Figure 2).  Professionals who are committed to working for people with mental 
disabilities need to take on the commitment of learning how their clients, patients and 
service users communicate. 
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 At the same time, the human mind has the capacity to compensate remarkably for 
places in the brain that are devastatingly damaged in ways that impair the ability to use 
language to communicate.  People with profound mental disabilities may not be able to  
contemplate a past or imagine the future in an articulate way.  However, they may live  
 
Fig. 2 Categories of Communication Behaviours 
 
intensely in the present.  Sacks describes the ―world of the simple‖ as populated by 
people who live a more ―concrete‖ reality:  ―their world is vivid, intense, detailed, yet 
simple, precisely because it is concrete: neither complicated, diluted, nor unified, by 
abstraction‖ (1998, 174).  Sacks further believes that this concrete sensibility does not 
preclude a capacity to experience that reality in a very rich and deep way:  
          The concrete is readily imbued with feeling and meaning—more readily, perhaps,  
          than any abstract conception.  It readily moves into the aesthetic, the dramatic, the  
          comic, the symbolic, the whole wide deep world of art and spirit.  Conceptually,  
          then, mental defectives may be cripples—but in their powers of concrete and  
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          symbolic apprehension they may be fully the equal of any ‗normal‘ individual.  
          (Sacks 1998, 176-77; emphasis in original) 
What this suggests is that the richness of a life experience, or a sense of self, is not 
necessarily dependent upon the ability to communicate one‘s life narrative.   
 Bruner believes that selfhood is constructed as much from the outside in– by the 
way individuals are perceived by their culture– as it is from the inside out.  He concludes 
that  
          [w]e gain the self-told narratives that make and remake our selves from the culture 
          in which we live.  However much we may rely on a functioning brain to achieve  
          our selfhood, we are virtually from the start expressions of the culture that nurtures  
          us.  And culture is itself a dialectic, replete with alternative narratives about what  
          self is or might be.  The stories we tell to create ourselves reflect this dialectic.  
          (2002, 87) 
This statement reaffirms the unstable status of disability as a concept or category of 
cultural identity, as it also reiterates Bruner‘s understanding of language as a condition of  
selfhood.      
 Bruner‘s epistemological assumption that language is a pre-condition of selfhood 
is similar to Whalley‘s even more restrictive assumption that literacy is a universal 
condition (134).  Both theorists are deeply immersed in a specific area of expertise that 
impairs their ability to see clearly beyond their disciplinary borders.  Margaret Somerville 
is a scientist and ethicist who cautions that ―[i]f, as many philosophers and others believe, 
language is fundamental to being human—fundamental to becoming fully our ‗self‘, 
relating to others, experiencing our world, and finding meaning in life—then we must 
take great care in using it‖ (75).  Later she affirms that  language is important to 
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articulating a shared human reality; however, she also believes that making language a 
fundamental aspect of being human, or a requisite condition of an understanding of self 
has been a preoccupation largely confined to ―the territory, the province, and the function 
of academics, scholars, and intellectuals, especially philosophers‖ (90).  The ability to 
express relationship with others and impact the world can also be communicated in other 
ways.   
 This may be observed in the unreserved spontaneity and open emotion often 
communicated by some nonverbal people.  Kittay argues that  
          [i]f personhood is limited to those who possess certain intellectual capacities and to 
          those who are productive, then my daughter would not be a person.  But my  
          daughter is a person.  She is, after all, my daughter.  How can she be anything but a  
          person?  If traditional conceptions of personhood are not capacious enough to  
          include Sesha and those who share her impairments, we need a new definition.  I  
          propose that being a person means having the capacity to be in certain relationships 
          with other persons, to sustain contact with other persons, to shape one‘s own world  
          and the world of others, and to have a life that another person can conceive of as an  
          imaginative possibility for him- or herself. (568)   
Sacks affirms that it is our relations with other people that ―carry the possibilities of 
proper being-in-the-world‖ (1990, 272) and give meaning to life.  It may be 
discrimination based on disability, or ableism (J. Murphy 161), to argue that the capacity 
for narrative is a necessary pre-requisite for the construction of self.  Perhaps academics, 
storytellers and advocates might enhance their contribution to their respective vocations 
by striving to observe more closely, inquire more directly, and imagine more vividly a 
human way of being that we cannot experience first-hand.      
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Intellectual Disability and Mental Illness 
 The origin of distinct spheres of disability and mental health policy in Ontario has 
had at least as much to do with politics and the desire to establish the legitimacy of an 
emerging psychiatric profession as it has with scientific distinctions between the ―curable 
and incurable insane‖ (Simmons 1982, 24).  Psychiatry, and the medical profession 
generally, had a vested interest in populating the new asylums with ―defectives‖ who 
could be potentially cured and returned as productive members of society, thereby raising 
the status of a new branch of medicine (Scull 120-123).  As a result, those identified as 
mentally ill (or curably insane) went to the asylum, and the mentally retarded (incurables) 
were transferred to the institutional hospitals.  However, Geoffrey Reaume‘s research of 
patient files from the Provincial Lunatic Asylum (PLA) reveals that the facility housed a 
population of patients with overwhelmingly chronic conditions:   
          In 1876 it was estimated that seven-eighths of the asylum population were chronic 
          and at the turn of the century it was estimated that 81.5 per cent of all admissions to 
          999 [Queen Street West] were in this category.  By 1940, over 85 per cent of  
          patients at the Toronto Hospital for the Insane were not considered fit for discharge,  
          indicating that chronic care was the primary feature of the patient population. (7)  
Simmons‘ historical research on mental health policy in Ontario further affirms that  
―mentally retarded people still continued to find their way into the PLA.  One reason was 
that local doctors were ignorant of any distinction between mental retardation and mental 
illness, lumping both together under the category of lunatic‖ (1982, 6).  From the 
beginning, the process of assignation was inconsistent and haphazard, in part because 
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asylums for the insane and hospitals for the retarded were over-crowded, and people were 
sent wherever a bed could be found (Simmons 1990, 4).   
 Contributing to the confusing assignation process was the fact that determinations 
about mental fitness often were often made in the courtroom where judges were called 
upon to decide who should be imprisoned and who should be institutionalized.  ―They 
had to choose between the prison and the hospital, two solutions that, in the final analysis, 
were somewhat equivalent.  The problem was: This individual needs to be locked up‖ 
(Foucault Roundtable, 85).  Simmons also finds that ―some scholars have argued that 
many of  those labeled as mentally ill suffered from nothing more than a tendency to 
depart from accepted political or social norms and that  the function of these hospitals 
was to impose social control over these deviants‖ (1990, 4).  These facilities were also 
sometimes a refuge for people who needed to escape from their families (Reaume 24), or 
people who simply had no other personal supports.   
 Although the asylums for the ‗curably insane‘ tended to be better funded than the 
institutions for people deemed to have little prospect of recovery, both systems were 
chronically underfunded; therefore, the ability to pay also could influence patient 
placement.  The class system that was prevalent in wider society was reproduced within 
the institution (Reaume 9).  Regardless of their prospects for cure, patients who had 
financial support were more likely to be placed in the insane asylum, rather than the 
facility in Orillia that was designated for idiots (Simmons 1982, 22-23) because a better 
quality of life could be purchased there.  The arbitrary assignment of people deemed 
mentally ill or mentally retarded is further supported by Reaume‘s finding that patients 
were exchanged between the asylums for lunatics and hospitals for the feeble-minded 
based upon their capacity to supply specific types of labour to support the facility, 
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whatever the individual‘s diagnosis (153).  He gives several examples including the case 
of Wilfred S. who was ―presented at a medical conference to determine whether he was 
suitable to be sent as a worker to a ‗bush farm‘ at the Orillia Hospital for the Feeble 
Minded.  He was transferred there in 1911 after 14 years at 999‖ (153).  This individual 
did not suddenly convert from being mentally ill to mentally retarded; he was transferred 
for his worth as unpaid labour.  Reaume and Simmons both cite evidence that suggests 
that the labour needs of the asylum and hospital systems often influenced diagnosis and 
patient placement.     
 Given the political interests that have influenced diagnosis and treatment of 
mental illness and disability, it is hardly surprising that many people have become 
skeptical about the methods for curing the mentally ill, or even the validity of these 
categories.  Dvora Yanow explains that ―[t]he conceptual logic of category-making 
implies that the differences between members of different categories are sharp, when 
from another viewpoint they may be only minor gradations of difference‖ (50).  
Certainly, many people who identify themselves as psychiatric survivors maintain that 
mental illness is not a legitimate category.  Bradley Lewis asserts that ―[m]ental illness is 
not an objective medical reality but rather either a negative label or a strategy for coping 
in a mad world‖ (343).  Lewis cites the work of Thomas Szasz, who trained as a 
psychiatrist only to eventually devote his career to proving its illegitimacy:   
          For Szasz, physical illness was real because it was based on actual observation, but 
          mental illness  was at best a metaphor.  A broken leg is real because you can see the 
          x-ray, but a ‗broken brain‘ is a myth because there is no x-ray that will show it.  For  
          Szasz, to see mental illness as ‗real‘ rather than as metaphor was to make a serious  
          category mistake.  ‗Mental illness‘ is not objectively observable; it is a myth.  
62 
 
 
          (Lewis 343; emphasis in original)   
In reality, many people are service users of both mental health and disability services 
because people with chronic mental illness or intellectual disabilities often require similar 
services and supports.    
 Today, the diagnostic criteria used to determine who is streamed into which 
administrative system are still haphazard.  There remains a lack of clarity around the 
eligibility for mental health or disability services in Ontario which, since the 1970s, have 
fallen under the auspices of ministries that are known today as the Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care, and the Ministry of Community and Social Services, respectively.  
There are separate eligibility criteria for programs and services under each Ministry, yet 
there is obvious overlap in terms of how mental illness and disability are defined.  For 
example, the Mental Health Act, which is administered by the Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care, defines ―mental disorder‖ as ―any disease or disability of the 
mind‖(1.i).  At the same time, the Government of Ontario, through the agency of the 
Minister of Community and Social Services, has proclaimed a new Services and Supports 
to Promote the Social Inclusion of Persons with Developmental Disabilities Act, which 
defines developmental disability in terms of a person who has  
          prescribed significant limitations in cognitive functioning and adaptive functioning 
          and those limitations (a) originated before the person reached 18 years of age; (b) 
          are likely to be life-long in nature; and (c) affect areas of major life activity, such as  
          personal care, language skills, learning abilities, the capacity to live independently  
          as an adult or any other prescribed activity. (3.1) 
It is interesting that the policy definition of disability actually seems more dependent 
upon a medical model of specific diagnosis than does the policy definition of mental 
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illness.  On the other hand, the definition of mental disorder seems to capture any and all 
manifestations of cognitive deviance from whatever is considered normal.  Evidence of 
the historical distinction between ―curable‖ and ―incurable‖ insanity endures in the 
legislative stipulation that an intellectual disability be understood as life-long in nature.  
 Recently, however, there is an emerging preference for the term ―recovery‖ in the 
field of mental health, which ―is not the same thing as being cured.  For many individuals, 
it is a way of living a satisfying, hopeful, and productive life even with limitations caused 
by the illness; for others, recovery means the reduction or complete remission of 
symptoms related to mental illness‖ (Kirby 42).  This definition suggests a framework for 
understanding mental health that further blurs categories of illness and disability by 
recognizing that, at least for some people, mental illness is a chronic condition that is 
permanently disabling; and further, that ―not everyone living with a mental illness will be 
able to recover‖ (Kirby 42) .  From recovery perspectives, emphasis is placed on 
advancing individual life planning and the provision of supports that are perceived to 
optimize and sustain mental health and a good quality of life, as defined by the individual 
and co-creators of his or her life narrative.  A recovery model emphasizes wellness over 
illness (Baldwin qtd in Kirby 43).  This position ultimately endorses policy frameworks 
and services that are very similar to those aspired to in contemporary disability theories 
that emphasize ability over impairment.      
 Still, contemporary writers generally maintain the distinction between illness and 
disability.  Iyer alludes to it in relation to the depiction of intellectual disability in fiction, 
observing that, ―[l]iterary depictions of intellectual disability and mental illness share 
some common themes.  They both reflect societal views about these conditions in the 
time that they were written‖ (127).  However, there is a richer narrative tradition of first- 
64 
 
 
person accounts of recovering from mental illness, while, on the other hand,  
―[i]ntellectual disability is fundamentally different in this respect because the very nature 
of the condition makes it difficult to have a subjective account of what it is to have it.  In 
fictional accounts of people with intellectual disabilities, words are used to describe those 
who are essentially without access to the medium used to portray them‖ (127).  While 
Iyer concisely identifies the challenge of narrating an experience that cannot be 
articulated from within, it is important not to perceive people with intellectual disabilities 
as a homogenous population; to assume, for example, that all people with intellectual 
disabilities are nonverbal.    
 Defining disability is no less problematic outside the realm of policy and program 
planning, especially for critics who take a particular interest in the representation of 
disability in literature.  Patrick McDonagh theorizes about the representation of disability 
in literature, and he explains his rationale for selecting the term intellectual disability to 
define his subject category by acknowledging its limitations:   
          The idea of intellectual disability has never been without cultural meaning. 
          I use ‗intellectual disability‘ because it is a contemporary term whose connotative 
          powers are not so developed as other more pejorative terms:  it simply carries less  
          semiotic baggage.  The proviso, of course, is that intelligence has no clear  
          definition, nor is there any way to measure it. (1997, 268)   
The lack of consensus around an appropriate and precise definition of intellectual 
disability only compounds the challenges associated with trying to distinguish between 
intellectual disability and mental illness.   
 Complicating the categorizing process further is the fact that many contemporary 
diagnoses do not easily fit into distinct disability or psychiatric categories.  Autism 
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spectrum disorders are a good example.  Hudson and Chan point out that there are 
significant limitations to the  
          definition of psychiatric disorder or mental illness that include autism spectrum  
          disorder or similar syndromes.  To include these syndromes as a psychiatric  
          disorder is problematic in terms of service provision and treatment plans.  There  
          also appears to be a lack of common understanding between the definition of 
          challenging behaviour as symptomatic of a person‘s behaviour or syndrome and  
          challenging behaviour as a distinguishing feature of a psychiatric disorder. (34)   
Across different disciplinary literatures autism is referred to as a disease (Ray-Mihm 102-
103), a psychiatric disorder (Hudson & Chan 34), and as neurological difference (Bagatell 
420).  Lack of consensus around causes and appropriate responses must remind us that 
the boundary between disease and disability is a porous one.       
 Another reason why it is so difficult to establish a boundary between disability 
and illness is that there is so much diversity within each category, and sometimes similar 
symptoms are attributed to a range of diagnoses.  In the absence of reliable diagnostic 
testing for many mental illnesses or disabilities, a field of critical psychiatry is emerging 
where ―psychiatrists are moving beyond the narrow approaches of their training and 
drawing from interdisciplinary theory in science studies, disability studies, and the 
humanities‖ (Lewis 344).  This approach helps fill knowledge gaps where patients face 
barriers to communicating a rich description of their symptoms and experiences.  Tom 
Shakespeare agrees that it is important to consider the relationship between symptoms 
and the individual‘s quality of life, suggesting that   
          [i]f a person with multiple sclerosis is depressed, how easy is it to make a causal 
          separation between the effect of the impairment itself; her reaction to having an  
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          impairment; her reaction to being oppressed and excluded on the basis of having an  
          impairment; other, unrelated reasons for her to be depressed?  In practice, social  
          and individual aspects are almost inextricable in the complexity of the lived 
          experience of disability. (201) 
In some cases, symptoms of the disability may mimic mental illness.  In other cases those 
symptoms may actually indicate mental illness, but the diagnostic testing employed is not 
sophisticated enough to accommodate the communication methods of nonverbal people.   
 As Sacks readily admits, ―our ‗evaluations‘ are ridiculously inadequate‖ (1998, 181).   
Although many mental health professionals suspect a close relationship between mental 
illness and disability it is very difficult to make a dual diagnosis when patients with 
intellectual disabilities have trouble describing their symptoms (Hudson & Chan, 41).   
 Even where there exists fairly substantial verbal capacity, the reliability of self-
disclosure can often be problematic for making a sure diagnosis.  There is significant 
evidence, for instance, that many people with intellectual impairments may be easily led 
by the interviewer.  Interview subjects may be trying to guess what is the right answer, or 
just trying to be agreeable.  Claudia Malacrida argues that  
          [i]ndividuals with intellectual disabilities may be especially vulnerable to… 
          discrediting strategies precisely because they are so devalued and stigmatized.  For 
          example, researchers have argued that individuals with intellectual disabilities are  
          particularly prone to persuasion by researchers and therapists, particularly when 
          claims of abuse have been involved. (406)   
Malacrida believes that researchers and frontline workers regularly use this evidence as 
an excuse not to consult with people with intellectual disabilities about their experience, 
and she wants their ‗truths‘ to be believed, without question.  This is difficult interpretive 
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terrain, and the conscientious worker or researcher must tread cautiously to avoid 
manipulating messages being communicated by people with intellectual or mental health 
impairments.  Professional praxis entails engaging in continuous action and reflection  
(Flyvbjerg 136; Friere 128).  Such praxis needs to be exercised by social workers in order 
to avoid uncritically accepting responses that can be interpreted as consistent with the 
worker‘s own perspective, while dismissing those that seem unlikely or otherwise 
problematic.   
  If no definition of disability can contain all of its dimensions and interpretive 
perspectives, then perhaps it is prudent to take a simple but inclusive approach.  The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms collapses mental and physical categories in its 
definition of disability as a domain of protection from discrimination:  ―Every individual 
is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based 
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability‖ (Sec. 15.1).  The Ontario Human Rights Code also recognizes the rights of 
people with disabilities to enjoy freedom from discrimination, incorporating a definition 
of disability that is consistent with and expands upon that delineated in the Charter:   
          ‗Disability‘ covers a broad range and degree of conditions, some visible and others 
           not.  A disability may have been present from birth, caused by accident, or  
          developed over time.  It includes, physical, mental and learning disabilities, mental  
          disorders, hearing or vision disabilities, epilepsy, drug and alcohol dependencies,  
          environmental sensitivities, as well as other conditions.  (Ontario Human Rights 
          Commission para. 5)  
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More recently, the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act (2005) defines 
disability as:  
(a) any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement that 
is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and, without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, includes diabetes mellitus, epilepsy, a brain injury, 
any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical co-ordination, blindness or 
visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech 
impediment, or physical reliance on a guide dog or other animal or on a 
wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device, 
(b) a condition of mental impairment or a developmental disability, 
(c) a learning disability, or a dysfunction in one or more of the processes involved 
in understanding or using symbols or spoken language, 
(d) a mental disorder,  
(e) an injury or disability for which benefits were claimed or received under the 
insurance plan established under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 
(I.2) 
It is clear that when disability is defined in relation to human rights policy, the causes of 
disability are not relevant.  Whether as a result of accident, genetic anomaly, or illness 
mental disability may manifest itself in ways that make it incumbent upon social workers 
and other advocates to organize, translate or co-create personal narratives.  Regardless of 
the cause of impairment, these stories often contain thematic similarities in terms of 
personal aspirations and systemic barriers to realizing life goals or ‗happy endings‘.     
 
CHAPTER 4- Policy Theory 
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What is Policy and Planning? 
 Policy is what governs our social existence through the implementation and 
enforcement of laws, regulations, programs and services that define a collective sense of 
reality.  ―As cultural scripts, policy documents communicate certain values, case specific 
roles, and convey particular models of people and communities‖ (Prince 7).  According to 
Frank Fischer and John Forester, ―if analysts‘ ways of representing policy and planning 
issues must make assumptions about causality and responsibility, about legitimacy and 
authority, and about interests, needs, values, preferences and obligations, then the 
language of policy and planning analyses not only depicts but also constructs the issues at 
hand‖ (1).  Like disability, policy and planning may be seen as unstable concepts, 
generating different interpretations at different times and across different theoretical 
perspectives.   
 Social policy is specifically intended to address problems resulting from unequal 
access to resources required to maintain health and well-being that, in turn, enable 
participation in one‘s community.  Traditionally, social policy has been understood to  
          refer to a range of state programs, legislation and regulations focused on the well- 
          being of citizens.  In North America and Europe in the twentieth century, programs  
          and certain laws were captured under the umbrella of the ‗welfare state‘.  Health,  
          education, culture and income assistance or security initiatives have formed the  
          substantive program arenas for most discussion of social policy. Economic policies  
          are included in this list by some analysts… . (Neysmith et al. 21-22)  
However, determining what constitutes a reasonable standard of care, a poverty line, or a 
basic social minimum to which all citizens should be entitled is a contentious field of 
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debate, and consensus around shared social values is elusive (Westhues 5-9).  Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the representation of mental disability is no more consistent in 
policy, over time, than it is in other types of discourse, including narrative fiction.     
 Generally, policy and planning discourses differ from narratives in their 
construction.  Thomas J. Kaplan explains that policy is typically expressed in accordance 
with a chronicle approach.  He says that a ―chronicle is usually terse and often takes the 
form of an outline or a list of pros and cons.  The chronicle approach does not seek to tell 
a story, presents no plot, and exhibits no organized beginning, middle, or end‖ (173).  
This is, arguably, a rather narrow determination of what counts as policy, especially when 
policy may be understood as a category that incorporates discourses as large and complex 
as international charters and conventions, to the ambitious mission statement of a small 
community nonprofit organization.  As Yanow observes, ―policy-relevant groups 
interpret a wide range of acts, from agenda-setting acts to acts legislating and 
implementing, as communicating policy meaning‖ (74).  Some policy discourses are 
invested with the force of law, while others are aspirational.  In either case, policy texts 
are often quite expansive and even eloquent.   
 
Systematic and Interpretive Policy and Planning Theories 
 As with other knowledge disciplines, social policy embraces both systematic and 
interpretive theoretical approaches.  Barclay Hudson (1979) introduced a model that 
depicts a continuum of different planning models that may be used for responding to 
social welfare issues (Table 2).  The strengths and limitations of these planning 
approaches are defined under the SITAR acronym and, similar to the spectrum of 
disability theories articulated previously in Table 1, most planning traditions can be 
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accommodated within the SITAR model.  These different approaches may be understood 
to represent contending frameworks that not only refer to different policy discourses, but 
also different courses of action, values and meanings (Yanow 12).  The following 
discussion describes the contributing theoretical approaches that Hudson incorporates in 
his model, and then subsequently critiques them in terms of their implications for social 
policy planning, especially with regard to people with mental disabilities.   
 The synoptic approach to policy planning emphasizes a systematic model of 
means and ends.  Also referred to as rational planning (Dewan 185; Flyvbjerg 15-34; 
Gilbert & Specht 72; Rothman & Zald 1985), it assumes the presence of inputs and 
outputs that can be measured and compared in order to arrive at the most efficient policy 
solution.  Barclay Hudson explains that synoptic planning involves a process that  
―typically looks at problems from a systems viewpoint, using conceptual or mathematical  
models relating ends (objectives) to means (resources and constraints), with heavy 
reliance on numbers and quantitative analysis‖ (389).  Synoptic, or rational planning 
methods have a long history in all branches of policy planning and administration; 
however, their limitations in terms of the provision of human services have also been 
widely recognized (Davidoff 1965; Etzioni 1977; Friedmann 1977; Healey 2005; Hudson 
1979; Lindblom 1977, 1979; Rothman & Zald 133-135).   
 
 Table 2 
SITAR Model of Policy Planning 
Synoptic Incremental Transactive Advocacy Radical 
 Also referred to 
as rational 
planning 
 Emphasis on 
means and ends, 
mathematical 
models 
 Planner as 
objective expert 
 Belief that policy 
structures cannot 
tolerate radical 
change 
 Change is made 
over time, 
through a series 
of stakeholder 
trade-offs, 
mutual 
adjustment 
 Planning and 
implementation 
occur 
simultaneously  
 Planning 
becomes 
decentralized 
 Process- oriented 
with emphasis on 
mutual learning 
between planner 
and recipient of 
services 
 Subjects of 
planning take 
more control of 
the process 
 
 Planner identifies 
with the 
stakeholder and 
actively works 
on their behalf to 
realize desired 
policy change  
 Promotes policy 
pluralism 
 Challenges 
perception of 
unitary public 
interest 
 
 Emphasis on 
personal growth 
and freedom 
from 
manipulation 
from government 
or other 
institutional 
forces 
 Call for 
structural 
change, either 
incrementally or 
through 
revolutionary 
means 
  Competing stakeholder interests and the unpredictability of human behaviour  
means that rational planning can only be aspired to as an ideal.  All policy, including 
social policy, is continually re-interpreted from the planning table and legislative 
assembly, through to the frontlines where it is finally operationalized.  At this point, it 
often becomes apparent that ―interpretations may be at odds with what policymakers 
(whether legislators or agency actors) intend to communicate‖ (Yanow 74).  There are 
trade-offs at every level of administration as well as at the point of service delivery.  
Sometimes these adjustments are the outcome of deliberate negotiations, or responses to 
new information.  At other times policy is just interpreted in unanticipated ways.  The 
realities of human services administration and program delivery move many policy 
theorists to assert that, to the extent that policy changes, it can only deliberately do so 
incrementally:   
          Disjointed incrementalism involves choosing among a limited range of alternatives 
          that differ in small degrees from existing policies… Unlike the rationalistic 
          approach this model does not emphasize problem solving by in-depth analysis of  
          cause-and-effect relationships and examination of all possible courses of action.   
          Instead, the incremental approach seeks to achieve small remedial gains through  
          successive limited comparisons between ‗what is‘ and ‗what is acceptable or  
          feasible in the way of change‘. (Gilbert & Specht, 73-74) 
Lindblom distinguishes between the realms of the policy theorist who has the luxury of 
thinking in terms of ideal states, and the practitioner who at any time has only a limited 
range of options to select from when responding to social welfare crises as they emerge, 
on the ground.  Thus, the social planner practices the ―science of muddling through‖ 
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(1977, 98; 1979, 517) because he or she realizes that whole-scale change within 
administrative systems is impossible. 
 Moving from an emphasis on planning outcomes to planning processes, Hudson 
acknowledges that the three remaining approaches in his SITAR model are more typically 
conceived as responses to dominant planning traditions, particularly the synoptic method.  
However, transactive, advocacy and radical planning practices are important because they 
introduce ―a broader perspective on issues and another set of voices for articulating the 
public interest‖ (396).  Beginning with transactive planning, this planning approach 
emphasizes a collaborative relationship between the professional helper and the client 
(Friedmann 113; Gilbert & Specht 74; Hudson 389).  Constituents are consulted by 
planners regarding their own social welfare requirements in order to seek direction for 
progressive change.  This is an aspect of Roe‘s approach to narrative policy analysis, as 
he explains that ―[t]he narrative policy analyst encourages marginalized voices in a 
controversy to speak up, to tell their own stories, on the grounds that the more policy 
narratives there are, the better idea about metanarratives, if any, they generate‖ (18).  
Moving away from the winner/loser dichotomy in a planning conflict, a transactive 
approach to planning is important because of new knowledge that can be generated by 
consulting the expertise of service recipients who are generally marginalized from 
traditional planning processes.   
 For example, although he does not use the term, Sacks demonstrates a transactive 
approach to planning a course of therapy for patients in his description of how the 
contributions of patients inform the physician‘s understanding of their impairments:    
          [o]ne must drop all presuppositions and dogmas and rules—for these only lead to 
          stalemate or disaster; one must cease to regard all patients as replicas, and honour  
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          each one with individual attention, attention to how he is doing, to his individual 
          reactions and propensities; and, in this way, with the patient as one‘s equal, one‘s 
          co-explorer, not one‘s puppet, one may find therapeutic ways that are better than 
          other ways, tactics which can be modified as the occasion requires. (1990, 259; 
          emphasis in original)   
This is reminiscent of Paulo Friere‘s exhortation for professional helpers to embrace a 
process of mutual learning in working with oppressed and disenfranchised populations.   
In providing education to poor and marginalized people, he says that ―[t]he teacher is no 
longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the 
students, who in turn while being taught also teach.  They become jointly responsible for 
a process in which all grow‖ (80).  Friere explicitly acknowledges the expertise of these 
constituents; an expertise that planners, educators, or community organizers must not 
only acknowledge, but learn from in order to do their work well.   
 In moving from transactive to advocacy planning, it is evident that the two 
approaches share some theoretical ground; however, while advocacy planning may entail 
the active participation of individuals or groups directly affected by a policy proposal, this 
is not always the case.  Advocacy planners use their expertise to work on behalf of 
identified constituency groups.  Premised on a philosophy espousing that ―[t]here are no 
neutral grounds for evaluating a plan; there are as many evaluative systems as there are 
value systems‖ (Davidoff  443), advocacy planners recognize that diverse constituencies 
require different supports to actively participate and contribute to their communities.  
People with severe mental disabilities and communication impairments may not be able 
to effectively participate in a transactive planning process.  In these circumstances, an 
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advocacy model may be the most effective approach for realizing structural policy 
change, on their behalf.           
 Radical disability theorists take the advocate‘s critique of existing policy systems 
even further, arguing that institutional structures are responsible for the oppression of 
people within capitalist, patriarchal or colonial systems.  People who see their political 
and economic systems as structurally flawed and disabling will seek to replace them, 
either by working from within the system to transform it, or outside of it through 
insurrection and revolution (Hudson 390).   
 Although the SITAR model acknowledges and even advocates for drawing from 
the strengths of the different contributing approaches to address particular policy issues, 
Hudson also makes reference to a method specifically identified in planning literature as 
mixed scanning (396).  Mixed scanning recognizes the ideal of a rational approach to 
policy making that is objective and comprehensive, as well as the unpredictability of 
human behaviour that makes small, incremental policy adjustments in the day to day 
reality in administrative settings.  Thus,   
          [m]ixed scanning attempts to incorporate the strengths of both [synoptic and  
          incremental] theoretical approaches into a workable approach to planning that  
          involves a combination of elements of the rationalistic model that emphasize the  
          analytic tasks of research and fact-gathering and elements of the incremental  
          approach that emphasize the interactional task of consensus building. (Gilbert & 
          Specht 73)   
Mixed scanning may be understood as an example of how different features of the 
theories that contribute to the SITAR model may be combined to address specific policy 
problems and planning issues.  Jerome H. Kaufman‘s accompanying commentary on 
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Hudson‘s model extols the advantages of drawing from the contributing traditions to 
resolve specific policy issues:  ―[t]he SITAR acronym… is cleverly applied to planning… 
the five-string SITAR is a type of lute which can be played by performing a single string 
at a time, or by weaving a blend of harmony and dissonance from all five‖ (404).  
Features from the contributing theories can be combined in different ways to construct 
innovative and effective policy responses to human need generally, and supports for 
people with mental disabilities, specifically.  
   Those required supports can be substantial, ranging from daily assistance with 
personal care and mobility to facilitating community access, work and learning 
opportunities. People with mental disabilities experience higher rates of unemployment 
(Uppal 529), poverty (Nelson 258), ill health and housing insecurity than the population 
at large (Dunn 413-425); and J. Thomas Couser recognizes that ―[s]o many controversial 
issues in the arenas of public policy and public culture are bound up with variations in the 
form or function of our bodies‖ (2008, 351).  For these reasons, Dunn acknowledges that 
―[o]ne of the challenges of social policy is to respond to the needs of Canadians with 
disabilities in a comprehensive, just, and effective manner‖ (413).  Such a response must 
entail reinforcing what Canadians understand as our social safety net: the network of 
policies coordinated between federal, provincial and municipal levels of government to 
provide services and supports to people in need.         
 The range of disability experience calls for social policy responses that are 
flexible and responsive to individual needs.  Sacks articulates the limitations of a 
systematic approach by emphasizing how the life experiences of people cannot be 
rationally predicted or addressed in a uniform way.  Thus, in his attempt to further 
illuminate the experience of disability, Sacks explains:   
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          [m]y aim is not to make a system, or to see patients as systems, but to picture a  
          world, a variety of worlds—the landscapes of being in which these patients reside.   
          And the picturing of worlds requires not a static and systematic formulation, but an  
          active exploration of images and views, a continual jumping-about and imaginative  
          movement. (1990, xviii; emphasis in original)   
Not only do synoptic planning goals take a long time to realize, rational social planning 
objectives are also based upon the assumption that human needs are predictable and 
consistent across and within designated categories such as age, income, culture and 
geographic location.  Because rational planning goals are dependent upon the existence of 
objective facts, John W. Murphy argues that rational social policy outcomes may never be 
attained because  
          facts are not things—the hallmark of Durkheim‘s stance on norms—but 
          accomplishments… facts are acknowledged to be constructed consciously and  
          maintained through continued interaction between persons.  Facts, in other words,  
          are a product of intentionality, and thus norms are not objective but revealed  
          through on-going discourse.  Those that become prominent are elevated in 
          importance because of shifts in values, beliefs, or commitments. (157)   
Beyond the basic necessities of life, there is little predictable enough about human 
behaviour to constitute objective facts.  Even if these existed, Bruner notes that our 
systems of measurement make planning an imperfect science, at best, because  
          our plans sometimes fail not just because we don‘t know enough but  
          also because of the way we know things.  And it is not just that we are ‗all too  
          human‘ and shape our knowledge to conform to our wishes and fears.  We are not  
          good statistical machines, and are prone to inferential errors.  These are fulsomely  
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          annotated in the literature on ‗human error tendencies‘—errors in judging others, in  
          making investment choices, in predicting outcomes generally. (2002, 29-30)   
Here, Bruner agrees with Charles Lindblom who argues that any  kind of strategic 
analysis must inevitably be incomplete because it is impossible to identify, measure and 
compare all the risks and benefits of all the different types of policy options that are 
theoretically available to the planner (1979, 518).  Along with the limitations of the 
mind‘s capacity to operate independent of values, the other great obstacle to practising a 
theory of rational planning in human services provision is that even people identified as 
belonging to a similar category of need may require different provisions to meet that need 
(Hillyard & Watson 332-333).  As a result, large scale policy interventions generally need 
to be invested with a considerable degree of flexibility in order to fit individual case 
circumstances and be efficient.   
   The enhanced ability to accommodate emerging contingencies is a strength of 
the incremental approach to policy planning.  However, accommodation via small 
incremental adjustment also has serious limitations, as Lindblom admits that one 
drawback of this approach is that it does not allow for consideration of policy alternatives 
that do not closely resemble the status quo (1977, 110).  On the other hand, ―when 
decisions are only incremental—closely related to known policies, it is easier… to make 
correction for injury already accomplished‖ (Lindblom 1977, 107-08).  In the day to day 
world of administration what the planner really is trying to do is keep all the competing 
stakeholder interests in play and, at least to some degree, satisfied.   
   Transactive planning, with its emphasis on process rather than outcome, directly 
engages the planner with learning from the constituency that receives social welfare 
services, or is otherwise affected by policy intervention.  However, participatory action 
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projects require a lot of collaboration of unique stakeholder interests and strong public 
support to realize significant change.  As a result, participation in transactive policy 
planning efforts may be initially empowering for constituents who are invited to 
contribute their personal expertise at the planning table, but repeated experiences of 
opposition to changing the policy status quo in a meaningful way can ultimately 
compound the experience of marginalization.   
 Nelson delineates some of the key features of such an approach to service 
planning for the provision of services to people with mental health disabilities.  His 
community process model goes hand in hand with transactive and advocacy planning 
ideals, and has specific implications for people with disabilities who require other people 
to represent their interests, at least to some extent:     
          First, not only is the consumer at the centre of the framework, but the consumer  
          also controls and directs the sources of support that surround him or her.  Second,  
          while mental health services are part of the framework, there is a strong emphasis  
          on other sources of support, including family, friends, social networks, peer  
          support, self-help, and community groups and agencies.  Third, the framework  
          includes access to the basic resources that are needed to promote a desirable quality  
          of life, including housing, income, work, and education.  Fourth, the framework  
          asserts that while medical science and social science are valuable ways to  
          understand mental illness, they are not the only sources of knowledge.  Experiential  
          knowledge and the knowledge of lay persons are also valuable and need to be  
          incorporated into mental health policy and programs. (253-54)    
It is important not to lose sight of the reality that some service consumers are unable to 
participate in the kind of service model articulated here; and while consulting the input of 
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family members and other advocates is useful, these perspectives are not the same as 
accessing the first person experience of people with the most to gain by an advocacy 
campaign.  All constituents have their own vested interest in whatever policy or program 
decisions are made, which will influence how and for what they advocate.  It takes a 
considerable commitment by all participants to make collaborative planning processes 
work, and there is often not enough ‗buy in‘ to sustain such initiatives over the long term.   
 Policy consultation with people with disabilities, in particular, has a history of 
political opportunism and tokenism.  While active constituent participation in planning 
should contribute to program efficiencies by addressing service overlaps as well as gaps, 
the primary objective is the empowerment of the constituents affected by policy 
decisions.  Unfortunately, Beresford and Croft have found that  
          [s]ocial work academics and practitioners may be prepared to concede service 
          users‘ knowledge and expertise in their own oppression as, for example, disabled  
          people; and indeed to both call upon and rely upon that knowledge… However,  
          they seem reluctant to concede service users‘ expertise in the domain of anti- 
          oppressive practice itself, preferring generally instead to see this as a developing  
          academic discipline or specialism. (301)   
Friere says that this kind of practice approach ends up oppressing both parties in the 
empowerment effort.   For him, ―[t]he solution is not to ‗integrate‘ them into the structure 
of oppression, but to transform that structure so that they can become ‗beings for 
themselves‘‖ (74).  Systemic transformation is a difficult ideal for many social workers to 
work for, as it tends to set them in opposition to the institutions that employ them.  
However, to the extent that social workers are able and inclined to work for the best 
interests of their clients, even to the extent of subverting existing institutional policy that 
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is experienced as oppressive or discriminatory, they are endorsing a  structural or radical 
approach to policy planning.   
 Radical policy planning incorporates two distinct routes to social change.  Both  
are grounded in the philosophical belief that ―class structure and economic relations are 
perceived to be at the heart of problem definition.  Planned change is generated through 
social movement, confrontations, alliances, and struggles‖ (Rothman & Zald 139).  The 
most extreme radical theorists believe that the current social welfare system cannot be 
transformed from within and, as a result, they promote revolutionary means to overthrow 
institutional  authority by society‘s oppressed.  Here, insurrection is assumed to be 
necessary in order to achieve the desired structural reform.   
 The other approach to radical planning borrows from advocacy and transactive 
philosophies to realize systemic transformation by working from within the existing 
political, economic and social welfare institutions.  At the same time however, 
institutional systems aspire to maintain homeostasis and Canada has no real legacy of 
radical social change.  For example, André Picard reported on a candle-lit vigil at 
Queen‘s Park that was held to acknowledge the official closing of Ontario‘s remaining 
institutions for people with intellectual disabilities, in 2009.  In his article, he notes that it 
was 1971 when the Williston report first called on the Provincial government to look for 
alternatives to the ―‗large multipurpose residential hospitals‘‖ (L4) that for more than a 
century had been the social policy response to mental disability in Ontario.  Realizing this 
policy objective was the result of incremental policy adjustments over a very long period 
of time.     
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 All social planning refers to that aspect of the policy process where needs are 
identified or, ideally, anticipated and proposes appropriate legislative intervention to 
address those needs.  Hudson concludes that  
          [m]ost planners would admit that their craft is one of art as well as science.  Most 
          are uncomfortable, however, with depicting the future in the full richness of  
          subjective color and detail which they know gives meaning to the present…   
          planners are uncomfortable with the literary method, which may be a valid and  
          accurate means of discussing social problems and solutions, but lacks the reliability  
          and objectivity found in the more familiar tools of social science. (394)   
The art of planning is practised from the United Nations on down to grassroots social  
action campaigns.  Hudson‘s SITAR model contrasts the strengths and limitations of 
different theoretical approaches to planning that might help to contextualize how 
disability policy is conceived, and sometimes informed or challenged by the life 
experiences of people most directly affected by these systems of programs, services and 
regulations.       
 
Policy Narratives and Case Studies  
 Policy narratives may explain the ways that policy plays out in people‘s lives, 
thereby justifying certain policy choices and rationalizing outcomes when planning 
objectives are not realized.  Couser observes that  
          [t]he interaction between narrative—cultural or personal—and law is multi- 
          dimensional and multi-directional… Disability narratives—long or short, written or  
          oral, formal or informal, individual or communal—may first stimulate legislation  
          by highlighting areas in which protection from discrimination is lacking; those laws  
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          in turn evoke narratives of their violation.  Personal narrative may call for  
          legislation, which in turn may call forth personal narrative. (2007, 82)   
Couser‘s argument suggests a symbiotic relationship between law and narrative that 
policy makers might wish to explore in order to better plan for and predict the outcomes 
of policy interventions.     
 As evaluation tools, case studies are valuable sources of information with respect 
to demonstrating how policies shape the storyline of a person‘s life (Di Terlizzi 501; 
Flyvbjerg 66-78).  Bent Flyvbjerg points out that the case study method is as important as 
it is enduring.  He observes that every time Plato asked for universals, he was given case 
studies.  He also quotes Donald Campbell, who says that ―‗[s]ometimes we simply have 
to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases—not in the hope of proving 
anything, but rather in the hope of learning something‘‖ (73).  Social welfare planning 
cannot account for every contingency, and those invested with the responsibility for the 
administration of services are generally far removed from the places where policy is 
enacted at a personal level.  Case studies that portray and comment upon individual 
experiences of human struggle or personal triumph invest policy discourses with meaning 
and relevance, and they shed light on the strengths and limitations of a policy narrative.  
This section provides an overview of dominant policy narratives that contextualize the 
institutional cycle in Ontario, and illustrates the role case studies play in critiquing those 
narratives.        
 Policy narratives may be constructed to predict social responses to human need in 
relation to issues that may affect the economic, environmental, health or social welfare of 
individuals and communities.  For the policy analyst, policy narratives ―can be defined as 
those stories—scenarios and arguments—that are taken by one or more parties to the 
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controversy as underwriting (that is, establishing or certifying) and stabilizing (that is, 
fixing or making steady)  the assumptions for policymaking in the face of the issue‘s 
uncertainty, complexity or polarization‖ (Roe 3).  Although structurally they will often 
follow prescribed protocols, they may also incorporate literary conventions to illustrate 
policy objectives and outcomes.  Yanow explains that  
          [a]lthough metaphors may appear to be merely descriptive, outside the world of 
          literature—in organizational and policy practices—they often acquire a prescriptive 
          aspect.  Metaphors no longer only present new insights into the situations they  
          describe: they also suggest possible action in response to those situations.   
          Metaphors may express some prior, unarticulated understanding of the situations.  
          That is, metaphors can be both models of a situation and models for it. (2000, 43;  
          emphasis in original)   
The values that generate a particular policy narrative are implicit in the way the social 
welfare issue is framed in terms of the constituents and the social context, or the 
characters and setting, concerned.  For example, when a policy of institutionalization for 
people with mental disabilities was endorsed it promoted a narrative of care and cure.  
The subsequent policy narrative of de-institutionalization has incorporated metaphors of 
choice and inclusion.     
 In Ontario, policy narratives around disability can be seen to have come full 
circle, since May 11, 1839 when ―the House of Assembly passed: ‗An Act to authorize 
the erection of an Asylum within this Province for the reception of Insane and Lunatic 
persons‘‖ (Simmons 1990, 3).  This narrative told a story of people who needed to be 
institutionalized for their recovery; to protect them from themselves or unscrupulous 
people who would exploit and take advantage of them.   
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 Hand in hand with that storyline went another dominant narrative that described 
how the mentally infirm needed to be segregated from the general public to prevent the 
spread of idiocy propagated by ―feeble-minded‖ women who were represented as deviant 
and oversexed (Simmons 1982, 69-70; Reaume 31).  Regardless of the reasons for 
political and community support for institutionalization, today its effect is interpreted by 
many disability advocates as having denied a substantial population a voice and visibility 
(Couser 2007, 72) in society.     
 Yanow explains how the study of built spaces can inform interpretive policy 
analysis.  She says that ―settings of policy and agency acts may communicate policy 
meanings other than, in addition to, or even contradicting those named in the policies 
themselves‖ (62).  Descriptions of facilities for people with mental disabilities that use 
terms like ―fortress‖ or ―prison‖ (Sacks 1990, 25; Scull 49) imply social attitudes of fear 
and antipathy toward people living outside the cognitive or psychiatric norm.  At the 
same time, Reaume also notes that while the ―asylum itself was viewed with genuine fear 
and loathing by some… for others who felt they had nowhere else to turn it was perceived 
as a last refuge‖ (24).  This is because in a pre-social welfare state, the institution or 
asylum provided refuge to people who were poor and too sick to support themselves, as 
well as abused or deserted wives and the elderly (Reaume 20).     
 The slow change of social attitudes regarding the place of mental disability in 
society speaks to how a dominant policy narrative, once it captures a society‘s 
imagination, is hard to counteract.  This is especially true when subjects of the dominant 
narrative have impairments that limit or preclude the ability to generate a viable counter-
narrative.  However, eventually the narrative did change as a result of a long period of 
advocacy led by parents of people with severe disabilities and other social reformers that 
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finally began to gain political momentum in the 1960s, culminating in a community living 
movement that took hold in the 1970s (Dunn 417; Marshall 7).  The new dominant policy 
narrative endorsed a de-institutionalization storyline as more humane and appropriate to 
realizing personal growth and human rights entitlements.  For example, Dunn praises 
what he perceives as a ―paradigm shift from a medical and rehabilitation model to one 
based on consumer control, empowerment and self-help‖ (415); a perspective shared by 
many people who celebrate the closing of the remaining provincial institutional facilities 
in Orillia, Smiths Falls and Chatham-Kent, in 2009 (Picard L1, L4; Crawford, 27 Dec. 08, 
para. 2-3).   
 At the same time, those who oppose this narrative shift may be depicted as 
difficult, or in some way lacking in natural affections, even if those same people were 
once prevailed upon to relinquish custody of family members as the best option for 
meeting the disabled person‘s needs.  Reaume‘s investigation of patient files from the 
Toronto Hospital for the Insane found that ―some patients who escaped, sometimes to 
hundreds of miles from Toronto, returned on their own to live out their lives at the 
institution they decided was their home after decades of knowing no other environment‖ 
(71).  This is consistent with sentiments expressed by some people in relation to the  
current de-institutionalization experience in Ontario.  Some families have resisted the 
relocation of their relations who have lived most of their lives in an institutional facility 
that they recognize as their home.  Alternative narratives– for instance, ones that address 
broken relationships between residents moved from their institutional homes to new 
community living arrangements (―Lifetime Friendships Lost‖ para. 1-14)– have rarely 
been published.   
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 In this light the dominant narrative of the apparent success of de-
institutionalization in Ontario needs to be critically considered.  People living in the 
community may be less visible than when they reside in facilities that are required to 
meet standards of care, and are inspected regularly.  Rose Galvin observes that the 
―rhetoric behind this move has been cloaked in philanthropic terms that are consistent 
with the aims of the independent living movement.  In reality, however, this has proven to 
be a cost-cutting exercise‖ (47).  Segregated services in institutions may be replaced by 
segregated services in the community (Dunn 415), as implied by Dr. Benjamin 
Goldberg‘s belief that ―it is possible to have ‗institutionalization‘ in the community 
setting, and it is possible also to have ‗deinstutionalization‘ and the concept of 
normalization inside the institution‖ (In Marshall 41).  Andrew Scull is also mindful of 
how similar rhetorical positions have been used over time to endorse opposing policy 
narratives advocating for or against institutionalization:   
          I would hope that those encountering our contemporary reformers and ideologues, 
          who urge deinstitutionalization and praise the virtues of ‗community,‘ may acquire  
          a certain necessary skepticism from recalling how fervently their nineteenth- 
          century counterparts once preached the gospel of retreat from the world and  
          seclusion within the walls of the asylum.  Similarly, both those who urge liberty for  
          the lunatic and those who on the contrary complain of patients ‗dying with their  
          rights on‘ play out scripts with a long and checkered history. (7) 
There is ample evidence that community integration is not the inevitable outcome of 
closing institutional facilities, as policy makers already consider the experiences of a 
growing number of  people with mental illness and intellectual disabilities ‗falling 
through the cracks‘, or the holes of Ontario‘s existing social safety net.   
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 Andrew Scull also cites evidence from both Canadian and American studies 
indicating that, when compared with people receiving community treatment, fewer people 
with mental health diagnoses who resided in hospital ―‗were incontinent, fewer took no 
part in bathing, more were able to bathe without help, fewer took no responsibility for 
their own grooming, more dressed without assistance, fewer failed to dress… and more 
had money available and were capable of making occasional purchases‘‖ (Epstein & 
Simon in Scull 324).  While this evidence must be dependent on the nature and degree of 
disability within a diverse population of people with disabilities, Scull also argues that 
there is no strong evidence that people being released from institutional facilities today 
are actually doing better, much less thriving in the wider community (315-316).  Even if 
we agree that the lives of all members are enriched by living in truly integrated 
communities, it is irresponsible to ignore evidence that points to the vulnerability of 
mentally disabled people pursuing ‗independent living‘:  
          The mother of a mentally disabled man says she talked to her son three times on   
          the phone, unaware he was being held and tortured in a filthy attic apartment.   
            Though he sounded ‗tired,‘ she didn‘t know that her 22-year-old son, who  
          has the mental capacity of a 12-15-year-old, was allegedly being beaten with pipes,  
          forced to eat feces and burned over much of his body with a hair iron.   
            The man who cannot be identified due to a court order, was near death  
          from toxic shock when police found him… (Morse, para 1-3). 
This Toronto Star article goes on to report that the man had lived on his own with help 
from a social worker, and that his mother had given up all of her parental rights to get him 
the personal supports that he needed as a child (para. 10-11).  Such media reports 
demonstrate the implications of policy narratives on individual lives, and are similar to 
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case studies to the extent that they contribute to a critical evaluation of policies, programs 
and services that influence these storylines.   
 At the locations where services are delivered, agency policy narratives may 
include reporting on program planning and evaluations.  Program evaluations regularly 
expose significant discrepancies between stated policy objectives and actual outcomes.  
These occasions often provide rich data for interpretive analysis because ―[b]y exploring 
the tensions or contradictions between intended and enacted meanings, the analyst can 
begin to assess whether the act is communicating some additional policy-relevant 
meaning‖ (Yanow 79).  Case studies are often employed to demonstrate apparent 
disconnection between policy objectives and outcomes.   
 In fact, the case study method is utilized extensively in many health and social 
welfare agencies to meet a number of therapeutic and legislative ends.  Di Terlizzi argues 
that case studies have the potential to demonstrate how ―reports on [service] users‘ views 
and life stories… shed new light on the diversity of individual outcomes‖ (501).  She adds 
that the case study method is more appropriate than traditional program evaluation tools, 
as even contemporary interview techniques and emerging technologies cannot overcome 
challenges associated with ―eliciting the views of people who have a communicative 
impairment‖ (502).  This view echoes Sacks‘ explanation for writing his case studies of 
his patients to depict life stories where severe neurological disease or disability is present.  
He is trying to bring the clinical interpretation closer together with the life experience; a 
practice that dates back to ―that universal and prehistorical tradition by which patients 
have always told their stories to doctors‖ (Sacks 1998, viii).  His commitment to a 
narrative method is motivated by his dissatisfaction with deficit-based case histories, 
observing that  
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          [t]here is no ‗subject‘ in a narrow case history; modern case histories allude to the  
          subject in a cursory phrase… which could as well apply to a rat as a human being.   
          To restore the human subject at the centre—the suffering, afflicted, fighting, human  
          subject—we must deepen a case history to a narrative or tale; only then do we have  
          a ‗who‘ as well as a ‗what‘, a real person, a patient, in relation to disease—in  
          relation to the physical. (1998, viii)   
Oliver Sacks‘ case study narratives have generated several books and substantial personal 
fame, as well as raising awareness about a population of people who were otherwise 
socially marginalized and ignored.   
 One of his most moving case studies is the story of Rebecca:  a young woman 
with profound intellectual deficiency, offset by a strong spiritual capacity and a great 
appreciation for language and symbolism that could not be captured by diagnostic testing.  
He says that ―my two visions of her—as idiot and as symbolist—met, collided and fused.  
She had done appallingly in the testing—which, in a sense, was designed, like all 
neurological and psychological testing, not merely to uncover, to bring out deficits, but to 
decompose her into functions and deficits‖ (1998, 180-181).  In the construction of the 
case study, care needs to be taken to avoid emphasizing deficits, at the expense of 
considering strengths.  The dramatic aspects of a case history are always recorded, but 
often what the clinician, care-giver or advocate needs to know is what a regular day looks 
like; the inevitably mundane aspects of day to day life are at least as important in getting 
to know an individual‘s life story.  Therefore, the author of the case study needs to 
constantly critically reflect upon the purpose of this construction and its implications in 
terms of therapeutic intervention for the client.  In addition, the author‘s professional 
obligations and status, and even political repercussions that may result from honest 
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documentation of a client or patient‘s life story also influence what information goes into 
a case study and how that information is represented.       
 Reaume‘s extensive study of client case files from the Toronto Hospital for the 
Insane speaks to a considerable range of depth in terms of case file content of patients 
between 1870 and 1940.  Perhaps not surprisingly, he finds that the ―lack of material in 
some files includes those of long-term patients who were among the most isolated 
inmates who had no outsiders inquiring about them‖ (5).  Incomplete or deficit-based case 
studies are often the outcome of  uninspired advocacy, and counter-productive 
intervention planning.  Sacks (1998) also marvels about the lack of investigation and the 
brevity of data that often comprise the substance of contemporary case studies.  In 
investigating one patient‘s rich and complicated life history he notes that he started with a 
very thin file:  ―This, then, was the tale I received, or, rather, put together from his chart 
or charts, documents so remarkable for what they lacked as for what they contained‖ 
(221-222).  Case studies are regularly found to be lacking in terms of the depth of 
relevant information, as well as the range of sources that contribute to a cohesive and 
comprehensive client narrative.   
 Michele De Terlizzi expands further upon the implications of incomplete and 
deficit-based client histories that result in externally constructed life stories that are only 
partial, at best.  More unfortunately, they often contribute to a distorted, unfavourable 
perception of the individual.  At the same time, workers and caseloads change within 
agencies on a regular basis and a client case history may actually generate the first 
impression a worker has of the individual.  Di Terlizzi‘s case study of Sue, a woman who 
had lived most of her life in a series of long-term care facilities, demonstrates the kind of 
difficult investigative work that needs to be undertaken in order to re-construct a life 
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history from the fragmented and often contradictory evidence in a case file.  The 
researcher‘s indignation at the long-term lack of insight into Sue‘s life is apparent:   
          A scrutiny of the Special Care unit reviews and Ward 66 records contradict the 
          statements relating to Sue‘s past achievements.  It seems that the people who 
          produced this report did not inspect Sue‘s hospital file and if they did so, it appears  
          that they chose to dismiss their content.  Another possible explanation could be that  
          their assessment of Sue‘s potential was based on what they observed at the time.   
          One of the regrettable features is the fact that the opinion ‗nothing has been  
          achieved in the past 24 years‘ was used to support predictions such as ‗we could  
          contain her only for a few months; I do not think with our staffing levels we could  
          do better than this‘.  These people did not know Sue… . (510)   
Clients often receive services from a number of agencies and their case histories follow 
them.  A file that is already disproportionately focused on deficits becomes fragmented 
over time as the file is passed from different agencies and information is lost or 
disconnected from the contexts that gave it meaning.    
 Social work has a rich casework tradition of its own, where client histories are 
gathered in order to determine and justify the intervention taken to address client 
concerns.  Beresford and Croft point out how client  
          experience and knowledges, reconstructed in the form of case notes, material and 
          studies, have traditionally been used to legitimate, rationalize and promote social  
          work.  Originally when social work was mainly a charitable activity, they served a  
          primary purpose in social work in both allocating and gaining money, and were  
          used both in client assessment and organizational fund raising.  When social work  
          also became a statutory activity, they were employed more systematically as a data  
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          source for management, research and theory building.  It is important to remember,  
          however, that this was service users‘ experience and knowledges as judged,  
          interpreted and understood by social work and its agents. (300)  
Because social workers are preoccupied with identifying and fixing problems, it is not 
surprising that the nature of personal dysfunction is the focus of most case note records.  
In many cases, organizational policy or legislative protocols determine the content of case 
histories and even how they are constructed.   
 Considering all that is not known about life stories that can only be narrated from 
the outside, it is prudent to avoid making unqualified assumptions about the feelings or 
needs of nonverbal people with mental disability diagnoses.  It is at least possible that 
many of them are capable of composing something resembling that internal narrative that 
Bruner identifies as being so vital to the construction of selfhood, even if it cannot be 
expressed in language that others can easily understand.  Referring again to Sacks‘ case 
study of Rebecca, he muses about the ways that this young woman with profound 
disabilities understands herself and her world:  ―[i]s it possible, I wondered, that this 
being before me—at once a charming girl, and a moron, a cognitive mishap—can use a 
narrative (or dramatic) mode to compose and integrate a coherent world, in place of a 
schematic mode, which, in her, is so defective that it simply doesn‘t work?‖ (1998, 181; 
emphasis in original).  Through observation and direct engagement Sacks decides that 
Rebecca is ―complete and intact as ‗narrative‘ being‖ (181).  For him, this means that she 
could present herself in a way that could be communicated as a narrative: a story with a 
purpose and a plot ―and this is something very important to know, for it allowed one to 
see her, and her potential, in a quite different fashion from that imposed by the schematic 
mode‖ (1998, 182).  Again, it is apparent that it is the personal story that contextualizes 
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disability, that gives meaning to the scientific diagnosis of different kinds of impairment, 
as well as the policy responses and planning initiatives designed to accommodate it.   
 As client files are typically fragmented and deficit-based, literary narrative can 
possibly provide vital context in trying to fill information gaps.  Patrick McDonagh 
observes that ―[l]iterary texts are useful historical documents because these often 
foreground how learning disabilities worked symbolically in a social context and enable 
us to examine the ideological forces shaping notions of disability‖ (2000, 49).  Literary 
narratives, together with a range of informed perspectives, including insights from family 
members, friends and frontline workers can be incorporated into the client history, even if 
they contradict the prevailing expertise or the dominant narrative.  This kind of research 
can help to fill in gaps in the life story communicated by people with severe mental 
disabilities, and diminish the effects of professional and cultural bias that the writer 
inevitably brings to the construction of the narrative.     
  Case histories contribute to the determination of client life plans, service 
eligibility, decisions about the ability to provide informed consent, or personal 
responsibility under the law.  It is remarkable how much legal authority is ascribed to 
case histories constructed by social workers and other health and human services 
professionals, even when they are constructed with little or no input from the subject 
whose experience is being documented.  Thus, there is enormous responsibility attached 
to writing a comprehensive and informed narrative, particularly when the subject of that 
narrative cannot directly challenge it.  Jerome Bruner recognizes how a culture‘s stories 
contribute to the content of our legislative systems:   
          Literature, exploiting the semblance of reality, looks to the possible, the figurative.    
          Law looks to the actual, the literal, the record of the past.  Literature errs toward the  
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          fantastic, law toward the banality of the habitual.  But each is half a loaf, and in  
          some covert way each knows it.  Can we ever fit our discontents in the present to  
          the writs and statutes of the past, as the law would have us do?  Or, for that matter,  
          can writers simply imagine the possible worlds they create without brooding over  
          the constraints inherited from their past?  How to wed memory and imagination?   
          How does the comfort of predictability come to live with the excitement of  
          possibility?  The answer is, of course, that they only do so uneasily, even  
          precariously. (2002, 61) 
Traditionally policy planning honours the factual over the imaginative.  What Bruner 
seems to be advancing is the idea that we need both to be able to access a rich reading of 
the past in order to imagine more effective and enriching policy options for the future.   
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CHAPTER 5-  Methodology 
 
Research Problem 
 Statistics Canada reports that 4.4 million Canadians reported having a disability in 
2006 (cited in Prince 201); and most people with disabilities, including most people with 
mental disabilities, have the capacity to challenge representations of their life stories that 
are constructed within society‘s institutions and its cultural texts.  Historically, all women 
and men with severe disabilities have experienced marginalization similar to other 
minority populations; however, their oppression is compounded when the ability to 
communicate their own life stories is impaired.  Eva Feder Kittay points out that  
          [t]hose who speak do so in a language not recognized—and even demeaned—by 
          those who speak in the language of the public sphere.  Without a claim to cognitive  
          parity, even those who can speak are not recognized as authors or agents in their 
          own right.  Those who cannot speak must depend on others to speak for them.   
          Those who can speak find that their voice is given no authority.  Perhaps there is no  
          more disabling disablement. (559) 
When mental disability limits capacity for self-advocacy, the interests of these people are 
represented by family members, care givers, health and social work professionals.  While 
there is a body of research that considers these perspectives, it is important to note that 
the representations of life narratives that are provided by workers, friends and family are  
interpretations that are inevitably filtered through the personal and professional values 
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and aspirations of caregivers and advocates.  As a result, they cannot be assumed to be 
similar to the narratives that people would tell about their own lives.
2
   
 There are ethical as well as epistemological problems associated with representing 
individuals or groups who ―are unable to change, contest or confirm how they are 
portrayed‖ (Iyer 127).  Whether they work in direct practice with individuals, 
administration, program or policy planning, social workers have a professional obligation 
to work for the best interests of their clients (Westhues 5-8).  However, many of the 
theories that social workers rely upon in professional practice with individuals, in service 
planning, administration and policy development cannot be easily evaluated without input 
from clients, service consumers or those most directly affected by policies that social 
workers advocate, implement and analyze.  When the client has a communicative 
impairment that compromises or precludes the ability to express their interests through a 
narrative that is understood as coherent and reliable, social workers need to look beyond 
traditional, evidence-based practice models that cannot adequately address the unique 
combinations of experience, strengths, impairments and resources that contribute to an 
individual‘s life story.   
    
Historical Context 
 Ontario has just completed what may be referred to as an ‗institutional cycle‘, 
beginning with an Establishment phase in 1839 when legislation authorizing the 
establishment of the Province‘s first Provincial Lunatic Asylum was passed (Figure 3).  A 
                                               
2 G. Thomas Couser  (2002) invites the critical reader of disability life narratives to consider ―a number of 
instructive questions:  What sorts of relationships do memoir writers have to their disabled subjects, and 
how do these relationships inflect their narratives?  To what extent do memoir writers mimic the 
ethnographic scenario in which the story of the other is written by a professional expert?  What ethical 
questions arise when disability is narrated by a close relative or friend that do not arise in 
autobiography…?‖ (113) 
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subsequent period of Reform began in the 1960s, culminating with a pledge, in 1987, to 
close all Provincial long-term care hospitals for mentally disabled people over the next 
twenty-five years.  From this point, Ontario entered a Dismantlement phase that 
concluded in spring 2009 when the three remaining long-term care facilities were finally 
closed.   
Figure 3 
 
Theoretical Postulates 
 The research being proposed is grounded in the following theoretical assumptions: 
1. Disability is a social or cultural construction that is unstable and changes over 
time, and across disciplinary perspectives. 
2. Policy and literary discourses are cultural texts that contribute to the construction 
of our definition of disability. 
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3. Current social work theory does not adequately address how to work effectively 
for people who cannot speak for themselves. 
4. Social workers have a professional obligation to work for the best interests of the 
client at individual, organizational and legislative levels of intervention. 
5. Literary narrative is a legitimate resource to utilize for addressing social policy 
problems.   
 
Purpose 
 The purpose of this research is to undertake an interdisciplinary analysis of 
literary and policy discourses in order to better inform policy planning and service 
delivery for people with severe mental disabilities.  It builds upon Michael Ignatieff‘s 
suggestion that the language of human rights does not adequately address the complexity 
of human need:  ―When we talk about needs we mean something more than just the basic 
necessities of human survival.  We also use the word to describe what a person needs in 
order to live to their full potential  What we need in order to survive, and what we need in 
order to flourish are two different things‖ (10).  He concludes that a language of human 
need cannot come from political discourse alone.  Instead, he notes that ―[i]t was in 
literature and painting rather than in political language that the possibilities of urban 
belonging were first given adequate images‖ (140); and further, that ―[i]t is the painters 
and writers, not the politicians or the social scientists, who have been able to find a 
language for the joy of modern life‖ (141).  Such a position speaks to the creative 
potential of a dialogue between policy and literary discourses to enrich a language of 
needs that may inform the efforts of social workers engaged in representing the interests 
of people who can not effectively advocate for themselves.    
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 Consistencies or contradictions within or between different literary and policy 
texts may suggest corresponding agreement or disconnect between professional and 
cultural/social understandings of people with mental disabilities and their life 
experiences.  In addition, this analysis may suggest possible correlations between 
dominant narrative themes and policy responses relevant to people with disabilities that 
have occurred before and might be predictable again.     
 Specifically, the research is designed to answer the following research questions:   
1. What can be learned through a comparative examination of how mental disability 
is represented in literary and social policy discourses over the course of Ontario‘s 
Institutional Cycle?  
2. How may an interdisciplinary analysis of literary and policy discourses inform 
policy planning and the provision of services for people with mental disabilities in 
Ontario?  
 
Procedure 
 The proposed research questions may be answered through a process of 
interpretive discourse analysis, which lends itself well to interdisciplinary knowledge 
generation.  As the preceding overview of dominant literary, disability and policy 
approaches demonstrates, an interpretive discourse analysis entails ―consideration of 
several alternative ways of conceptualizing the discursive domain under analysis‖ 
(Burman, sec 4 para 1).  Discourse analysis is also well suited to a text-based study where 
―text is the data and the approach is therefore not about exploring ‗the‘ content or 
meaning of the text.  Rather, it is about explaining how certain things came to be said or 
done‖ (Cheek 147, emphasis in original).  Discourse analysis contributes to generative 
102 
 
 
theory, which Goldstein describes as ―pliable, inductive, open-ended, and therefore 
responsive to new information‖ (39).  A generative or inductive approach to knowledge 
gathering is appropriate when the aim of the research is to find new sources of 
knowledge, rather than testing an existing sample.   
 Using a reflexive approach that entails reading and interpretation as processes that 
occur together, throughout the analysis, themes or patterns emerge through reading and 
re-reading the selected discourses.  The data collected will consist of extracts from the 
selected literary and policy texts that demonstrate how disability is constructed in these 
discourses, within and between identified phases (Establishment, Reform, 
Dismantlement) of the institutional cycle.  It is anticipated that themes generated by 
interpretive analysis of the data will identify dominant cultural assumptions about what is 
disability, as well as the experience, aspirations and potential of people with severe 
mental disabilities.  Particular interest will be paid to points of transition in the 
Institutional Cycle to identify any corresponding shifts in dominant narratives about 
disability.  Any rhetorical patterns, debates or contradictions between the stories and 
policies will be noted and their implications considered.   
 
Rationale 
Goldstein explains how the humanities inform understanding of social welfare 
issues by suggesting that the ―humanities do not profess to offer answers; rather, they 
encourage the kind of disciplined questioning and reflection that are fundamental to what 
effective [social work] practice may be.  Not to be overlooked, the humanities enable us 
to understand the life of the sciences we depend on‖ (41).  Turning more specifically to 
literature, several writers have theorized about its contribution to our understanding of 
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social welfare problems (Bruner 2002, 13-14, 194; Cohen 73; Iyer 127; Mar & Oatley 
173, 180; Margolis & Shapiro 18; McDonagh, 2000, 49; Nussbaum 5-6; Peckham 227-
228).   
 Novels have been identified as the most appropriate literary genre for answering 
the research questions because ―[n]ovels… do not merely reflect the ideologies of their 
times.  They also contribute, performatively, to the creation of those ideologies‖ (Miller 
167).  Furthermore, advances in mass production technology and growing literacy rates, 
as the product of an emerging public education system, were contributing factors that 
resulted in the rapid proliferation of the novel (Davis, 1998, 318) at the same time that 
political impetus to formalize institutional policy for people with mental disabilities was 
being established.   
 Franco Moretti has tracked literary publication trends in England from 1700-1850 
and finds that the number of novels published in England rises sharply in 1840 (7), 
corresponding with the establishment of the Institutional Cycle.  While this is not 
sufficient evidence to claim a direct correlation between the novel and emerging policy 
discourses about mental disability, it does affirm the merit in considering novels and 
policy together as relevant cultural texts associated with mental disability.   
 Martha Nussbaum (1995) writes specifically about the unique contribution that 
narrative literature, especially the novel, offers people who have the authority to influence 
policy change:   
          The novel is a living form and in fact still the central morally serious yet popularly  
          engaging fictional form in our culture… [I]f we are going to speak about  
          contemporary public life, and the ways in which concrete circumstances shape  
          human emotions and aspirations, it seems wise to focus on a genre that is still  
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          productive, and in which concrete circumstances that are relevant to our  
          deliberations may be depicted. (6-7)   
Novels are the most accessible narrative genre that both depicts and sometimes challenges 
dominant social, political and professional constructions of disability.  This is the 
rationale for selecting novels as the most representative cultural discourse for 
representing life stories of people who are the subject of disability policy across the 
Institutional Cycle.   
 
Themes for Analysis 
 Regarding the data sample selected to answer the research questions, the 
following themes have been identified as fundamental to addressing the research 
questions:    
 How Their Stories are Told-  The research problem is concerned with how 
social workers construct the life stories of people with limited or no capacity to speak for 
themselves.  Therefore, it will be instructive to look to novels for insight into how 
disabled characters‘ stories are told.  Narrative technique and point of view indicate who 
speaks for the disabled individual.  Do people communicate their own stories in literary 
fictions?  If so, how?  In policy and in story it is important to consider who speaks for 
people with mental disabilities, as an indication of the value given the testimony of this 
population at different phases of the Institutional Cycle.       
 The Role of the Family-  The relationship between  people with mental 
disabilities and their families is central to the stories and policy that depict how people 
with mental disabilities should live, and who should support them.  In all phases of the 
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Cycle the representation of family roles and relations draws attention to problematic 
assumptions in planning, administration and service delivery.   
 Community Roles/Responsibility/Inclusion-  The perceived relationship 
between people with mental disabilities and their respective communities determines the 
storylines given to them in cultural texts, including novels, and the nature of services and 
supports defined in policy.  When planning objectives do not realistically represent 
people‘s needs or community capacity then personal and policy outcomes are 
compromised.     
 Perceptions of the Institution-  The role of institution may be influenced by  
family and community roles, and will be examined in each phase of the Cycle.  This 
research understands institution as a long-term custodial care facility for people perceived 
to be mentally disabled.  In addition, schools, hospitals and other facilities may also be 
relevant institutions for analysis where they function as an asylum, or as a training facility 
for people who have impairments that pose barriers to inclusion in the community.  In 
some cases these impairments are the result of family dysfunction or structural 
discrimination that either contribute to or exacerbate mental disability.      
  
Description of Sample 
 In each phase of the Cycle three novels will be analysed, together with significant 
policy texts or legislation.  There is much critical debate surrounding what constitutes 
social policy (Westhues 6).  It ―is a term replete with emotional content but lacking in 
agreed-upon meaning‖ (Lightman 37).  In undertaking an interpretive policy analysis, 
Dvora Yanow argues that ―[w]hereas traditional approaches to policy analysis focus on 
policies as exclusively instrumental and goal-oriented, interpretive approaches add the 
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expressive dimension of human policy-making action, demonstrating and enacting for a 
variety of audiences, near and far, what a polity finds meaningful‖ (88).  Given the lack 
of consensus about what constitutes policy, an interpretive policy analysis should 
optimally consider a diverse selection of policy texts.  Therefore, this study considers 
major legislative acts that have defined the parameters of formal policy related to people 
with mental disabilities.  In addition, relevant policy planning and consultation 
documents, program evaluations, and critical commentary by researchers, practitioners, 
and in the public media, represent the range of disability policy discourse selected for 
analysis. 
 Given that the identified Cycle addresses a policy context specific to Ontario, all 
of the policy research, reporting, planning documents and legislation considered pertains 
to that jurisdiction.  Policy sources have been selected on the basis of their historical 
significance and their contribution to moving the Institutional Cycle from one phase to 
the next.        
 The data sample is clustered around the formal commencement of the Cycle that 
occurred with passage of legislation to open Ontario‘s first lunatic asylum, and near 
subsequent points of transition between phases.  The selection of relevant novels aspires 
to diversity by considering literary sources that have influenced the cultural construction 
of disability by virtue of their popularity, critical acclaim, or in terms of innovative ways 
that they represent or challenge dominant constructions of mental disability.  The literary 
sample includes both male and female characters who embody a range of impairments 
that are diagnosed as mental illness or mental disability.  The sample also reflects the 
influence that British and, later, American cultures have had on policy responses to 
disability in Canada, specifically Ontario. 
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Table 3- Establishment Phase 
Year Policy Texts and Events Narrative 
1839 ―An Act to authorize the erection of 
an asylum within this Province for 
the Reception of Insane and 
Lunatic Persons‖ 
 
1841 First Provincial Lunatic Asylum 
opens in Ontario 
Dickens, Barnaby Rudge 
1847  Brontë, Jane Eyre 
1850  999 Queen Street West opens  
1855  Gaskell, Half a Life-Time Ago 
1866 An Act Respecting Municipal 
Institutions of Upper Canada 
 
1876 Orillia Lunatic Asylum opens  
1897 Russell, ―The Relation of Insanity 
to the State‖ 
 
1900 An Act Respecting Lunatics  
 
 The Establishment phase covers over 120 years of expansion of the institutional 
system in Ontario, and is disproportionately long in comparison with subsequent Reform 
and Dismantlement phases.  In order to keep the scope of the present research within 
manageable parameters a number of factors were considered.  First, literary narratives for 
the Establishment phase sample were selected on the basis of their proximity to the 
commencement of the Institutional Cycle, in 1839, in order to obtain a sample most 
representative of cultural attitudes at the time when it was deemed necessary to introduce 
a formal policy of institutionalization.   
 In terms of policy analysis, the potential sample is much smaller than in 
subsequent cycles of the Institutional Cycle.  In addition to the 1839 Act to authorize the 
establishment of the Province‘s first lunatic asylum, the 1866 Act Respecting Municipal 
Institutions of Upper Canada addresses the status of idiots and their management in 
society.     
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 Dr. Russell‘s (1897) speech to the British Medical Association is included in the 
sample, as he speaks specifically to contemporary theories of insanity and the 
government‘s role in the care and control of the ―defective classes‖(3), from his 
perspective as Superintendent of the Asylum for the Insane, in Hamilton Ontario.  
 An Act Respecting Lunacy is also included to explicate the distinction between 
mental illness (lunacy) and mental disability (idiocy) in law.   
 Analysis of the policy context for the Establishment phase is substantially 
informed by secondary analysis of research produced by Harvey G. Simmons (1982, 
1990), Geoffrey Reaume (2000), and others who have undertaken comprehensive 
historical analysis on the lives of people residing in Ontario institutions.     
 Because Upper Canada was a British colony and its social policy was most 
heavily influenced by British law and cultural traditions, the sample for this phase is 
comprised of English novels.  In addition,  the potential sample was further refined to 
include only those narratives that remain in print in order to better ensure selection of 
stories that have enduring popularity and relevance to contemporary readers.  These 
criteria ultimately limit the potential sample to a relatively small selection of English 
novels that depict characters with mental disabilities.   
 It is rare for a mentally disabled character to be the eponymous hero of a novel.  
Therefore, Charles Dickens‘Barnaby Rudge (1841) is significant for placing the idiot 
character in the centre of the story‘s action.  Even though it is not one of Dickens‘ more 
successful novels, by any other writer‘s standard it garnered a substantial audience.  
 Charlotte Brontë‘s novel, Jane Eyre (1847) was an immediate success, upon its 
original publication (Davies ix, xi), and has remained tremendously popular since that 
time.  In addition, the character of Bertha Rochester marks the establishment of a 
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narrative archetype—the ‗madwoman in the attic‘-- that is re-visited in selections from 
subsequent phases of the Cycle.   
 Elizabeth Gaskell‘s novella, Half a Life-Time Ago (1855), is included in this set 
because Gaskell‘s work was very popular.  She was a regular contributor to Dickens‘ 
weekly magazine, Household Words, which was where Half a Life-Time Ago was first 
circulated (Easson ix).  Also, Willie Dixon contributes to the diversity of the sample in 
that his disability is acquired as a result of illness, and the story addresses many of the 
issues that have been central to the debate around a policy of institutionalization.   
 Mental disability has historically been constructed as either lunacy or idiocy.  The 
literary sample for the Establishment phase offers different manifestations of mental 
disability:  Dickens‘ Barnaby Rudge, is born an idiot; Brontë‘s Bertha Rochester is a 
lunatic; and Gaskell‘s Willie Dixon whose mental incapacitation is acquired as a result of 
illness.    
Table 4- Reform Phase 
 
Year Policy Texts and Events Narrative 
1960 Berton, ―What‘s Wrong at 
Orillia…‖, Toronto Star 
 
1962  Kesey, One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest 
1966  Rhys, Wide Sargasso Sea 
1971 ‗Williston Report‘  
1973 ‗Welch Report‘  
1974 Developmental Services Act  
1980  Krantz, Princess Daisy 
1982 Clark v. Clark  
 
 Relevant policy texts selected for analysis include Pierre Berton‘s Toronto Star 
column, ―What‘s Wrong at Orillia: Out of Sight—Out of Mind‖ (6 Jan 1960) because it 
brought the institutional crisis to wider public attention.  Public reaction to this column 
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generated a political response that contributed a growing movement to reform the 
institutional system in Ontario.   
 In 1971, Walter Williston was commissioned by the Ontario Minister of Health to 
investigate the circumstances surrounding the deaths of two individuals who were under 
the guardianship of the Rideau Regional Hospital, at Smiths Falls.  His report, ―Present 
Arrangements for the Care and Supervision of Mentally Retarded Persons in Ontario,‖ is  
a comprehensive analysis of the institutional system serving mentally retarded persons in 
the Province.  The ‗Williston Report‘ findings greatly influenced subsequent planning for 
people with mental disabilities and accelerated a shift toward de-institutionalization and 
community living.   
 Walter Welch‘s report, ―Community Living for the Mentally Retarded in Ontario: 
A New Policy Focus‖ (1973) was the Ontario Government‘s official response to 
Williston‘s findings.  In his capacity as Provincial Secretary for Social Development, 
Welch outlined the needs of people with mental disabilities and the limitations of the 
current system.  His report outlines a plan for downsizing the institutional sector that 
considers a range of planning options, and a corresponding analysis of costs and benefits.   
 The Developmental Services Act (1974) is an important piece of legislation that 
was introduced to respond to the transfer of responsibility of people with developmental 
disabilities from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Community and Social 
Services.  It also establishes the regulations governing community living organizations 
that supported people being diverted or released from provincial institutions.   
 Judge John Matheson‘s decision in the case of Clark v. Clark is included because 
it offers another perspective on the role of families in determining the life plans of people 
with mental disabilities, as the Dismantlement phase of the Cycle was approaching.  It is 
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considered a ground breaking case for many disability activists (Roeher Institute 1996) 
because it endorsed the right of a person with substantial mental and communication 
disabilities to challenge familial authority, and exercise the choice to leave the institution.   
 These policies are considered beside novels that portray characters with mental 
disabilities, their relationship to the institution, and wider society.  Ken Kesey‘s One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1962) was a best-selling novel in North America.  Time 
magazine includes it on its list of 100 best English language novels of all time (Grossman 
& Lacayo).  Set in a psychiatric ward for long-term patients, the story represents people 
with mental disabilities as casualties of a dysfunctional society.  Stereotypes of mental 
disability are interrogated together with cultural assumptions pertaining to race and 
gender.  
 Jean Rhys‘ novel, Wide Sargasso Sea (1966), is important for the way that it 
―writes back‖ (Jenkins viii) to cultural assumptions that the author perceives in Brontë‘s 
creation of Bertha Rochester.  Rhys critically analyses the ‗madwoman in the attic‘ as a 
casualty of cultural tradition that oppresses women in society.  The novel explores how 
the cultural and legal subjugation of women are at least contributing factors to Bertha 
Rochester‘s madness.   
 Both Kesey‘s and Rhys‘ novels were published within a few years of the 
beginning of the Reform period of the Institutional Cycle.  Judith Krantz‘s novel, 
Princess Daisy, was published closer to the transition to the Dismantlement phase of the 
Cycle, and is included in the Reform sample because it was one of the best-selling novels 
of 1980.  Krantz portrays a world that equates beauty and virtue, and presents an 
uncritical portrayal of the institution as the an asylum for a mentally disabled character 
who presumably does not belong in the wider world.   
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Table 5- Dismantlement Phase 
 
Year Policy Texts and Events Narrative 
1987 ―Challenges and Opportunities‖ 
report 
 
1995  Findley, The Piano Man’s 
Daughter 
2004  Haddon, The Curious Incident of 
the Dog in the Night-Time 
2005 Marin (Ombudsman Ontario), 
―‗Between a Rock and a Hard 
Place‘…‖ 
Edwards, The Memory Keeper’s 
Daughter 
2006 Parsons, ―Consultations Regarding 
the Transformation of 
Developmental Services‖  
 
 ―Opportunities and Action‖ report  
 Dingwall, Kemp & Fowke. 
―Creating a Good Life in 
Community: A Guide on Person-
Directed Planning‖  
 
 ―Out of the Shadows at Last…‖ 
(Kirby Commission report) 
 
2008 Services and Supports to Promote 
the Social Inclusion of Persons with 
Developmental Disabilities Act 
 
 
 A substantial amount of policy discourse has been generated since the 
Government of Ontario‘s ―Challenges and Opportunities Initiative‖ (1987) formally 
declared the long-range objective of closing provincial institutions for people with mental 
disabilities.   
 In 2005, the Ombudsman of Ontario, André Marin, produced a report responding 
to complaints by Ontario parents who could not access intensive behavioural and 
residential supports that their severely disabled children required without relinquishing 
custody of these children to the Children‘s Aid Society.  Marin admonished the Ministry 
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of Children and Youth to address the problem of inadequate, or nonexistent government 
services necessary for families to support their children with severe mental disabilit ies.    
 In 2006, the Parliamentary Assistant (Disabilities) to the Minister of Community 
and Social Services, Ernie Parsons, produced his report on ―Consultations Regarding the 
Transformation of Developmental Services‖.  This document reports on consultations 
with family members and service providers for people with developmental disabilities, 
and makes recommendations regarding the service priorities and planning for people with 
developmental disabilities in a post-institutional society.   
 Later that same year, the Government of Ontario released a planning document, 
the ―Opportunities and Action‖ report, which proposed a new system for people with 
mental disabilities to access the services and supports required to meet their specific daily 
living needs.  A corresponding planning guide (Dingwall, Kemp & Fowke, 2006) defines 
roles for service recipients, family members and community partners to realize personal 
planning goals.    
 The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology 
released ―Out of the Shadows at Last: Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness and 
Addiction Services in Canada‖, in 2006.  Authored by Committee Chair, Michael J. L. 
Kirby, this comprehensive analysis of mental health services in Canada is commonly 
known as the ‗Kirby report‘.  It speaks to the community living experiences of people 
who are diagnosed with a chronic mental illness and are trying to maintain good mental 
health.  Many of the issues of housing instability, inadequate personal supports, poverty 
and isolation speak to the same concerns highlighted by people diagnosed with 
developmental or intellectual disabilities.   
114 
 
 
 The 2008, Services and Supports to Promote the Social Inclusion of Persons with 
Developmental Disabilities Act was enacted to replace the 1974 Developmental Services 
Act.  It defines a service structure for people with developmental disabilities in post-
institutional Ontario.  Some sections of the Act have not yet been proclaimed.        
 The literary sample that accompanies Dismantlement policy discourse includes 
novels set across in all of three phases of the Institutional Cycle.  Timothy Findley‘s The 
Piano Man’s Daughter (1995) is set in the Establishment period, beginning in 1889 and 
concluding in 1946.  In addition to offering a retrospective representation of how one 
woman with a mental disability participated in family and community life this novel also 
offers a third perspective on the ‗madwoman in the attic‘.  The novel was also selected 
because Findley is an internationally acclaimed writer (O‘Malley & Potash, para. 2) who 
addresses mental disability in many of his novels with insight and sensitivity.  As a 
Canadian writer, his novel contributes a distinctly Canadian perspective and offers 
historical insight about disability and mental health policy that is specific to Ontario in the 
first half of the twentieth century.   
 Mark Haddon‘s, The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time (2004) is set in 
a suburb of contemporary London and was an international best-seller.  The story is 
narrated in the first person, by the mentally disabled character, and this narrative anomaly 
contributes a new dimension to analysis of how people with mental disabilities may tell 
their own stories. 
 The majority of the action in Kim Edwards‘ novel, The Memory-Keeper’s 
Daughter (2005), is set in the Reform phase of the Cycle, beginning in 1964 through 
1985.  In this novel the disabled individual is not an active character throughout most of 
the storyline.  However, she is omnipresent and influences the storylines of the other 
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major characters in very significant ways.  Like Haddon‘s book, Edwards‘ novel was both 
popular and critically acclaimed.     
 Collectively, the literary sample in this phase depicts characters with the most 
recognizable mental diagnoses in contemporary society:  chronic mental illness, autism, 
and Down syndrome.  The novels selected in the final phase of the cycle are 
representative of the three dominant cultural influences in terms of social policy in 
Ontario:  A Canadian, a British and an American novel comprise the sample here.  
Finally, newspaper articles and nonfiction narrative also contribute to policy discourse.
3
  
Where pertinent, such texts will also be considered in the analysis.   
   
                                               
3 Jutta Weldes‘ refers to ―high‖ and ―low‖ data sources to refer to peer-reviewed research and mainstream 
or popular media, respectively.  He argues that both are essential for interrogating culturally constructed 
concepts (178-180).   
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CHAPTER 6-  Analysis of Establishment Phase 1839-1959 
 
Introduction 
 It is convenient to identify the beginning of the Institutional Cycle in Ontario at 
the date when the first legislation designed specifically to care for mentally disabled 
people was passed in Upper Canada, even though the 1839 Act to Authorise the Erection 
of an Asylum within this Province for the Reception of Insane and Lunatic Persons 
(Statutes of Upper Canada, Ch. XI) was a deliberate response to a social welfare issue 
that had already been long debated and responded to in a number of different ways.
4
  
Traditionally, people who were perceived as idiots, naturals or lunatics were cared for by 
extended family networks, and the community at large (McDonagh, 2008, 41).  However, 
changes in social and economic organization displaced people who were not attached to 
the waged labour economy, and needed daily living care (Davis, 1997, 9-11; Simmons, 
1982, 41-42).   
 Political pressure to develop an institutional response arose from a recognition 
that, as a formal social welfare system in Upper Canada began to emerge, people who 
could not contribute actively to the new economy found themselves on the margins (J. 
Russell 8): often living out of doors or taking up space in prisons, hospitals and poor 
houses.  All of these factors contributed to the erection of the first Provincial Lunatic 
Asylum, which   
                                               
4 To cite just two comprehensive historical treatments, Michel Foucault‘s (1965) Madness and Civilization 
traces political and cultural constructions and response to madness in Western Europe from the end of the 
Middle Ages.  Patrick McDonagh‘s (2008) Idiocy: A Cultural History specifically traces the history of the 
construction of idiocy in (predominantly) English literature from the sixteenth century.   
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          opened with 17 patients in 1841, [and] was originally situated in the county gaol on  
          Toronto Street.  There was not enough space, however, so branch facilities were set  
          up in a house at the corner of Front and Bathurst Streets and in the east wing of the 
          colonial legislative buildings.  In January 1850 a new insane asylum located three  
          miles west of downtown Toronto, at 999 Queen Street West, received its first  
          patients. (Reaume 6)   
The passage of this legislation thus marks the formal recognition of mentally disabled 
people as a distinct component of the population in Upper Canada (Ontario).  The  
subsequent policy that has been built upon this initial Act provides a framework that 
determines the life opportunities of people who have been unable to articulate their own 
life narratives and aspirations.   
 Harvey Simmons traces the separate histories of the asylum systems for people 
who were designated as idiots (1982) or insane (1990), and finds what Geoffrey 
Reaume‘s later research reaffirms:  that these distinct policy responses often overlap, as a 
result of the haphazard way that individuals were assigned to one system or another 
(Parsons 5).   
          Very early on the government of Upper Canada tried to ignore the mentally  
          retarded people who were found in the first lunatic asylums established in the  
          province.  Nevertheless the authorities were forced to deal with them, initially by  
          barring them from admittance to the lunatic asylums and later by providing special  
          facilities for them along with others labelled as ―chronically insane‖.  This was  
          policy by inaction, or inadvertence, for by establishing lunacy policy and  
          deliberately trying to ignore mentally retarded people the authorities in Upper  
          Canada nevertheless found themselves making policy regarding mentally retarded  
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          people.  Thus on occasion the term ―policy‖ refers to government actions which  
          indirectly affected the fate of mentally retarded people. (Simmons 1982, xiii)   
Ontario‘s first Idiot Asylum, originally the London Lunatic Asylum, opened in 1872 for 
the purpose of segregating the chronically insane from those that the lunatic asylum 
purported to cure.
5
  The Province‘s largest facility was devoted exclusively to the care of 
idiots, feeble-minded, mentally retarded, developmentally disabled opened at Orillia in 
1876 (Government of Ontario, 2006, 5; Radford & Park 3).   
 At the time when an institutional policy was established the jurisdiction of Upper 
Canada was an English colony.  As a result, Establishment era social welfare policy was 
heavily influenced by the English legislative system.  Along with its political system, 
British literature also contributed significantly to the cultural fabric of Upper Canada, as 
the Canadian literary canon was barely in its infancy.  As a result, the narratives that 
contributed to an emerging nation‘s construction of disability were, at least at the 
beginning of this phase, also mostly English.  Popular and enduring literary narratives 
published in and around the establishment of the first institutional policy for people with 
mental disabilities include, Charles Dickens‘ Barnaby Rudge (1842); Charlotte Brontë‘s, 
Jane Eyre (1847);  and Elizabeth Gaskell‘s novella, Half A Life-time Ago (1855).  These 
narratives in some ways reflect and reinforce social assumptions inherent in the 1839 Act 
that marks the Establishment of the Institutional Cycle in Ontario and its long period of 
expansion.   
   
                                               
5 Confusion around appropriate diagnosis and treatment of lunatics and idiots existed  in all jurisdictions 
where the asylum system was evolving.  In France, Pinel who pioneered the practice of moral therapy 
observed that ―‗Ideots constitute the greatest number of patients at lunatic hospitals; and their pitiable 
condition, has in too many instances, originated in severity of treatment experienced at other places…. At 
Bicêtre idiocy constitutes one fourth of the whole number of patients,‘ in large part, he claims, because the 
hospital is considered a repository for the untreatable‖ (In McDonagh, 2008, 58) 
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How Their Stories are Told 
 Little scope is given for a person with mental disabilities to tell his or her own 
story in Establishment policy or literature.  In the mid-nineteenth century, politicians and 
medical superintendents might consult other experts, but the experiences of frontline 
workers or family members were not considered, much less the opinions of the idiots or 
lunatics who were the subject of institutional policy.  Whether or not the resulting policy 
was more effective, the administrative system that produced it was smaller, more stable 
and less dynamic than the political bureaucracies that have evolved over the course of 
subsequent phases in the Cycle.  This is evident by the comparatively slender policy 
legacy generated at the beginning of the Establishment period, in contrast with 
subsequent policy phases that had more substantial bureaucracies dedicated to addressing 
contemporary issues in disability policy.    
 Contemporary disability scholars have attempted to compensate for the absence of 
first-person stories at the outset of the Institutional Cycle through ethnographic research.  
Geoffrey Reaume, for example, has researched the patient files at Ontario‘s largest and 
most famous asylum: the Toronto Hospital for the Insane, at 999 Queen Street West.  His 
work makes an important contribution to our understanding of what institutional life was 
like for patients who resided there.  Still, he admits that surviving records of first-person 
narratives are quite thin (5).  This makes the Establishment novel a particularly important 
source for portraying dominant cultural constructions of disability that influenced and 
was influenced by policy assumptions at the time.    
 Dickens novel, Barnaby Rudge, was published in 1841, two years following the 
commencement of the Institutional Cycle in Ontario.  It‘s a historical novel, set during the 
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Gordon Riots, which occurred in 1780 (Bowen xvi).  The eponymous hero of the novel is 
an idiot, cared for by his devoted mother, but also by the wider community.  Dickens 
establishes his primary characters in a small village where social ties are strong.  There is 
an intimacy between the residents that fosters stronger relationships between Barnaby and 
the characters who contribute to his life narrative.  Furthermore, despite his intellectual 
impairments, Barnaby is very capable of telling his own story.  Even though he is not a 
consistent presence in a story with many characters and storylines, the reader ‗hears‘ 
Barnaby‘s voice as clearly as any of the other major characters in the novel, which is a 
rare occurrence in literature from this period (Bowen xxii).
6
   
 Jane Eyre is a retrospective narrative told in the first person by the title character 
of the novel.  There is an intimacy created between the narrator and the reader that is 
contrived, in part, by the tendency for  Jane to address the reader directly, particularly at 
major turning points in the story.
7
  In contrast, Bertha Rochester is depicted mostly as a 
mysterious and sinister presence, rather than an actual person.  The reader never has 
access to her thoughts, and only receives her story third hand, as it is Jane‘s account of 
what Rochester tells her about his wife‘s history.  In fact, Jane is never actually present to 
hear Bertha say anything for herself.  The only words ascribed to Bertha over the course 
of the novel‘s action only further elucidate her depravity, as her brother attests that when 
Bertha attacked him with a knife and with her teeth, ―‗she said she‘d drain my heart‘‖ 
(Brontë 246). Otherwise, the raving that Jane hears, and eventually witnesses, is 
inarticulate.  Furthermore, Rochester‘s version on his wife‘s story cannot necessarily be 
                                               
6 Earlier drafts of the novel were named for Gabriel Varden, who represents ―solid middle-class citizenry‖ 
(McDonagh, 2008, 174) and is most directly responsible for bringing about the restitution of social order, 
and saving Barnaby from the gallows.  Bowen believes that Dickens‘ decision to name a novel ―after 
someone as socially marginal and intellectually weak as Barnaby is a remarkable act of confidence in his 
own dramatic powers‖ (xxii).    
7 Perhaps most famously, ―Reader, I married him‖, at the beginning of the concluding chapter. 
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relied upon, as he is a man who feels duped into a marriage that he has regretted from the 
outset; and he is trying to defend his attempt to lure Jane into a bigamous union.   
 Like Dickens, Gaskell also sets her novella in a rural setting that emphasizes the 
intimacy of relationship between the characters.  She also sets her story back in time.  In 
Half a Life-time Ago,  Willie Dixon‘s story is told retrospectively from the perspective of 
an omniscient third-person narrator fifty years after the action of the story takes place.  
There is almost a fairytale,  ‗once upon a time‘ feel to the story right from its opening 
lines: ―Half a life-time ago, there lived in one of Westmoreland dales a single woman of 
the name of Susan Dixon‖ (Gaskell 3).  The narrator then proceeds with a description of a 
rural past that is picturesque in its rustic simplicity and evocation of a way of life that 
reaches back generations.   
 Setting the idiot in an idyllic, pastoral backdrop was a well established literary 
convention by this time.  Literary critics have linked Gaskell‘s novella with William 
Wordsworth‘s poem, ―The Idiot Boy‖ (1798), published in his collection of Lyrical 
Ballads (Easson x).  In addition,  the maternal devotion that Wordsworth‘s Betty Foy has 
for her idiot boy is replicated in Susan Dixon‘s fond affection for her brother, Willie; and 
also in Mary Rudge‘s relationship with her son, Barnaby.  The perspectives of these 
characters are crucial in the novels as they are called upon to speak and advocate for the 
mentally disabled individual, whereas Bertha Rochester‘s primary spokesperson is a man 
who loathes her and sees his mentally disabled wife as an obstacle to his happiness.  
Thus, the relationships between the idiot or lunatic to their families and community have 
a substantial influence in the ways that their stories are constructed, and determinations 
that are made about their care.     
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The Role of the Family 
 Nineteenth-century English literature typically identifies mental disability as the 
personal misfortune or burden of the individual, regardless of how it is acquired.  The 
community has no inherent responsibility to directly care for or protect the individual, 
although the passage of legislation to erect Upper Canada‘s first lunatic asylum included 
a provision to tax ―each and every inhabitant householder… an additional rate of 
assessment of one-eighth of a penny in the pound‖ (XIII) to offset the cost of building and 
maintaining the lunatic asylum.  Otherwise, care and control of the disabled individual 
was perceived at this time to be the exclusive responsibility of the family, and where the 
family was unable or unwilling to carry out that responsibility the individual was 
typically contained in a workhouse, jail or hospital if he or she was unable to work for a 
living.  This section considers how novels and policy discussion hold family responsible 
for causing or exacerbating mental disability in the individual.  At other times, however, 
the love of a good mother or devoted sibling is shown to be essential for maintaining the 
mentally disabled individual‘s personal security and place in the community.  This caring 
labour is also represented as morally correct and personally rewarding for the caregiver.    
 The original legislation for the Provincial Lunatic Asylum held families 
responsible for the costs of maintaining patients (VII).  However, given the high 
proportion of destitute lunatics who were maintained in the asylum at the expense of the 
State (VIII), many families simply abandoned their relatives in order to relieve 
themselves of responsibility for their maintenance.  In his remarks to the British Medical 
Association (1897), the Superintendent of the Asylum for the Insane at Hamilton Ontario 
affirmed that there was ―abundant evidence‖ that the public abused the privilege of 
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government funded care intended for those who have no other means of support (J. 
Russell, 7).       
 The role of the family in relation to people with mental disabilities is depicted in 
Establishment novels in a number of different ways.  In some cases, the mental incapacity 
of the individual is portrayed as the devastating inheritance from parents who themselves 
are deranged, or behave immorally.  At other times the presence of the disabled individual  
highlights the selflessness of family members who devote their lives to caring for the 
idiot.  These novels speak to the personal toll that being the familial guardian of the 
disabled individual can take, but these caregivers also know the satisfaction of 
unconditional love from those who are so dependent upon them.  Finally, the 
vulnerability of the disabled individual is conveyed in the ways that they are exploited 
and abused by those who reject their duty to provide care and protection.   
 In the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, lunacy is often  
linked with some kind of individual or degenerative moral failing that may be traced back 
through the parents, and perhaps further (McDonagh, 2008, 258-263).  For instance, 
―Barnaby Rudge is very concerned with the nature of inheritance, in particular what we 
inherit from our parents‖ (Bowen xxvi).  Barnaby is even physically marked by his 
father‘s evil by the blood red birth mark on his wrist (Dickens 5).   
 On the other hand, Jane Eyre‘s isolation contributes to inflaming her passionate 
nature to a point verging on madness.  Orphaned, and under the care of her Aunt Reed, 
the widow of her mother‘s brother, Jane is mercilessly abused by a family who does not 
want her.  John Reed torments Jane with epithets that dehumanize her.  He calls her a 
―bad animal‖ (Brontë 11), and when Jane retaliates against his assault she admits that ―he 
had closed with a desperate thing‖ (Brontë 14).  When the nursery maid comes to help 
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restrain Jane, she compares her to a ―mad cat‖ (Brontë 15); and Jane recalls how she 
―looked doubtfully on my face, incredulous of my sanity‖ (Brontë 16).  This episode 
occurs at the beginning of the novel, and the animal metaphors used to describe Jane in 
her distress anticipate the isolation and apparent distress of a similarly incarcerated Bertha 
Rochester at Thornfield. 
 When Jane is punished for defending herself against her cousin‘s assault she is 
confined in the upstairs bedroom where her uncle died.  Jane‘s terrified imagination 
manifests a vision of a spirit that provokes a kind of fit where she admits that ―[a]ll John 
Reed‘s violent tyrannies, all his sisters‘ proud indifference, all his mother‘s aversion, all 
the servants‘ partiality, turned up in my disturbed mind like a dark deposit in a turbid 
well‖ (Brontë 18).  In this way, Brontë demonstrates how a child who is starved of 
affection and a sense of belonging is vulnerable to strange terrors that may disturb the 
mind.     
 Gaskell, on the other hand, de-emphasizes a hereditary explanation for madness  
in her story by stressing the sobriety and temperance of the Dixon lineage: ―William 
Dixon and Margaret Dixon were rather superior people, of a character belonging—as far 
as I have seen—exclusively to the class of Westmoreland and Cumberland statesmen—
just, independent, upright; not given to much speaking; kind-hearted, but not 
demonstrative; disliking change, and new ways, and new people; sensible and shrewd‖ 
(Gaskell 4-5).  This description of the family‘s lineage extends to the character of the 
community generally and explains Susan‘s own characteristic reserve.   
 This does not mean, however, that the Dixon parents are not susceptible to poor 
judgment.  Susan‘s and Michael‘s union had initially seemed an advantageous alliance to 
both families as a means of merging their farms and the assets that they generated:  ―Both 
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fathers and mothers cast a glance from time to time at Michael and Susan, who were 
thinking of nothing less than farm or dairy, but whose unspoken attachment was, in all 
ways, so suitable and natural a thing that each parent rejoiced over it, although with 
characteristic reserve it was never spoken of‖ (Gaskell 6).  Even parents with good 
intentions for their children‘s interests are shown to be fallible in their judgment, 
particularly when other interests, like the combination of assets and property influence 
perception.   
 Edward Rochester‘s father and Bertha Mason‘s parents, however, are blatantly  
deceitful in manipulating the disastrous match between their children. Rochester‘s 
―avaricious and grasping‖ (Brontë 351) father arranged the match so that his second son 
would be wealthy without having to divide the family fortune.  Having found an eligible 
candidate in the daughter of business partner, who would offer a dowry of thirty 
thousands pounds, Rochester explains how after college he was dispatched to Jamaica, 
―‗…to espouse a bride already courted for me.  My father said nothing about her          
money; but he told me Miss Mason was the boast of Spanish Town for her beauty;           
and this was no lie…  a marriage was achieved almost before I knew where I was‘‖ 
(Brontë 352).  He admits that Bertha was also used as her family‘s currency to secure a 
fortune, and explains that it was only after his wedding that he learned about the family‘s 
history of madness ―for they were silent on family secrets before.  Bertha, like a dutiful 
child, copied her parent in both points‖ (Brontë 337); these points being madness and 
drunkenness.   
 The tradition of placing economic considerations above personal compatibility in 
marriage is one that Jane also, albeit reluctantly, endorses when she presumes that 
Rochester will propose marriage to Blanche Ingram.  Watching them together, Jane 
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admits to herself:  ―I had thought him a man unlikely to be influenced by motives so 
commonplace in his choice of a wife; but the longer I considered the position, education, 
etc., of the parties, the less I felt justified in judging or blaming either him or Miss Ingram 
for acting in conformity to ideas and principles instilled in them, doubtless, from their 
childhood‖ (Brontë 217).  It was considered natural for people to marry within their social 
class, to their economic advantage, and Jane‘s acceptance of that social convention 
justifies, at least to some extent, the circumstances that facilitated Rochester‘s existing 
marriage.  Therefore, it seems unfair to make Bertha bear the brunt of responsibility for 
such an arrangement between herself and Rochester.  Still, despite his self-recriminations 
for being the dupe of his own family‘s ambitions, Rochester does not evince any 
compassion for his wife being placed in similar circumstances.  In fact, as a woman she 
would have had even less ability to assert herself against a match that her family would 
have arranged for her interest and their own:  a complexity that Jean Rhys explores in her 
re-construction of Bertha‘s life-narrative in Wide Sargasso Sea.   
 Because Jane recognizes the supremacy of Bertha‘s claim, as a wife, on the man 
she loves, she must sacrifice that love; but she ultimately gains new family relations and 
financial independence by choosing the right course.  Similarly, Gaskell‘s Susan 
ultimately gains by insisting on the moral course of action in honouring her deathbed 
pledge to her mother to care for her brother Willie who, following his illness, is subject to 
fits and requires ―the same care taken of him that a little child of four years old requires‖ 
(Gaskell 24).  When Susan refuses to concede to Michael‘s demand that Willie be 
institutionalized upon their marriage ―[t]he sacrifice she had made for this object only 
made it more precious to her‖ (Gaskell 37).  Furthermore, the house-servant responds to 
the broken engagement by declaring that ―‗[w]e‘re rid of bad rubbish anyhow‘‖ (Gaskell 
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33).  Peggy‘s assessment of the break-up as an act of good fortune proves correct, as 
Michael ultimately degenerates into a life of dissipation that leaves the wife that he does 
take and their children living in destitute circumstances.  Willie‘s disability, therefore, 
may be read as his sister‘s salvation.    
 If Gaskell‘s story points to the family as the best asylum for the disabled 
individual, and Brontë depicts how dysfunctional families can also be the source of the 
malady, Dickens creates a character whose idiocy is caused by the moral depravity of the 
father, although he is saved by the goodness of the mother who loves the offspring of her 
disastrous union ―better than she loved herself‖ (Dickens 208).  Barnaby‘s idiocy, like the 
blood red birthmark on his wrist, is the legacy left by his father following as a result of 
the shock that his pregnant mother suffered upon seeing him after the murder he 
committed (Dickens 5).
 8
  Barnaby is born the day his father leaves the scene of his crime, 
and Mary Rudge subsequently devotes her life to his care.  By the time Barnaby is grown 
she is  
          about forty—perhaps two or three years older—with a cheerful aspect, and a face  
          that had once been pretty.  It bore traces of affliction and care, but they were of an  
          old date, and Time had smoothed them.  Any one who had bestowed but a casual  
          glance on Barnaby might have known that this was his mother, from the strong  
          resemblance between them; but where in his face there was wildness and  
          vacancy, in hers there was the patient composure of long effort and quiet  
          resignation. (Dickens 49-50) 
                                               
8 McDonagh (2008) points out that ―as late as 1904, the American physician Martin Barr stresses the role of 
the mother‘s imagination in deviant births, ‗Paget cites a case of a girl with a thick harsh crop of brown hair 
on back and arms who bore a striking resemblance to a monkey.  The mother had received a sudden shock 
caused by the monkey of an organ-grinder springing upon her back‘ (Barr 1904: 96)‖ (125).  Clare Clark‘s 
(2007) historical novel tells a story about an apothecary who tries to prove his theory of ―the nature of 
monsters‖, based upon this hypothesis.   
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Barnaby is his mother‘s penance and also her solace in return for the shame and remorse 
that is otherwise the legacy of her marriage to a violent, irredeemable man.   
 The security of idiot characters like Barnaby Rudge and Willie Dixon is 
contingent upon the care of mother figures.  McDonagh suggests this is because 
conventional wisdom at the time was that ―women—less logical, but as a consequence 
slightly natural—provide the link, or perhaps the transition, between the world of idiot 
boys and that of rational adult men‖ (2008, 45).  Despite the intellectual impairments of 
Susan‘s brother and Mary Rudge‘s son, and the sacrifices that both women make to 
preserve their security, the love that is bestowed upon Willie Dixon and Barnaby is 
clearly reciprocated.  When Susan is away from home Willie is depicted as ―moping in 
her absence—hanging listlessly on the farm-yard gate to watch for her.  When he saw her, 
he set up one of his strange, inarticulate cries… and came towards her with his loose, 
galloping run, head and limbs all shaking and wagging with pleasant excitement‖ 
(Gaskell 29).  He is sensitive to his sister‘s moods, as is Barnaby when he comes home to 
his mother ―and putting his arms about her neck, kissed her a hundred times‖ (Dickens 
147).  Full of his own story of his day, he eventually realizes that his mother is disturbed:  
―‗How pale you are to-night!‘ said Barnaby, leaning on his stick.  ‗We have been cruel, 
Grip, and made her anxious!‘‖ (Dickens 148).  When Barnaby does leave his mother, 
against her wishes, to join the political uprising, it is for her sake at least as much as his 
own, as he imagines the time  
          when these frays were over, and the good Lord had conquered his enemies, and  
          they were all at peace again, and he and she were rich, what happiness they would  
          have in talking of these troubled times when he was a great soldier; and when they  
          sat alone together in the tranquil twilight, and she had no longer reason to be  
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          anxious for the morrow, what pleasure would he have in the reflection that this was  
          his doing—his—poor foolish Barnaby‘s; and in patting her on the cheek, and  
          saying with a merry laugh, ‗Am I silly now, mother—am I silly now?‘ (Dickens  
          471) 
Through numerous examples, Dickens and Gaskell both demonstrate how the affectionate 
devotion of their charges justifies the sacrifices that Mrs. Rudge and Susan Dixon make 
to keep Barnaby and Willie safe.   
 This does not mean that loving and caring for someone with severe mental 
disabilities is not wearing.  At times even the caregiver‘s personal safety and mental 
health are threatened by the dependence and the sometimes violent behaviours of the 
mentally disabled character.  Rochester‘s story particularly demonstrates the enormity of 
the care burden when there is no natural affection between the lunatic and her keeper.  
Joined in marriage, Rochester is the only family that Bertha can claim with any obligation 
to care for her,
9
 and it is made clear that the union is indissoluble.  He explains that ―a 
nature the most gross, impure, depraved I ever saw, was associated with mine, and called 
by the law and by society a part of me.  And I could not rid myself of it by any legal 
proceedings; for the doctors now discovered that my wife was mad‖ (Brontë 353; 
emphasis in original).  Death is the only legal exit from such a union, and at his most 
hopeless point Rochester admits to have contemplated suicide to release him:   
          ‗This life,‘ said I at last, ‗is hell:  this is the air—those are the sounds of the  
          bottomless pit!  I have a right to deliver myself from it if I can.  The sufferings of  
                                               
9 The depiction of mental disability within marital relationships is relatively rare at this time.  Marriage of 
idiots and imbeciles would generally be frowned upon and perceived as unnatural.  However, in No Name 
(1862) Wilkie Collins depicts a marriage between con-artist Colonal Wragge and his idiot wife, who he also 
marries for money.  Mrs. Wragge is a simpleton, and  pathetic figure, but also gentle and kind-hearted.   
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          this mortal state will leave me with the heavy flesh that now cumbers my soul.  Of  
          the fanatic‘s burning eternity I have no fear:  there is not a future state worse than  
          this present one—let me break away, and go home to God!‘ (Brontë 355)   
The reader sympathizes with Rochester‘s burden because his wife is so extremely 
depraved that his aversion to her and his despair seem only natural.   
 In fact, Rochester‘s relentlessly loathsome description of the ‗madwoman in the 
attic‘ on all sides makes Jane‘s eventual call for pity for the woman, on the grounds that 
―‗[i]t is cruel—she cannot help being mad‘‖ (Brontë 347), almost incredible.10  When she 
tries to fortify Rochester‘s control over his desires by appealing to his duty as a husband, 
he takes offense at Jane‘s  suggestion that he hates his wife because she is mad:  
         ‗…it is not because she is mad I hate her.  If you were mad, do you think I  
          should hate you?‘ 
            ‗I do indeed, sir.‘  
            ‗Then you are mistaken, and you know nothing about me, and nothing 
          about the sort of love of which I am capable.  Every atom of your flesh is as dear to  
          me as my own:  in pain and sickness it would still be dear.  Your mind is my  
          treasure, and if it were broken, it would be my treasure still…‘. (Brontë 347) 
The implication is that it is not Rochester‘s duty to care for his wife that is intolerable; it 
is that he never loved his wife in the first place.  The provision of compassionate care is 
understood to be dependent upon the establishment of a regard that pre-dates the 
affliction.       
                                               
10 In hindsight, Brontë wrote to her editor that she regretted the demonization of Bertha, although she added 
that ―‗there is a phase of insanity which may be called moral madness‘: however, ‗profound pity out to be 
the only sentiment elicited by the view of such moral degradation… I have not sufficiently dwelt on that 
feeling.   I have erred in making horror too predominant, Mrs. Rochester indeed lived a sinful life before 
she was insane, but sin is itself a species of insanity‘‖ (Davies. Editor‘s Notes, 568-569).  
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 While the reader sympathizes with Rochester‘s responsibility as husband to a 
lunatic wife, the selflessness required by a mother or a sister to commit her life to the care 
of a mentally deficient son or brother is portrayed as natural.  Susan Dixon‘s anxieties are 
actually the reverse of Rochester‘s:  while he resents his legal obligation for his wife‘s 
care, Susan lives in fear of being deprived of the right to be her brother‘s caregiver.  
Susan‘s authority as guardian is limited by her gender and her status as an unmarried 
woman.  Even though Willie demonstrates the capacity to communicate his attachment to 
his sister, he has no right to choose his own living circumstances.  Even Susan‘s 
guardianship could be overruled if her brother‘s occasional violent outbursts became 
known.   
 As eternal children, Willie and Barnaby‘s dependency instills a devotion to their 
family which, in turn, engages the nurturing capacities of their caregivers and gives them 
strength to persevere.  In a fervent prayer, Barnaby‘s mother asks, 
 ‗Oh Thou,…who hast taught me such deep love for this one remnant of the  
          promise of a happy life, out of whose affliction, even, perhaps the comfort springs  
          that he is ever a relying, loving child to me—never growing old or cold at heart, but  
          needing my care and duty in his manly strength as in his cradle-time—help him, in  
          his darkened walk through this sad world, or he is doomed, and my poor heart is  
          broken!‘ (Dickens 154)  
As the child of her dead husband‘s beloved sister, Mrs Reed could perhaps have also 
found comfort in raising up the child according to her dying husband‘s final wish, but she 
is not a generous woman.  Mrs Reed‘s treatment of Jane belies the assumption that 
parents and guardians will always act in the best interests of those for whom they are 
presumed to carry some filial attachment or moral obligation.   
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 Both Gaskell and Dickens also depict how the vulnerability of simple-minded 
characters is exploited by those who should feel responsible for their care.  Michael is 
physically abusive toward his prospective brother-in-law.  In one instance, he kicks Willie 
for being clumsy and when Susan remonstrates with him for the assault, Michael goes off 
and gets drunk.  Yet, when he is incapacitated the next day, it is noted that ―Willie had far 
more pity on him than Susan.  Before evening, Willie and he were fast… friends‖ 
(Gaskell 12).  The simple and affectionate nature ascribed to the idiot is also apparent in 
Barnaby‘s determination to see good in his loathsome father.  Even when he recognizes 
him as the robber who had left his friend Chester for dead he still ―put his arms about his 
neck, and pressed his head against his cheek‖ (Dickens 520).  As Barnaby is very 
susceptible to any association that may make a claim on his duty and affections, once the 
rioters break open the jails to release the prisoners Barnaby cares for his unworthy father, 
in exile:   
          Heaven alone can tell, with what vague thoughts of duty, and affection; with what  
          strange promptings of nature, intelligible to him as to a man of radiant mind and  
          most enlarged capacity; with what dim memories of children he had played with  
          when a child himself, who had prattled of their fathers, and of loving them, being  
          loved; with how many half-remembered, dreamy associations of his mother‘s grief  
          and tears and widowhood; he had watched and tended this man.  But that a vague  
          and shadowy crowd of such ideas came slowly on him; that they taught him to be  
          sorry when he looked upon his haggard face, that they overflowed his eyes when he  
          stooped to kiss him on the cheek, that they kept him waking in a tearful gladness,  
          shading him from the sun, fanning him with leaves, soothing him when he started  
          in his sleep… .(Dickens 566) 
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All the while, Barnaby is waiting on his mother to come and make their family complete.  
Rudge the father, however, is a most irredeemable character.  Incapable of empathy, 
remorse or any redeeming human feeling, to the very last he does not repent his heinous 
crimes.  Rather, he curses his long-suffering wife and their son because she will not lie to 
spare him the death sentence that he has already once eluded (Dickens 611-612).  With 
his lack of conscience, or natural feeling, Rudge has more in common with Bertha 
Rochester than does Barnaby or Willie Dixon.   
 Relationships between the mentally disabled individual and his or her family are 
revealed to be more complex in Establishment novels than policy belonging to this phase 
of the Cycle indicates.  There is a tendency to explain disability in terms of the family‘s 
moral degeneracy, where madness is perceived as a condition passed on from one 
generation to the next, or idiocy is an affliction upon the offspring as a result of the sins 
of the parent.  Policy largely endorses these assumptions, yet also identifies the family as 
the most appropriate location of care for the mentally disabled individual.  The  first 
institutions for the care of lunatics and idiots in Upper Canada were originally perceived 
as a last resort for people who did not have family willing or able to support them.  The 
fact that asylum admissions continued to exceed expansion is attributed to the moral 
degeneracy of the working classes.  An interrogation of the ways that rapid social and 
economic change contributed to undermining traditional family roles and displacing many 
people would not occur for generations.  As a result, it is not surprising that an 
institutional option is not portrayed as a positive solution from the perspective of good 
people like Mary Rudge and Susan Dixon.  Rochester‘s position is more ambiguous, but 
by finally acting selflessly to risk his life to save that of his lunatic wife, he is rewarded 
by her demise, and the liberty to make a new family with the woman he loves.     
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Community Roles 
 By the time a formal institutionalization policy was introduced, in 1839, mental 
disability was perceived to exist ―completely within the individual‖ (McDonagh 2008, 4).  
In an age of rapid industrialization, the worth of the individual was increasingly 
conceived of in terms of his or her contribution to the waged labour market.  People who 
could not compete in a capitalist economy were at best a burden on society.  Eventually,  
with the growth of the eugenics movement in England and North America that was 
occurring by the turn of the century, they increasingly became perceived as a threat to the 
species.  Families were expected to care for their vulnerable members, but as extended 
family networks were broken down as a result of urbanization an increasing number of 
people were destitute of the necessary personal daily living supports required to sustain 
them.  Nineteenth-century social welfare policy generally perceives idiots as belonging to 
a larger population of vagrants and immoral characters.  Community responsibility 
toward people with mental disabilities was defined in terms of their charitable 
contributions and the taxes that they paid to maintain houses of industry or poorhouses, 
and the insane and idiot asylums that were eventually established.   
 At the outset of the Establishment phase the Government of Upper Canada tried to 
put the responsibility for financing the difference between the costs of care and what 
families were able to pay onto municipalities.  This, however, was not sustainable and 
over time it became incumbent upon the Province to pick up most of the costs.  Before the 
first asylum dedicated to the care and control of idiots was established in Ontario, every 
municipality was required to erect a workhouse to contain the chronically unemployed or 
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indigent.  The Act Respecting the Municipal Institutions of Upper Canada (1866) 
empowered a Justice of the Peace, or his representatives to  
          commit to the House of Industry or of Refuge, to be employed and governed  
         according to the rules, regulations and orders of the House:    
1. All poor and indigent persons who are incapable of supporting themselves; 
2. All persons without means of maintaining themselves and able of body to work 
and who refuse or neglect to do so; 
3. All persons leading a lewd, dissolute, or vagrant life, and exercising no ordinary 
calling, or lawful business sufficient to gain or procure an honest living;  
4. And all such as spend their time and property in public houses, to the neglect of 
any lawful calling;  
          5.  And idiots. (Sec. 414) 
Criteria for distinguishing between categories of unemployable people were very arbitrary 
and inconsistent.  This law, for instance, establishes no specific criterion for determining 
who is an idiot.  
The fifth and final category of eligibility for the workhouse implies that the idiot 
is anybody with no inclination or capacity for gainful employment, who is not otherwise 
assigned to a preceding category.  Upper Canada‘s first Provincial Lunatic Asylum 
opened in 1841.  However, it was not until 1876 that the first asylum dedicated to the care 
of idiots would open in the Province, thereby  acknowledging that idiots did not fit the 
general profile of people who could be coerced into self-sufficiency through enforced 
labour.  That being said, a historical analysis of the living conditions of asylum residents 
reveals that these facilities relied very heavily on the uncompensated labours of inmates 
(Simmons, 1982, 103).     
136 
 
 
 Policy reinforced the public‘s distinction between lunatics and idiots, although by 
the end of the nineteenth century this distinction was largely irrelevant in law.  
Explanatory notes attached to Ontario‘s Act Respecting Lunacy explains that ―[a]n idiot 
is one who never had reason, while a lunatic as distinguished from an idiot is a person 
who was of good and sound memory, and by the visitation of God, sickness, grief or 
accident, has lost it… The distinction between an idiot and a lunatic is now of no 
consequence, the word ‗lunatic‘ comprising idiots and persons of unsound mind‖ 
(Bicknell & Kappele 243).  In law, the terms and conditions of guardianship for idiots or 
lunatics were the same.   
 Given the increasingly hostile community environment for people who were 
unattached to the labour market, it is significant that Dickens and Gaskell both set their 
novels seventy and fifty years back in time, respectively.  Although their mental 
disabilities still threaten their personal security, Willie Dixon and Barnaby Rudge are also 
able to claim a place in the small villages where their respective families have been long-
established.  The importance of the community is less explicit in Brontë‘s, Jane Eyre, as 
in many respects it is a story about isolation.  Jane‘s own mental stability is threatened in 
childhood as a result of her personal isolation within a family who does not want her 
(Wood 96); and Bertha Rochester‘s madness, arguably, is exacerbated by her segregation 
from the rest of the world.        
 A considerable amount of Establishment-era policy pertaining to people with 
mental disabilities addresses the relationship between the individual and those people or 
agencies charged with their care.  When Susan will not submit to Michael‘s terms 
concerning Willie‘s place in the family she asserts her brother‘s hereditary right to abide 
with her.  She tells her fiancé,  ―‗I will not have thee, if thou say‘st in such a hectoring 
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way that Willie must go out of the house—and the house his own too—before thou‘lt set 
foot in it.  Willie bides here, and I bide with him‘‖(Gaskell 27).  People deemed mentally 
incapable typically forfeit the right to manage their own financial affairs and estate.  What 
Susan is declaring here is the enduring moral right that her brother has, even in his idiocy, 
to enjoy the avails of his hereditary entitlement.   
 In the novel, the disabled character is often used as a narrative device to illuminate 
the motives of other characters, or wider society (Davis, 1998, 328-329; Iyer 131;  
Mitchell & Snyder 205).  In the nineteenth century ―‗idiots‘ increasingly become a 
measure of the goodness of their patrons; they are the objects of charitable acts that define 
the actors as responsible and morally worthy citizens‖ (McDonagh, 2008, 95).  Mentally 
disabled characters are also sometimes used to illuminate the worst aspects of other 
characters.  In Gaskell‘s story, Michael Hurst‘s abusive treatment of Willie and his lack 
of compassion make him the story‘s villain.  Having ―long felt the boy to be a trouble… 
of late he had absolutely loathed him.  His gibbering, his uncouth gestures, his loose, 
shambling gait, all irritated Michael inexpressibly‖ (Gaskell 25).  In fact, on several 
occasions it is Michael who is revealed as the real disruptive element to the family peace 
and good management of the estate.  When he begins to assume authoritative airs as the 
presumptive master of the farm, Michael‘s  abilities are called into question by the farm 
labourers, who remember him as   
          a stripling on the farm, knowing far less than they did, and often glad to shelter his 
          ignorance of all agricultural matters behind their superior knowledge.  They would  
          have taken orders from Susan with far more willingness; nay, Willie himself might 
          have commanded them; and from the old hereditary feeling toward the owners of  
          the land, they would have obeyed him with far greater cordiality than they now  
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          showed to Michael. (Gaskell 21) 
Local tradition and hereditary respect for the Dixon family line purchase a degree of 
tolerance for Willie and establish a place for him in the community, despite his mental 
incapacity.  
 Still, Susan lives in fear of having Willie taken from her care without her consent, 
in the event that she cannot keep his behaviours contained:  ―above all, she dreaded lest 
some one might find out in what danger and peril she occasionally was, and might assume 
a right to take away her brother from her care.  The one idea of taking charge of him had 
deepened and deepened with years.  It was graven into her mind as the object for which 
she lived‖ (Gaskell 37).  This is why she feels compelled to do better than merely get by.  
Her personal conduct and domestic management must be perceived as being above 
reproach in order to secure Willie‘s place on the family farm and within the community.   
 Dickens‘ novel also portrays how important community-belonging is for people 
with mental disabilities.  When Barnaby and his mother are forced to leave their home in 
order to escape his father, he suffers more in their exile than his mother, who understands 
why they need to live secretly in order to attain peace and some degree of security.  While 
their humble income is diminished by lack of adequate employment to sustain them, 
Barnaby also becomes socially impoverished because ―[f]ew in that place, even of the 
children, could be idle, and he had no companions of his own kind‖ (Dickens 371).  
Where he comes from, ―[t]he people all knew Barnaby, and the children of the place 
came flocking round him—as [his mother] remembered to have done with their fathers 
and mothers round some silly beggerman, when a child herself.  None of them knew her‖ 
(Dickens 209) now because her world has been much smaller, preoccupied with 
maintaining a home and providing for her son.  Therefore, when Barnaby and his mother 
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happen upon the gathering of Lord Gordon‘s troops, Barnaby is seduced by the spirit of 
camaraderie that the cause inspires in him as he attaches his blue cockade to his hat ―with 
an air of pride‖ (Dickens 298), as well as the promise of riches to relieve his mother‘s 
poverty and make a happier life for them both.   
 Barnaby does not really understand the Gordon cause, which occurred in 1780 as 
a result of ―agitation against the Catholic Relief Act… Opposition to the Act was co-
ordinated by the Protestant Association, of which Gordon was President‖ (Bowen 710-
711).  The attraction of the uprising, for Barnaby, is the sense of belonging that his 
compatriots give him.  When Hugh gives him a banner to carry at the head of their 
regiment, Barnaby becomes  
          [f]orgetful of all other things in the ecstacy of the moment, his face flushed and his  
          eyes sparkling with delight heedless of the weight of the great banner he carried,  
          and mindful only of its flashing in the sun and rustling in the summer breeze, on he  
          went, proud, happy, elated past all telling:-- the only lighthearted, undesigning  
          creature, in the whole assembly. (Dickens 404-405)    
His only regret is that his mother is not present to see him in his glory.  Barnaby does not 
understand that the cause he has signed on for will imperil his friends and cause terrible 
loss and grief to innocent people.  Because of his innocence he trusts easily in the 
goodness of others who welcome him in their midst.
 11
      
                                               
11For Dickens it makes sense that Barnaby experiences a sense of belonging among those who would bring 
down the Government because revolution is a kind of madness.  Even though Dickens satirizes the 
leadership on either side of this uprising, the better men are aligned with the forces of stability and order, 
which is what government aspires to symbolize.  Bowen reads Barnaby Rudge ―as one of the more 
conservative of Dickens‘s works‖ (xxv) because of its ―treatment of popular insurrection‖.  However, a 
similar ambivalence is evident in Hard Times where Dickens depicts a very vivid and heartbreaking story of 
the working conditions of factory ―hands‖, but also represents a fledgling union movement as reckless and 
uninformed.  He endorses a liberal humanist tradition that critiques the injustices of the prevailing political 
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   Barnaby‘s innocence wins him protectors on both sides of the uprising.  However, 
the most substantial indicator of Barnaby‘s value in the community is the lengths that the 
good locksmith, Gabriel Varden, goes to in order to save Barnaby from being hanged 
following the Gordon Riots.  He assures his friend, Haredale, that Barnaby‘s mother will 
have a home and a friend in him,           
          ‗…but Barnaby—poor Barnaby—willing Barnaby—what aid can I render him?   
          There are many, many men of sense, God forgive me,‘ cried the honest locksmith,  
          stopping in a narrow court to pass his hand across his eyes, ‗I could better afford to  
          lose than Barnaby.  We have always been good friends, but I never knew, till now,  
          how much I loved the lad.‘ (Dickens 633) 
Even Hugh, who has manipulated Barnaby into participating in the uprising and has no 
legitimate claim for mercy to be exercised on his own behalf, commits his final words to 
absolving Barnaby of blame, as he stands before the noose:  ―I‘ll say this,‘ he cried, 
looking firmly round, ‗that if I had ten lives to lose, and the loss of each would give me 
ten times the agony of the hardest death, I‘d lay them all down—ay I would, though you 
gentlemen may not believe it—to save this one.  This one,‘ he added, wringing his hand 
again, ‗that will be lost through me‘‖ (Dickens 646).  When Barnaby attempts to 
remonstrate, Hugh gestures to the attending clergyman and explains how he ―‗has often in 
the last few days spoken to me of faith, and strong belief.  You see what I am—more 
brute than man, as I have been often told—but I had faith enough to believe, and did 
believe as strongly as any of you gentlemen can believe anything, that this one life would 
                                                                                                                                            
system and its institutions, yet also expresses enough confidence in the existing political institutions to 
reform themselves in ways that may improve the quality of life for the oppressed.   .   
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be spared‘‖ (Dickens 646); and in fact, at the very last moment, Varden does win 
Barnaby‘s release.   
 However, in the sample considered here, the positive outcomes that do occur are 
revealed to have more to do with the strength of individual characters than they do with 
the inherent justice of government systems and their policies.  Dickens, in particular, 
makes a point of demonstrating that it is only good fortune and the perseverance of a 
worthy citizen that spares Barnaby from being hanged, following the Gordon Riots.  In 
fact, he depicts a justice system that exercises its harshest sentences on those least able to 
defend themselves.  Describing the scenes that Barnaby passes en route to his own 
imminent execution Dickens describes how 
 [t]wo cripples—both mere boys—one with a leg of wood, one who dragged his  
          twisted limbs along with the help of a crutch, were hanged in this same  
          Bloomsbury Square.  … Another boy was hanged on Bow Street; other young lads  
          in various quarters of the town.  Four wretched women, too, were put to death.  In a  
          word, those who suffered as rioters were for the most part the weakest, meanest and  
          most miserable among them.  (Dickens 648-649)  
In the end, Dickens is critical of the political status quo even while he deplores the 
lawlessness of the riots.  Barnaby‘s reprieve is not meant to be seen as justice tempered 
with mercy, as it is made clear that had he been truly alone in the world, without the 
support of people of status and influence, then he would have been executed for actions 
he committed without directly causing any bodily harm to anyone, and without really 
understanding their implications.   
 The conclusion of Barnaby‘s story is especially fortuitous when contrasted with 
the other disabled characters considered in this selection whose storylines end in death.    
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In fact, the death of the disabled character often means liberty for those who carry the 
burden for their care.
12
  When Jane returns to Thornfield, a year after her flight, she finds 
it burned to the ground.  In response to her inquiries, the local inn-keeper describes how 
Rochester 
          ‗…went back to get his mad wife out of her cell.  And then they called out to him   
          that she was on the roof, where she was standing, waving her arms above the  
          battlements, and shouting out till they could hear her a mile off:  I saw her and  
          heard her with my own eyes.  She was a big woman, and had long black hair:  we  
          could see it streaming against the flames as she stood.  I witnessed, and several  
          more witnessed, Mr Rochester ascend through the sky-light on to the roof; we  
          heard him call ―Bertha!‖ We saw him approach her; and then, ma‘am, she yelled  
          and gave a spring, and the next minute she law smashed on the pavement.‘ (Brontë  
          493) 
Jane returns to a humbled man, blinded and maimed by the fire that destroys the 
impediment to their union.  For her part, Jane admits relief at learning the extent of the 
disabling injuries that he suffered:  ―I had dreaded worse.  I had dreaded he was mad‖ 
(Brontë 494).  With his beloved restored to him, Rochester gives thanks to a God that is 
merciful as well as just (Brontë 516).  Unlike Barnaby Rudge and Willie Dixon, Bertha‘s 
madness is so completely debilitating that she cannot generate any sympathy from other 
characters in the novel, or even the reader.  Furthermore, because she is unable to tell her 
own story, has no sympathetic advocate, or real presence in the community her loss is 
                                               
12 As the Establishment phase progresses, the prospects for idiots and imbeciles becomes even more bleak 
as the realistic novel continues to evolve.  Critically acclaimed examples include,  Joseph Conrad‘s The 
Secret Agent (1907) and John Steinbeck‘s Of Mice and Men (1937).  Both authors create worlds so hostile 
to their  mentally disabled characters that they die violent deaths.  A notable exception to this trend is 
William Faulkner‘s tragic family saga, The Sound and the Fury (1929) where the idiot brother suffers, but 
survives his beautiful sister and gifted brother.   
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mourned by no one.  Therefore, when she finally dies by fire, the response is to celebrate 
the removal of the obstacle to Jane and Rochester‘s union.13   
 Willie eventually dies of physical exhaustion as a result of a particularly intense 
and prolonged fit that takes Susan‘s endurance nearly to its limit.  She ―wrestled in prayer 
that somehow it might end before she, too, was driven mad; or, worse, might be obliged 
to give up life‘s aim, and consign Willie to a madhouse.  From that moment of prayer… 
Willie calmed—and then he drooped—and then he sank‖ (Gaskell 38).  Finally at rest, 
―she knew that to him death was no enemy, but a true friend, restoring light and health to 
his poor clouded mind‖ (Gaskell 38).  However, like many people who devote their lives 
to the care of a loved one with severe disabilities, the responsibility often threatens to 
consume their whole identity.  So, where Rochester experiences profound loneliness in 
his marriage, when Willie dies Susan loses her last remaining human tie.  Therefore, the 
end of Willie‘s story, is also nearly the end of Susan‘s, as without her brother to care for 
her life has lost its purpose.   
 Her happy ending comes when she discovers Michael collapsed in a snowstorm 
and returns his body to his own family whom she finds living in poverty and neglect.  The 
strain of Susan‘s load finally culminates in her own collapse, upon suffering a stroke at 
the widow‘s door.  Revived by the compassion of the woman who ―laid her on her own 
bed, and weeping silently for her own lost husband… nursed Susan like a sister‖(Gaskell 
47), Susan finally learns how to be cared for, herself:    
                                               
13
 Although not explored in Brontë‘s construction of Bertha Rochester, Rhys‘ (1966) prequel, Wide 
Sargasso Sea, constructs a life story for the ‗madwoman in the attic‘ that explains her rage as a result of 
personal losses, and her incarceration in a foreign land.  Otherwise, Bertha‘s raving is largely 
incomprehensible, apart from an apparent aversion to the woman who would usurp her place as Mrs. 
Rochester.  Bertha has also been interpreted by feminist theorists as Jane‘s avatar, or her ―truest and darkest 
double‖ (Gilbert & Gubar 360) who acts out Jane‘s repressed resentments and anxieties.  At the very least 
she is a warning to Jane of the consequences of being guided by passion, unrestrained by reason.   
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          Susan, lying still and motionless, learned much.  It was not a severe stroke; it might  
          be the forerunner of others yet to come, but at some distance of time.  But for the  
          present she recovered, and regained much of her former health.  On her sick-bed  
          she matured her plans.  When she returned to Yew Nook, she took Michael Hurst‘s  
          widow and children with her to live there, and fill up the haunted hearth with living  
          forms that should banish the ghosts. (Gaskell 47)  
Like Rochester, Susan needs to become physically disabled in order to learn how to live 
in reciprocal affection where she is not always the benefactor or caregiver.  Physical 
incapacitation compels Rochester and Susan to be dependent on others, and this reminds 
the reader that none of us are immune to the loss of faculties or abilities that are easy to 
take for granted.   
 In all of the novels considered here, the isolation and losses suffered as a result of 
being assigned responsibility for the mentally disabled character‘s well-being are 
eventually rewarded with reconciliation with others, and re-integration into the wider 
community.  Willie‘s idiocy is ultimately the saviour of his sister and the farm.  It is the 
cause of the irreconcilable breach between Susan and Michael, which turns out to be 
fortuitous, given Michael‘s profligate and irresponsible temperament.  Finally, the 
representation of Barnaby Rudge as an idiot who is involved in family secrets, the ordeals 
of crossed lovers, and political intrigues offers unique insight into dysfunction within 
families, community and the larger political system.  The portrayal of an idiot character 
with such an extensive network of relationships and place in the community is quite 
radical within this phase of the Institutional Cycle. 
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Perceptions of the Institution 
 The institution is understood here as all those facilities that housed people with 
mental disabilities, as well as other facilities that are utilized for the care and control of 
unwanted individuals.  The government of Upper Canada originally tried to legislate that 
all municipalities provide some sort of poor house to provide shelter and the basic 
necessities of life for people who could not or would not care for themselves, as 
articulated in the Act Respecting Municipal Institutions of Upper Canada, 1866.  
However, over time it became impracticable to enforce this measure, as some 
jurisdictions simply pleaded lack of resources to maintain their elderly and feeble-
minded.  The Provincial Lunatic Asylum that was first established in London was under 
constant pressure to accommodate more people, and expansion was inevitable and rapid.  
By 1897 Ontario‘s social welfare system was established to the point that the Medical 
Superintendent for the Hamilton Asylum for the Insane addressed a meeting of the British 
Medical Association full of pride in the ―vast provisions made by the State for the care 
and comfort of the defective classes‖ (J. Russell 3).  He traces the rapid expansion of the 
asylum system in Ontario, pointing out that just  
          [s]ince 1871 there have been practically four new asylums erected in different parts  
          of the Province, with a capacity of 2,700, not to speak of additions that have been  
          made to the two older asylums, all erected and maintained at the expense of the  
          Province.  No nobler tribute could be paid to the wisdom, the generosity and the  
          beneficence of the Government than the ample and splendid provision which has  
          been made for the defective classes in this Province. (7) 
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Such high praise for the institutional system expressed by the state and its advocates in 
the medical community contradicts the asylum‘s cultural legacy.  In fact, the 
Establishment-era novel is, at best, ambivalent about the benefits of institutional 
treatment for people with mental disabilities.   
 As the first institutions established for the care of idiots were being established, 
most readers of English literature would have been familiar with the Bethlem Hospital, 
commonly known as Bedlam.  The oldest institution for the insane had a notorious 
reputation since the eighteenth century (Scull 59).  In Barnaby Rudge, Dickens vividly 
depicts days and nights of rioting, destruction of property and violent death; however, 
what inspires the greatest public terror is a rumour 
          which diffused a greater dread all through London, even than these publicly- 
          announced intentions of the rioters, though all men knew that if they were  
          successfully effected, there must ensue a national bankruptcy and general ruin.  It  
          was said that they meant to throw the gates of Bedlam open, and let all the madmen  
          loose.  This suggested such dreadful images to the people‘s minds, and was indeed  
          an act so fraught with new and unimaginable horrors in the contemplation, that it  
          beset them more than any loss or cruelty of which they could foresee the worst, and  
          drove many sane men nearly mad themselves.  (Dickens 557)   
Given the fear and loathing that Bedlam inspired in London‘s citizenry it is hardly 
surprising that people had reservations about the efficacy of an asylum system dedicated 
to the care of idiots, much less the security of relatives placed there.   
 The inability to reconcile their disagreement over the proper place for Willie 
Dixon is what finally breaks off his sister‘s engagement with Michael Hurst.  Susan‘s 
absolute rejection of the idea of having her brother admitted to an institution is 
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rationalized by the narrator of Half a Life-time Ago in terms that go beyond filial 
attachment:  ―The country-side was full, in those days, of stories of brutal treatment 
offered to the insane; stories that were, in fact, but too well founded, and the truth of one 
of which only have been a sufficient reason for the strong prejudice existing against all 
such places‖ (Gaskell 26).  Originally published in 1855, it is interesting to speculate 
about Gaskell‘s narrative purposes in setting the story ―half a lifetime‖, or fifty years past.  
Institutions for idiots had only been recently established at the time of Gaskell‘s writing 
(McDonagh 2008, 195).   It is interesting that Dickens and Gaskell both set their stories in 
the past, and their characters reside in small villages.  Possibly their intent is to enhance 
verisimilitude by setting their characters in a time and place where an idiot could more 
readily be accepted within the community.
14
   
 Once a policy of institutionalization was formalized, administrators began to 
perceive an alarming increase in idiocy and insanity in the general population.  It is 
difficult to obtain reliable statistics for the beginning of the Establishment phase in 
Ontario; however Dr. James Russell reported that ―[i]n the Province of Ontario the census 
and Provincial returns show an increase of population from 1871 to 1895 of 36 per cent., 
while the increase of insane for the same period is 245 per cent‖ (6).  Similar rates of 
increase were being reported in the United States and England.  As a result, debate ensued 
about whether this increase was attributable to better diagnosis and reporting, or if there 
were environmental explanations for this phenomenon.  Dr. Russell argues that the rapid 
industrialization of the times is an important contributing factor to rising rates of insanity:   
                                               
14 Other novels by the authors considered in this phase of the Cycle more specifically address the writers‘ 
impressions of contemporary social, familial and economic systems, and how they were being impacted by  
rapidly expanding industrialization, urbanization and capitalism.  Brontë‘s Shirley (1849), Dickens‘ Hard 
Times (1854)and Gaskell‘s North and South (1855) are examples.    
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          It cannot be denied that a large per centage of the human family is born into the  
          world so weakly endowed mentally as to be wholly unfit for anything but the most 
          primitive form of citizenship.  With quiet and uneventful surroundings, which do  
          not overtax their mental energies, they manage to pass through life in the  
          undisturbed possession of their meagre mental outfit with comparative ease and  
          comfort, but the moment they are subjected to complex conditions of life which  
          require greater mental and physical activity to gain a subsistence, they weaken and  
          falter by the way and gravitate into the vagrant and pauper ranks, which are the  
          great recruiting camps from which we draw the great army of pauper insane. (8) 
However, in literature from the commencement of the Establishment era, the impact of 
rapid industrialization on the lives of people with mental disabilities can only be inferred.  
 The establishment of an institutional policy system marks a cultural shift in 
attitudes about mental disability.  Dickens sets his novel seventy years in the past, and 
Gaskell looks back fifty years to situate their characters in rural communities where the 
‗village idiot‘ could still claim a place.  However, each of the novels also debate the role 
of the institution as it was emerging at the time.  In different ways, each of the novelists 
considered here is wrestling with a transition from a tradition that saw people with mental 
disabilities as members of the community, to the growing influence of a perspective that 
advocates for their segregation.   
 The idiot asylum system commenced with an original mandate to train idiots up to 
a functional level where they might sustain themselves in wider society (McDonagh 
2008, 195; Radford & Park, 5-6).  The rapid expansion of the asylum system, however, 
demonstrates that this often did not occur, even in those asylums erected for the care and 
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control of the ―curably insane.‖15  The steady growth in the rate of institutionalization 
does not reflect the moral debate that surrounded the decision to place a family member 
in the institution.  Establishment era novels portray great skepticism about the quality of 
institutionalization and the appropriate location of care for people with mental disabilities.   
 The debate in Gaskell‘s Half a Life-Time Ago, about how to deal with Willie 
Dixon‘s mental disability, speaks to the reputation of the asylum amongst the public, 
while also revealing the true natures of the primary characters in the story.  Michael‘s pre-
emptive move to get a referral for Willie to an idiot asylum, ―or madhouse, as they were 
called in that day and place‖ (Gaskell 25), is for self-interested purposes that are poorly 
disguised as concern for Willie‘s well-being.  Because Michael‘s motives for getting rid 
of Willie are selfish, his actions reveal his own defective character.  Therefore, it is 
difficult to determine whether his representation of the doctor‘s advice is reliable when he 
asserts that the ―doctor thinks he will get badder from year to year.  And he said if he was 
us—you—he would send him off in time to Lancaster Asylum.  They‘ve ways there both 
of keeping such people in order and making them happy‖ (Gaskell 24).  Because he is not 
a trustworthy character, and because of his undisguised aversion to Willie, Michael‘s 
advocacy for an institutional solution for Willie‘s care is intended to be read as a bad 
choice.         
 People‘s attitudes about the asylum are also enmeshed with how they perceive 
their obligation to the disabled individual.  Rochester does not offer an explicit reason for 
not having his wife placed in an asylum; however, there is historical evidence that 
                                               
15 Reaume finds that over the course of the first century of its existence (1846-1940) the discharge rate for 
men from the Toronto Hospital for the Insane was about 50.26% for men, and 55.25% for women, 
including deportations to other institutional facilities.  Simmons indicates that the number of  ―Mentally 
Retarded People in Provincial Institutions‖ rose almost continuously from the time that these statistics were 
kept in 1872‖ (1982, 314-318).   
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institutionalization was a less attractive option for people who had the means to consider 
alternatives.  Near the end of the nineteenth century, Russell explains that the  
          increase in pauper lunatics [in England and Wales] from 1859 to 1896 was from   
          31,401 to 87,417, while the increase in the private class has only been from 4,679   
          to 8,265… The Commissioners draw a marked distinction to the ratio of increase  
          between private and pauper lunatics, and report that the number of private lunatics  
          is actually lower in 1896 than in 1879, and is still undergoing annual diminution.   
          (5-6)   
It is likely that the ability to acquire private care services also allowed the rates of the 
―private‖ lunatic population to go under-reported.16  Wealthier classes had the means to 
make the kind of care arrangements to allow them to maintain their privacy and shield 
them from the stigma associated with having madness in the family.  Therefore, it makes 
sense that Rochester would have shunned institutionalization as the best recourse for a 
wife whose existence he did not want to acknowledge.   
 Although Brontë‘s novel makes no direct attempt to cast aspersions on the quality 
of institutional care, it was generally perceived as an option of last resort for families of 
all classes (McDonagh, 2008, 223), as portrayed in Gaskell‘s story.  Mrs Poole‘s 
character sketch, abbreviated as it is, alludes to the toll that the work exacted from those 
who were employed as attendants in these facilities, as well.  When the local inn-keeper 
                                               
16
 In Ontario, Simmons explains that ―[t]he fact that a certain number of beds were set aside for the 
wealthier patients at the PLA whereas this was not the case at Orillia [idiot asylum] is indirect proof that 
Orillia was unlikely to attract those who could pay their expenses.  Another determining factor against 
sending those who could pay to Orillia was the differentiated treatment accorded to the patients at Orillia as 
compared to those at Toronto, or, even more important, with mentally retarded people at the New York 
State Asylum for Idiots at Syracuse… [E]vidence is lacking, but it is likely that many Canadians who could 
afford the cost, sent their children or relatives to the New York Asylum where treatment and conditions 
were so much better than at Orillia‖.  (1982, 36-37) 
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gives Jane the details surrounding the fire that destroyed Thornfield he explains how 
Bertha ―had a woman to take care of her called Mrs Poole—an able woman in her line, 
and very trustworthy, but for one fault—a fault common to a deal of them nurses and 
matrons—she kept a private bottle of gin by her, and now and then took a drop overmuch.  
It is excusable, for she had a hard life of it‖ (Brontë 492 emphasis in original).  Although 
it is possible that Grace Poole‘s hard life may have been an outcome of other 
circumstances, apart from the nature of her employment, the historical evidence shows 
that the working conditions for caretakers of idiots and lunatics were generally poor.   
 Upper Canada‘s system of institutional care was largely modeled after England‘s 
policy.  In fact, ―ideas about policy were widely shared by authorities in Canada, the U.S. 
and Great Britain‖ (Simmons, 1982, 50).  Research cited by Simmons indicates that 
personal attendants at Orillia fared worse than their counterparts in the United States:  
―the dramatic economies obtained in Ontario as compared with the American Asylums 
came from paying personnel, both superintendents and staff, much less than elsewhere, 
by having few staff for many patients, and by feeding the patients a monotonous and 
tasteless diet‖ (1982, 33).  Simmons points out that ―[i]n 1883, inspector O‘Reilly noted 
that the average monthly wage for attendants in the United States was $73.82 while in 
Ontario it was $29.32‖ (1982, 33).17  Walter Williston also speaks to how, historically, 
institutional staff were chronically ―overworked, undertrained, and underpaid‖ (24).  
However, regardless of the conditions of work and level of compensation, in his historical 
analysis of patient life at the Toronto Hospital for the Insane, Reaume also stresses that 
                                               
17 In his work dedicated specifically to mental health policy in Ontario from 1930-1989, Simmons further 
contends that in the 1930s hospital staff had to cope with similar capacity pressures as experienced in the 
asylum designated for idiots, coping ―on a day-to-day basis with enormous and increasing numbers of 
people suffering from a wide variety of mental and physical illnesses, often behaving in a bizarre, disruptive 
or violent fashion.  It is no wonder that, lacking any other means, staff sometimes resorted to brute force 
and violence or to mechanical restraints in order to deal with difficult patients‖ (1990, 15) 
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these circumstances can not excuse abuses that were perpetrated against vulnerable 
patients (74).   
 Apart from the anxieties that many people had about relinquishing the care of 
loved ones to an asylum system of such dubious reputation, many others were skeptical 
about the wisdom of providing any social welfare support for people with mental 
disabilities.  Dickens depicts this position in Barnaby Rudge in a scene where Barnaby 
and his mother encounter a country lord who arrests them on their journey:     
          when the gentleman appeared disposed to exercise his horsewhip, the widow  
          ventured to inform him in a low voice and with tears in her eyes, that her son was  
          of weak mind.   
  ‗An idiot, eh?‘ said the gentleman looking at Barnaby as he spoke.  ‗And  
          how long hast been an idiot?‘ … 
  ‗From his birth,‘ said the widow. 
  ‗I don‘t believe it,‘ cried the gentleman, ‗not a bit of it.  It‘s an excuse not  
          to work.  There‘s nothing like flogging to cure that disorder.  I‘d make a difference  
          in him in ten minutes, I‘ll be bound.‘  
  ‗Heaven has made none in more than twice ten years, sir,‘ said the widow  
          mildly.    
            ‗Then why don‘t you shut him up?  we pay enough for county institutions,  
          damn ‘em.  But thou‘d rather drag him about to excite charity.  Ay, I know thee.‘  
          (Dickens 389-390) 
For as long as there has been any kind of social welfare system to provide relief to the 
poor, sick, unemployed and unemployable, there has always existed a suspicion and fear 
that people will rely on such supports to avoid working to support themselves.  This is the 
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rationale for a policy of less eligibility.  By making the conditions of poorhouses and 
other public institutions so materially deprived, the authorities ensured that the institution 
must always be an option of last resort (Rice & Prince 34-35).  This attitude at least 
partially explains the public distaste for the institutional system, even as the 
Establishment period progressed and it was actively promoted as the most appropriate 
treatment for lunacy and the care of idiots.   
 Bertha is incarcerated because of her madness, but Jane has also been incarcerated 
for most of her life before going to Thornfield:  first as a lonely and abused ward in the 
Reed household, and then as a student at the Lowood Charitable Institutional School for 
poor and orphaned girls.  Brontë, in fact, suggests that this isolation threatens Jane‘s own 
sanity.  When she becomes ill as a result of the ―fit‖ she experiences while locked in the 
―red room,‖ the attending apothecary gains insight into the child‘s living situation within 
the Reed household; and he recommends that Jane be sent away to school because her 
―‗nerves are not in a good state‘‖(Brontë 31).  She is soon dispatched to Lowood School.   
 Jane gives a detailed description of her first impressions of the unhealthy living 
environment at Lowood, which are heavily influenced by Brontë‘s own childhood 
experience of boarding at a school for clergymen‘s daughters:18   
          A stone tablet over the door bore this inscription:- 
            ‗Lowood Institution.-  This portion was rebuilt A.D.--, by Naomi 
          Brocklehurst, of Brocklehurst Hall, in this county.‘ ‗Let your light shine before  
          men that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in  
                                               
18This section of the novel demonstrates how even fiction stories can often be traced back to events in an 
author‘s personal life story.  Chapter IV of Elizabeth Gaskell‘s (1857) biography, The Life of Charlotte 
Brontë, goes into detail about the similarities between Jane‘s time at Lowood School and Brontë‘s own 
experience at Cowan Bridge where her elder sisters, Maria and Elizabeth contracted the consumptive illness 
from which they died, shortly after their removal.  Gaskell speculates that Charlotte‘s stunted growth may 
be attributed, at least in part, to the deprived, semi-starved circumstances that she experienced at the school.   
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          heaven.‘—St Matt.v. 16.   
            I read these words over and over again.  I felt that an explanation belonged  
          to them, and was unable fully to penetrate their import.  I was… pondering the  
          signification of ‗Institution,‘ and endeavouring to make out a connection between  
          the first words and the verse of Scripture...  (Brontë 58-59). 
When Jane asks Helen Burns, ―‗why do they call it Institution?  Is it in any way different  
from other schools?‘‖ (Brontë 59),  Helen explains that it is an institution for educating 
orphans.  Most of the children do not have access to sufficient funds to pay their board, 
nor do they have anyone to care much about whether they are provided for.  
 Another explanation for the deprivations of institutional life was that charity 
should aspire to nurture humility and fortify the spirit for the low station in life to which 
inmates could realistically expect to aspire.  Lowood School imposes stringent economies 
at the expense of the health of its charges.  The  living conditions described by Jane in 
chapter VI are not dissimilar to the impressions recorded by J. H. Tuke, following his 
visit to the Provincial Lunatic Asylum, in Upper Canada, on September 30, 1845:  
          It is one of the most painful and disgusting places I ever visited… There were  
          perhaps seventy patients upon whose faces misery, starvation and suffering were  
          indelibly impressed.  The doctor… pursues the exploded system of constantly  
          cupping, bleeding, blistering and purging his patients, giving them also the smallest  
          quantity of food and that of the poorest quality… (In Simmons 1982, 4) 
Jane Eyre recalls in detail the experience of being constantly hungry and yet often unable 
to eat the burnt or rancid rations that were served to the students at Lowood School (ch 
VI-VII).    
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 The intended purpose of the asylum was to rehabilitate and cure.  Likewise, Jane 
is ostensibly sent to this institution to cure her of her wicked ways.  As Brocklehurst 
introduces her officially to the assembly of students and teachers he publicly condemns 
Jane as a liar, on the basis of the testimony he has received from Mrs Reed:  
          ‗This I learned from her benefactress—from the pious and charitable lady who  
          adopted her in her orphan state, reared her as her own daughter, and whose  
          kindness, whose generosity the unhappy girl repaid by an ingratitude so bad, so  
          dreadful, that at last her excellent patroness was obliged to separate her from her  
          own young ones, fearful lest her vicious example should contaminate their purity.   
          She has sent her here to be healed, even as the Jews of old sent their diseased to the  
          troubled pool of Bethesda; and, teachers, superintendent, I beg of you not to allow  
          the waters to stagnate round her.‘ (Brontë 79) 
The educational emphasis is placed on her moral rehabilitation rather than her intellectual 
accomplishment.  Again, this is similar to the trend within the lunatic asylums of the time 
to replace physical coercion with a system of ―moral treatment‖19 to induce compliance 
with societal dictates about what constituted proper behaviour, according to one‘s station 
in life (Reaume 11, 14; Scull 16-17).    
 Jane experiences a healthier standard of living once ―the typhus fever had fulfilled 
its mission of devastation at Lowood… [and] its virulence and the number of its victims 
                                               
19 Reaume explains that ―[m]oral therapy originated with the work of Philippe Pinel in France and William 
Tuke in England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  They initiated the movement away 
from the most physically coercive forms of confinement and emphasized instead trying to instil self-
discipline and a firm ‗guidance‘ over the behaviour of their charges through moral suasion.  This effort to 
promote essentially middle-class standards of conduct on people in mental institutions, such as ideas about 
respectability and a regular daily routine, influenced asylum keepers throughout the Western world, where 
larger and increasing numbers of mental institutions were being established.  As with their British and 
American counterparts who had earlier used the ideas of Tuke and Pinel to try to move away from physical 
coercion, Joseph Workman, Superintendent [of the Toronto Hospital for the Insane] from 1853 to 1875, and 
Daniel Clark (1875-1905) both saw this approach as more humane‖ (11). 
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had drawn public attention to the school.  Inquiry was made into the origin of the scourge, 
and by degrees various facts came out which excited public indignation to a high degree‖ 
(Brontë 99).  This part of Jane‘s story seems to anticipate a pattern in the Institutional 
Cycle where neglect and abuse of vulnerable people is allowed to progress until a crisis 
occurs that draws public attention to the segregated lives of people who, generally, have 
few advocates.  Public exposure of the living conditions at Ontario‘s Hospital School in 
Orillia will later lend momentum to the Reform phase of the Cycle.  
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CHAPTER 7-  Analysis of Reform Phase (1960-1986) 
 
Introduction 
 After 120 years of institutional establishment and steady expansion, a combination 
of pressures finally brought about a shift in the Institutional Cycle from the Establishment 
to the Reform phase.  This transition cannot be linked to the introduction of any one 
specific policy act or narrative.  The Ministry of Community and Social Services 
indicates that the ―community living movement [was] originally started by parents in the 
mid-1950s to integrate their family members more fully in the community‖ (Government 
of Ontario, 2006, 5).  However, throughout the course of the long Establishment period 
there were always dissenting voices who lobbied for greater opportunities for people with 
mental disabilities.
20
  Parents especially advocated for educational opportunities for 
feeble-minded and idiot children who were, by this time, more consistently defined as 
mentally retarded or handicapped (Simmons 1982, 145).  Still, the Province‘s large 
institutional facilities kept growing, and growing more crowded.  Except for family 
members who tried to maintain active involvement in the lives of their relations residing 
at the Orillia Hospital,  the Rideau Centre or the other long-term institutional facilities for 
                                               
20 For example, on Sept. 29, 1948 the Toronto Daily Star published the following letter, written by Mrs. 
V.B. Glover: ―May I say a few words on behalf of our backward children, and their bewildered mothers.  
There is no school for such children, no place where they could get a little training to be of some use in the 
world, only Orillia, which is always full.  If these children can be taught something at Orillia, why cannot a 
day school be put at their disposal?  I am sure their mothers would gladly pay for their transportation to and 
from school.  After all, they are paying taxes for other, more fortunate children‘s schooling.  I think it is 
time something was done for parents, who, from a sense of faith and hope in a merciful providence wants to 
keep them at home, living a normal life.  These are real parents only asking a little aid and encouragement 
to shoulder their own heavy burden…‖ . 
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people with disabilities in the Province, the general public was largely unaware of what 
life was like for people living in the institution.   
 This changed for many when Pierre Berton published his regular column in the 
January 6, 1960 edition of the Toronto Star.  Entitled ―What‘s Wrong at Orillia:  Out of 
Sight—Out of Mind,‖ he spoke to the issues of structural deterioration and overcrowding 
at Ontario‘s oldest institution for the mentally retarded:    
          [t]here are 4000 names on file at Orillia—names of people who have applied to  
          enter a retarded child in the institution.  The active waiting list—of people who  
          have written within the last year—is 1500… 
            In 1949 Orillia admitted 196 new patients.  In 1959 the number had grown  
          to 310.  At the present time they are coming in at the rate of three a day.  The  
          hospital loses, by death or discharge, less than half the number it admits annually.   
          And so the terrifying problem builds up every year.         
            There are several reasons for this.  One, obviously, is the population  
          increase: for every 200 children born this year in Ontario, three will need  
          institutional care.  Ironically, too, medical advances have almost doubled the lives  
          of many mentally retarded patients.  The big move to the cities has made it difficult  
          to care for a retarded child at home, and the ‗village idiot‘ of our forefather‘s day is  
          likely to be a patient at Orillia now.  Finally, because of a change in public  
          attitudes, people seek out institutions which they once shunned. (31)                
Public and political response to this column contributed momentum to a growing 
community living movement in the Province, and this chapter speaks to many of the 
issues raised by Berton.   
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 As Ontario‘s hospital schools came under closer scrutiny, the government became 
increasingly interested in looking for policy options that would better serve the needs of 
residents and alleviate government‘s direct responsibility for the care of people with 
mental disabilities.  In the 1970s, a number of reports were commissioned to find a way 
out of the institutional system for government and residents.  Some of these, like the 
‗Williston Report‘ (1971), were commissioned by the Ontario government in response to 
specific incidents resulting in death or serious injury to individuals under the care of 
institutional facilities (3).  The ‗Welch Report‘ (1973) subsequently announced a ―new 
policy focus for the delivery of services to the mentally retarded centred around the 
concept of community living‖ (i).  However, this new objective could not be realized 
without first building community capacity to provide the services and supports currently 
delivered within the institutional system.   
 In fact, in the years immediately following Berton‘s damning exposé, admittance 
to hospital schools for the disabled continued to rise (Simmons 1982, 312-313).  It was 
not until 1964 or 1965 that the total population of residents across sixteen facilities, in 
Ontario, finally peaked at 2,916 residents (Marshall 33).  The number of institutional 
facilities grew because the initial impetus of the Reform movement was to shift to 
smaller, regional centres before beginning to actively expand community 
(nongovernmental) capacity.  As a result, by  the mid-1970s, Ontario had nineteen 
Schedule 1 (government-operated) institutions (Government of Ontario, 2006, 5).   
 A similar trend was occurring in provincial psychiatric facilities in Ontario, as 
many of these asylums housed substantial populations of seniors with chronic conditions, 
and little prospect of recovery (Simmons, 1990, 109-120).  Dramatic reductions in the 
number of people residing in provincial institutions began to occur over the final ten years 
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of the Reform period when the number of people being ―served in the community-based 
system grew from approximately 4,600 to more than 25,000‖ (Parsons 5) in anticipation 
of the Dismantlement phase of the cycle.   
 The other significant policy shift related to disability services planning came 
about as a result of the transfer of disability policy planning from the Ministry of Health 
to the Ministry of Community and Social Services, under the auspices of the 
Developmental Services Act, in 1974 (Government of Ontario, 2006, 5).  This transfer re-
affirmed the tradition of planning that aspired to develop separate service systems for 
people diagnosed as mentally disabled and mentally ill, despite Williston‘s finding that 
the psychiatric and retarded were still co-habiting in the same facilities (31).   
 This transfer of responsibility from Health to Social Services ministries may have 
been perceived as progressive by some disability rights advocates who took issue with 
having cognitive impairments perceived as illness and disease, as well mental health 
advocates who promoted recovery from mental illness as an outcome not consistent with 
a disability diagnosis.
21
  In reality, the incentive for the move was to make disability 
services meet the criteria for federal funding through the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) 
initiative (1966), whereby the federal government pledged to match provincial investment 
in social services programming dollar for dollar (Simmons, 1982, 207).
22
  On the other 
hand, this transfer of ministerial responsibility did little to facilitate coordination of 
services for people who were directly affected by policies generated now by separate 
bureaucracies.   
                                               
21 In his report, Sen. Kirby explains that ―[r]ecovery is about hope… recovery does not necessarily equate 
with cure.  It can mean different things to different people.  Very broadly, it suggests that the goal of mental 
health policy should be to enable people to live the most satisfying, hopeful, and productive life consistent 
with the limitations caused by their illness‖ (45). 
22 CAP was replaced by the Canada Health and Social Transfer in 1996, eliminating this cost sharing 
incentive for provinces.   
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 A lot of novels published over the course of the Reform period reflect a growing 
awareness of the rights of people with mental disabilities and their status in society.  Ken 
Kesey‘s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest was published the same year as the Ontario 
Human Rights Code was passed, in 1962; and the novel depicts characters who are 
victims of a discriminatory society that is intolerant of people who cannot conform to 
socially prescribed roles and behavioural norms.  Thus, the patients on Kesey‘s ward are 
victims of the ―Combine‖ that works to assimilate people into their socially prescribed 
norms.  However, even those who work to achieve the Combine‘s objective are revealed 
to be casualties of structural discrimination and abuse of power in the outside world.  The 
trauma that Nurse Ratched and her orderlies have experienced in the outside world 
contextualize their cruel and dehumanizing treatment of patients within the ward.  In 1964 
Jean Rhys attempts to reconstruct Brontë‘s madwoman and tell her life-story in Wide 
Sargasso Sea.  Her novel portrays how historical practices of patriarchy and 
ethnocentrism effectively disable women and others.     
 If the Reform phase of the institutional cycle opened with a victory for parents 
who were advocates for better services for their children, in and out of institutions 
(Parsons 5), the end of this phase demonstrates that family members cannot always be 
presumed to be the best judge of the capacity of a person with severe disabilities.  Story 
and policy near the end of the Reform phase anticipate a more complex understanding of 
families in the final phase of the Cycle.  Judith Krantz‘s wildly popular Princess Daisy 
(1980), and the real-life drama of Clark v. Clark (1982) depict the family as a sometimes 
empowering and, at other times, oppressive influence on the lives of people with mental 
disabilities.   
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How Their Stories are Told 
 Berton‘s exposé is indicative of the beginning of a growing public awareness 
about the compromised quality of life for people with mental disabilities in Ontario.  
While outside expertise was commissioned to report on the status of the institutional 
system, the emphasis was still on the wisdom of government to determine how to realize 
a new objective of community integration for people who would once have been assigned 
to an institutional facility for most of their lives.  At the same time, however, a more 
activist public was increasingly challenging the wisdom of government to address the 
social welfare issues that determined the rights and opportunities of citizens.  Family 
members of people with mental disabilities,
23
 and workers on the frontlines
24
 became 
better organized and insisted on contributing to policy debate that affected the range and 
quality of services available to support people with mental disabilities.   
 As the wisdom of government institutions was increasingly challenged in society, 
so the legitimacy of cultural assumptions about what it means to be normal was 
questioned in the popular novel.  In Ken Kesey‘s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest  
Patrick McMurphy‘s story is narrated by a ‗chronic‘ on the ward, named Bromden.  
Because Bromden is presumed to be deaf and dumb, he is given extraordinary access 
within the ward and insight regarding the motives of those who abuse the authority 
invested in them as healers and helpers.  He explains that the custodial staff ―don‘t bother 
                                               
23 In 1971 the OAMR was composed of 117 locals in Ontario, and was a significant influence in the 
―development of appropriate legislation and suggested amendments to legislation when required to better 
meet the needs of the retarded‖ (Williston, 59).  
24 The Ontario Public Service Employees Union undertook independent consultations across the Province 
where family members, and disability professionals challenged the optimistic rhetoric of community living, 
and argued that the dismantlement of a Provincial system of institutional care put residents at significant 
risk in the wider community.  See Marshall (1982).   
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not talking out loud about their hate secrets when I‘m nearby because they think I‘m deaf 
and dumb.  Everybody thinks so.  I‘m cagey enough to fool them that much‖ (Kesey 3).  
This access enhances Bromden‘s reliability as a narrator, despite his own illness that 
manifests itself in a perception of the institution as a diabolical machine:  a Combine that 
detects fear and enforces submission.   
 Throughout the novel, Bromden is telling his own story as well as McMurphy‘s.  
He flashes back to increasingly vivid memories of his life before his hospitalization:  A 
childhood spent fishing on ancient Aboriginal lands before the government flooded the 
Reserve and destroyed his community.  In recalling his past, he realizes that he had begun 
to lose his voice before he even determined to give up speaking:   
          it wasn‘t me that started acting deaf; it was people that started acting like I was too  
          dumb to hear or see or say anything at all… 
            …In the Army anybody with more stripes acted that way toward me.  That  
          was the way they figured you were supposed to act around someone looked like I  
          did.  And even as far back as grade school I can remember people saying that they  
          didn‘t think I was listening, so they quit listening to the things I was saying. (Kesey  
          210)          
As McMurphy‘s influence makes Bromden want to speak his mind to him, he 
increasingly struggles with his silence and the awareness that ―I had to keep on acting 
deaf if I wanted to hear at all‖ (Kesey 209).  For Bromden silence has been a sanctuary 
that keeps him safe from at least some of the cruelties perpetrated by others.   
 Bromden tells McMurphy‘s story several years after the time of their 
acquaintance.  He explains to the reader how ―I been silent so long now it‘s gonna roar 
out of me like floodwaters and you think the guy telling this is ranting and raving my 
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God; you think this is too horrible to have really happened, this is too awful to be the 
truth!  But, please.  It‘s still hard for me to have a clear mind thinking on it.  But it‘s the 
truth even if it didn‘t happen‖ (Kesey 8).  To the extent that characters with mental 
disabilities are able to speak for themselves, their versions of their life stories remind the 
reader that truth is perspectival.  In other words, the behaviours of people diagnosed as 
crazy or incompetent may actually be an understandable response to trauma that they 
have experienced, trauma that may have precipitated the mental disability, or have been 
experienced as a result of abuse or exploitation because of the individual‘s impairment.   
 When Bromden finally speaks to McMurphy and tells him about the Combine, as 
well as the story of his life before he lost his voice and ended up on the ward, he 
concludes on the verge of despair because he just does not have the words to fully 
communicate his experience:  ―‗I can‘t say it all.  It don‘t make sense.‘‖  McMurphy 
makes an important distinction in his reply:  ―‗I didn‘t say it didn‘t make sense, Chief, I 
just said it was talkin‘ crazy.‘‖ (Kesey 222)  McMurphy is able to recognize truth in 
Bromden‘s metaphors.  He realizes that, taken altogether, what Bromden recollects is a 
true account from his memory, even if no one else experiences the chemical fogs and 
whirling gears that give Bromden a language for theorizing the inhumanity of the asylum 
and its objectives.        
 Rhys‘ novel incorporates multiple voices to demonstrate how different 
perspectives on the same events communicate very different versions of the same story.  
In the first section of Wide Sargasso Sea, Antoinette Cosway gives her own first-person 
narrative of her life before becoming Bertha Rochester.  However, her loss of authority to 
speak her own story is symbolized in the second section of the novel when Rochester 
assumes the role of narrator, immediately following their wedding.  This shift in voice is 
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not explicitly indicated in the text.  In fact, Rochester is not referred to by name at any 
point in the novel.  The effect is to bestow upon the new husband the omniscience 
conventionally assigned to the third-person narrator.  As her husband, Rochester has 
assumed authority over Antoinette‘s story from this point onward, to the extent that he 
even exercises the right to change her name to Bertha.  The only explanation he gives for 
renaming his wife is that ―‗it is a name I‘m particularly fond of.  I think of you as 
Bertha‘‖ (Rhys 86).  The patriarchal tradition of  women surrendering their name in 
marriage is, here, further enforced by Rochester indulging his inclination to reconstruct 
his wife‘s identity altogether by assigning her an English name.   
 Truth is provisional, determined by those who have the power to lend legitimacy 
to their narrative perspective.  Having Antoinette literally lose her voice upon being 
transformed into Bertha Rochester emphasizes how disability is a social construction that 
is heavily influenced by patriarchal and colonizing traditions that have historically 
silenced women.  As the second son of a father who does not wish to divide the family 
legacy, Rochester is briefly shown to struggle with his own duplicity in marrying a 
woman he does not love in order to secure his own interests.  When he is honest with 
himself, he recognizes the elusiveness of an objective truth that can be relied upon:   
―suddenly, bewilderingly, I was certain that everything I had imagined to be truth was 
false.  False.  Only the magic and the dream are true-- all the rest‘s a lie‖ (Rhys 109).  
Nonetheless, with English law on his side, the version of the truth that he contrives is the 
one that prevails.  By comparison,  Antoinette‘s truth, even about her own life-story,  has 
little worth.  
 A third version of Antoinette‘s story is told by her alleged half-brother, Daniel 
Cosway, in a letter to Rochester.  The letter both accuses and condemns Antoinette, 
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despite the absence of any specific charge or evidence against the young woman (Rhys 
57-60).  Still, this testimony is enough to galvanize Rochester‘s unease in his marriage, 
and serves as his justification for abandoning any affection he may have been nurturing 
for his bride.  When he eventually does question Antoinette about the letter‘s allegations, 
she asks him why he is so quick to believe a stranger‘s accusations without asking for her 
side, asserting that ―‗[t]here is always the other side, always‘‖ (Rhys 81).  This line 
alludes to a key theme of the novel, as a response to Jane Eyre and the story of 
Rochester‘s first wife who never gets to speak for herself.   
 The third section of the book opens with a monologue by Grace Poole, who is 
Bertha‘s keeper/caregiver in Jane Eyre, and silent in that novel.  She speaks here to the 
pains taken by Rochester  to control and contain the story of Mrs. Rochester.  The 
existing household staff have been dismissed and Grace is offered double her salary if she 
can prevent the circulation of any ―gossip‖ (Rhys 114) about the existence of Mrs. 
Rochester.  Still, despite her confinement and the suppression of her very existence, 
Grace Poole also observes that Mrs Rochester ―hasn’t lost her spirit.  She’s still fierce.  I 
don’t turn my back on her when her eyes have that look.  I know it‖ (Rhys 115).  Grace 
Poole is an ambivalent figure in Brontë‘s original story and remains so here.  She is not 
developed to an extent that the reader generates any definite sympathy or antipathy 
toward her.  In Wide Sargasso Sea, Grace Poole gives her own perspective and speaks 
pragmatically about her role and her responsibility in a manner befitting someone who is 
well acquainted with the mentally disabled individual, as well as the world where she 
exists.  That Grace Poole knows that the ―look‖ in Bertha Rochester‘s eyes suggests that 
she too has felt fierce in her confinement.  Perhaps every woman has.   
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 Rhys finally concludes the novel by returning the narrative to Antoinette who 
anticipates her final exit.  Like the parrot who perishes in the burning of her family home 
at Coulibri because Mr Mason had his wings clipped (Rhys 22); like the mother who 
succumbs to madness because she is not permitted to fly from her persecutors (as will be 
discussed below); Antoinette Bertha Cosway Rochester is also destined to go down in 
flames.   
 Much of disability policy debate revolves around the question of who is qualified 
to tell the story of the mad or retarded person.  In Judith Krantz‘s novel the mentally 
disabled sister, Danielle Valensky, never speaks directly.  The story is narrated in the 
third person, primarily from Daisy‘s point of view.  Occasionally the motives and internal 
monologues of other characters are described, but Danielle exists only in terms of how 
she is perceived by others.  She is always referred to in the third person and is important 
exclusively for her impact on her twin sister‘s life; an imperfect reflection of the 
beautiful, bright and successful other, but insubstantial in her own right.  However, 
Krantz‘s storyline allows for enough intercourse between the two sisters before their 
separation to establish an attachment and a mutual understanding that transcends time and 
distance.  This bond is represented in the childhood language that they share and is only 
understood between them (108-112), their mutual grief at Danielle‘s eventual removal to 
an institutional facility (122-123), and Daisy‘s enduring loyalty to her twin.  In terms of 
the author‘s narrative purpose, it is essential that this bond exist in order to establish 
Daisy as a reliable advocate and protector of her sister‘s interests.     
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The Role of the Family 
 This phase of the Institutional cycle opens with a journalist‘s public narrative 
about a personal experience:   
          On the last afternoon of 1959, I drove to Orillia with a friend of mine and his 12- 
          year-old son.  The boy is handsome, with large, dark eyes, but he is not very  
          communicative for he will always have the mind of a child.  He is retarded  
          mentally.  On holidays he comes home to his parents.  The rest of the time he is a  
          patient at the Ontario Hospital school.   
            There are 2,807 others like him, jammed together in facilities which would 
          be heavily taxed if 1,000 patients were removed.  More than 900 of them are hived  
          in 70-year-old buildings.  There is nowhere else for them to go. (Berton 31)
25
 
The young boy being returned to the facility was the son of Jerry Anglin, then Institutions 
Chairman of the Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded (Simmons, 1982, xv), 
which was an advocacy group founded by parents in 1953 and a forerunner of the Ontario 
Association for Community Living.   
 Although parents have always comprised the largest, most persistent advocacy 
group on behalf of people who cannot effectively advocate for themselves, Berton‘s 
column contributed to raising wider public awareness of a growing institutional crisis.  
The debate about the most appropriate response to what was increasingly perceived as a 
human rights issue must have been particularly troubling for these parents who for many 
years had been told that the institution was the best place for their children to get the care 
                                               
25 Berton must have been given uncommon access for his tour, as Williston notes that in 1960 the hospital 
school ―was truly a ‗closed‘ institution and no parent was allowed beyond the front hall‖ (29).  
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and the training required to allow them to live as ‗normal‘ a life as possible.  Arguably, 
the most radical aspect of the Reform-era policy shift is the reversion of primary 
responsibility back to families as the most appropriate location for the care and training of 
people with mental disabilities.  In his 1973 planning document, The Provincial Secretary 
for Social Development argued that,    
          [i]deally… the family of the retarded individual can provide him with the 
          most familiar and most socially reassuring environment, with minimal additional  
          costs imposed on the community.  It does tend to place an extreme financial and  
          emotional burden on the family, however, and it does not necessarily encourage the  
          social development and adjustment of the retarded person. (Welch 12)   
Many families were feeling pressure to assume roles and responsibilities that they had 
once been urged to relinquish.  Furthermore, a family‘s capacity to provide care would 
vary in relation to the financial resources at their disposal, the nature and extent of the 
individual‘s mental impairments.           
 This confusion about family roles, as well as the personal and financial costs of 
care, are reflected in the literature of the time, and are discussed in this section.  Some 
popular novels, such as Krantz‘s Princess Daisy, still contrast the selfless caregiver and 
the bad parent in a fairly simplistic way.  Increasingly, however, the Reform novel offers 
a more complex portrayal of the family struggling with personal issues and societal 
attitudes that challenge the ability to care for children, spouses and siblings with mental 
disabilities.  In many cases the shift in emphasis from institutional to community care had 
a disproportionate impact on women as society‘s primary caregivers, and compounded 
inequality between men and women in law and custom within patriarchal and colonizing 
cultures.  This is the familial context that Rhys portrays in Wide Sargasso Sea where 
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patriarchal traditions in law and custom are also depicted as contributing to or 
exacerbating women‘s experiences of mental disability.  In some cases, as in Kesey‘s 
novel, the family is peripheral to the action of the story.  To the extent that it is referred 
to, it generally is portrayed as another of society‘s dysfunctional institutions.  The 
ambiguous status of the family is made apparent in policy and novels of the Reform phase 
in the way it is sometimes identified as the source of mental disability, and at other times 
depicted as the most appropriate location for care. 
 In Wide Sargasso Sea, Antoinette recalls that part of her mother‘s motivation for 
marrying Mason had been to try to secure a passage for her disabled son, Pierre, so that 
he could obtain treatment that might cure his disability (17).  Annette‘s despair is linked 
to her son‘s disability, as Antoinette recalls how, even though they had no money, ―[s]he 
persuaded a Spanish Town doctor to visit my younger brother Pierre who staggered when 
he walked and couldn‘t speak distinctly.  I don‘t know what the doctor told her or what 
she said to him but he never came again and after that she changed‖ (Rhys 4).  Pierre‘s 
disability motivates the mother‘s ambition to leave a society already in the midst of social 
upheaval and retaliation against generations of racial oppression.  In a society so 
sensitized to differences in class and physical appearance, Antoinette‘s mother is keenly 
sensitive to her son‘s vulnerability (16).  Her inability to protect her family is a major 
contributing factor to Annette‘s complete and irreversible mental breakdown.     
 Both policy and popular novels identify the ability to meet the costs of care as 
essential for meeting extraordinary human need.  However, in Krantz‘s novel, Danielle 
Valensky‘s story suggests that no amount of money is enough to ensure that parents have 
the personal capacity to support a child with severe mental disabilities.  Daisy and 
Danielle Valensky are the offspring of a brief and passionate marriage between an 
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American actress, Francesca, and a Russian prince, Alexander (Stash) Valensky.  When 
their twin daughters are born, one of the sisters is immediately identified as being 
mentally retarded.  The father‘s reaction to this news is one of complete revulsion.  In his 
attempt to console the father, the doctor who delivers the girls explains how 
          ―[a]ccidents happen in nature, against which the utmost skill of man can do nothing  
          except salvage as best it can.‖  
  ―Salvage?”  Stash said the word as if he had never heard it before.  What  
          had he to do with salvage?  There had never been any allowance in his life for loss,  
          so what room could there be for salvage?  (Krantz 69) 
Stash Valensky‘s refusal to love his retarded daughter is explained as an outcome of 
being raised by a mother who was chronically ill.  The boy‘s inability to save his mother 
from a slow death has made him intolerant of weakness of any kind:   
          From his earliest memories, the little boy, Alexander never knew what it was like  
          to have a healthy mother.  His babyish play with her was always cut short by  
          someone who was afraid that he was tiring her.  When Titiana read out loud to him, 
          a nurse would always close the book far too soon.  When Alexander grew old  
          enough to play simple games of cards with his mother, her chief doctor took him  
          aside and gravely warned him of the dangerous excitement engendered by any  
          games of chance.  His love for her was imprinted, from earliest memory, by the  
          terrible tension which lies between the sick and the well.  From babyhood on he  
          was crippled, permanently, with a resentment, a wordless hatred, and a deep and  
          irrationally superstitious fear of any sign of illness.  (Krantz 38) 
The father‘s capacity to love is disabled as a result of his childhood trauma.  So intense is 
his aversion to disability of any kind that he manages to briefly convince his wife that the 
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child did not survive, and arranges to have Danielle fostered out to a woman who makes 
her living by caring for wealthy people‘s discarded children (Krantz 81).       
 Valensky‘s abandonment of his mentally disabled daughter speaks to the reality 
that not all parents are inclined to parent a disabled child (Landsman 111).  According to 
Vanier, feelings of ambivalence and even aversion on the part of some parents towards 
offspring who are born with severe disabilities contribute to a reality where ―those with 
intellectual disabilities are among the most oppressed and excluded people in the world.  
Even their own parents are frequently ashamed to have given birth to a child ‗like that.‘ 
Such parents feel humiliated and ashamed by the apparent failure, so great is the social 
pressure to create a perfect baby‖ (72).  As a result, some parents remove these children 
from their lives as the only way they can cope with their feelings of guilt or 
disappointment.   
 In contrast to the father who has no tolerance for imperfection, the good mother 
and sister of the Establishment phase are both recreated in Krantz‘s novel.  When 
Francesca discovers that Danielle is not dead, she immediately reclaims her, leaves her 
marriage, and goes into exile with both daughters.  She devotes her life to their care until 
she dies suddenly when the twins are six years old.  The difference between the mother‘s 
and the father‘s response to their mentally disabled child is further contextualized by a 
medical model that was long established as the dominant framework for constructing 
disability by this time.  The doctor who attends the births of Daisy and Danielle Valensky 
explains that   
          the mothers of retarded children often spend much less time with their normal 
          children in favor of the sick one; yes, it was not at all impossible that the Princess  
          would refuse to have the child institutionalized no matter how necessary it was.   
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          Indeed, there were many such cases.  The maternal instinct was often strengthened  
          beyond the imagination of man by the care of a sick or retarded child and there was  
          no force as strong as that instinct.  Nature was indeed marvelous.  Mothers were  
          self-sacrificing. (Krantz 80)   
Indeed, Francesca‘s love for her infant daughter is, if anything, intensified because of her 
total dependence.  Danielle will always need her in ways that her twin sister will not.  
Therefore,             
          it was with Dani that Francesca found her most peaceful and harmonious moments.  
          Dani‘s eyes, like a baby‘s eyes, seemed to remember something of a previous life  
          which couldn‘t be communicated, but which reassured and comforted her.  Dani‘s  
          vulnerability was her strength, since no one saw her without feeling the impulse to  
          protect her.  Dani was never unhappy because she was never frustrated.  If she  
          couldn‘t do something, she didn‘t bang furiously on the table the way Daisy did  
          when she first discovered that she didn‘t know how to read.  Dani didn‘t ask  
          endless questions, didn‘t plague Francesca with demands to climb a tree, catch an  
          earthworm, make cookies, train a hummingbird, take a walk in the woods and  
          collect pebbles on the beach—all in the same breath, as Daisy did. (107) 
Relationship with their parents, especially mother figures, is emphasized as paramount to 
the security of people with mental disabilities across all phases of the Institutional Cycle.  
In novels where these relationships are absent or dysfunctional the mentally disabled 
character is always extremely vulnerable.    
 In Wide Sargasso Sea it is implied that at least part of the explanation for Annette 
Mason‘s breakdown is her inability to save her disabled son, Pierre, from the attack on 
Coulibri.  In Antoinette‘s version of her life-story she suggests that her mother cared 
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more for the younger brother, perhaps because he is so vulnerable:  ―she pushed me away, 
not roughly but calmly, coldly, without a word, as if she had decided once and for all that 
I was useless to her.  She wanted to sit with Pierre or walk where she pleased without 
being pestered, she wanted peace and quiet.  I was old enough to look after myself‖ (Rhys 
5).  The inability to prevent the disaster that she is able to foretell, and the loss of her 
child finally does push Annette over the edge into madness.  Her mother‘s decline into 
madness makes Antoinette vulnerable, in turn.   
 While nurturing capacity has been understood in popular literature and in policy 
as an innate feminine quality, Kesey satirizes this cultural assumption in One Flew Over 
the Cuckoo’s Nest.  When McMurphy brings his fellow patients‘ attention to the way 
Ratched manipulates and humiliates them in group therapy, Harding tells him, ―‗[w]hy, 
see here, my friend Mr. McMurphy, my psychopathic sidekick, our Miss Ratched is a 
veritable angel of mercy and why just everyone knows it.  She‘s unselfish as the wind, 
toiling thanklessly for the good of all, day after day, five long days a week.  That takes 
heart, my friend, heart‘‖ (61, emphasis in original).  Ratched, of course, is no Mary 
Rudge or Susan Dixon.  Instead, she rules her ward by a combination of degrading 
condescension, manipulative therapeutic tactics, drugs and, in extreme cases, shock 
therapy and radical surgery to ensure compliance to her authority.       
 If Ratched is woman who abuses her authority, Rhys writes about women who 
have no legitimate power at all within the family, and particularly within marriage.  
Antoinette loses her mother to a combination of patriarchal indifference and cultural 
prejudice that eventually breaks her spirit and her mind.  Even while she still has her 
sanity, Antoinette‘s mother is powerless to influence a course of action that would move 
her family out of harm‘s way from the superstitions and local caste system that reviles 
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Annette and her progeny because she is the daughter of a slave owner and the widow of a 
slave owner.  She marries to obtain security for herself and her children, but Annette is 
unable to convince her new husband of the danger they face in staying in the community.  
Antoinette recalls how her mother tried to impress upon her new husband the urgency of 
their need to leave Coulibri, but he would not listen.  Instead, he told his wife that she was 
imagining an enmity that did not exist (Rhys 14).  Thus, Rhys portrays how easily 
women‘s versions of their own life-story are dismissed or discredited even by those who 
are closest to them.   
 Annette‘s failure to have the veracity of her experience acknowledged has 
disastrous consequences:  the family home is destroyed, her disabled son dies, and she 
loses her sanity as a result of her grief and helplessness.  Having witnessed her mother‘s  
complete mental breakdown, Antoinette is understandably wary of entering into a 
marriage of her own.  She is persuaded by Rochester, however, because she lives in a 
society where all women need to be attached to family, through blood or through 
marriage.  Even Rochester, in his version of his wife‘s story, acknowledges Antoinette‘s 
reservations, which he sweeps away with romantic gallantry:  ―I kissed her fervently, 
promising her peace, happiness, safety‖ (Rhys 46).  These three things are irrevocably 
lost to the bride by the time they leave for England.  She has no resources, no friends, 
which is why she persists in seeing England as a beacon of hope if she can only get there 
(Rhys 68).   
 As the marriage deteriorates, Antoinette is urged by her childhood nursemaid, 
Christophine, to ―‗[h]ave spunks and do battle for yourself.  Speak to your husband calm 
and cool, tell him about your mother and all what happened in Coulibri and why she get 
sick and what they do to her.  Don‘t bawl at the man and don‘t make crazy faces.  Don‘t 
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cry either.  Crying no good with him.  Speak nice and make him understand‘‖ (Rhys 72).  
Before the madness overtakes her, Antoinette does try to tell her own version of her life 
story to her husband; and she tells Rochester, ―[y]ou have no right… You have no right to 
ask questions about my mother and then refuse to listen to my answer‖ (Rhys 82).  
However, social custom and policy empower him to overrule or dismiss his wife‘s 
version of the truth, to rename and renounce her without appeal to a higher justice.   
 As with her mother, Antoinette‘s fate is sealed when she fails to convince her 
husband to believe in her own account of her life-story.  Instead, Rochester chooses to 
believe in unsubstantiated allegations against his wife and her family (Rhys 57-60) to 
justify removing her to England, and incarcerating her in his family estate.  Rhys‘ version 
of Bertha Rochester‘s life narrative offers an explanation for the ‗madwoman in the attic‘ 
that explores women‘s vulnerability to mental disability within the institution of marriage 
where policy and social custom invested all authority in the husband, with no appeal.               
Antoinette/Bertha‘s insanity is ultimately linked to her mother‘s (Rhys 107) and blamed 
on familial inheritance.  This is the version of her story that is given and uncritically 
accepted in Brontë‘s Jane Eyre.   However, Rhys is exploring alternative storylines that 
contribute to women‘s madness.  She suggests in her version of Antoinette‘s story, before 
she is recast as Bertha, that her madness is an outcome of an abusive patriarchal system 
that invests men with power over women to break them down.   
 Antoinette does not have sufficient personal power or advocates to successfully 
challenge Rochester‘s construction of her.  In the end, even Rochester acknowledges to 
himself the veracity of the accusation that is leveled against him by Christophine, who 
has cared for Antoinette since childhood.  Christophine tells Rochester he has only 
pretended to believe unsubstantiated allegations about Antoinette as an excuse to extricate 
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himself from his wife (Rhys 99).  In their final exchange, Christophine tells him that 
madness is a diagnosis of convenience bestowed by men with power on people without.  
She asks, ―‗[y]ou think you fool me?  You want her money but you don‘t want her.  It is 
in your mind to pretend she is mad.  I know it.  The doctors say what you tell them to 
say‘‖ (Rhys 104).  Christophine‘s version of Antoinette‘s story transfers responsibility for 
her madness from the woman he has renamed Bertha, and her family to him.  Rochester is 
the one responsible for breaking up his wife (99).   
 In One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, Nurse Ratched reiterates the popular 
assumption that blames parents for their children‘s mental disability, legitimizing this 
perspective through her authority as a psychiatric nurse.  When introducing a punishment 
to the patients on the ward for defying her authority by boycotting their housekeeping 
duties, she explains the therapeutic rationalization for her revenge:   
          ―Please understand: We do not impose certain rules and restrictions on you  
          without a great deal of thought about their therapeutic value.  A good many of you  
          are in here because you could not adjust to the rules of society in the Outside  
          World, because you refused to face up to them, because you tried to circumvent and  
          avoid them.  At some time—perhaps in your childhood—you may have been  
          allowed to get away with flouting the rules of society.  When you broke a rule you  
          knew it.  You wanted to be dealt with, needed it, but the punishment did not come.   
          That foolish lenience on the part of your parents may have been the germ that grew  
          into your present illness.‖ (Kesey 199-200) 
This is not just meanness on Ratched‘s part.  Kesey is pointing to dominant medical 
approaches to mental disability that essentially blamed parents for a wide range of 
diagnoses and deviant behaviours.  This is consistent with perspectives depicted in other 
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novels written in the Reform period, which reflect the influence of therapeutic approaches 
emphasizing family dysfunction as a dominant cause of mental illness.
26
  Such views had 
long been held, but had only recently come under critical scrutiny.  As the case for de-
institutionalization began to evolve, policy makers, social workers and other human 
services professionals struggled to reconcile how families could not be both the problem 
and the solution in the life stories of people with mental disabilities.     
 One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest presents a cast of characters whose family 
relationships are represented as broken, dysfunctional, or nonexistent.  Indeed, it is hard 
to conceive how the abuses perpetrated on the ward could occur in the face of active 
interest from family members, or other advocates on the Outside.  The only references to 
family connections that are a source of strength, or at least consolation, are the 
reminiscences that are offered by the story‘s narrator, Chief Bromden.  He survives and 
escapes the asylum partly on the strength of his memories of his past, which his 
relationship with McMurphy help him to recall.  When McMurphy walks into the ward, 
Bromden observes that  
          [h]e talks a little the way Papa used to, voice loud and full of hell, but he doesn‘t  
          look like Papa; Papa was a full-blood Columbia Indian—a chief—and hard and  
          shiny as a gunstock.  This guy is redheaded with long red sideburns and a tangle of  
          curls out from under his cap, been needing cut for a long time, and he‘s broad as  
          Papa was tall, broad across the jaw and shoulders and chest, a broad white devilish  
          grin, and he‘s hard in a different kind of way from Papa, kind of the way a baseball  
                                               
26 For example, in Joanne Greenberg‘s (1964) I Never Promised You a Rose Garden Dr. Fried, the 
protagonist‘s psychiatrist observes that, ―[m]any parents said—even thought—that they wanted help for 
their children, only to show, subtly or directly, that their children were part of a secret shame for their own 
ruin‖ (27). 
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          is hard under the scuffed leather. (Kesey 12-13)      
The comparison to Bromden‘s father that Murphy inspires is significant because 
McMurphy does represent a kind of parental figure to the other patients on the ward.  
They rely on his strength and his advocacy, as children rely on their parents.    
 The ambivalence about the role of the family in the lives of people with mental 
disabilities is also reflected in a policy that did not encourage participation in their 
relatives‘ lives within the institution.  In his report, Williston notes that, in Ontario the 
institution was often ―hundreds of miles from the patient‘s home.  Hence, visits from the 
family are both expensive and time-consuming.  They tend to become infrequent… 
Contacts between the retarded person and his family are weakened and often lost 
altogether‖ (65).  As a result, it was not unusual for people with chronic mental 
disabilities to become estranged from their families.  In this respect Daisy and Danielle 
Valensky‘s relationship, in Princess Daisy,  is atypical.  Somehow, the sisters maintain 
their relationship.  Even when Daisy moves from England to America, through letters, 
pictures and photographs that Daisy sends she is able to maintain her presence in her 
sister‘s life.     
 The high quality care that keeps Danielle Valensky safe and happy in her 
institutional school does not come cheap.  So, when their parents die and Daisy‘s 
inheritance is lost, Daisy struggles to earn enough money to maintain her sister in the 
facility that she knows as home (Krantz 223).  Even if the quality of care that Danielle 
receives was available to all families, most could not afford it.  In other cases people may 
make poor choices on behalf of others as a result of ingrained prejudice, guilt, personal 
trauma, or indifference.   
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 In extreme circumstances, the courts have been called upon to arbitrate what is the 
most just course of action in the interests of people with severe disabilities.  This 
happened in Ontario, in 1982, when Matthew Justin Clark appealed to the courts for the 
right to emancipate himself from his parents‘ guardianship.  His parents were opposing 
Mr. Clark‘s decision to reside outside of the Rideau Residential facility, even though they 
had maintained no relationship with their son since his placement at the age of two.  This 
twenty-year-old man‘s disabilities included severe physical impairments from cerebral 
palsy, as well as mental retardation determined to be in the mild to moderate range (Clark 
v. Clark, para. 21).  He also could not speak.  He communicated his case through 
Blissymbolics,
27
 and it was supported through the testimony of doctors and frontline 
workers who had known Mr. Clark for many years.  Judge John Matheson pronounced his 
verdict in favour of Justin Clark ―in language which clearly affirmed Justin‘s full 
humanity‖ (Rioux & Frazee 182).  The judgment validated the legitimacy of Justin 
Clark‘s personal narrative, despite his significant mental impairments.     
 This decision challenged the generally accepted notion that family members 
always are always best equipped to determine the best interests of an individual with a 
severe mental disability.  Instead, Judge Matheson emphasized the principle of individual 
rights, which should not preclude the right of individuals to take risks:     
          Sir William Blackstone in Book the First of Commentaries on the Laws of  
          England stated in 1809 that the principle aim of society is to guard and protect  
          individuals in the proper exercise of their individual rights.  Such rights he  
                                               
27 Blissymbolics refers to a type of communication program that utilizes pictorial symbols to allow some 
people who are nonverbal to respond to questions and express themselves.  Justin Clark ―was the first 
person in Canada ever to give legal evidence using this means of communication‖ (Rioux & Frazee 181-
182).   
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          characterized as absolute.  I believe a courageous man such as Justin Clark is  
          entitled to take a risk.   
         With incredible effort Justin Clark has managed to communicate his passion for   
          freedom as well as his love of family during the course of this trial.   
          I have accepted that and believe that to be so…  
         We have, all of us, recognized a gentle, trusting, believing spirit and very much a   
          thinking human being who has his unique part to play in our compassionate  
          interdependent society.  … 
          I find and I declare Matthew Justin Clark to be mentally competent. (Clark v.   
          Clark, para. 41-45) 
Judgments on the capacity of people with mental disabilities to self-advocate have 
typically relied heavily on the authority of medical models and, more recently, the 
perspectives of parents.  However, no expertise should be uncritically accepted when its 
implementation may undermine fundamental human rights.     
 As Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) specifically affirmed 
the equality rights of people with mental and physical disabilities in law (Rioux & Frazee 
171), a rhetoric of community living continued to evolve.  Policy planners were taxed 
with the responsibility for building community capacity to support people being diverted 
from the institutional system.  This objective included determining how to support 
families that undertake to provide care for family members who would once have been 
institutionalized as a matter of course.  In his 1971 report, Williston argued that it is 
incumbent upon families to take an active role in supporting their children with mental 
disabilities, but he also insisted that they cannot be expected to do it alone.   
          There is a need for acceptance of the idea that the responsibility of a community to  
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          help parents of handicapped children to bring up their children involves the  
          providing of a totality of services.  This concept is widely accepted in such fields as  
          education, medicine, health, baby bonuses, old age pensions and Thalidomide  
          children.  In providing social care for handicapped children and their families  
          (historically administered as an adjunct to the poor law), public concern has not  
          until very recently been developed to the same extent.  I suggest that we must soon  
          spell the death knell on our poor law legacy as applied to handicapped persons and  
          to the social attitudes and practices which stem from them. (73)   
The stories told in the Reform era suggest that the prospects for people with mental 
disabilities varied, depending upon the extent that families were actively engaged in their 
lives, and the resources available to them.  These include financial resources to purchase 
services and supports, as well as the extent of personal attributes and knowledge to be 
effective advocates for community support.  Without the seclusion that the institution 
provides, families also have to be able to nurture self-esteem in their children to help 
them confront the discrimination that they will face in the community.   
 
Community Responsibility 
 Berton‘s revelations about the crisis in care at Orillia were published as a period 
of political activism was beginning to mobilize many marginalized populations, including 
women, racial and cultural minority populations.  A growing civil rights movement 
culminated in the  
          flowerchild 60s [when] conservative old Ontario decided to become progressive.   
          Just as it had opted to revolutionize its school system… it espoused the  
          scientifically-sound and morally-humane idea of releasing the mentally  
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          handicapped and ill from the Dickensian chill of the custodial institutions into the  
          warm and caring community. (Marshall 7)   
Marshall is being somewhat facetious here, as the capacity of the community to care for 
people with mental disabilities has been hotly debated in response to the enthusiastic 
rhetoric of community living.  Still, the 1960s were optimistic times for many people:  
more inclusive views about human rights, generally, together with the human potential of 
people with mental disabilities converged with a pressing political need to contain the 
costs of institutional sprawl in Ontario.  However, these emerging perspectives could not 
easily overcome generations of fear and stigma associated with disability, nurtured by a 
social policy context that had long promoted segregation as the best option for individuals 
with mental disabilities, their families, and society.  
 Jean Vanier believes that ―[w]hen we ally ourselves with the excluded in society, 
not only are we enabled to see people as people and join them in their struggle for justice, 
to work for community and places of belonging, but we also develop the critical tools for 
seeing what is wrong in our own society‖ (96).  In a similar way, novelists have used 
disability as a device for making larger statements about social justice.  In this phase of 
the Institutional Cycle, Kesey and Rhys both draw attention to how the community 
disables individuals and groups through discriminatory attitudes about gender and race, as 
well as mental diversity.  At the same time, policy makes its own assumptions about the 
abilities and needs of a diverse population, as well as the communities where they live.  In 
a society that is beginning to undertake a policy of community integration of people with 
mental disabilities, those who look normal and are perceived as eternal children are most 
likely to elicit public support.  However, Krantz‘s novel suggests that even these 
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sympathetic characters are often still perceived as most happy and secure living apart 
from mainstream society.
 28
    
 The mental hospital in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest ostensibly exists to help 
people adjust to normal functioning in society.
29
  In the ―Therapeutic Community‖ that is 
practised in the group sessions on the ward, the ward psychiatrist explains ―how a guy has 
to learn to get along in a group before he‘ll be able to function in  normal society; how the 
group can help the guy by showing him where he‘s out of place; how society is what 
decides who‘s sane and who isn‘t, so you got to measure up‖ (Kesey 49).  Despite its 
theoretical claims, however, the Therapeutic Community is actually a tool of coercion.  
Its purpose is to keep the focus of deviance on the individual, without questioning the 
prejudices and the abuses that have been perpetrated on the Outside.  This, in turn, works 
to diminish self-esteem, as well as to exacerbate and even create mental disability.   
 The importance of passing as normal
30
 is portrayed in Kesey‘s novel when 
McMurphy succeeds in obtaining permission for himself and nine other patients to leave 
the ward to go out on a fishing charter.  Initially giddy in their courage to sign up for the 
expedition, despite Ratched‘s intimidation tactics (227), they suffer from the reactions of 
people on the Outside who realize where they are from:     
          It was a fine woodsmoked autumn day, full of the sound of kids punting footballs  
                                               
28 The literature review undertaken failed to find one popular or critically acclaimed novel from this period 
that depicted a positive outcome for a person with a mental disability living in the community.  Greenberg‘s 
(1964) I Never Promised You a Rose Garden also depicts the mental asylum as a sometimes abusive facility 
that still functions as a necessary asylum from society and the family, which are depicted as systems that 
exacerbate mental disability.  Similarly, Timothy Findley‘s (1967) The Last of the Crazy People, portrays a 
family struggling with different manifestations of mental disability as isolated from the wider community.   
29 As explained in chapter three, a functional model of disability theory emphasizes training people with 
mental disabilities to accommodate their impairments and any associated behaviours to the norms of 
mainstream society (Roeher Institute 15).   
30 Michalko explains why it is important for people with disabilities to look and behave like normal people 
in order to gain social acceptance.  He explains:  ―My goal in passing was to demonstrate that I was worthy 
of the privilege that came from being ‗normal‘‖ (149).   
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          and the putter of small airplanes, and everybody should‘ve been happy just being  
          outside in it.  But we all stood in a silent bunch with our hands in our pockets while  
          the doctor walked to get his car.  A silent bunch, watching the townspeople who  
          were driving past on their way to work slow down to gawk at all the loonies in their  
          green uniforms. (Kesey 234) 
The self-consciousness that the patients feel at the outset sinks further into humiliation 
when the cars stop at a nearby gas station to fill up.  When the gas station attendants 
attempt to exploit their status as asylum patients being passed off as a work crew by their 
attending physician, Bromden observes:  ―I could see everybody was feeling pretty bad.  
The doctor‘s lying made us feel worse than ever—not because of the lie, so much, but 
because of the truth‖ (Kesey 235-236).  These men have been institutionalized so long 
that they cannot succeed at integrating into the wider community without exposing 
themselves to the negative judgment and discriminatory treatment from others.   
 Realizing this, McMurphy draws upon the fear that people have of mental 
disability and its associations with violence.  By exploiting the stereotype of the violent 
madman he recasts his travel companions:   
          ―Now, Hank, don‘t you see that was just a kindly precaution to keep from startlin’  
          you folks with the truth?  The doc wouldn‘t lie like that about just any patients, but  
          we ain‘t ordinary nuts; we‘re every bloody one of us hot off the criminal-insane  
          ward, on our way to San Quentin where they got better facilities to handle us.  You  
          see that freckle-faced kid there?  Now he might look like he‘s right off a Saturday  
          Evening Post cover, but he‘s an insane knife artist that killed three men.  The man  
          beside him is known as the Bull Goose Loony, unpredictable as a wild hog.  You  
          see that big guy?  He‘s an Indian and he beat six white men to death with a pick  
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          handle when they tried to cheat him trading muskrat hides.‖ (Kesey 236-237   
          emphasis in original)  
In fact, the number of people with mental disabilities who have violent propensities is 
very small (Williston 7).  However, when the cars pull away having only paid 
government rate for their gas and supplies, all the patients have gained confidence.  
Harding, in particular, realizes for the first time how ―‗mental illness could have the 
aspect of power, power’‖ (238) when the subjects of societal stereotypes are able to take 
control of them.   
 McMurphy helps empower his fellow patients to reconstruct their stories by 
exploiting a stereotype of the madman, whereas in Rhys‘ novel,  Wide Sargasso Sea, the 
transformation of Antoinette into Bertha represents the limitations of that kind of power, 
especially for women.  Written as a prequel to Brontë‘s Jane Eyre, Rhys attempts to tell 
the story of  Bertha Cosway/Mason‘s life, from the period before she was Edward 
Rochester‘s wife, indeed before she was Bertha.  It is, at least in part, a response to what 
Rhys perceived as Brontë‘s cultural imperialism (Jenkins xi), and the incomplete 
construction of the original Mrs. Rochester (Jenkins vii).  Post-colonial critics have 
argued that ―Bertha Rochester as a West Indian ‗Creole‘, whether of white or mixed race, 
is demonized [in Jane Eyre] by a racist ideology… In such readings, the treatment of  
Rochester‘s first wife as an amoral maniac of degenerate race intimates a queasy racism 
which pollutes the ethic of the novel‖ (Davies xiii).  In Brontë‘s original depiction of 
Bertha Rochester it is difficult to tell from Jane‘s description to what extent Bertha‘s 
bloated, distorted features are shaped by madness or ethnicity.  There does seem to be a 
deliberate blurring of these aspects of physical complexion in Jane‘s description of an 
apparition with features that were ―‗[f]earful and ghastly to me… I never saw a face like 
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it!  It was a discoloured face—it was a savage face.  I wish I could forget the roll of the 
red eyes and the fearful blackened inflation of the lineaments!‘‖ (Brontë 327).   Jane 
continues to refer to Bertha as an object by explaining to Rochester that ―‗[t]his, sir, was 
purple:  the lips were swelled and dark; the brow furrowed:  the black eyebrows widely 
raised over the bloodshot eyes‘‖(Brontë 327).  The inference is that the madwoman is a 
creature not only outside of the beholder‘s English race or ethnicity, but also foreign 
enough to be outside the human species.   
 Rhys‘ version of Antoinette/Bertha Cosway‘s story picks up on this racial 
ambiguity in her first person narrative.  In the first part of Wide Sargasso Sea, Antoinette 
speaks to how the prejudice and social isolation that her family suffers, within the 
community she was born into, is inflected with racism.  The opening lines of the novel 
identify Antoinette and her family as marginalized within their own community:   
          They say when trouble comes close ranks, and so the white people did.  But we  
          were not of their ranks.  The Jamaican ladies had never approved of my mother,  
          ‗because she pretty like pretty self‘ Christophine said. 
            She was my father‘s second wife, far too young for him they thought, and,  
          worse still, a Martinique girl. (Rhys 3) 
The emancipation of slaves upsets the social order in Coulibri and contributes to the 
vulnerability of Antoinette and her family as former slave owners.  Antoinette recalls:  ―I 
never looked at any strange negro.  They hated us.  They called us white cockroaches.  
Let sleeping curs lie.  One day a little girl followed me singing, ‗Go away white 
cockroach, go away, go away.‘ I walked fast, but she walked faster.  ‗White cockroach, 
go away, go away.  Nobody want you.  Go away‘‖ (Rhys 7).  Antoinette‘s mother, 
Annette, rallies to attract and marry an Englishman, Mr. Mason.  She tries in vain to 
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convince him of their peril at Coulibri and pleads with him to remove them from the 
community and its enmity toward them, but he will not believe her (Rhys 14-16).   
 The toll that her family‘s  social isolation takes on Antoinette‘s mother eventually 
reaches a crisis when their home is burned down by vengeful negroes, killing Antoinette‘s 
disabled younger brother, Pierre:  ―she began to scream abuse at Mr Mason, calling him a 
fool, a cruel stupid fool.  ‗I told you,‘ she said, ‗I told you what would happen again and 
again.‘ Her voice broke, but still she screamed, ‗You would not listen, you sneered at me, 
you grinning hypocrite, you ought not to live either, you know so much, don‘t you?‘‖ 
(Rhys 20).  Grief and loss destroys her mother‘s sanity, and she is reduced to the 
madwoman the community had already determined her to be.  These traumas that 
Antoinette suffers in childhood may be read as contributing to her own eventual mental 
collapse, after her husband refuses to believe in her version of her life narrative and she 
has no one to support or advocate for her.   
 Kesey‘s novel also demonstrates how people who are discriminated against in 
society will internalize those attitudes and behaviours and, in turn, persecute individuals 
who are even more marginalized.  In One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, Ratched exploits 
the rage and humiliation of her hand-picked orderlies to persecute her charges on the 
ward.  She recruits her workers by appealing to the hatred these African American men 
have accumulated through their experiences of a lifetime of discrimination and violence 
in the outside world.  Bromden explains how Ratched‘s first recruit learned hate by 
watching his mother being raped:   
          his papa stood by tied to the hot iron stove with plow traces, blood streaming into 
          his shoes.  The boy watched from a closet five years old and squinting his eye to  
          peep out the crack between the door and the jamb, and he never grew an inch  
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          after…  Eyelids like thin gray leather, he lifts them up just a bit whenever a new  
          white man comes on the ward, peeks out from under them and studies the man up  
          and down and nods just once like he‘s oh yes made positive certain of something he  
          was already sure of.  He wanted to carry a sock full of birdshot when he first came  
          on the job, to work the patients into shape, but [Ratched] told him they didn‘t do it  
          that way anymore, made him leave the sap at home and taught him her own  
          technique; taught him not to show his hate and to be calm and wait, wait for a little  
          advantage, a little slack, then twist the rope and keep the pressure steady.  All the  
          time.  That‘s the way you get them into shape, she taught him. (Kesey 30) 
Like the patients they terrorize, Ratched‘s orderlies are refugees from the outside world: 
the place where identities are constructed, power is designated and abused.  In the ward, 
the oppressed ascend, but are every bit as tyrannical.
31
   
 Bromden‘s own life story is shaped by structural discrimination and injustice.  He 
compares McMurphy‘s calculated decision to at least pretend to defer to ward authority 
with his own father‘s submission to government agents who paid off the people of his 
Aboriginal nation in order to build a dam and flood their reservation:  ―Papa had done the 
smart thing signing the papers; there wasn‘t anything to gain by bucking it.  The 
government would of got it anyhow, sooner or later; this way the tribe would get paid 
good.  It was the smart thing.  McMurphy was doing the smart thing.  I could see that.  He 
was giving in because it was the smartest thing to do‖ (Kesey 174).  In his experience, 
bureaucrats are oblivious in the face of objection.  They never heard Bromden or his 
                                               
31 In Disturbing the Peace (1975), Richard Yates depicts a ward for violent men in the famous Bellevue 
mental hospital, in 1960.  Again, all the frontline staff are black men.  One of the patients explains that the 
reason that the administration only hires ―spades‖ is ―‗because no white man‘d work here for the kind of 
money they get‘‖ (31). 
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father when they tried to explain a different point of view:  ―the apparatus inside them 
take the words… I just said and try to fit the words in here and there, this place and that, 
and when they find the words don‘t have any place ready-made where they‘ll fit, the 
machinery disposes of the words like they weren‘t even spoken‖ (Kesey 213).  This 
demonstrates a cynical approach to consultation and policy planning where government 
bureaucrats go through the motions of consultation only to either manipulate or ignore 
perspectives that are inconsistent with a predetermined course of action.
32
     
 The cultural prejudice that Rhys perceives as being associated with the original 
creation of Bertha is further extended to the oppression of women in a patriarchal culture 
that has existed since the Bible.  This is apparent in the way that Antoinette‘s home is 
associated with the Garden of Eden.  Antoinette recalls:  
          Our garden was large and beautiful as that garden in the Bible—the tree of life 
          grew there.  But it had gone wild.  The paths were overgrown and the smell of dead  
          flowers mixed with the fresh living smell.  Underneath the tree ferns, tall as forest  
          tree ferns, the light was green.  Orchids flourished out of reach or for some reason  
          not to be touched.  One was snaky looking, another like an octopus with long thin  
          brown tentacles bare of leaves hanging from a twisted root. (4) 
While the idiot tends to be associated with nature in ways that emphasize the character‘s 
innocence, the explicit reference here to the Garden of Eden also alludes to Original Sin.  
Women are marked in Genesis as especially linked with sin; and madness, particularly in 
                                               
32 Gambrill (2001) criticizes the social work profession, specifically, for failing to undertake or ignoring the 
findings of evidence-based research, including the informed perspectives of service users, that may 
undermine its status as a profession that provides ―special expertise to address certain kinds of problems‖ 
(166).    
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women, has also been regularly been linked in Western culture to sinful deviance (Gilbert 
& Gubar 3).   
 Given the turbulence and tragedy of her childhood, Antoinette enters her marriage 
aware of her personal vulnerability.  She hardly knows the man who is to be her protector, 
therefore, it is hardly surprising that she cannot trust the happiness that she feels in the 
first weeks of their honeymoon.  She asks Rochester: 
            ‗Why did you make me want to live?  Why did you do that to me?‘ 
            ‗Because I wished it.  Isn‘t that enough?‘ 
            ‗Yes, it is enough.  But if one day you didn‘t wish it.  What should I do 
          then?  Suppose you took this happiness away when I wasn‘t looking…‘ 
            ‗And lose my own?  Who‘d be so foolish?‘  
            ‗I am not used to happiness,‘ she said.  ‗It makes me afraid.‘ (Rhys 55) 
The romantic rituals of English courtship are social conventions; motions that the groom 
goes through, perhaps hoping that in participating in those rituals he can make them be 
true.  However, at least with himself Rochester is very honest:  ―I did not love her‖ (Rhys 
56).  As a result, Antoinette‘s difficulty with trusting in her husband‘s endearments is 
actually insightful.   
 Still, Antoinette does initially enjoy a degree of security in her marriage.  While 
Rochester is at least physically attracted to his bride, he perceives her to be ―not a stupid 
child but as an obstinate one‖ (Rhys 56).  Although there are hints suggesting a 
predisposition for mental disability (Rhys 52), Antoinette retains Rochester‘s goodwill as 
long as she maintains her beauty and a kind of childish innocence that predisposes her 
husband to be indulgent.  Antoinette‘s transformation occurs after Rochester renames her 
Bertha.  It is complete after he communicates the withdrawal of his affections by having a 
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sexual encounter with a housemaid within earshot of his wife, on the other side of her 
bedroom door (Rhys 89-90).  The next time he sees his wife, her ―hair hung uncombed 
and dull into her eyes which were inflamed and staring, her face was very flushed and 
looked swollen… when she spoke her voice was low, almost inaudible‖ (Rhys 94).  At 
this point Antoinette has completely lost her voice and the ability to elicit any sympathy 
or support from any quarter is lost.           
 Interestingly, once Rochester‘s conquest over his wife is complete, he reverts back 
to referring to her in childish endearments.  In contemplating their departure for England, 
he considers that,  
          [i]f she… weeps, I‘ll take her in my arms, my lunatic.  She‘s mad but mine, mine.    
          What will I care for gods or devils or Fate itself.  If she smiles  
          or weeps or both.  For me.   
            Antoinetta—I can be gentle too.  Hide your face.  Hide yourself but in my 
          arms.  You‘ll soon see how gentle.  My lunatic.  My mad girl. (Rhys 108, emphasis  
          in original) 
Antoinette‘s fate is sealed when she departs without any word or expression of remorse.  
Because she does not behave in ways that elicit any sympathy for her mental incapacity, 
she receives none.         
  Rhys‘ story about the transformation of Antoinette Cosway into Bertha 
Rochester, the madwoman in the attic, contrasts with Krantz‘s presentation of a character 
whose claim to protection is assured because she does not transform from the eternal 
child into a depraved woman.  In her novel, Krantz  wants to make both sisters 
sympathetic characters.  To that end, the doctor attending their birth is anxious to assure 
the parents that in spite of their daughter‘s retardation, Danielle ―will look normal‖ 
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(Krantz 88).  When Francesca is re-united with the disabled daughter whom she has been 
made to believe is dead, she scrutinizes Danielle and considers  
          How small she was.  How incredibly sweet.  Silver blonde hair, curly and fine.  A 
          grave face, a bit sad, but so marvelously familiar.  And the eyes—the same velvety  
          black, the black of a purple pansy, Daisy‘s eyes.  But dull.  Just a little dull.  33    
          Perhaps only dull if you compared her to Daisy… and that was something you must  
          never, never do, never again. (Krantz 91-92)   
Well into adulthood it is apparent that Danielle‘s physical appearance reflects the limited  
intellectual development that she has attained.  When the adult Daisy reflects upon her 
most recent reunion with her sister she observes to herself that ―Dani had not changed, 
had remained, eerily beautiful and untouched by time, a happy five-year old in Daisy‘s 
body‖ (Krantz 389).  Emphasizing what is attractive, child-like or endearing about a 
person with mental disabilities contributes to generating sympathy for these individuals, 
and generating advocacy on their behalf.   
 For example, it is significant that the description of the young boy in Berton‘s 
column draws attention to both his physical attractiveness as well as his communication 
impairments.  He looks normal, but he is vulnerable and ―will always have the mind of a 
child‖ (Berton 31).  In this way, Berton creates a subject who evokes the reader‘s 
                                               
33
  Such imagery recalls recurring descriptions in Establishment novels that identify idiocy in the eyes of 
the disabled character.  In Barnaby Rudge, Dickens describes his idiot-hero as having ―a glassy luster of his 
large protruding eyes‖ (Dickens 35).  Gaskell‘s, Willie Dixon has ―restless eyes and ever-open mouth‖ (21).  
In Brontë‘s Jane Eyre, the eyes are especially important indicators of character.  When Rochester 
emphasizes the contrast between his mad wife and Jane, he invites his witnesses to ―‗[c]ompare these clear 
eyes with the red balls yonder‘‖(339).  Bertha‘s brother, Mason, has an eye that is described as ―large and 
well cut, but the life looking out of it was a tame, vacant life… His eye wandered, and had no meaning in 
its wandering (220-221).  In contrast, when Jane draws Rochester‘s portrait, she leaves the eyes for last 
―because they required the most careful working.  I drew them large; I shaped them well:  the eyelashes I 
traced long and somber; the irids lustrous and large.  ‗Good!  But not quite the thing,‘ I thought, as I 
surveyed the effect:  ‗they want more force and spirit;‘ and I wrought the shades blacker, that the light 
might flash more brilliantly‖ (Brontë 269).   
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compassion.  In Princess Daisy, this construction of Danielle as an eternal child 
legitimizes her claim for care and protection within the institution, for the duration of her 
life.   Of course, such attitudes also contribute to the infantilization of people with mental 
disabilities and the diminishment of their right to exercise personal autonomy.      
 Furthermore, in a novel that focuses on the ambitions of characters belonging to a 
society preoccupied with beauty, glamour and wealth, Princess Daisy does not take a 
critical stance in relation to these values.  When the existence of Daisy‘s secret twin is 
revealed in People magazine, the reaction from the publicity team of the agency where 
Daisy is under contract seems to validate Daisy‘s motives for protecting Danielle from 
public exposure:  
          ―Her features are different, no, not different really, but just not quite as… clear, not 
          as fine.  She looks, oh, younger, as if she doesn‘t have a sense of humour,‖ Jenny  
          said wonderingly.  ―But it is the same face… Daisy‘s face.‖   
            ―No!‖ Candice said.  ―Not the same—you wouldn‘t look twice at her!...‖ 
            Neither woman could take her eyes off the haunting picture of the twins.   
          They were unable to stop comparing the slight but all-important differences in their  
          faces which made of one a glorious beauty and the other unformed, unfinished,  
          uninteresting, with a muted little smile, pathos in her big black eyes. (Krantz 433- 
          434, emphasis in original). 
When Danielle‘s existence is exposed, so is society‘s antipathy for the visible features of 
her mental disability.  The differences in their faces that are described as ―slight but all-
important‖ because they are significant enough to separate Danielle from mainstream 
society as someone who is ―unformed, unfinished, uninteresting‖.  Daisy eventually 
reconciles herself to this unauthorized exposé, and even experiences a sense of liberty as 
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a result of being unburdened by the secret of her sister.  However, Danielle‘s presentation 
in the novel never really challenges the reaction to the photograph because, as a character, 
she is essentially unformed and uninteresting.   
 The Reform literary sample suggests that anybody with personal attachments, 
behaviours or habits that deviate from the prescribed cultural norm are vulnerable to 
social persecution and becoming disabled for their difference.  By the end of One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, Harding realizes that this is what had happened to him.  When 
McMurphy asks him how he ended up on the ward and staying so long Harding answers: 
          ―I could give you Freudian reasons with fancy talk, and that would be right as far as    
          it went.  But what you want are the reasons for the reasons, and I‘m not able to give   
          you those.  Not for the others, anyway.  For myself?  Guilt.  Shame.  Fear.  Self- 
          belittlement.  I discovered at an early age that I was—shall we be kind and say  
          different?  It‘s a better, more general word than the other one.  I indulged in certain  
          practices that our society regards as shameful.  And I got sick.  It wasn‘t the  
          practices, I don‘t think, it was the feeling that the great, deadly, pointing forefinger  
          of society was pointing at me—and the great voice of millions chanting, ‗Shame.   
          Shame.  Shame.‘ It‘s society‘s way of dealing with someone different.‖ (Kesey  
          307-308) 
During the Reform period, homosexuality was still predominantly constructed as a 
disease that could be treated and cured (Szasz 166-168).   
 However, Kesey does finally try to suggest that everyone involved in the mental 
health system is inevitably a victim or servant of the Combine: Bromden‘s metaphor of 
the machine that works to assimilate people into their prescribed roles in society.  When 
McMurphy and Bromden are sent to the Disturbed Ward, following their fight with the 
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orderlies, they have their injuries treated.  Bromden‘s recollection of the sympathetic care 
that they receive from the nurse on this ward re-asserts the ideal of the nurse as healer:       
          the nurse—about as big as the small end of nothing whittled to a fine point, as  
          McMurphy put it later—undid our cuffs and gave McMurphy a cigarette and gave  
          me a stick of gum.  She said she remembered that I chewed gum.  I didn‘t  
          remember her at all.  McMurphy smoked while she dipped her little hand full of  
          pink birthday candles into a jar of salve and worked over his cuts, flinching every  
          time he flinched and telling him she was sorry.  She picked up one of his hands in  
          both of hers and turned it over and salved his knuckles.  ―Who was it?‖ she asked,  
          looking at the knuckles.  ―Was it Washington or Warren?‖ (Kesey 278) 
When McMurphy explains how he fought to prevent an assault against another patient, 
the nurse ―nodded and looked at her feet.  ‗It‘s not all like her ward,‘ she said.  ‗A lot of it 
is, but not all.  Army nurses, trying to run an Army hospital.  They are a little sick 
themselves‘‖ (Kesey 278).  This scene also finally offers a human explanation for 
Ratched‘s ruthless need to control the ward as a symptom of her own trauma suffered on 
the Outside.   
 As the patients on the ward grow in their own self-assurance, they are able to 
contribute insight into how the abuses in the ward are allowed to occur.  Scanlon, for 
example, suggests that the general public is complicit in tolerating the methods of the 
hospital.  When McMurphy first gets educated about EST and lobotomy by the others on 
the ward he asks why the public doesn‘t object to such practices. 34  ―‗I don‘t think you 
                                               
34 In his study of mental health practices and policy in Ontario, Simmons finds that although lobotomy and 
other radical treatments like insulin coma were once regularly and indiscriminately prescribed to mental 
patients, by the 1960s such procedures were already very rarely performed in Canada, and never without 
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fully understand the public, my friend; in this country, when something is out of order, 
then the quickest way to get it fixed is the best way‘‖ (Kesey 190).  Scanlon implies that 
perhaps the public does not necessarily want to know what goes on within the walls of its 
mental wards and institutions.
35
  Ratched rules with society‘s implicit consent, and 
―‗[g]etting rid of her wouldn‘t be getting shut of the real deep-down hang-up that‘s 
causing the gripes‘‖ (Kesey 192) on the ward.  In other words, Ratched is not the 
problem, she only an instrument of society‘s will to enforce conformity and assimilate 
difference.   
 Berton also suggests, in his column, that the public‘s willful ignorance made the 
substandard living conditions in Ontario‘s largest institution possible.  With the social 
misfits out of sight, they are also out of mind.  He concludes that:  
          Orillia‘s real problem is public neglect.  It is easier to appropriate funds for  
          spectacular public projects such as highways and airports than for living space for  
          tiny tots with clouded minds.  Do not blame the present Department of Health for  
          Orillia‘s conditions.  Blame yourself.   
            Remember this: After Hitler fell, and the horrors of the slave camps were  
          exposed, many Germans excused themselves because they said they did not know  
          what went on behind those walls; no one had told them.  Well, you have been told  
          about Orillia. (31)    
In fact, the public response generated by this column embarrassed the Provincial 
government into finding the resources to speed up some renovations at Orillia, and the 
                                                                                                                                            
consent.  By the 1970s they were banned altogether in this province.  Between 1944 and 1967, 
approximately 1000 lobotomies were done at the various provincial mental hospitals (1990, 209-210).    
35 Debate about consent, involuntary treatment and controversial therapeutic techniques such as EST are 
addressed in ch. 4 of the Kirby Commission‘s report.   
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development of more institutional spaces across the province to address overcrowding 
issues.  However, Williston‘s report indicates that most of the concerns raised by Berton 
had not been meaningfully addressed eleven years later.  Instead, he found that, ―[t]his 
hospital school is located on six hundred beautiful acres.  Most of the buildings, however, 
are old and antiquated.  Two in particular constitute a very serious fire hazard.  There 
should be an immediate investigation by a fire marshall.  There is serious overcrowding… 
There is a very serious shortage of professional staff‖ (36).  What becomes apparent is 
how, even when policy action is demanded in terms of a fundamental human rights crisis, 
political bureaucracies move slowly.  This policy context, together with public apathy, 
allowed for the entrenchment of deplorable living conditions for some of society‘s most 
marginalized members to be sustained for so long.      
 In the end, despite the demise of McMurphy, Ratched‘s authority is diminished; 
and most of the others have gained enough self-esteem to attempt life again on the 
Outside. Yet, in the final pages of the story, the reader is reminded that struggles for 
justice and equality are battles that are never won outright.  In his final lucid moments, as 
the end of his own fight was approaching, McMurphy ―was in his chair in the corner, 
resting a second before he came out for the next round—in a long line of next rounds.  
The thing he was fighting, you couldn‘t whip it for good.  All you could do was keep on 
whipping it till you couldn‘t come out anymore and somebody else had to take your 
place‖ (316).  Jean Rhys‘ Antoinette wages a similar battle for justice.  Shortly before her 
transformation into Bertha Rochester, Antoinette confronts her husband, and all the 
patriarchal and colonizing social attitudes that he represents, in the name of justice:  
―‗Justice,‘ she said,  ‗I‘ve heard that word.  It‘s a cold word.  I tried it out,‘ she said, still 
speaking in a low voice.  ‗I wrote it down.  I wrote it down several times and always it 
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looked like a damn cold lie to me.  There is no justice.‘‖ (Rhys 94).  Even when justice is 
served, the right to live freely outside dominant cultural constructions of what it means to 
be ‗normal‘ in terms of race, gender, sexuality and ability is a battle to be fought, on 
different fronts, over and over again.  At a time when policy is increasingly identifying 
societal integration as the solution for disability, popular Reform era novels do not share 
that confidence in society‘s capacity to be a safe place for people who deviate from the 
social norm.  
   
Institution as Asylum 
 In 1971, after a comprehensive review, Walter B. Williston described the 
institutional facilities for mentally retarded people in Ontario in the following terms:   
          The wards of these institutions are almost universally large, combining persons of 
          different ages, degrees of retardation and varied handicaps.  Living conditions tend  
          to be dull, monotonous and impersonal.  The wards are severely overcrowded;  
          those which were designed to house 30 often accommodate over 50.  The residents  
          have few private possessions, and seldom is there space to store them.  Any degree  
          of personal attention or privacy is simply not possible.  Generally, one immense  
          building accommodates the residence, the hospital, and facilities for training,  
          education and recreation.  There is almost complete segregation of the sexes  
          beginning in early childhood; co-educational activities are minimal.  I have found  
          that many of the wards are unnecessarily locked.  In most cases males and females,  
          even those who are only moderately retarded, must use lavatories without doors  
          and often without toilet seats. (65)   
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Williston‘s report had significant implications for subsequent mental disability policy 
planning.  By 1973, there was growing recognition in policy planning that ―the problems 
faced by the majority of the mentally retarded are primarily of a social rather than a 
medical nature‖ (Welch 1).  However, this recognition did little to disrupt the segregation 
of mental disability and mental illness policy streams.  In his detailed descriptions of all 
the institutional facilities for mentally disabled people in Ontario, Williston notes that just 
at the Ontario Hospital, in Cobourg, ―[t]here are some sixty to seventy residents who, in 
addition to being retarded, are suffering from some form of psychoses [sic]‖ (39).  Even 
though both populations continued to require similar supports and even cohabited within 
the same institutions, pains taken to differentiate between lunacy and idiocy in the 
Establishment phase of the Cycle persist in the Reform phase.   
 In the Reform novels under analysis the institutions include those places 
designated for the control or cure of mental disability.  In addition, other locations where 
characters with mental disabilities seek asylum from a society that discriminates against 
them are also considered.  In the three novels under review here different institutions 
serve as an asylum:  the hospital school where Danielle Valensky resides, in Krantz‘s 
Princess Daisy; the mental hospital where McMurphy serves his sentence, in Kesey‘s 
One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest; and the convent school in Rhys‘ Wide Sargasso Sea.   
 The emphasis on diagnosis and segregation of people who often need similar 
kinds of supports is depicted in Kesey‘s, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest.  The 
distinction here is made between the ‗Acutes‘ and the ‗Chronics‘ (15) who are regarded 
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as two populations who ―don‘t generally mingle‖ (Kesey 18), even though they occupy 
territory within the same ward.
36
  Bromden describes how  
          [a]cross the room from the Acutes are the culls of the Combine‘s product, the 
          Chronics.  Not in the hospital, these, to get fixed, but just to keep them from  
          walking around the street giving the product a bad name.  Chronics are in for good,  
          the staff concedes.  Chronics are divided into Walkers like me, can still get around  
          if you keep them fed, and Wheelers and Vegetables.  What the Chronics are—or  
          most of us—are machines with flaws inside that can‘t be repaired, flaws born in, or  
          flaws beat in over so many years of the guy running head-on into solid things that  
          by the time the hospital found him he was bleeding rust in some vacant lot.   
           But there are some of us Chronics that the staff made a couple of mistakes on  
          years back, some of us who were Acutes when we came in, and got changed over.   
          (Kesey 15-16) 
The Combine is Bromden‘s concept of a machine that rehabilitates and assimilates 
society‘s misfits.  According to Bromden, the Chronics are casualties of assimilation 
procedures gone wrong, or they are people who have been born ―simple‖ (Kesey 52).  
They are immune to the Combine.  However, McMurphy does not acknowledge the 
distinction between the two groups when he comes onto the ward.  Instead, after 
introducing himself to all the Acutes, ―he comes right on over to the Chronics, like we 
aren‘t no different… He shakes the hands of Wheelers and Walkers and Vegetables, 
shakes hands that he has to pick up out of laps like picking up dead birds‖ (Kesey, 22-23).  
                                               
36 Williston‘s report on the ―Care and Supervision of  Mentally Retarded Persons in Ontario‖ demonstrates 
that, in 1971, that substantial ―mental retardation units‖ existed in psychiatric hospitals in Kingston, 
Lakehead and Woodstock (41-42).  In all categories of special care facilities, mentally ill and disabled 
populations (‗acutes‘ and ‗chronics‘) co-mingled.   
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It does not occur to McMurphy not to speak to someone just because they may not 
answer.  He insists on seeing all the patients on the ward in terms of what they have in 
common as human beings.  Furthermore, the fact that Bromden is assigned the ‗chronic‘ 
label even though he has an internal narrative suggests that the other ―Wheelers and 
Walkers and Vegetables‖ may have one too.         
 In Wide Sargasso Sea, the convent school is a kind of reprieve from a cruel world 
for Antoinette, even while she learns its rules.  At the convent Antoinette learns how to 
behave like a lady from the example of her classmates and the stories of the lives of the 
saints ―who were all very beautiful and wealthy.  All were loved by rich and handsome 
young men‖ (Rhys 29).  These narratives help to prepare Antoinette for the role she will 
be expected to play in the outside world, or at least an idealized representation of what 
she should aspire to be.  Without dwelling much upon the terrible suffering that these 
martyrs had to suffer in order to become beatified, the young Antoinette loves the 
escapism that these narratives offer.  The convent boarding school is her  
          refuge, a place of sunshine and of death where very early in the morning the clap of 
          a wooden signal woke the nine of us who slept in the long dormitory.  We woke to  
          see Sister Marie Augustine sitting, serene and neat, bolt upright in a wooden chair.   
          The long brown room was full of gold sunlight and shadows of trees moving  
          quietly.  I learnt to say very quickly as the others did, ‗offer up all the prayers,  
          works and sufferings of this day.‘ But what about happiness, I thought at first, is  
          there no happiness?  There must be.  Oh happiness of course, happiness, well. (31)  
Antoinette appreciates the security that her asylum affords, even at the cost of a more 
active life in the wider world.  She leaves her sanctuary at the age of seventeen.  When 
her stepfather comes to collect her, he tells her ―[y]ou can‘t be hidden away all your life‖ 
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(33).  As her departure approaches, Antoinette cannot help but resent those who are able 
to stay behind: ―They are safe.  How can they know what it can be like outside?‖ (Rhys 
34).  For Antoinette, and most women of her time, the only way for her to live securely 
on the ―Outside‖ is to be under the protection of a man.   
 While Antoinette‘s asylum is a place for her to heal and learn, McMurphy‘s  
decision to get himself transferred to the mental hospital is an attempt at exercising some 
control over the terms or his confinement.  The hero of Kesey‘s novel deliberately 
arranges his transfer to the mental ward as an asylum from the rigors of the penitentiary 
where he has served four months of a six month sentence on a work farm.
37
  McMurphy‘s 
patient file indicates that he has been sent to the mental hospital on the authority of a 
judge‘s ruling that seems to have been imposed as a measure of discipline, rather than 
cure for an alleged psychosis.  His file alludes to the possibility that he may be ―‗feigning 
psychosis to escape the drudgery of the work farm‘‖(Kesey 47).  McMurphy is a burden 
passed from one custodial facility to another.  He makes it clear that ―‗I‘m in this place 
because that‘s the way I planned it, pure and simple, because it‘s a better place than a 
work farm.  As near as I can tell I‘m no loony, or never knew it if I was‘‖ (Kesey 74).  
McMurphy‘s ability to manipulate the system again points to the arbitrariness of 
diagnosis that can be influenced and even made up to serve the interests of the 
institutional placement system.  For their part, the administration of the penitentiary was 
able to surrender responsibility for a uncooperative inmate.     
 While McMurphy sees himself as just passing through the ward, Krantz depicts a 
different type of institutional experience in her novel.  Princess Daisy  tells a story of 
                                               
37 The residents at the Orillia and Rideau facilities also worked on farms—originally as labourers for the 
institutions, and later as low-paid labour for other area farmers, justified as work skills training (Reaume 
133-180; Simmons, 1982, 102-106; Williston 23-29) 
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identical twins born into power and privilege who go on to lead very different lives 
because one sister is bright as well as beautiful, and the other is mentally disabled.  The 
plot of the novel essentially revolves around the journey that one sister is compelled to 
undertake to protect the other and find a way to be able afford to keep her in an expensive 
institutional school.  The ethics of institutional care for people with mental disabilities is 
not explored in this novel.  Krantz simply incorporates the general medical wisdom 
considered at the time of the twin sisters‘ birth, in the mid-1950s, as expressed through 
the advice of the attending physician.  He explains to their father the stresses and risks 
associated with raising a disabled child:    
          ―There will be, in any case, the question of constant care, even with    
          moderate retardation.  With severe retardation the problem becomes enormous.     
          Great watchfulness is necessary in all cases, throughout the child‘s life.  Once the  
          child can walk, there will always be danger.  As puberty approaches, the problem  
          becomes aggravated.  Often an institution is the only answer.‖ (77)   
In order for the reader to be sympathetic with Daisy‘s quest to maintain her sister in her 
asylum, Danielle‘s vulnerability outside of the institution and her attachment to the 
facility need to be accepted without question.   
 In Princess Daisy the School is more than an educational facility, a retreat, and a 
solution.  It is Danielle‘s home, and the staff and residents become her surrogate family.  
Over time, even Daisy begins to lose the imaginative capacity to conceive of an 
alternative storyline for her sister, outside the institution:   
          she would imagine Danielle, her double, her other self, more her child than her  
          sister, playing in the garden or singing the simple songs she had been taught, and 
          hot tears would fill her eyes at the realization of all her twin was missing, all the 
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          new knowledge and experience she would never have.  Her only comfort was the  
          realization that Dani was as happy as she could possibly be, that Queen Anne‘s  
          School was truly home for her and that the staff and other patients had become her  
          family. (Krantz 179-180) 
From the time Danielle enters the institution there is no question of her leaving it.  Even 
when Daisy moves to America, there is no suggestion that it might be appropriate for 
Danielle to relocate closer to her only family.  Instead, the greatest kindness that can be 
done for Danielle is to maintain the structure of her life that she has learned in the 
institution.   
 Some have suggested that the bonds formed between residents and staff, the 
importance of structure and routine, and the difficulties with transition that many people 
with severe mental disabilities experience have not been adequately taken into account in 
the de-institutionalization process (―Lifetime Friendships Lost‖, 12 July 2008).  While 
there is some expert opinion from this time to support the contention that re-integration 
into the community is not the ideal option for all people who have spent most of their 
lives in the institution, the drive to close down the institutions in Ontario ultimately 
prevailed.  In his report to the Minister of Health, Walter Williston suggests that it ―is too 
much to expect that any person could spend years in a large institution and, after having 
been ‗discharged‘ into a strange community, be able to cope with the problems that will 
beset him in the outside world‖ (5).  Therefore, his policy recommendations were for 
long-term planning to incorporate a range of services in all communities so that the 
institution does not need to be considered as the only viable option for people who have 
severe mental disabilities.  
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 Reform policy discourse was more optimistic than the storylines of many Reform-
era novels about the capacity of people with mental disabilities to succeed in communities 
that are portrayed as fearful, intolerant, or unable to accommodate diverse abilities and 
needs.  In Welch‘s ―New Policy Focus‖, he contends that mentally retarded people ―may 
require an environment that is protective and highly structured.  It must be stressed, 
however, that special treatment does not necessarily imply or demand segregation of the 
retarded‖ (4 emphasis in original).  Williston and Welch both wanted to see community 
capacity enhanced to the extent that institutionalization was recognized as a last resort for 
people with mental disabilities.  However, Williston would agree with the narrator of 
Danielle Valensky‘s story:  After spending her life, from the age of six, in the same 
facility, she will not grow and change to be able to thrive in the wider community.  
Likewise, the community will not grow and change to adequately accommodate the way 
she is (Williston 67).     
 This is a position shared by Dr. Bruce D. McCreary, to whose testimony Judge 
John Matheson refers in his decision on Clark v. Clark.  McCreary testified that it was his 
―professional opinion that Justin‘s mental development, physical problems and life 
experiences, which have been essentially confined to an institutional environment, are 
such that he should be regarded as incompetent‖ (para. 32).  However, Judge Matheson 
found the evidence given by the professionals who worked with Mr. Clark on a regular 
basis to be more convincing.  As a result, Judge Matheson found Mr. Clark competent to 
make the decision to leave the institution to move to a supported-living home in the 
community.
38
  The lack of consensus around the best care alternatives for people who 
                                               
38 In March 2008, Helen Henderson reported that Justin Clark moved from the Rideau Regional Centre in 
1983 ―into a house in Ottawa with two long-time friends.  He also travelled the world—from Switzerland to 
207 
 
 
have lived most of their lives in an institution speaks to the diversity of this population.  
To be effective, any policy needs to be flexible to accommodate the specific capacities 
and desires of each person affected.   
 Justin Clark‘s family does not appear to have maintained a personal relationship 
with their son from the time he was admitted to the institution, at the age of two.  When 
he learned to communicate using Blissymbols many of his questions were about his 
family (Clark v. Clark, para. 13).  This circumstance was not unusual, as for many years 
contact between families and their retarded children who resided in an institution was not 
actively encouraged.  In many cases, the relationship that Daisy maintains with her sister, 
over years, and across great distances just would not have been possible.  Institutions for 
people with mental disabilities in Ontario were almost always located in rural areas.  For 
example, in 1971 the catchment admission area for the Rideau Regional Hospital School 
was 176,600 square miles (Williston 21).  Large distances between family homes and 
isolated institutions, together with restrictive institutional policy conspired to effectively 
undermine family ties.   
 Williston further explains that ―admission procedures were rather heartless, with 
no opportunity for pre-admission visits, and an almost knife-like separation at the 
moment of admission; any communication with the family came only from the individual 
initiative and dedication of a member of the staff‖ (30).  Such a scene is played out in 
Princess Daisy:    
 The dedicated professionals who ran the institution were accustomed to, as they  
          put it, ―unfortunate scenes‖ when a child was finally left in their excellent care, but  
                                                                                                                                            
Nicaragua, where by all accounts his Bliss board became a useful bridge between two languages.  These 
days, Clark prefers to stay out of the spotlight, declining interview requests.  Friends say he lives quietly in 
that same Ottawa house and works as a computer consultant‖ (L11) 
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          nothing had prepared them for the parting of Daisy and Danielle.  All of them who  
          were unlucky enough to be present found themselves in despair and some of them  
          were reduced to unprofessional tears by the time Stash finally pried Daisy away…  
          (Krantz 123) 
On her wall, Danielle keeps pictures that her sister draws and sends her, along with 
photographs taken of the two of them together during regular visits that Daisy tries to 
sustain over the years, except when the cost of keeping her sister in the institution makes 
traveling to visit her prohibitive.  In this small detail the reader is given a point of 
comparison to the Ontario institution where the residents lived in wards, with no room to 
store or display personal possessions (Williston 65).   
 In large scale institutional facilities, internal policies tended to emphasize 
structural authority and predictable routine, even down to personal hygiene regimens.
39
  
In Kesey‘s novel, McMurphy forces his fellow patients to confront this reality by 
habitually making a mockery of official policy that serves no legitimate purpose other 
than enforcing the dependence of the patients.  On his first morning in the ward, he is 
unable to brush his teeth because it is ward policy to keep the toothpaste locked in the 
cabinet until six-forty-five:   
          ―Locked in the cabinet, is it?  Well well well, now why do you reckon they keep 
           the toothpaste locked up?  I mean, it ain‘t like it‘s dangerous, is it?  You can‘t  
                                               
39 In the Globe and Mail (27 July 2010), Beth Marlin reports on a prospective class-action suit being 
launched against the Huronia institution in Orillia, covering thousands of former patients:  ―Marilyn 
Dolmage, whose brother, born with Down syndrome, died of untreated pneumonia at Huronia when he was 
eight years old, worked as a social worker there from 1968 until 1973 and has kept in touch with several of 
its residents.   ‗They had all of their citizenship rights stripped away. They had no control over their lives. 
They were lined up to eat, they were lined up to shower,‘says Ms. Dolmage. adding that she also witnessed 
residents being tranquillized, kept in caged cots and sprayed with a water hose after eating‖ (para 9-10).  
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           poison a man with it, can you?  You couldn‘t brain some guy with the tube, could  
          you?  What reason you suppose they have for puttin‘ something as harmless as a  
          little tube of toothpaste under lock and key?‖ 
             ―It‘s ward policy, Mr. McMurphy, tha‘s the reason.‖ And when [the  
          orderly] sees that this last reason don‘t affect McMurphy like it should, he frowns  
          at that hand on his shoulder and adds, ―What you s‘pose it‘d be like if  evahbody  
          was to brush their teeth whenever they took a notion to brush?‖ … 
            ―Yes, now, I do [see].  You‘re saying people‘d be brushin‘ their teeth  
          whenever the spirit moved them.‖ (Kesey 93) 
The episode speaks to a recurring question in policy planning generally: Whose needs 
does the policy serve?  Is the intention to promote independence, choice and self-
actualization, or merely to reinforce relations of power and dependence?   
 The pressure to accommodate a large, diverse population at minimal expense is  
evident in Williston‘s evaluation of Ontario‘s residential infrastructure for mentally 
retarded people.  He found that most facilities, especially the largest ones, had a staffing 
complement that was about 20-40% lower than the standard set for this service sector by 
the American Association for Mental Deficiency (36-40).  Following Williston‘s and 
Welch‘s reports, the Developmental Services Act was passed in 1974 to address the 
transfer of responsibility of developmental disability policy from the Ministry of Health 
to the Ministry of Community and Social Services.  In addition, it facilitated the transfer 
of residential care from the Provincial institutions to community living agencies and 
residential facilities.   
 Moving away from the institutional model was clearly promoted as a significant 
cost saving initiative, as Welch indicated the ―the share of capital costs underwritten by 
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the Government of Ontario for any program in an institution for the mentally retarded is 
100 per cent; [and] the share of capital costs taken for programs in the community is a 
maximum of 50 per cent‖ (7).  With such chronic shortages of support staff on large 
wards of people with very complex needs it is difficult to maintain personal safety, much 
less realize a stimulating environment with any individual attention or personal 
engagement.  In his novel, Kesey alludes to emphasis on fiscal restraint as a priority in the 
administration of the asylum.  The description of the ward makes note of a commendation 
on the wall that says ―CONGRATULATIONS FOR GETTING ALONG WITH THE 
SMALLEST NUMBER OF PERSONNEL OF ANY WARD IN THE HOSPITAL‖ (18).  
Creating ‗efficiencies‘ in terms of personnel generally leads to less personalized 
therapeutic care and more reliance on drug therapy to control behaviours (Armstrong & 
Armstrong 86-87).  In addition, isolation of frontline staff often leads to neglect or 
episodes of abuse (White, Holland, Marsland & Oakes 7).     
 Given the legacy of under-funding and controversial treatment that became 
associated with institutional care, it is not surprising that Williston concluded that ―a 
century of failure and inhumanity in the large multi-purpose residential hospitals for the 
retarded should, in itself, be enough to warn of the inherent weakness in the system and 
inspire us to look for some better solution‖ (68).  However, even where the institution is 
reviled, in the Reform novel it still often is depicted as a refuge from an even more cruel 
world.  In Kesey‘s nightmare vision of the mental hospital the institution is still perceived 
as a preferable option to trying to navigate the barriers and discriminating attitudes so 
prevalent on the Outside.  When McMurphy realizes that most of the people on the ward 
are voluntary patients he is incredulous:  ―‗Tell me why.  You gripe, you bitch for weeks 
on end about how you can‘t stand this place, can‘t stand the nurse or anything about her, 
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and all the time you ain‘t committed.  I can understand it with some of those old guys on 
the ward.  They‘re nuts.  But you, you‘re not exactly the everyday man on the street, but 
you‘re not nuts‘‖ (Kesey 195, emphasis in original).  When McMurphy asks Billy Bibbit, 
specifically, why such a young man would choose to be in the ward instead of driving a 
car and meeting girls, he reduces him to tears:   
           ―You think I wuh-wuh-wuh-want to stay in here?  You think I wouldn‘t like a con- 
          con-vertible and a guh-guh-girl friend?  But did you ever have people l-laughing at  
          you?  No, because you‘re so b-big and so tough!  Well, I‘m not big and tough.   
          Neither is Harding. Neither is F-Fredrickson.  Neither is Suh-Sefelt.  Oh— 
          oh,you—you t-talk like we stayed in here because we liked it!  Oh—it‘s n-no  
          use…‖ (Kesey 195)    
As hard as life on the ward may be, the structure that it provides is security.  Furthermore, 
under Ratched‘s direction, the therapy only reinforces dependence and destroys self-
esteem.  Making community re-integration even more difficult is the stigma associated 
with having spent time in an asylum for the mentally ill or retarded (Williston 67). 
 The asylum that the institution offers is further affirmed at the end of the novel 
when the patients plot McMurphy‘s escape.  It is noted that ―the police never press too 
hard to pick up AWOLs from the hospital because ninety percent of them always show 
back up in a few days, broke and drunk and looking for that free bed and board‖ (Kesey 
306).  Reaume‘s research into patient files at Toronto‘s Hospital for the Insane confirms 
that, historically, escaped patients sometimes did return of their own accord (198).   
 Even Bertha Rochester‘s confinement is construed as an act of mercy by the 
woman employed as her personal attendant.  At the conclusion of Wide Sargasso Sea,  
Grace Poole reflects upon the terms and conditions of her employment as the custodial 
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caregiver for Rochester‘s mad wife, as well as her reasons for accepting them.  She muses 
that 
          ‗…[a]fter all the house is big and safe, a shelter from the world outside which, say   
          what you like, can be a black and cruel world to a woman.  Maybe that’s why I  
          stayed on.’  
            The thick walls, she thought.  Past the lodge gate and a long avenue of  
          trees and inside the house the blazing fires and the crimson and white rooms.  But  
          above all the thick walls, keeping away all the things that you have fought till you  
          can fight no more.  Yes, maybe that’s why we all stay—Mrs Eff and Leah and me.  
          (Rhys 115) 
Grace Poole is well paid to make sure that Antoinette/Bertha Rochester‘s subsistence 
needs are met and that her existence remains hidden.  In this version of her story, 
Rochester‘s wife has quarters that are spacious and she gets outside occasionally; but she 
is not like McMurphy who chooses the institution, nor like Danielle who is happy there 
because she has no memories of any other home.  Bertha has no choice; she waits in vain 
for Rochester to come so that she can plead her case for emancipation (Rhys 115).   She 
has her memories of a time before her confinement, and these contribute to her madness 
and drive her desperate escape.   
 Like Bertha, McMurphy is only able to escape his captivity in death.  His refusal 
to accept the terms of his incarceration eventually breaks down his mind and precipitates 
his own demise.  Looking back, Bromden muses on its inevitability: ―It was like he‘d 
signed on for the whole game and there wasn‘t any way of him breaking his contract‖ 
(Kesey 310).  Starting with the return from the fishing trip, there are increasing allusions 
to McMurphy looking tired and worn out, and on the morning of his last battle with 
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Ratched he ―looked sick and terrifically tired‖ (Kesey 311).  When McMurphy advances 
on Ratched to commit his final, and ultimately fatal, act of resistance, Bromden is aware 
that  
          [w]e couldn‘t stop him because we were the ones making him do it.  It wasn‘t the  
          nurse that was forcing him; it was our need that was making him push himself  
          slowly up… It was us that had been making him go on for weeks, keeping him  
          standing long after his feet and legs had given out, weeks of making him wink and  
          grin and laugh and go on with his act long after his humor had been parched  
          between two electrodes. (Kesey 318)   
In the institution McMurphy is transformed from egoist to advocate.  He has helped 
others to see how their asylum was actually making them more sick and too dependent 
upon authority to ever really survive on their own.  McMurphy‘s success at undermining 
institutional authority costs him his mind and his life.     
 McMurphy is able to exercise greater influence over the terms of his segregation 
than either Bertha Rochester or Danielle Valensky.  Still, his choice to get himself 
removed from one institution (the penitentiary) to what he perceived as an asylum is 
ultimately his death sentence.  In Rhys‘ version of the life-story of the ‗madwoman in the 
attic‘ there is no justice in Bertha Rochester‘s demise.  As her husband‘s captive, she is 
left with no one to hear her story and eventually she loses her voice altogether.  However, 
McMurphy has become the martyr that Ratched always feared he would become.  Her 
patients have become ―immune to her poison.  Their eyes met hers; their grins mocked 
the old confident smile she had lost‖ (Kesey 313), and the ―enamel-and-plastic face was 
caving in‖ (Kesey 314).  McMurphy dies, but not before empowering the others to choose 
to leave their asylum and return to find their place on the Outside (Kesey 319).  In 
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contrast, Danielle Valensky is a passive player in her own story whose existence affects 
other people‘s relationships, while she is locked in time in the mind of a three-year-old.  
Safe in her high-priced institutional school, Danielle survives because she is insulated 
from the world and its torments.   
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CHAPTER 8-  Analysis of Dismantlement Phase (1987-2009) 
 
Introduction 
 A policy commitment to phase out institutional residency for people with mental 
disabilities was first articulated in Ontario‘s Challenges and Opportunities Initiative.  
Developed in 1987, it was heavily influenced by the 1971 Williston report (Government 
of Ontario, 1987, 4).  At the outset of the Dismantlement phase, the downsizing of the 
institutional system was already underway in Ontario, although Simmons cautions that it 
is difficult to ascertain reliable discharge rates as, initially, many people were simply 
transferred from one type of institutional facility to another (1982, 313).  However, by 
1987 there were ―14 directly operated… and 10 board-operated… facilities, serving an 
estimated 5,200 persons‖ (Government of Ontario, 1987, 22).  By 2009 the three 
remaining provincial institutions dedicated to the care of people with mental disabilities 
were all closed, despite vocal resistance and a failed court challenge by some family 
members who had placed their relatives into institutional facilities as children, ―with the 
promise that they would be looked after forever‖(Parsons 16).  However, celebration over 
the official end of the institutional era has generally overwhelmed voices of concern for 
the well-being of severely disabled people living in less structured environments with, 
arguably, less direct oversight and enforcement of legislated standards.     
   The Ministry of Community and Social Services is responsible for enforcing the  
Services and Supports to Promote the Social Inclusion of Persons with Developmental 
Disabilities Act, which received Royal Assent on October 8, 2008.  This legislation was 
designed to replace the Developmental Services Act that had regulated care for people 
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with mental disabilities within provincial facilities since 1974.  Although some key 
sections of the new legislation have yet to be formally enacted, it emphasizes the 
objective of individualized service planning to support a population with diverse daily 
living needs in the community.   
 The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care has also pursued a community 
integration mandate for people who once would have resided in mental hospitals for long 
periods of time with a diagnosis of mental illness.  The 2006 Kirby Report highlights the 
insecure living conditions of thousands of Canadians who are disabled as a result of 
chronic mental illness; it demonstrates that many of the issues raised by and on behalf of 
people diagnosed with mental illness are almost identical to those identified in mental 
disability policy discourse, including:  the need for enhanced and individualized 
community services, accessible supported housing, supports for family members, and 
policy that works to eradicate the enduring stigma attached to having a mental disability.   
 As society comes to terms with a shift in emphasis in responsibility from 
government to community, from expert-driven models of care to the expertise of 
individuals and family in designing life plans, role confusion and gaps in service are 
bound to occur.  In an era of change and uncertainty, it is not surprising that 
Dismantlement novels look to the past in writing contemporary narratives about people 
with mental disabilities in the community.  Timothy Findley‘s The Piano Man’s 
Daughter (1995) begins at the end of the nineteenth century and spans the life of three 
generations of the Kilworth family, until 1945.  Kim Edwards‘ The Memory Keeper’s 
Daughter (2005) is set primarily in the Reform phase of the Cycle.  A more contemporary 
perspective is offered in Marc Haddon‘s The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-
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time (2003), which is set in a suburb of London and incorporates some of the modern-day 
environmental challenges faced by an adolescent boy with autism.   
 Given a growing sensitivity to diversity that individualized planning implies, it 
also makes sense that each of the novels selected for analysis depicts characters with 
different manifestations of disability.  In Findley‘s novel, Lily Kilworth is, in her words, 
―not disabled… merely hampered‖ (273) by a mental illness that is never specifically 
diagnosed; Haddon‘s hero, Christopher Boone, is autistic; and in Edwards‘ novel Phoebe 
Gill has Down syndrome.  While the authors have created characters whose stories are 
influenced by their respective disabilities, their outcomes are determined by their 
relationships with others, as well as by their place in their communities.    
  
How Their Stories are Told 
 The final phase of the Cycle reveals a noticeable increase in the range of 
perspectives that appear to contribute to policy planning and evaluation.  In terms of 
policy development, there is evidence of a concerted effort to consult directly with those 
people most affected by changes in disability policy objectives in a post-institutional era.  
A number of planning documents and evaluations quote extensively from service users 
and family members (Kirby 2006; Marin 2005; Government of Ontario 2006; Parsons 
2006).  The Ministry of Community and Social Services also produced a ―Guide on 
Person-Directed Planning‖ (Dingwall, Kemp & Fowke, 2006) that concludes with two 
personal narratives produced with the assistance of family members to demonstrate the 
empowering potential of person-directed planning.   
 In addition, there has been a number of memoirs and biographies published in 
recent years about the life-stories of people with a range of mental disabilities, their 
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relationships with family, and their communities.
 40
   Access to more individual stories 
may enrich planners‘ understanding of how policy affects personal lives, but it is difficult 
to determine the extent that consultation influences policy planning in a meaningful way.  
For example, Ellen Gambrill identifies social work as an ―authority-based profession‖ in 
which ―penetrating critiques of accepted views… are ignored or dismissed rather than 
carefully read, accurately presented, and carefully critiqued‖ (168).  Claudia Malacrida 
argues that individuals with intellectual disabilities are so ―devalued and stigmatized‖ 
(406) that their testimonies are undermined.  Close family members are generally 
portrayed in contemporary policy consultations as reliable advocates.  However, the 
novels considered in the Dismantlement phase suggest that perspectives offered by 
personal caregivers are influenced by their own needs or protective impulses that may 
oppose personal life choices that their child, sibling, or spouse might wish to make for 
him or herself.  
 Different narrators of the same person‘s life story will not necessarily emphasize 
the same life events.  In Findley‘s The Piano Man’s Daughter, Charlie Kilworth spends 
his life trying to learn from his mother‘s story who his father is; but for Lily this is simply 
not an important part of her narrative.  Charlie learns the story of his mother‘s life largely 
through her own telling, but she has a confusing and unorganized way of giving her life 
story ―—all of it sliding sideways, drifting off in little dots—all her sentences unfinished, 
the way her life was lived—everything always a beginning before there could be an 
ending to the part that went before‖ (Findley 6).  In his own version of his mother‘s life, 
                                               
40 A partial list includes: Brown (2009) The Boy in the Moon; Greenberg (2008) Hurry Down Sunshine; 
Inman (2010) After her Brain Broke: Helping my Daughter Recover her Sanity; Menzies (2009) Enter 
Mourning: A Memoir on Death, Dementia, & Coming Home; Thomson (2010) The Four Walls of My 
Freedom.  These nonfiction narratives add to the range of perspectives that inform disability studies.   
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Charlie begins by recounting the circumstances of Lily‘s death:  ―She had died by fire as 
she had lived, in a circle of strangers.  For once, she had made no attempt to escape.  Her 
running—at long last—came to its end in the Asylum for the Insane at Whitby, Ontario, 
on Monday, the seventeenth of July, 1939.  One month after her forty-ninth birthday‖ 
(Findley 6).  Charlie‘s life-long sense of responsibility for his mother, along with his 
grief, influence how he tells her story.  Still, the integrity of Charlie‘s version of Lily‘s 
life narrative is reinforced in a number of different ways.  For example, Charlie explains 
that his rendition of Lily‘s account of her early years is corroborated and further informed 
by the testimony given by  his grandmother, Ede Wyatt.  Furthermore, much of Charlie‘s 
storyline is also drawn from Lily‘s own record of her life, which she has kept safely 
stored in the wicker basket that has never failed to accompany her when she makes an 
―escape‖ (Findley 10-11).   
 At the same time,  Findley reminds the reader that a first-person narrative is not 
necessarily the truest life-story.  Charlie faithfully recalls Lily‘s lies as well as her truths 
such as when she tells her brother, Liam, about a confrontation with her stepfather, 
Frederick Wyatt, which never happened (Findley 367).  On another occasion Charlie 
recalls his mother recounting how ―Frederick used to lock me up there [in the attic] in the 
dark…But Frederick had never locked her in the dark.  The dark was a state of mind she 
could not escape—and she blamed him for it, though in her lucid moments I think she 
knew better.  He was not the monster she made of him‖ (Findley 438).  Findley succeeds 
at making Charlie‘s version of Lily‘s story credible because he is a character who can 
hear the authentic voice—in pianos and in people:   
          Every piano has its own voice—unique in its sound as the voice of a human being.  
          And when that voice begins to waver—when it strays, the way human voices do  
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          under stress—my job is to restore its resonance—tighten its enunciation—clarify its  
          tone.  I have an unerring ear for these voices.  That is my gift.  In the music  
          business, we call it perfect pitch. (Findley 8-9)    
By paying attention to all the different sources and versions of Lily‘s story, against his 
own memories their life together, the reader accepts that Charlie is telling his own true 
story.      
 Dismantlement novelists are trying to represent the stories of characters with 
mental disabilities in a number of different ways.  In Haddon‘s The Curious Incident of 
the Dog in the Night-time, Christopher Boone tells his own life story as he tries to solve 
the mystery of who killed the neighbour‘s dog, which he discovers impaled with a garden 
fork on Mrs Shears‘ lawn.  However, because Christopher is autistic his ability to give a 
comprehensive life narrative or solve a murder mystery is challenged in interesting ways.  
His disability profoundly impairs his capacity to comprehend anything that is not 
communicated directly, in a matter-of-fact manner.  Metaphor, symbolism and 
information that may be inferred through body language elude him.  This is why 
Christopher  finds people ―confusing… for two main reasons.  The first main reason is 
that people do a lot of talking without using words.  Siobahn says that if you raise one 
eyebrow it can mean lots of different things.  It can mean ‗I want to do sex with you‘ and 
it can also mean ‗I think what you just said was very stupid‘‖ (Haddon 14-15).  The other 
reason that Christopher finds people confusing is that they ―often talk using metaphors‖ 
(Haddon 15).  He explains what metaphors are and concludes that metaphors are lies.  On 
the other hand, when he observes that the police inspector‘s hairy nostrils looked ―as if 
there were two very small mice hiding‖ (Haddon 17) in them, he explains this as a simile, 
―which means that it really did look like there were two very small mice hiding in his 
221 
 
 
nostrils, and if you make a picture in your head of a man with two very small mice hiding 
in his nostrils, you will know what the police inspector looked like.  And a simile is not a 
lie, unless it is a bad simile‖ (Haddon 17).  Christopher‘s ability to grasp humour is also 
impaired.  Therefore, he advises the reader that ―[t]his will not be a funny book.  I cannot 
tell jokes because I do not understand them‖ (Haddon 8).  However, the ensuing narrative 
is often very funny precisely because of Christopher‘s inability to recognize things that 
most people would consider humorous.
 41
   
 In The Memory Keeper’s Daughter, Kim Edwards takes a more conventional 
approach in her portrayal of Phoebe Gill by not giving her a substantial narrative voice.
42
  
Edwards uses the same plot device employed by Krantz, in Princess Daisy, in contrasting 
the life experiences of twins: one who is born normal, and the other with a mental 
disability.
 43
  As in Krantz‘s novel, the babies‘ father suffers from a childhood trauma that 
prevents him from accepting the disabled daughter; and David Henry succeeds in 
convincing his wife, Norah, that Phoebe has died at birth.  However, unlike in Krantz‘s 
novel, Phoebe‘s presence is felt throughout the narrative, as the other major characters 
narrate their own stories, which have all been shaped by Phoebe‘s existence in the world.  
Even though the story is never given from her perspective, Phoebe is present in every 
                                               
41 Authors incorporate the voice of a mentally disabled narrator to critically comment upon disability and 
society in different ways.  For example, Clare Allan‘s (2006) Poppy Shakespeare depicts a first-person 
narrator who self-identifies as ―dribbler‖:  ―[f]act is I been dribbling since before I was even born.  My 
mum was a dribbler and her mum as well, ‘cept she never seen her hardly, grown up in a home while they 
scooped out bits of her mother‘s brain, like a tater, taken the bad bits out, till she never knew she had a 
daughter no more and all she could do was dribble and shit‖ (3).  Personality intersects with the narrator‘s 
disability in a way that allows her to give an uninhibited perspective on the mental health system and the 
characters belonging to it; and she lavishly engages in  hyperbole and other narrative devices of effective 
satire.   
42 In this respect, Edwards‘ novel resembles Karen Bender‘s (2000) Like Normal People.  Lena is a woman 
who is mentally disabled, and her life story is told from the perspectives of her mother, sister and niece.  
Although the action of the story and, in fact, the life experiences of all the other characters are determined 
by their relationship to Lena, her story is never given directly, from her point of view.   
43 Wally Lamb‘s novel (1998), I Know This Much is True also tells the story of twins, one of whom has a 
mental disability. 
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chapter of the novel, or at least her memory is evoked as the thread that ties all the other 
characters‘ storylines together.  Furthermore, Phoebe is depicted as a character who 
grows and changes along with the other characters in the novel.  Even though she does 
not give much of her own story, those who do speak for Phoebe tell her story with enough 
insight and detail to make her a fully formed character, in her own right.     
 Although the mentally disabled characters considered in this phase of the Cycle 
can all speak for themselves, at crucial points in their respective stories Lily Kilworth, 
Christopher Boone and Phoebe Gill need advocates to speak for them.  At the same time, 
however, their presence also contributes insight into the limitations of the other major 
characters in Findley‘s The Piano Man’s Daughter, Haddon‘s The Curious Incident of the 
Dog in the Night-time, and Edwards‘ The Memory Keeper’s Daughter.   
    
The Role of the Family 
 Premier David Peterson‘s letter that prefaces the Province of Ontario‘s Challenges 
and Opportunities Initiative opens by expressing ―great pleasure in offering my 
encouragement and support to the parents of developmentally-handicapped residents in 
Ontario‖.  The identification of his primary audience is telling.  From the outset of the 
Dismantlement phase it is clear that the realization of policy objectives related to mental 
disability services and supports rely most heavily upon the active participation of 
families.  The substance of much of the policy debate revolves around how much, and in 
what ways, the caregiving work of families should be supported by the community, and 
how much by government programs.  This sub-chapter considers how cultural 
assumptions about parents, siblings, and children as caregivers intersect with 
Dismantlement policy objectives.  The novels considered in this phase of the Institutional 
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Cycle challenge the assumption made in policy planning that family members are always 
the best qualified to offer the most authentic version of the disabled individual‘s life 
story.       
 Findley portrays the conflict that parents often experience in trying to reconcile 
their own dreams with their children‘s needs.  When a child has a mental disability that 
demands extraordinary vigilance, it is not unusual for parents to experience feelings of 
exhaustion, frustration and even resentment.  By the time Lily Kilworth is seven years 
old, her mother, Ede, is already struggling with how to provide for her education, her 
entertainment, and her care, even though she has a secure home and a supportive 
extended family at hand who also love the child (Findley 80).   
 To some extent Ede Kilworth‘s concern for Lily is that of any anxious parent 
carefully watching over the growth of their child, but by the time Frederick Wyatt enters 
their lives Ede already realizes that Lily will require accommodation and protection for 
the rest of her life (Findley 134).
44
  Therefore, when Frederick proposes to her, Ede 
debates with herself whether Lily is an insurmountable obstacle to marriage with this 
man:   
 Lily.  The cause of all my joy.  And all my grief. 
 Don‘t say that.  It isn‘t true.   
 Ede dropped the curtain, shutting out her vision of Frederick. 
 It wasn‘t true.  It wasn‘t. 
 And it was. 
                                               
44 Thinking about his own experience raising a child with severe disabilities, Ian Brown asks whether the 
parenting journey that he and his wife have known is very different from what other parents experience:  
―But let me ask you this:  is what we‘ve been through so different from what any parent goes through?  
Even if your child is as normal as a bright day, was our life so far from your own experience?  More 
intensive, perhaps; more extreme more often, yes.  But was it really different in kind?‖ (75) 
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 She turned back into the room and began to undress. 
 If only Lily… 
           No.  She must not think that.  She must never think that again.  She had thought it  
           once in the throes of some despairing moment.  She had thought it and said it— 
           cursing the child to her face.  For some denial of access to a moment‘s freedom— 
           for being the impediment between the life Ede wanted and the life she had:  damn  
           you!  Meaning:  damn you for being born! 
          But oh—if I should ever say that again.  Or think it.  (Findley 102)  
Resentment and guilt commingle in Ede‘s desire to lead a normal life.45  Ultimately, Ede 
does decide to accept Frederick‘s proposal, but waits until after their marriage to disclose 
Lily‘s disability.  Her new husband makes it clear that her daughter‘s disability is hers to 
manage and that he will not tolerate Lily‘s behaviour becoming an obstacle to his 
ambitions.  From this point forward, Ede‘s role as Lily‘s advocate is tempered by her 
primary duty to promote her husband‘s professional and social interests.   
 Throughout the Institutional Cycle, the advocacy of parents has been identified as 
a catalyst for policy change.  However, the novels considered in the Dismantlement phase 
also portray, in different ways, how the challenges of coping with the mentally disabled 
individual‘s impairments sometimes make it difficult to have confidence in their abilities.  
In learning how to be the impeccable, polished status symbol that Frederick wants her to 
be, Ede loses herself and her ability to love Lily for who she is.  This is evident in 
                                               
45 Brown discusses the kind of conflict parents with disabled children have with themselves, or in relation to 
societal expectations of how they should live their lives.  He recalls a conversation with Fergus and Bernice 
McCann, whose daughter, Melissa, has a similar diagnosis (CFC) as his own son:  ―What drove Fergus 
especially crazy was that because of Melissa, he wasn‘t allowed to have the same impulses and desires the 
rest of the world had—because to have regular ambitions for our own life meant you were putting yourself 
first, or even momentarily ahead of your all-consuming child‖ (148).   
225 
 
 
Charlie‘s recollection of Ede‘s reaction to Lily‘s academic achievement that earns her a 
scholarship to Cambridge University:   
          That my mother was an intellectual had long been evident—but brilliant?  Ede  
          was at a loss.  She kept the [acceptance] letter to herself and its description of  
          Lily‘s talent was not transmitted.  I heard of it only after my mother‘s first  
          incarceration at the Lunatic Asylum on Queen Street in Toronto. 
          She indulged in too many dreams, Ede said.  Her brilliance was a curse.  She  
          claimed to have known this all along—but I doubt it.  I think Ede‘s fears for Lily  
          blinded her to some of Lily‘s wonders.  (Findley 306) 
Lily‘s mental disability contributes to episodes of active psychosis that compel her need 
for escape, as well as catatonic lapses that render her oblivious to her surroundings, but 
her intelligence, particularly her creative capacity, is not impaired.  However, the nature 
of Lily‘s symptoms call upon Ede to commit her energies to protecting Lily from 
potential consequences of those behaviours that make her daughter vulnerable.  As a 
result, she fails to recognize the abilities that set Lily apart.   
 Edwards‘ The Memory Keeper’s Daughter depicts how important advocacy is for 
many parents and the prospects of their children.  When Caroline assumes responsibility 
for Phoebe, she also takes it upon herself to learn everything she can about Down 
syndrome in order to minimize its disabling influence on Phoebe‘s life.  This puts her in 
contact with other parent advocates:   
          Caroline would never forget those hours, the excitement she‘d felt, as if she  
          were waking from a long, slow dream.  What would happen, they conjectured, if  
          they simply went on assuming their children would do everything.  Perhaps not  
          quickly.  Perhaps not by the book.  But what if they simply erased those growth and  
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          development charts, with their precise constricting points and curves?  What if they  
          kept their expectations but erased the time line?  What harm could it do?  Why not  
          try?  (Edwards 98) 
For Caroline, being Phoebe‘s advocate gives her life purpose, and her professional 
expertise as a nurse helps inform her research and her understanding of professional 
attitudes about disability.   
 However, Caroline‘s enthusiasm for insisting on Phoebe‘s rights and abilities are 
eventually supplanted by anxiety about the prospects of Phoebe growing up, leaving 
home, and possibly getting married.  When she is approached by the director of the day 
centre that Phoebe attends to discuss Phoebe‘s emerging sexuality, Caroline refuses to 
address this reality. Her anxieties about Phoebe‘s capacity to live independently, as well 
as her inability to imagine her life without having Phoebe to care for, are all mixed up in 
Caroline‘s vision of Phoebe‘s future life when she tries to explain her concerns to her 
husband:   
            ―I just can‘t imagine her out in the world.  And  
          she certainly can‘t get married, Al.  What if she did get pregnant?  I‘m not ready to  
          raise another child, and that‘s what it would mean.‖ 
  ―I don‘t want to raise another baby either,‖ Al said. 
   ―Maybe we should keep her from seeing Robert for a while.‖ 
  ―Al turned and looked at her, surprised.  ―You think that would be a good    
          thing?‖ 
  ―I don‘t know,‖ Caroline said.  ―I just don‘t know.‖  
  ―Look here,‖ Al said gently.  ―From the minute I met you, Caroline,  
          you‘ve been demanding that the world not slam any doors on Phoebe.  Do not  
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          underestimate her—How many times have I heard you say that?  So why won‘t you  
          let her move out?  Why not let her try?  She might like the place.  You might like  
          the freedom.  Why have you worked all your life, if not for some kind of  
          independent life for Phoebe?‖ (Edwards 346-347)   
While policy-makers have come to depend upon parents to support people with mental 
disabilities, the novels show that not all parents have the resources to be effective 
advocates.  Contemporary analysis of access to support services for people with 
developmental disabilities has found that ―parents who are well educated and articulate 
appear to have a much greater chance of obtaining funding for services for their family 
members than those parents without the skills required to effectively advocate for their 
child‖ (Parsons 8).  People with mental disabilities especially need to count on the 
capacity of family members to speak for them when they have communication 
impairments, or simply because their own voices carry little authority.    
 Whereas Caroline has embraced the role of being Phoebe‘s mother, Haddon‘s 
novel depicts a mother who has trouble sustaining the effort required to provide for her 
son‘s needs.  Christopher Boone‘s mother is a woman who feels exhausted and lonely in 
her role as the parent of a child with severe behavioural impairments.  When she leaves 
the family, Christopher‘s father acts out of feelings of helplessness and resentment by 
telling his son that she has died from ―a problem with her heart‖ (Haddon 23).  However, 
Christopher finds the letters that his Mother has been writing him; and he learns how 
being his mother affected her decision to leave:   
           I was not a very good mother, Christopher.  Maybe if things had been different,  
          maybe if you’d been different [sic.], I might have been better at it.  But that’s just  
          the way things turned out. 
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            I’m not like your father.  Your father is a much more pacient [sic.] person.    
          He just gets on with things and if things upset him he doesn’t let it show.  But that’s  
          not  the way I am and there’s nothing I can do to change that.  ( Haddon 106) 
Christopher‘s Mother‘s feelings of inferiority as a parent partially explain her loneliness 
within the family and her decision to leave her son in the care of his father, who she 
perceives to be the better parent (Haddon 107).  She tries to explain how observing 
Christopher with his Father validated her decision to leave with Mrs. Shears‘ husband 
because he was lonely in his marriage too:  
          you didn’t shout at one another.  And it made me sad because it was like you didn’t  
          really need me at all.  And somehow that was even worse than you and me arguing  
          all the time because it was like I was invisible.   
            And I think that was when I  realized you and your father were probably  
          better off  if I wasn’t living in the house.  Then he would only have one person to  
          look after  instead of two. (109)   
A dominant cultural value, as portrayed in its stories, is that good mothers do not leave 
their children.  Many people would struggle to sympathize with this mother‘s frustration, 
loneliness, and her decision to escape the responsibility of parenthood.  However, 
Christopher‘s mother is just a regular person who makes spelling mistakes, holds a small 
job, reads cheap novels, and wishes that her life was different.  She does not have the 
same range of personal resources as the mothers in other novels in this sample:  Caroline 
Gill has professional expertise as a nurse to organize and advocate for Phoebe‘s right to 
attend school and access existing community supports; and Ede Kilworth Wyatt has an 
extended family and a household staff to help her meet her child‘s needs.    
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  The prominent role that Christopher‘s father takes in his son‘s care marks another 
notable shift in the representation of family roles that have typically privileged the 
maternal bond with a disabled child.  When confronted by his wife‘s outrage at the 
revelation that he had told their son that she had died, Christopher‘s father defends 
himself as a loving parent.  When she points out the injustice of wiping her ―out of his life 
altogether‖, he questions whether this is not what she really wanted (196).  Christopher‘s 
father‘s role as his son‘s primary caregiver is just one dimension of the greater diversity 
of roles and family models in Dismantlement-era novels in comparison with previous 
phases of the Cycle.   
 Christopher‘s father tells his son that his mother has died rather than attempt to 
give a complicated and painful explanation about why she has left them, and the other 
novels also explore how parents and other familial caregivers will deceive themselves and 
others in order to rationalize choices that they make on behalf or because of their disabled 
children.  This, in turn, imposes limitations on the veracity of any life narrative offered by 
a familial spokesperson who is presumed to know the individual best.  In Findley‘s novel, 
Charlie lives with the guilt of one particular episode when he denied his relationship with 
his mother altogether, in order to avoid the embarrassment of coming to Lily‘s aid when 
she needed it:     
          It happened in a public place—the quad at King‘s College, where I had   
          been sent when still a boy.  The occasion, I guess, was some sort of parents‘ day or  
          prize day—I don‘t remember.  The memory of what I did overwhelms it.   
  Lily had one of her episodes and fell to the ground.  There were a lot of  
          people there and I was mortified.   
  ―She‘s fainted,‖ someone cried.  ―We must get a doctor!‖ 
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  But I knew she hadn‘t fainted.  I knew too well precisely what was  
          happening and what was going to happen next and I could not bear to be present  
          when it happened in that particular place.   
  ―Does anyone know who this woman is?‖ someone asked. 
  No. 
  I was silent.  I turned away.  And ran.  And left her to the mercy of her  
          demons, anonymous and alone. (Findley 11-12) 
When family members sometimes struggle to endure the complications of loving 
someone with a severe mental disability, it may seem sensible to ask how policy makers 
can reasonably expect their acceptance and inclusion within the wider community.  
 Both Charlie and Ede live with the guilt of the limitations of their personal 
abilities that prevent them from always being able to protect Lily.  When her daughter is 
finally institutionalized Ede has to confront all the ways that she has failed as Lily‘s 
advocate and protector.  Charlie says that ―[b]lame was the burden of all Ede‘s concern.  
She told me so on other occasions.  She told me at length, when Lily died.  I didn’t… she 
would say.  I couldn’t… she said.  I tried…And, inevitably:  I failed‖ (Findley, 411).  
Even though Ede goes to see Lily every day during her incarceration, her guilt reaches 
further back in their lives.  For years Ede had deluded herself into believing that marrying 
Frederick Wyatt had been in Lily‘s best interests, as well as her own.  Although the 
decision did not cause Lily‘s illness, it divided Ede‘s loyalties in ways that undermined 
her ability to advocate for her daughter.  As Lily declines, Ede is forced to acknowledge 
how the roles they have played in the Wyatt dynasty have compromised them all.        
 The biggest deceit of all, however, is perpetrated by David Henry in Edwards‘ The 
Memory Keeper’s Daughter.  Dr. Henry ostensibly lies to his wife about their baby‘s 
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death for the same reasons that Christopher‘s father lies to him about his mother being 
dead.  Both men want to protect the people they love from being hurt.  However, in both 
cases the people who lie are also trying to spare themselves the emotional difficulties that 
come with dealing with the truth.  David ―had wanted to spare [Norah], to protect her 
from loss and pain; he had not understood that loss would follow her regardless, as 
persistent and life-shaping as a stream of water.  Nor had he anticipated his own grief, 
woven with the dark threads of his past.  When he imagined the daughter he‘d given 
away, it was his sister‘s face he saw‖ (Edwards 109).  David‘s inability to accept 
responsibility for parenting a disabled child stems from the childhood trauma of watching 
his sister slowly die from a chronic heart ailment.  However, in making his rash decision, 
David does not count on how important it would be for his wife to mourn the loss of a 
child she never saw, much less how the lie would undermine their marriage.   
 Norah is never allowed to see the body of the daughter she bore because Phoebe is 
actually alive.  Without that contact, she is unable to properly grieve for her lost daughter.  
A year later, time has not eased her loss:  ―Norah still had the sense, inexplicably, of her 
daughter‘s presence, as if she might turn and see her on the stairs or standing outside on 
the lawn‖ (Edwards 79).  She seems to be experiencing an almost instinctual awareness of 
her daughter‘s existence, even though she is not aware that the source of the growing 
estrangement between herself and her husband is the secret of Phoebe‘s life.  Norah has 
no reason to suspect that her husband has lied about their daughter.  It never occurs to her 
that Phoebe may possibly be alive and out there in the world.  Yet, on some primal level 
she never recovers from the loss because she always senses Phoebe‘s presence.    
 David Henry eventually realizes that the lie about his daughter‘s death also 
touches his son, the twin he kept; and again he is astonished by how his instinct to protect 
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is shaped by his own childhood experiences of deprivation and loss.  In the moment when 
he made the decision to give up his daughter, he was partly trying to protect his son so 
that:   
          Paul would not grow up, as David had, suffering the loss of his sister.  He would 
          not be forced to fend for himself because his sister couldn‘t. 
            This thought, and the force of its bitterness, shocked David.  He wanted to 
          believe he‘d done the right thing when he handed his daughter to Caroline Gill.  Or  
          at least that he‘d had the right reasons.  But perhaps he had not.  Perhaps it was not  
          so much Paul he‘d been protecting on that snowy night as some lost version of  
          himself. (Edwards 113) 
Over time, however, it becomes apparent that the ramifications of David‘s abandonment 
of his daughter do not spare his son, any more than they do his wife.  Instead, Paul has 
grown up shaped by the family‘s loss, which affects his relationships with both parents, in 
different ways. 
 The choices family members make in Dismantlement literature must remove them 
from the pedestal occupied by characters like Mrs Rudge and Susan Dixon, in the 
Establishment phase.  When Caroline finally confronts Norah with the truth about her 
daughter‘s life, she tells her how 
          ―For years I believed in my own innocence… I believed I‘d done the right 
          thing.  The institution was a terrible place.  David hadn‘t seen it; he didn‘t know   
          how bad it was.  So I took Phoebe, and I raised her, and I fought many, many  
          fights to get her an education and access to medical care.  To make sure she would  
          have a good life.  It was easy to see myself as the hero.  But I think I always knew,  
          underneath, that my motives weren‘t entirely pure.  I wanted a child and I didn‘t  
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          have one.  I was in love with David too, or thought I was… But when I saw the  
          funeral announcement, I knew I had to take her.  That I‘d have to leave anyway,  
          and I couldn‘t leave her behind.‖ (Edwards 369) 
In the end, there are no saints and no villains in these stories.  All of the characters are 
more complex than simple categorization will allow, and they all make decisions that 
undermine their reliability as disinterested advocates for people who do not have the 
capacity or authority to speak for themselves.   
 In many cases the choices that caregivers make reinforce how much they have in 
common with the person that is dependent upon them.  The Dismantlement novels portray 
how all the characters are susceptible to personal stress in trying to manage their 
relationships and responsibilities, showing that irrational behaviour is not exclusively 
associated with the characters who have a mental disability.  In his confession, 
Christopher‘s father emphasizes how he and Christopher are alike when he tries to 
explain how he speared the neighbour‘s dog in a moment of irrational frustration and 
anger:  ―‗So when she slams the door behind me the bugger‘s waiting for me.  And… I 
know, I know.  Maybe if I‘d just given it a kick it would probably have backed off.  But, 
shit, Christopher, when that red mist comes down… Christ, you know how it is.  I mean, 
we‘re not that different, me and you‘‖ (121-122).  Christopher‘s Father reinforces their 
shared status as struggling and imperfect human beings when he concludes his confession 
by saying, ―[w]e all make mistakes, Christopher.  You, me, your mum, everyone.  And 
sometimes they‘re really big mistakes.  We‘re only human‖ (122).  It is quite a departure 
to represent a disabled character in terms of how he is like another, ‗normal‘ individual 
when disability has been more typically used to emphasize deviation from the norm.   
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 Once all the lies are exposed, rebuilding the trust that Christopher counts upon to 
understand his world takes a long time.  In fact, at the end of the narrative not all the 
relationships have been fully reconciled.  Christopher‘s father tells him, ―‗[y]ou have to 
learn to trust me… And I don‘t care how long it takes… If it‘s a minute one day and two 
minutes the next and three minutes the next and it takes years I don‘t care.  Because this 
is important.  This is more important than anything else‘‖ (Haddon 218).  Not all the 
loose ends in Christopher‘s life and his relationships with and between his parents come 
together neatly in the end, as in a math equation or a puzzle.   
 While parents are most typically recognized as the ‗natural‘ caregivers of children 
with mental disabilities, relationships between siblings have increasingly become a locus 
of investigation in disability studies and policy planning.  Edwards‘ novel depicts how, 
following David‘s death and the revelation of Phoebe‘s existence, Norah and Paul can 
only speculate how their lives would have been different if David had not made the 
fateful decision to give Phoebe away.  When Paul learns that his sister was passed off as 
dead because of her disability, he feels a number of different emotions:  
          anger at his father, and surprise, and sadness for what he‘d lost.  Worry, too; it was  
          terrible to be concerned about this, but what if he had to take care of this sister who  
          couldn‘t live on her own?  How could he possibly do that?  He‘d never even met a  
          retarded person, and he found that the images he had were all negative.  None of  
          them fit with the sweetly smiling girl in the photograph, and that was disconcerting  
          too.  (Edwards 383) 
In fact, Paul‘s feelings are quite natural, given the vulnerability of many disabled people 
whose parents are no longer in a position to care for them.  ―For people with a 
developmental disability who live with parents or other relatives, families are the most 
235 
 
 
important providers of care.  This includes not only parents, but also brothers and sisters 
who often play an increasingly important role as their parents age‖ (Government of 
Ontario, 2006, 17).  However, not everyone who requires daily living supports has access 
to family supports.   
 For many other families, the personal care needs associated with the disability 
exceed their capacity to meet them.  In his memoir about his relationship with his son, 
Walker, Ian Brown thinks about the futures of both his children:    
          I knew how much work Walker required, and how impossible it was for one or two  
          or three or even four people to care for him adequately, to do everything that  
          needed to be done, and still live productive, engaged lives in any other way.   
          Hayley‘s life was her own; that, at least, was a gift we would give her.  I refused to  
          cover her with the thick, wet cloak of guilt under which many families of disabled  
          children operate—a swamp of irrationality that has afflicted social thinking about  
          disability for millennia… There are political factions and even entire governments  
          that tap into this guilt and suggest that family is the only real solution to the  
          problem of caring for the disabled.   
  But families, like disabilities, are not uniform or consistent.  They‘re   
          anything but perfect.  No one asks to join them, and more than half the time they  
          don‘t last.  As a result—this was my thinking—the nuclear family is no model for a  
          system to care for the severely disabled. (185)      
The research on long-term outcomes for siblings of children with disabilities appears to 
be inconclusive.  There is some evidence that the siblings of children who have mental 
disabilities may grow up to experience less emotional attachment to extended family 
members, even when caregiving responsibilities contribute to greater contact than in other 
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families (Taylor et al. 912).  However, specifically in relation to siblings who have autism 
spectrum disorders (ASD), Ferraioli and Harris find that ―[a]lthough being the sibling of a 
person with an ASD does have an impact on them that does not mean the influence is a 
psychologically harmful one‖ (50).  Outcomes are likely to be affected by the nature and 
extent of impairment, by familial attitudes towards the disabled child, and by what 
supports are available for all members of the family.  In The Memory Keeper’s Daughter, 
Paul is given explicit permission to lead his own life, allowing him the freedom to form a 
relationship with his sister that feels comfortable for them both (Edwards 397).   
 It is important to recognize that people with mental disabilities are often parents 
too (Montgomery et al. 21).  The Piano Man’s Daughter is distinct from the other 
narratives considered in this sample in that it portrays a parent with a mental disability.
46
  
Lily is smart enough to capitalize on Frederick‘s fear of social embarrassment when she 
returns from overseas with her illegitimate child.  Charlie is three years old by then, and 
recalls that their  
          reception at Selby Street in 1914 was spectacular, to say the least.  Lily had given  
          no warning of our arrival, and the news of my existence having been so ill-received  
          at my birth was no better received in my presence.  We were immediately banished  
          to a hotel.   
  …It was at this time that Lily paraded in front of the Selby Street house,   
          pushing me in a pram I no longer needed—a picket line of two with a placard that  
          read:  WYATT PIANO COMPANY UNFAIR TO UNWED MOTHERS!  (Findley  
          357) 
                                               
46 Other contemporary literary examples of mothering and mental illness are Joan Clark‘s (2005), An 
Audience of Chairs and Ursula Hegi‘s (1994) Stones from the River. 
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With Ede acting as their emissary, Lily is able to extort enough money from Frederick to 
allow Charlie and her to live fairly comfortably in a series of hotels and upscale rooming 
houses, one after another, as her demons keep them moving.  However, there are limits on 
Lily‘s freedom because Frederick ultimately has the power to have Lily committed to an 
institution.  ―It was a man‘s world then, in which only a man could have his legal way 
with such a decision‖ (Findley 358).  Lily resists this authority, but she is sometimes a 
danger to herself and her son, especially when she experiences a mental break from 
reality and is compelled to suddenly pack up and escape the visions that torment her.
47
    
 Charlie‘s first lucid recollection of an escape is of an experience that occurred 
when he was four years old.  He recalls his mother waking him in the middle of the night 
to tell him to pull his clothes on over his pajamas, and run.  Eventually, Lily decides that 
it is safe for them to rest under a bridge where she makes a bed for them out of old leaves, 
where the snow cannot reach them.  She removes his wet shoes, provides him with dry 
socks, and fits his slippers onto his feet:  
          Lying down beside me, she pulled her half of the blanket over her shoulders and,  
          facing away from me, said:  ―good-night, Charlie.  Sleep well…‖ 
  Sleep well. 
  I did not sleep at all.  I didn‘t dare close my eyes.  I kept thinking:  my   
          mother is  crazy.  I am living with a mad person.  What is going to happen next?   
          Or the child equivalent of such thoughts.  I had always accepted her, until that  
          night, as being the way most mothers were—imperious, but trustworthy.  Odd—but  
          lovingly so.  I had never felt imperilled by her madness.  Now I was.  (Findley 364)   
                                               
47 Some people with mental disabilities have impairments that compromise their ability to parent to an 
extent that the safety and well-being of the child is at risk.  However, people who cannot maintain custody 
of their children do not necessarily relinquish their self-identity as a parent.  (Montgomery et al. 29) 
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He recalls other times when he had to be vigilant to prevent Lily from forgetting about 
him altogether:  ―Sometimes I would lose her.  She would disappear.  I constantly had to 
be on the alert—especially during our escapes, when Lily was already in traveling mode.  
She could say to me:  sit here, Charlie.  Wait for me.  I’m only going to the 
washroom…Then she would not come back‖ (Findley 143-144).  Still, Charlie is loyal to 
Lily for as long as he possibly can be.  He is eight years old when his mother is finally 
hospitalized and transferred, against her wishes, to an asylum.    
 Along with the desperate escapes, fires, and seizures, Charlie recounts many 
happy memories with his mother.  He tells the reader, directly:  ―Make no mistake of it—
Lily knew happiness—Lily knew joy.  We both knew heaven‖ (Findley 338).  Yet it is the 
struggles and anxieties associated with loving Lily that make him determined not to ever 
have children of his own, even at the cost of his marriage.  Like David Henry, Charlie has 
suffered from loving someone he could not save, and he makes the decision that his wife 
―will never have to bear the sorrow—or the burden—of giving birth to another Lily.  No 
more Kilworth babies.  None‖ (Findley 240).  As Lily indicates, the last time Charlie sees 
her, the world just isn‘t a safe place for them (Findley 4).  Yet Lily also wants Charlie to 
marry and to promise to have a child.  She tells him that she knows that he has a daughter 
out there waiting for him, and in the end Charlie does reconcile with the past by having 
enough faith in the future to have a daughter of his own.     
 All of the parents and children and siblings in these novels try to reconcile 
caregiving roles with their personal values and their need for self-realization within a 
policy context where assumptions about the costs associated with caring for a person who 
has a lifelong mental disability are often unrealistic.  Similarly, the assumption that 
family members are reliable advocates who always know their child‘s, parent‘s, or 
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sibling‘s best interests is also unrealistic.  However well family members believe that they 
know the person for whom they advocate, the informed perspective that comes with an 
intimate relationship needs to be balanced by an awareness that these are not disinterested 
parties.  It is impossible for parents to see their child‘s future without also seeing their 
own.   
   
Community Inclusion 
 The Challenges and Opportunities Initiative was produced to advance the 
―government of Ontario‘s commitment to the encouragement of independence and self-
direction for all Ontario citizens‖ (Government of Ontario, 1987, 3).  It was an ambitious 
policy statement that made enthusiastic claims about the success of community living 
initiatives to that point, as well as very optimistic predictions about the capacity of people 
with mental disabilities to successfully integrate into a mainstream society ready and 
willing to accommodate.  Most significantly, as a marker indicating transition from the 
Reform period to the Dismantlement phase of the Institutional Cycle, it is the first place 
where an official long-term goal of phasing out institutions altogether is articulated (3). 
Unfortunately, the document is very vague when it comes to evidence to support the 
claim that by the early 1980s a ―better acceptance and understanding on the part of 
society regarding the needs of developmentally handicapped people in general had been 
achieved‖ (Government of Ontario, 1987, 8).  In their novels, Findley, Edwards and 
Haddon suggest that social acceptance for people with mental disabilities is still by no 
means assured.   
 That Lily is marginalized from mainstream society is emphasized through 
Findley‘s evocation of the ―madwoman in the attic,‖ the topos that was made famous in 
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Brontë‘s  Jane Eyre and revisited in Rhys‘ Wide Sargasso Sea.  When Lily‘s ―sickness‖ 
begins to emerge, her grandmother Eliza is the only one who knows that ―in a dark room 
high in the attic, her own father‘s brother had been hidden from the world in her 
grandparents‘ house.  Lovingly cared for—but publicly unacknowledged—he, too, had 
suffered from Lily‘s illness.  Her condition‖ (Findley 98).  Eliza decides that it is 
incumbent upon her to confide the life-story of her uncle John Fagan to Lily‘s mother, 
Ede.  He was mad, had visions, and painted his prophecies of fire and death on the attic 
walls where ―‗he spent the whole of his adult life.  Hidden—but not in hiding.  He was 
kept there by his parents—for his safety’s sake.  And because they were ashamed… 
which in itself is shaming.  But… ‘‖ (Findley 115; emphasis in original).  Lily‘s mental 
disability is also enmeshed with a fascination with fire that emerges at the same time that 
Frederick commences the practice of confining her to the attic when the family entertains.  
Like Bertha Rochester, and like Uncle John Fagan, Lily Kilworth  finally escapes her 
incarceration through fire (Findley 6).   
 As Findley draws upon the ‗madwoman in the attic‘ topos, he makes the 
incarcerated lunatic more human than Brontë‘s original.  In Eliza‘s recollection of her 
Uncle John Fagan, she says that he ―‗… was childlike… childlike and simple‘‖, thereby 
linking both him and Lily, with the two dominant constructions of disability considered in 
the Establishment phase of the Cycle:  the idiot and the lunatic.  Still, the establishment of 
a hereditary dimension to Lily‘s emerging disability is a devastating revelation for Ede; 
one that compels her to hesitate before accepting Frederick Wyatt‘s marriage proposal.  
She wants a normal life for Lily, but she cannot be confident that Frederick will accept 
Lily and the ways that her mental disability may complicate their lives.           
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 Once Lily joins her mother and stepfather, she is kept under close surveillance in 
their Rosedale home.  Frederick, who owns a company that makes pianos for the drawing 
rooms of upper class families and concert halls, craves social respectability above all else.  
To achieve this end, shortly after their wedding Frederick has Ede commence 
          a thorough reading of Our Deportment by a man called John H. Young…  Mister  
          Young had collated a mass of instruction on the MANNERS, CONDUCT AND  
          DRESS of what he called THE MOST REFINED SOCIETY—all set out in capital  
          letters.  Ede just laughed, but Frederick‘s insistence could not be brooked.  He  
          quizzed her on the book‘s contents day by day, until she finally consented to take it  
          seriously.  He also provided her with a copy of Beeton’s Book of Household  
          Management in order to acquaint her with a proper relationship with servants.  
          (Findley 173)  
Ede is constrained by the expectations of the role she has assumed as the wife of an 
ambitious man.  Her freedom of movement and expression are effectively impaired, and 
this extends to her ability to advocate for Lily.   
 This is made evident following Lily‘s seizure at a dinner party attended by people 
Frederick wants to impress.  Immediately afterward he advises Ede that the Lily must be 
sent to her grandparents‘ farm because she is a ―liability‖ to their ―reputations‖ (Findley 
207).  Ede‘s protests are to no avail:   
 Lily cannot harm our reputations.  Only we can harm them. 
  The appearance of an idiot daughter… The presence of an idiot   
           daughter… the fact of an idiot daughter… 
            She is not an idiot.  Not an idiot. 
  She behaves like one. 
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  A seizure is not behaviour—it’s possession—being possessed. 
  I will not have it in my presence.  (Findley 208) 
From Frederick‘s perspective, Lily is not fit for polite society and her presence threatens 
the family‘s place in the most exclusive social circles.  Findley shows how Frederick 
commits a great deal of energy to conveying an image of domestic harmony and taste that 
is actually very false, as Lily and Ede are both shown to suffer in their prescribed roles.   
 Once Lily is allowed to return home, Frederick shows his wife how he has had the 
attic refurbished as a holding cell for Lily when the family entertains.  Ede is devastated 
because she knows the terrors that the attic contains for her daughter, but Frederick will 
not be moved.  Lily has gone to bed and is amazed to hear her mother and Frederick‘s 
voices above her room:   
  ―Oh, God,‖ Lily heard.  ―No—you mustn‘t do this.  It will kill her.‖  
  ―Don‘t be ridiculous,‖ said Frederick—equally muffled, as if he were  
          speaking through gauze.  ―Gain control of yourself.  It isn‘t as if she has to live up 
          here.  It‘s nothing but a holding room.‖ 
  ―A holding room?  A holding room!  Damn you!” … 
  ―Oh—god—Fred—I cannot bear it.  Please.‖  
          This was said as words might be said in a dream or nightmare—spoken  without a  
          trace of inflection.  Just the words, in a hollow space. 
  Ede, and then Frederick, crossed the ceiling and came down the still  
          mysterious stairs and—after the briefest pause—a door was shut and a key was  
          turned. 
  ―Go to bed,‖ said Frederick. 
  ―Yes,‖ said Ede.  Broken.  (Findley 227-228) 
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In the attic Lily‘s connection to Bertha Rochester is reinforced, as it is there that she 
begins to set her fires.  Lily is only periodically incarcerated, but Frederick‘s actions limit 
her freedom to be herself, and she spends the rest of her life in defiance of socially 
prescribed norms for women of her time and place: she lives alone with her child 
conceived out of wedlock and she befriends strangers.  Lily acts in response to the voices 
in her head, which carry more authority for her than culturally defined rules for personal 
conduct.   
 In Edwards‘ The Memory Keeper’s Daughter and in Haddon‘s The Curious 
Incident of the Dog in the Night-time, social exclusion is manifested in different ways in 
the lives of Phoebe Gill and Christopher Boone.  Edwards portrays Phoebe‘s unguarded 
affection for all people who show her any kindness.  Her attachments are strong, genuine, 
and unreserved.  This is stressful for her mother because Caroline does not want to 
suffocate Phoebe‘s affectionate nature.  At the same time, however, she is also anxious to 
protect Phoebe from potential embarrassment and exploitation.  Phoebe‘s vulnerability is 
evident when a man whom she meets on the bus invites her to his home.  Phoebe does not 
go with him, but the episode prompts Caroline to remind her daughter that ―‗[s]ometimes 
the world is dangerous.  I think this man is dangerous‘‖ (Edwards 351).  The experience 
draws attention to the risks to which Phoebe is exposed when she tries to navigate the 
world independently.  Unfortunately, Caroline‘s anxiety about Phoebe‘s safety and what 
could have happened diminishes Phoebe‘s ability to recognize that she needed to go home 
and check with her mother before going with the man.  Instead of celebrating Phoebe‘s 
competence, Caroline begins driving Phoebe to and from work in order to limit her 
contact with strangers.   
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 Living a fully realized life inevitably involves taking risks, and when a person has 
a mental disability often others are called upon to determine the individual‘s capacity to 
manage those risks.  In Edwards‘ novel, Phoebe eventually falls in love with a young man 
from the day program that she attends.  Caroline struggles with her parental impulses to 
protect Phoebe and her cultural assumptions about the capacity of people with intellectual 
disabilities to form intimate attachments.  As she watches her daughter‘s unabashed, 
―surging love‖ being reciprocated by Robert, Caroline asks herself, ―[w]hy not?  Wasn‘t 
such love rare enough in the world?‖ (Edwards 340).  However, when Phoebe declares 
that she and Robert want to get married, Caroline tries to discourage the idea.  After 
surprising Phoebe and Robert in an intimate embrace, Caroline finally tells her daughter 
that she cannot get married, have a home with Robert, and children of her own:  
―Phoebe‘s face was falling, tears were slipping down her cheeks.  ‗It‘s not fair,‘ she 
whispered.  ‗It‘s not fair,‘ Caroline agreed‖ (Edwards 346).  In fact, there is no law 
preventing people with mental disabilities from marrying where they are capable of 
giving informed consent;
48
 and many people with a developmental disability ―are married 
and have children of their own‖ (Government of Ontario, 2006, 17).  Jean Vanier asserts 
that ―[o]ur communities are essentially places where people can serve and create, and, 
most importantly, where they can love as well as be loved‖ (Vanier 11).  Generally, 
however, our cultural anxieties about sexuality, coupled with a protective impulse, have 
made it easier for caregivers and professionals to see people with mental disabilities as 
asexual.  
                                               
48 The central character in Karen E. Bender‘s, Like Normal People (2001) has a comparable level of 
intellectual ability as Phoebe.  Lena does marry and lives with her husband in a supported living housing 
complex.   
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When Paul is eventually reunited with his twin sister, and she tells him about 
Robert and her intention to marry him, Paul wonders ―if it was true that Phoebe would get 
married.  Then he felt bad for wondering this; why shouldn‘t she get married, or do 
something else?‖ (Edwards 389).  The right to make decisions for oneself and the 
obligation of guardians to protect can easily put people with mental disabilities in conflict 
with their caregivers and advocates, who are called upon to determine at what point the 
need to protect vulnerable people overwhelms their right to take risks.  Throughout the 
three phases of the Institutional Cycle, all of the novels considered for analysis depict 
failed relationships and characters who make poor choices.  These are human behaviours 
and experiences that are not confined to people who have a mental disability.      
 The presence of a communication impairment often further isolates people with 
mental disabilities and inhibits relationship building.  In Haddon‘s novel, Christopher 
explains that he cannot do ―what is chatting, where people say things to each other which 
aren‘t questions and answers aren‘t connected‖ (Haddon 40).  Due to their perceptual 
impairment, people with autism often have difficulty in comprehending what is going on 
around them and feeling secure in their environment.  When the police question 
Christopher about why he is on his neighbour‘s lawn in the middle of the night, cradling a 
dead poodle, he becomes overwhelmed by so much information coming at him all at 
once:  ―I rolled back onto the ground and pressed my forehead to the ground… and made 
the noise that father calls groaning.  I make this noise when there is too much information 
coming into my head from the outside world‖ (Haddon 7).  Without the ability to filter all 
the stimuli bombarding a person‘s senses, one can find the world a terrifying place.   
 Furthermore, people who have disabilities that are not immediately apparent may 
experience a particular kind of intolerance from people who do not understand what they 
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are trying to communicate.  In Christopher‘s case, the police officer is not immediately 
cognizant of Christopher‘s disability and how it makes him intolerant of strangers and 
especially of physical contact.  As a result, the police officer inadvertently provokes 
Christopher‘s assault against him when he reaches out to lift him to his feet (Haddon 8).  
The situation is resolved only after Christopher‘s father arrives at the police station and 
the nature of Christopher‘s disability is explained.      
 Christopher needs to cope with his aversion to strangers when he runs away from 
home.  In Findley‘s novel, however, Lily Kilworth considers that crowds are the best 
place to hide.  Her first ―escape‖ concludes when a man takes the seat beside her on the 
streetcar and begins masturbating.  Thinking that he is having a seizure, Lily runs for 
help.  In relaying the anecdote, Charlie remarks: ―So much for escaping.  The world of 
streets and trolley cars, which in time would become her permanent escape route, had 
offered her the promise of freedom only to bring her face to face with the fact that, in the 
streets, she would be pursued by demons other than her own‖ (Findley 268).  Usually, 
however, Lily‘s instincts are good.  It is never the strangers that she embraces who put her 
and Charlie in jeopardy.   
 From childhood, Lily rescues all kinds of things:  from her Aunt Willa‘s discarded 
doll collection to toads and worms from the garden paths (Findley 192); Lily does not 
discriminate about what or who is worth saving.  Charlie recalls one particularly poignant 
encounter when he and Lily are on the run.  Sitting in a café in the middle of the night, 
Lily calls the young boy‘s attention to a man across the room:  ―The man had alarmed me.  
Frightened me.  He seemed to have no face.  His nose was gone and there was just a hole 
where his mouth should have been.  What could have happened to him?‖ (Findley 144)  
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Eventually, Lily beckons Charlie to go with her to where the man is sitting.  She startles 
the man by asking permission to sit with him:   
  Then, quite slowly so as not to alarm him, she reached across the table and  
           took his hand in hers.   
  The man—I think unbelieving—looked down at the knot of their fingers— 
          entwined.  It was just as though someone had handed him a thousand dollar bill— 
          or a diamond as big as a fist.   
  In his throat, he made a noise—the breath, not the shape of words…. 
 No one spoke. 
  We sat that way for half an hour. 
  At first, I didn‘t understand why they went on holding hands for so long. 
  And then I did. 
  Lily was telling him that he was not alone.  (Findley 145- 146)   
Lily seeks out the lonely and disfigured, the social outcasts, because she is incredibly 
sensitive to their suffering.   
 Her sense of responsibility to humanity is consistent with the ideals that advocates 
of community living would have citizens embrace:   
          Surely it is right and proper, Charlie, she said, that a person should help another 
          person find his way home.  It doesn’t matter if you don’t know who they are; it only  
          matters that you get them there.    
  ―That‘s our job, Charlie,‖ she said.  ―To get other people to the one safe 
          place.‖  
  It was not until after Lily‘s death that I came anywhere near beginning to  
          understand this.  Her own safe place, which had seemed to be fire, was in fact other  
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          people.  Other beings.  (Findley 324-325) 
Lily‘s morality is sound.  Unfortunately, it is not always safe to live with such a faith in 
the world.  A theoretical perspective that understands disability in terms of personal 
deficiency constructs Lily‘s faith in strangers as a manifestation of impaired judgment.  
However, from the perspective of a social model of disability Lily‘s faith in strangers is 
problematic because society is not a safe place.  It is not the individual who needs to be 
cured or controlled, but rather a society that is hostile and dangerous for people who feel 
responsible for helping another person ―find his way home‖.   
 Not only must people with mental disabilities face social attitudes that hinder their 
inclusion in the community, they most often live in poverty, which is disabling in itself.  
Edwards‘ novel alludes to how poverty curtails active community participation (252).  
Dismantlement policy has emphasized the employment prospects for people with mental 
disabilities as a route to community integration, even though people with disabilities still 
experience much higher rates of unemployment and lower wages than the general public 
(Canadian Council on Social Development, 6; Titchkosky 51).  This reality is particularly 
problematic because employment status has been indicated as a significant indicator of 
subjective well-being for people who have disabilities (Uppal 526).  In addition, income 
supports such as the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) provide minimal 
subsistence income.  Residual income assistance policy reinforces the dominant social 
attitude that mental disability is an individual problem and a personal responsibility. 
49
   
                                               
49
 In his long search for appropriate residential care for his son, Brown discusses how ―[n]ew and even 
more exotic strains of guilt began to assail me.  If Walker lived full-time in a good group setting, the cost 
would run at least $200,000 a year.  If he lived to the age of fifty, the total would be $8 million.  I didn‘t 
have $8 million dollars, but there were eight million people in Ontario, the Canadian province where I 
lived.  Was Walker worth a dollar a person?‖ (83-84)        
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The financial security of the characters in the Dismantlement novels is assured 
due to  personal circumstances that are not typical of all people with mental disabilities.  
Edwards‘ novel indicates that Phoebe‘s long-term needs are looked after because David 
Henry had the means to establish a generous trust fund for the daughter whom he gave 
away at birth.  In Findley‘s novel, Lily and Charlie are able to live comfortable, 
independent lives in a series of apartments and hotel suites in good neighbourhoods until 
Frederick‘s piano company fails and Ede cannot afford the fees for the private, 
transitional housing that helped keep Lily from the institution.  In Haddon‘s novel, 
Christopher‘s future is uncertain but optimistic, as his extraordinary abilities in 
mathematics compensate somewhat for his impairments and may provide him with a 
university education his parents would otherwise have struggled to afford.            
Ontario‘s Ministry of Community and Social Services (MCSS) has published a 
guide to assist people with ―person-directed planning‖ in order to help facilitate the 
realization of life goals.  Person-directed planning puts the ―person with a disability at the 
heart of important decisions that affect their life‖ (Dingwall, Kemp & Fowke 4).  It is an 
empowering objective; however, there are all kinds of reasons why people‘s plans may 
not be realized:  limited resources, as well as a lack of cooperation from others who do 
not endorse the plan or do not perceive it as viable.  Packaged as a tool to help foster 
independence and autonomy, such person-directed planning tools may actually work to 
absolve the community and its institutions from responsibility for taking an active role in 
realizing community integration.  It is noteworthy, for example, that the case studies and 
planning examples given in the MCSS‘ guide identify the individual, family members, 
friends, neighbours, people from the individual‘s faith or church community, and people 
the same age as the individual as key consultants in planning (Dingwall, Kemp & Fowke 
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12).  No mention is made of a role for government and its institutions in facilitating the 
realization of personal plans.   
 While planners and advocates debate appropriate parameters for social policy to 
support people with mental disabilities, an important indicator of community inclusion is 
an individual‘s ability to form relationships with people outside their immediate care 
circle.  In Findley‘s The Piano Man’s Daughter, Ede does not immediately send her 
daughter to school because she is afraid that once Lily‘s disability becomes exposed 
harassment or isolation must inevitably follow.  Charlie explains that 
          In the back of her mind, where Lily was given the eternal promise of a normal life,  
          Ede saw the years advancing as they had for herself.  Grade school would one day  
          offer Lily a formal education—and friends.   
  But not yet.  Not now.    
  Ede knew the moment must come when Lily would rise from her desk in  
          the classroom, spin out her chittering words and fall to the floor in a clatter of  
          books and pencils, only to lie there helpless under the stare of her fellows—never  
          to recover their esteem.  Always thereafter, she would be their fool and their  
          cretin— the butt of all their jokes and the object of their pity. 
  No. 
  Lily would not go to school.  (Findley 181-182) 
However, keeping Lily at home is even more isolating and prevents her from having 
opportunities to socialize and participate in the wider community.  Ensconced as she has 
become in Frederick‘s middle-class, upwardly mobile ambitions that impose such narrow 
and rigid roles upon them all, Ede possibly underestimates the capacity of her community 
to accept Lily for who she is.   
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 Certainly, when Lily does eventually go to school, she enjoys more freedom and a 
greater sense of ‗normalcy‘ then she ever did enjoy in her confinement on Selby Street.  
She is able to form loyal friendships that support her and help to keep her safe when she 
loses touch with the everyday world.  It is at boarding school that Lily meets the friends 
with whom she travels to attend Cambridge University in England.  Having lived with 
Lily, they are familiar with her escapes and silences, and they care for her when she is 
―lost‖(Findley 312).  Lily succeeds to the extent that she does because she is able to build 
relationships with people whom she can count upon to care for her when she is not well.   
 Each of the novels considered in this sample emphasizes how vital are personal as 
well as financial resources to realizing community living objectives.  Edwards chronicles 
Phoebe‘s life-story until she is in her mid-twenties and at a place in her life where her 
family is still trying to figure out what her adult story will look like.  She is on a waiting 
list for a group home:   
          a place where she could live with several other adults and a house parent.  It  
          seemed ideal in some ways—more independence and autonomy for Phoebe, at least  
          a partial answer to her future—but the truth was that Caroline could not imagine  
          Phoebe living apart from her.  The waiting list for the residence had seemed very  
          long when they applied, but in the last year Phoebe‘s name had moved up steadily.   
          Soon Caroline would have to make a decision.  (Edwards 343-344) 
Phoebe‘s circumstances do not seem to reflect the reality of the supported living 
infrastructure in Ontario where waiting lists are very long, especially for people who are 
as ‗high functioning‘ as Phoebe, and who already have a strong personal support system.  
For example, when Ian Brown was looking for a supported living space for his son in 
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Canada‘s largest city he was told that the typical applicant was a forty year-old with 
parents who were themselves looking for long-term care living arrangements (82).     
 While Findley and Edwards portray mothers who sometimes diminish their 
daughters‘ abilities in order to protect their children and maintain influence over their 
lives, in Haddon‘s novel Christopher Boone‘s father tries to actively support his son‘s 
ambitions by defending his right to take the necessary entrance exams for university (44-
45).  Even though Christopher has little capacity to understand things that are not real, he 
is a boy who is still able to imagine growing up to be an astronaut, despite the taunts of an 
older boy who tells him: ―I would only ever get a job collecting supermarket trollies or 
cleaning out donkey shit at an animal sanctuary and [that] they didn‘t let spazzers drive 
rockets that cost billions of pounds‖ (Haddon 25).  Even though Christopher does 
concede that he may never become an astronaut, he has thought carefully about one day 
leaving home and moving to another town to attend university: 
          Then, when I‘ve got a degree in maths, or physics, or maths and physics, I will be  
          able to get a job and earn lots of money and I will be able to pay someone who can  
          look after me and cook my meals and wash my clothes, or I will get a lady to marry  
          me and be my wife ad she can look after me so I can have company and not be on  
          my own.  (Haddon 45) 
Despite his losses and his impairments, Christopher has abilities that place him outside of 
the mainstream of the population diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders.  With the 
necessary supports he may realize his goals.   
 For most people with severe mental disabilities, however, the prospects for 
community inclusion through employment do not seem to be improving.  The optimism 
of contemporary planning policy at times almost glosses over the reality that having a 
253 
 
 
severe mental disability inevitably places limits on the degree of independence that a 
person can achieve.  For instance, the Challenges and Opportunities Initiative proposed 
maximizing employment opportunities for people ―disadvantaged by developmental 
handicaps‖ by pursuing the following objectives:     
 placement of developmentally handicapped people in competitive situations; 
 development of on-the-job training opportunities with appropriate supports; 
 development and implementation of supported employment; 
 refinement and promotion of the Affirmative Businesses;  
 implementation of an equitable and objective wage policy. (Government of 
Ontario, 1987, 28) 
There is little evidence that any these objectives has ever been achieved.  In fact, 
subsequent provincial administrations have cut funding to the developmental services 
sector, even as the deinstitutionalization process was accelerated (Pedlar & Hutchison 
639-640).  As a result, many of the resources invested in supported work opportunities 
were eliminated, as community agencies were required to focus their depleted resources 
on providing accommodation and basic programming (―Unkind Cut for Disabled‖, para. 
2-4).   
 As novelists begin to portray mentally disabled characters as more complex 
individuals, these characters more often become the protagonists in their own stories 
rather than bit players in other people‘s narratives.  There are cultural assumptions about 
people with mental illness, with autism, with Down syndrome and every other mental 
disability diagnosis that is affixed to people.  However, when Phoebe‘s mother looks at 
her daughter, she sees ―the thing that couldn‘t be measured, couldn‘t be quantified or 
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even explained:  Phoebe was herself alone.  You could not, finally, categorize a human 
being.  You could not presume to know what life was or what it might hold‖ (Edwards 
168).  Findley and Haddon also create characters who transcend stereotypes about mental 
disability in novels that depict the challenges of trying to determine the right balance of 
personal and structural supports that are necessary for people with mental disabilities to 
live safely in society and experience community inclusion in a meaningful way.   
  
Re-conceptualizing the Institution 
 Findley‘s, The Piano Man’s Daughter, is a contemporary novel that depicts the 
asylum as it existed in 1918.  Charlie describes ―Lily‘s first asylum—the one on Queen 
Street in Toronto—[as] appalling.  The buildings, for all their windows, gave an 
impression of darkness.  Inside, there was always someone screaming‖ (Findley 435).  In 
his detailed historical study of patient life at this institution at this time, Geoffrey Reaume 
recounts the following evidence from a patient file:    
          In 1915, May K., the sister of patient Anne D., wrote that on a previous visit two  
          years before her sister was ―in a room not fit for an animal to be confined in—a cot  
          bed with a mattress on it not fit for any human being to sleep on, the sole furniture  
          without even a change of clothing‖.  …For most of those on the better wards,  
          hospital life was not one of comfort even by the standards of their own time, and  
          their were significant variations in the environment of paying wards. …For the  
          majority of inmates who had no money to improve their surroundings—the men  
          and women on the public wards—their physical environment at 999 Queen Street  
          West was cold, crude, and harsh. (11) 
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Returning to Findley‘s novel, Charlie recalls that during Lily‘s initial weeks at 999 Queen 
Street ―[p]ermission for visits was very hard to come by….  Observation privileges, on 
the other hand, could be arranged… There were rooms where you could not be seen, but 
from which you could observe your wards and charges at play—or at work, as the case 
might be.  Also when sedated.  Sometimes seated on the floor‖ (Findley 435).  Lily is 
committed when she is in an active psychotic and suicidal state.  As a result she is put in 
isolation, under close surveillance.   
 Reaume further finds that ―there were as many circumstances leading to 
confinement as there were patients.  The asylum itself was viewed with genuine fear and 
loathing by some, while for others who felt they had nowhere else to turn it was perceived 
as a last refuge‖ (24).  In some ways, present-day institutional reality for people 
experiencing active psychosis is not very different from what Findley and Reaume 
describe:  Visiting is very restricted, screaming and other symptoms of distress are not 
unusual behaviours for people experiencing active psychoses or suffering the effects of 
forced confinement in an alienating environment; police come and go on a regular basis, 
and people who are free to leave their rooms may be disoriented from the effects of very 
strong medication.
50
  The final report of the Kirby Commission quotes from the 
experiences of several participants who have been patients on psychiatric wards.  Jennifer 
Chamber‘s testimony, for example, speaks to some of the most disturbing aspects of 
institutional care depicted in novels across the Institutional Cycle:  
          To speak from my personal experience, being on a psychiatric ward was one of the 
                                               
50 In Hurry Down Sunshine (2008) Michael Greenberg gives his first-person narrative about his daughter‘s 
diagnosis and treatment for bi-polar disorder.  He describes the psychiatric facilities where Sally receives 
treatment that includes isolation units, locked wards and expressions of extreme distress and euphoria that 
are common for people in an active psychotic or manic state.    
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          most traumatic experiences of my life.  The things that happen on a psychiatric  
          ward taken in any other context would be seen as devastating.  People being locked  
          in tiny rooms they cannot leave, tied to a bed and injected with chemicals against  
          their will are clearly traumatic experiences.  Being told that it is all right because  
          they are in a hospital is really a departure from reality. (In Kirby 4)    
The nightmare vision of the mental hospital is one that persists across all phases of the 
Institutional Cycle in fiction and nonfiction narratives, and it has provided strong impetus 
for the de-institutionalization movement.  However, it is important to distinguish between 
those supports that accommodate the day-to-day needs of people who have a chronic 
disability and the intensive intervention that may be required for someone experiencing 
an acute crisis.  Furthermore, if necessary daily living supports such as secure housing 
and adequate income were accessible for all people, the incidence of acute mental health 
crises could be substantially diminished (Kirby 6).     
 Eventually Lily is transferred to a private facility that Charlie describes as a  
 kind of home for the mentally ill.  Lily‘s experience reaffirms research that finds that the 
experience of institutional care varied in accordance to the patient‘s ability to purchase a 
degree of comfort and privacy:     
          Her second asylum was for private patients only—as if all patients don‘t want   
          privacy.  On the other hand, this particular institution—to which my mother was  
          committed on three separate occasions—was extremely well run and set in the  
          midst of a terraced garden.  The buildings were part of an estate in North Rosedale  
          that had been left by its owner especially for the care of madwomen… The late  
          owner‘s daughter had been schizophrenic and had committed suicide. (Findley 437  
          emphasis in original)    
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Lily stays there until her family can no longer afford to pay the costs, which occurs after 
Frederick dies and the Wyatt Piano company fails (Findley 442).   
 The existence of such a facility speaks to a gap in contemporary policy in terms of 
provision of a range of housing services that are flexible enough to support a diverse  
population comprised of individuals who may have different needs at different times.  
Furthermore, supported living facilities that do exist do not always live up to the vision of 
community care articulated in Reform-era planning that recommended that residential 
facilities be located in the midst of the community and accessible through public 
transportation (Welch 4; Williston 74).  In fact, group homes have tended to be 
constructed on the fringes of communities where real estate is cheaper and there are fewer 
restrictive zoning bylaws.
51
  The Kirby report recommends the establishment of a Mental 
Health Housing Initiative (118-123) that could be implemented with a spectrum of 
services to meet the needs of all people who are insecurely housed as a result of poverty 
and mental disability.   
 Contemporary novels that are set in subsequent phases of the Institutional Cycle 
portray how the very limited range of community services available for people with 
mental disabilities continues to undermine the potential for community inclusion for 
many.  Edwards‘ novel depicts a doctor who, in 1964, sees the institution as the best way 
to protect his family from what he perceives as the inevitable grief of living with mental 
disability.  This belief prompts him to direct his nurse, Caroline Gill, to immediately 
deliver his newborn daughter to an institutional facility, while he convinces his wife that 
their daughter did not survive her birth.  Caroline makes the journey, but ultimately acts 
                                               
51 The Toronto Star published a report (24 April 2010) revealing a number of jurisdictions in Ontario 
(Toronto, Kitchener, Smiths Falls and Sarnia) that still had ―restrictive zoning bylaws governing where 
group homes for people with disabilities could be located‖ (para. 6).   
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upon her own moral impulse in deciding not to leave the child.  Edwards does a good job  
reconstructing the image of the ―home for the feebleminded‖ (Edwards 31) through 
Caroline‘s eyes, as it would have looked in the 1960s:52 
          across a mile of pale hills, she glimpsed the building, built of red brick at the  
          turn of the century, with two incongruous low-slung modern wings.  It disappeared,  
          now and again, as she followed the curves and dips of the country road, and then   
          was suddenly before her.   
            She pulled into the circular driveway.  Up close, the old house was in a  
          state of mild disrepair.  Paint was peeling on the wood trim and on the third floor a  
          window had been boarded up, broken panes backed with plywood. (24) 
The ―modern wings‖ suggest the constant expansion that the institutional system in North 
America had been experiencing since its inception, and was only beginning to subside 
around the time that this scene is set.    
 The antiquity of the place is impressed upon Caroline, suggesting a response to 
disability that is from another era:  ―She stood and walked to the windows, the 
floorboards shifting and creaking beneath the worn carpet.  Velvet drapes brushed the 
floor, remnants from the far-flung time when this place had been an elegant estate.  She 
touched the edge of the sheer curtains beneath; yellow, brittle they billowed dust‖ 
(Edwards 28).  Going deeper into the facility, she experiences an incongruence of past 
and present, held together by a pervasive sense of general neglect, as she passes ―several 
doors, glimpsing moments of people‘s lives, the images suspended like photographs‖ 
                                               
52 The description given resembles Greenberg‘s (1964) representation of the Blau family‘s first impression 
of the mental hospital in I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, as they drive toward a redbrick, somewhat 
run-down, Victorian building out in the country (ch. 1). 
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(Edwards 29).  Caroline‘s walk through the institution is described as a series of still 
frames.  The strongest impression is made upon her by the image of      
          a young woman wearing a white cotton slip sat on the edge of a bed, her hands  
          folded lightly in her lap, her head bent.  Another woman, a nurse, stood behind her,  
          silver scissors flashing.  Hair cascaded darkly onto the white sheets, revealing the  
          woman‘s bare neck:  narrow, graceful, pale.  Caroline paused in the doorway.   
            ―She‘s cold,‖ she heard herself saying, causing both women to look up.    
          The woman on the bed had large eyes, darkly luminous in her face.  Her hair, once  
          quite long, now jutted raggedly at the level of her chin. 
            ―Yes,‖ the nurse said, and reached to brush some hair off the woman‘s  
          shoulder; it drifted through the dull light and settled on the sheets, the speckled  
          grey linoleum.  ―But it had to be done.‖  (Edwards 29)   
It is a curious picture, as much for what it implies as what it depicts.  The young woman 
is presented in a vulnerable way, with her head bowed and her neck exposed.  The image 
of submissive resignation recalls a scene from Brontë‘s Jane Eyre in which Helen Burns 
is beaten with a switch on the back of her neck for not keeping herself neat (Brontë ch. 
VI).
53
  The hair is being hacked off with no consideration for appearance, the implication 
being that the way the young woman looked really is of no consequence.  The young 
woman‘s deference to the procedure suggests resignation and no reason to care for 
herself.  Finally:  ―it had to be done‖.  When Lily is institutionalized they ―cut her hair off 
for fear she would use it to strangle herself.  Women had done that—wound their long 
                                               
53 ―…Burns immediately left the class, and, going, into the small inner room where the books were kept, 
returned in half a minute, carrying in her hand a bundle of twigs tied together at one end.  This ominous tool 
she presented to Miss Scatcherd with a respectful courtesy; then she quietly, and without being told, 
unloosed her pinafore, and the teacher instantly and sharply inflicted on her neck a dozen strokes with the 
bunch of twigs.  Not a tear rose from Burns‘ eye; and… not a feature of her pensive face altered its ordinary 
expression.‖ (Brontë 64-65) 
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braids of hair around their necks and hanged themselves.  Now—all hair was cut.  A 
matter of course.  That and trimmed fingernails‖ (Findley 436).  Perhaps the woman 
Caroline observes just couldn‘t be keep her hair neat.  Possibly it was often in her food; 
maybe the woman pulled at it when in distress.  It is the submissiveness and the absence 
of a personal narrative to explain why the procedure ―had to be done‖ that makes the 
strongest impression in this scene.
54
   
 This image prompts Caroline to take the baby back to her home in the belief that, 
given time to reconsider, Dr. Henry will change his mind about keeping Phoebe.  
However, she is made aware of David‘s deception when she reads a notice in the 
newspaper for a memorial service for the baby who is very much alive.  She immediately 
arranges to meet him and urges him to recant.  When Caroline explains how she could not 
bring herself to leave the child at the institution, as David directed, she is relieved when 
he admits that he had never actually been to the place:  ―‗It came highly recommended, 
that was all.  I‘ve sent other people there, in the past.  I‘ve heard nothing negative‘‖ 
(Edwards 64).  Of course, there is ample historical evidence of all kinds of deprivation 
and abuse that has been allowed to occur over many years in institutional facilities where 
residents were not aware of their rights, or were not able to express them.
55
  However, he 
still insists that he has tried to do what was in everyone‘s best interests, and he is not 
                                               
54 In her memoir of her mother, and her slow death by dementia, Heather Menzies (2009) generally speaks 
positively about the care that her mother received in the long-term care facility where she was eventually 
transferred.  However, she shares one angry recollection of arriving to visit her mother one day to find that 
her hair had been cut:  ―I turned on my heel and went straight to the office.  Turns out, the cutting hadn‘t 
been done by the resident hairdresser, but by one of the personal-care attendants assigned to help Mum get 
washed and brushed and dressed in the morning.  Something about Mum‘s hair getting in the way.  I was 
furious.  This was my mother.  This was her hair, a hairdo that marked her as much as her name.  It was her 
identity, not something to be done away with for someone else‘s convenience!‖ (131) 
55 In her novel, Icy Sparks (1998), Gwyn Hyman Rubio describes incidents of compassionate care and also 
abuse in a mental hospital, also in Kentucky, where the eponymous heroine is sent in the mid-1950s to be 
treated for what is diagnosed today as Tourette Syndrome. 
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pleased that his nurse failed to follow through with his request:  ―‗I believe the home in 
Louisville is the right place for this child.  I don‘t make the decision lightly.  She will 
need medical care she cannot get elsewhere‘‖ (Edwards 65).  David adheres to a medical 
model of disability that perceives people with disabilities as inevitably afflicted, 
medically fragile, and unable to thrive in the wider world.   
 Even a year later, once he recognizes how his decision to send his newborn 
daughter to an institution has created a lie that is undermining his relationship with his 
wife, and causing her inconsolable pain, David still is unable to take full responsibility for 
the unresolved grief:  ―David felt a sense of panic, almost vertigo, at all he didn‘t know; 
at all he knew and couldn‘t mend.  And anger:  he felt that too, suddenly, in a great rush.  
At himself, but also at Caroline, who had not done what he‘d asked, who had made an 
impossible situation even worse‖ (Edwards 122).  This need to control is dominant in 
David, so it makes sense that he embraces an institutional response to disability where 
order is imposed upon abnormality that cannot otherwise be solved.          
 Policy and literary analysis both indicate that families who are bringing up 
children who have mental disabilities often experience a lot of stress.  In Haddon‘s novel, 
the burden of  responsibility for Christopher‘s care takes a high personal toll, and there 
are limits to the Boones‘ ability to constantly anticipate Christopher‘s needs and make his 
environment functional for them all.  As a result, Christopher‘s ―behavioural problems‖ 
provoke problematic behaviours and verbal outbursts in others.  He says that: 
          Sometimes these things would make Mother and Father really angry and they 
          would shout at me or they would shout at each other.  Sometimes Father would say,  
          ―Christopher, if you do not behave I swear I shall knock the living daylights out of  
          you,‖ or Mother would say, ―Jesus, Christopher, I am seriously considering putting  
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          you in a home,‖ or Mother would say, ―You are going to drive me into an early  
          grave.‖ (Haddon 47-48) 
Eventually, Christopher‘s mother leaves the marriage, which is not surprising given the 
high rates of breakdown in marriages where parents are raising a child with severe 
disabilities.  Brown talks about the toll that caring for their disabled son took on his own 
marriage, noting that ―[e]stimates of the number of marriages that fail due to caring for a 
disabled child range from 60 to 80 percent‖ (97).  Brown suggests that in their case, part 
of what held his wife and him together was the simple reality that there was no other way 
to care for their son unless they did it together.       
 The swing of the policy pendulum from a place where institutionalization was 
considered as the most appropriate option for severely disabled children and their 
families, to a position advocating family as optimal caregivers has been dramatic and in 
some cases devastating.  In 2005 the Ombudsman of Ontario published a report that 
exposed a policy system that sometimes required parents with children who have complex 
needs to surrender custody of their children in order to attain relief from an intolerable 
situation for their children and themselves.  He concludes that  
          [t]here are families in crisis in Ontario.  There may be as many as 100-150…  
          families who, out of desperation, have been forced to give up parental rights in  
          order to get their children the residential care they require.  In most of these cases  
          there was no need to strip those parents of parental rights because they are capable  
          and loving parents, entirely able to act responsibly.  These people are being forced  
          by the weight of the intolerable burden of caring for their children with special  
          needs, to sign agreements acknowledging falsely that they are unable to care for  
          those children, or even to engage in what for most parents would be the ultimate act  
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          of betrayal—to declare formally, for the public record, that they are abandoning  
          their children… These families are struggling to cope with children with special  
          needs at home, even though professionals have said that in the interests of the  
          family and of those children that the children need to be placed in residential  
          facilities.  Yet, these parents struggle with intolerable home lives, knowing that  
          their children‘s names are placed on a waiting list, sometimes for years. (Marin 40) 
Marin‘s findings are consistent with the experience of the Brown family who waited for 
seven years to get a placement for their son (Brown 78), even though he is medically 
fragile, requires tube feeding, engages in self-injurious behaviours, is incontinent and 
nonverbal.  Despite the fact that they were a two-income, professional, middle-class 
family, Brown admits that there ―was nowhere we could afford to put him, and there was 
nowhere to put him anyway‖ (69).  As government policy has have moved away from 
facilitating the institutionalization all children with mental disabilities, families who 
would once have had very little input into the lives of their mentally disabled children are 
now stranded without necessary supports that long-term care facilities once provided.   
 As the prevalence of long-term care for children with disabilities has been 
substantially reduced, although not altogether eliminated, a lot of the institutional debate 
in the Dismantlement phase has shifted from residential facilities to the school system.    
Lily, Christopher, and Phoebe all eventually go to school.  However, Caroline has to fight 
for Phoebe‘s right to attend public school by participating in legal action, alongside other 
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parents with children who have learning disabilities.
56
  The presentation of their case to 
members of the local school board prompts the following exchange:  
          ―We on the board appreciate everything you say, and we appreciate the  
          commitment and devotion of these parents.  But these children are mentally  
          retarded; that‘s the bottom line.  Their accomplishments, significant though they  
          may be, have taken place within a protected environment, with teachers capable of  
          giving extra, perhaps undivided, attention.  That seems a very significant point.‖  
            ―Mentally retarded is a pejorative term,‖ Ron Stone replied evenly.   
          ―These children are delayed, yes, no one‘s questioning that.  But they are not 
          stupid.  No one in this room knows what they can achieve.  The best hope for their 
          growth and development, as for all children, is an educational environment without    
          predetermined limits.  We only ask for equity today.‖ (Edwards 161-162 emphasis  
          in original) 
This episode in the novel is set in 1970, and Edwards is not historically accurate in having 
the parents‘ lawyer object that the term ―mentally retarded‖ is pejorative.  In fact, it is the 
designation typically used in Ontario policy planning until late in the 1970s.  Both 
Williston (1971) and Welch (1973), for example, wrote influential policy reports for the 
Government of Ontario regarding the provision of community supports for people who 
are mentally retarded.   
 At Caroline‘s meeting with the school board, another trustee on the panel 
acknowledges the lawyer‘s appeal to equity by making reference to a lack of resources:  
―To be equitable, we would have to accept them all, a flood of retarded individuals that 
                                               
56 This theme of parents (especially mothers) advocating for their children to lead ‗normal‘ lives is 
pervasive in all phases of the Institutional Cycles.  Another literary example, in the Dismantlement phase, is 
Karen E. Bender‘s (2000) Like Normal People.   
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would overwhelm the system‖ (Edwards 162).  This is also an enduring argument used to 
rationalize caps on social welfare services for people who cannot adapt to mainstream 
standards and expectations.  The case for imposing caps on certain services has been 
made by the Government of Ontario in recent years to limit funding for intensive 
behavioural intervention (IBI) services for children who have complex disabilities, such 
as autism, even though ―Bill 82 ensured that all exceptional school-age children in 
Ontario would have available, by 1985, special education services and programs 
appropriate to their individual needs without payment of fees by parents or guardians‖ 
(Government of Ontario, 1987, 7). A class action suit was launched against the 
Government of Ontario for refusing to fund IBI beyond the age of six years.  The parents 
won a lower court decision in April 2005, when Judge Kitely ruled that  
          ―…the age cutoff reflects and reinforces the stereotype that children with autism  
          over age 6 are virtually unredeemable…The absence of ABA/IBI means that  
          children with autism are excluded from the opportunity to access learning with the  
          consequential deprivation of skills, the likelihood of isolation from society and the 
          loss of the ability to exercise the rights and freedoms to which all Canadians are  
          entitled.‖ (In Makin, 8 July 2006, A6) 
In Edwards‘ novel, Caroline does win her battle to obtain an education for Phoebe; 
however, social welfare advocates realize that few social justice battles are ever won 
outright, and ground that is gained can always be lost again.
57
  Indeed, the Province 
                                               
57 Returning, for example, to the issue of parents having to relinquish custody of their children in order to 
obtain necessary long-term care supports, the Ministry of Children‘s Services pledged to change this 
practice following the release of Marin‘s (2005) report.  However, stories of parents caught in this same 
dilemma continue to come up.  Rob Ferguson documented the Commisso family‘s situation on 1 May 2008, 
and Tanya Talaga reported on the Gallinger family‘s case on 20 July 2009, both in the Toronto Star.  
Talaga reports that critics argue that ―the Liberal government has failed to implement changes advocated by 
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successfully appealed Kitely‘s ruling, which was overturned in July 2006 by the Supreme 
Court.
58
    
 In Findley‘s novel, Lily is finally sent away to a private boarding school following 
a series of serious fits that concludes with her setting every item of her young brother‘s 
clothing on fire in bitter revenge for his deliberate destruction of the ant colonies that she 
had studied and nurtured.  The event also occasions what her son, Charlie, refers to as the 
first of Lily‘s escapes.  ―This was not, as they came to be, an escape from her demons, but 
only from Frederick and the house on Selby Street.  Having already packed her suitcase, 
she simply left‖ (Findley 264).  However, Lily cannot escape Frederick‘s judgment and 
she is sent to a school ―forty-eight miles away in a field north of Newmarket—almost all 
the way to Lake Simcoe.  The dormitories and classrooms were housed in a large stone 
building that once had been a convent.  It was called St. Mary-Margaret and it prided 
itself on its mastery of difficult students‖ (Findley 269).  Upon moving Lily to her new 
residence, Ede flinches at the Director‘s philosophy of rule ―‗with an iron hand… in a 
velvet glove‘‖, but she also is ―resigned to the fact that strictures were required if Lily 
was to be controlled‖ (Findley 270).  However, despite the foreboding introduction to the 
new regimen, Lily enjoys more liberty at boarding school than she experienced living in 
the Wyatt family home.   
 In The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time, Haddon portrays his hero 
living in the community, yet Christopher Boone is still segregated from ‗normal‘ children 
by attending a school for children with exceptional needs.  He describes his classmates in 
the following terms:  
                                                                                                                                            
Marin four years ago to ensure legal protection against loss of custody, and money for the children‘s care.  
Instead, ad hoc solutions and funding are scraped together as the need arises—with mixed results‖ (A1). 
58 A compilation of media reporting on this decision is available at http://dawn.thot.net/autism-ruling5.html   
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          All the children at my school are stupid.  Except that I‘m not meant to call them  
          stupid, even though this what they are.  I‘m meant to say that they have learning  
          difficulties or that they have special needs.  But this is stupid because everyone has  
          learning difficulties because learning to speak French or understanding relativity is  
          difficult and also everyone has special needs, like Father, who has to carry a little  
          packet of artificial sweetening tablets around with him to put in his coffee to stop  
          him from getting fat, or Mrs. Peters, who wears a beige-colored hearing aid, or  
          Siobahn, who has glasses so thick that they give you a headache if you borrow  
          them, and none of these people are Special Needs, even if they have special needs.  
          (Haddon 43-44) 
Christopher does not resent his segregation from the mainstream as much as he resents 
how language is manipulated to avoid acknowledging the deliberate policy of separating 
children with learning disabilities from the general population of people who all have 
―special needs‖.59    
In many jurisdictions, segregated schools have become a controversial approach 
to education.  For the past several years, in Ontario, an integrated curriculum even for 
students with the most severe mental disabilities has been promoted as the most inclusive, 
and therefore appropriate, option.  Parents, however, do not unanimously endorse this 
policy.  Brown shares his own experience:   
          Walker begins to attend Beverley Junior Public School—a famous local institution  
          dedicated entirely to intellectually disabled children, where the ratio of students to  
                                               
59 Simi Linton interrogates the meaning of ―special education‖and suggests that ―[l]abelling the education 
and its recipients [as] special may have been a deliberate attempt to confer legitimacy on the educational 
practice and to prop up a discarded group.  It is also important to consider the unconscious feelings that 
such a strategy may mask.  It is my feeling that the nation in general responds to disabled people with great 
ambivalence.  Whatever antipathy or disdain is felt is in competition with feelings of empathy, guilt and 
identification.‖ (164)       
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          teachers is a mere three-to-one.  The school is a bright, airy space designed for  
          children who can‘t see out of normal windows or walk easily through a standard  
          door.  Its effect on Walker‘s confidence is instantaneous:  within a month he  
          progresses from needing to be carried from room to room at school to walking on  
          his own.  But within a year, the provincial government announces its intention to  
          close the school.  The school is only for the disabled—a ‗segregated‘ facility, in the  
          parlance of disability education—and doesn‘t conform to the province‘s policy of  
          supporting (much cheaper) ‗inclusive‘ schools, where, theoretically, the disabled  
          learn alongside the abled, and each gets used to the other.  Inclusive schools are  
          often excellent, and much preferred by a certain generation and political ilk of  
          educators.  But even those educators will admit integration isn‘t for everyone, that  
          dedicated facilities can be more helpful for children as delayed as Walker. (87) 
Public protest eventually succeeded at keeping this school open, but Brown concludes 
that ―the government‘s priorities are clear:  the disabled don‘t vote, and so don‘t deserve 
much individual attention.  They don‘t fit the formula—any formula‖ (88).60  Segregated 
education is perceived to reinforce marginalization in the wider community and 
emphasize difference instead of what children have in common.  However, Brown shares 
the opinion of some other parents and disability theorists who believe that some children 
have more intensive learning needs that are just not being addressed in a mainstream 
system.
61
   
                                               
60 In fact, people with disabilities have had the legal right to vote in Ontario elections since 1985, and 
federally since 1988.  (See CBC Digital Archives, 16 Nov. 1988; Prince 2004).  Brown is making the point 
that people with disabilities do not comprise a voting constituency of sufficient size to influence political 
agendas.    
61 In a Toronto Star article (23 May 2010) Laurie Monsebraaten profiles Heydon Park Secondary School, 
which was originally established in 1923 as a public vocational school for girls.  Today, ―[a]bout one-third 
of the school‘s 200 students have mild intellectual disabilities, including a dozen girls who have Down 
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 In Haddon‘s novel, Christopher‘s story also demonstrates that a facility dedicated 
to educating people with disabilities is not necessarily more progressive in its 
administration, or inclined to deliver a flexible curriculum, according to each student‘s 
individual abilities.  Christopher recounts how his school principal, ―Mrs. Gascoyne… 
didn‘t want to treat me differently from everyone else in the school because everyone 
would want to be treated differently and it would set a precedent‖ (Haddon 44).  When 
the issue of Christopher taking the university qualification math exam is raised, Mrs. 
Gascoyne suggests that ―she and Father should talk about this at some later point on their 
own‖ (Haddon 44).  In response, Christopher‘s Father insists upon his son‘s right to at 
least bear witness to decisions that affect his ability to realize his own goals.  Christopher 
recounts that his father asked ―whether she wanted to say things she was embarrassed to 
say in front of me, and she said no, so he said, ‗Say them now, then‘‖ (Haddon 45).  In 
this instance, Christopher‘s Father wins the right for Christopher to write the necessary 
entrance exams because he refuses to engage in subterfuge and accept excuses for 
denying Christopher‘s right to participate in decisions affecting his own future.  This 
episode also demonstrates how even when people with mental disabilities have a voice, 
their narratives almost always still need to be supported by an advocate.   
 In Findley‘s novel, Lily Kilworth‘s story begins and ends in a mental hospital, 
where she never feels safe ―‗[i]n spite of its being an asylum‘‖ (Findley 4).  Lily is finally 
committed to an institution following her breakdown, which occurs when she learns that 
her fiancé has been killed in World War I, on the final day of fighting (Findley 420).  She 
                                                                                                                                            
syndrome.  Autism, Asperger‘s syndrome and fetal alcohol syndrome are other common conditions.  The 
rest of the student body is made up of girls with average intelligence who are considered ‗high risk‘ due to 
learning disabilities, mental health issues or behaviour problems.  Many come from troubled families and 
tough neighbourhoods.  Three are pregnant, a dozen are Children‘s Aid Society wards, and some have 
suffered sexual or emotional abuse and been exposed to violence and even murder in their homes.  Many 
would be bullied, ostracized or just lost in a regular high school—if they attended at all…‖ (para. 17-19) 
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is hospitalized following a dramatic suicide attempt, by fire, at the movie theatre that had 
been her haven from the world:    
          In the hospital, she fought the nurses and the doctors who were trying to save her  
          life.  She fought them so effectively, somebody had to knock her out.  When her  
          stomach had been induced to give up its contents and a shot had been administered  
          to calm her down, she still persisted in her kicking and shouting until, at last, she  
          was captured and restrained and put into a strait-jacket. (Findley 427) 
At the Queen Street Lunatic Asylum, Lily is confined at first in a padded cell before 
being kept under close observation in a ward with others who were considered to be 
dangerous to themselves or others.  Charlie is unable to see his mother for several 
months, until she is stabilized.   
 At one point he explains his role in relation to his mother‘s illness in the following 
terms:  ―I was never Lily‘s keeper.  I was only ever her child—and, on occasion, her 
guardian and, on occasion, her victim and, on occasion, her accomplice.  But I was never 
her keeper.  The Keeper in Lily‘s life was fire.  Her jail was her illness, and its key was in 
a box of matches‖ (Findley 255).  Lily does eventually die by fire in the asylum.  Given 
the historical evidence cited by Berton, Reaume, Simmons, and Williston about the 
structural hazards of institutional facilities, the circumstances of Lily‘s death, and those 
who perish with her, seem very plausible:    
          There will always be some debate about whether or not she started it.  Smoking  
          was allowed in the Asylum.  Smoking, but not matches.  Not lighters.  When a  
          patient wanted a cigarette, she had to go and ask the nurses or the orderlies for a  
          light. 
  Still, Lily was Lily, and she had her own ways of coming by matches. … 
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          Twenty inmates perished.  Most of them were caught in a stairwell whose door  
          somehow got locked behind them.  At the bottom, there was thick wire meshing—  
          and no way through.  (Findley 43) 
From the moment that Findley invokes the legacy of the ‗madwoman in the attic‘, it is 
anticipated that Lily must die by fire.  However, he also builds upon the archetype made 
famous by Charlotte Brontë in the Establishment phase of the Cycle, and made human by 
Jean Rhys in the Reform period.  Findley‘s ‗madwoman in the attic‘ wins more battles, 
has more friendships, knows more love, and lives a richer life than either of her 
predecessors.  Within or outside of the institution, all the authors in this sample tell stories 
of lives constrained by policies of segregation that emphasize impairments over abilities, 
as the Dismantlement phase continues to struggle to reconcile the limitations of the 
community with the limitations of the individual.       
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CHAPTER 9- Findings 
 
Learning from a Comparative Examination of Literary and Social Policy Discourses   
 The review of the novels and policy documents that comprise the data sample for 
this research reveals that mental disability has typically been perceived in a much more 
limiting way in policy than it has been portrayed in literature, notwithstanding Parsons‘ 
assertion that ―[o]ver the years, governments have been guided by social values of the 
time and the public‘s perception of moral obligation versus actual legal responsibility‖ 
(13) for people with mental disabilities.  Policy planners have typically regarded idiocy 
and lunacy, mental retardation, or disability as conditions to be managed while novels 
portray how policy actually plays out in people‘s lives.  The ways that mental disability is 
represented in novels often challenges prevailing policy assumptions about rights and the 
roles available to people.  At the same time, cultural constructions of mental disability 
and the potential storylines available to them are influenced, and sometimes even 
determined by policy priorities, over time.   
 Table 6 identifies key themes and dominant perspectives that were prevalent 
throughout the Institutional Cycle and that informed responses to the research questions 
articulated in the methodology.  The findings of the research identify several relationships 
between the novels and policy texts that influence how the life stories of people with 
mental disabilities are constructed in policy designed to cure, control, or accommodate 
individual needs and rights.  Disjunctions between literary and policy discourses may be 
read as locations in the Institutional Cycle where social policy and cultural 
 Table 6 
DISCOURSE THEMES ACROSS THE INSTITUTIONAL CYCLE 
 
 LITERARY NARRATIVES POLICY DISCOURSE 
ESTABLISHMENT PHASE 
How Their Stories are Told  The life narratives of nonverbal characters are 
understood in terms of their relationships with others 
 Dickens‘ Barnaby Rudge is unusual for making the 
mentally disabled character the eponymous hero 
who contributes his own perspective on the action of 
the story 
 Sympathetic portrayal of idiots 
 Lunatic is perceived as more dangerous, morally 
corrupt 
 The capacity of people with mental disabilities and 
their place in society is articulated exclusively at a 
political level, in consultation with medical experts 
 Government Inspectors and Superintendents observe 
the behaviours and living conditions of people with 
mental disabilities and depict them in reports that 
result in occasional revision of resource allocation 
and institutional standards  
 Patients and family members are not directly 
consulted about the nature of therapeutic treatment, 
or personal daily living needs 
Family Roles  Primary care providers 
 Saintly maternal caregivers/martyrs  
 Social deviants or morally corrupt individuals may 
pass degeneracy down to their children 
 Primary responsibility for care at the beginning of 
this phase 
 Over time, and with the emergence of the ―menace 
of the feeble-minded‖ (Simmons 1982, 65-109) 
professional care and control of idiocy and lunacy is 
endorsed  
Community Roles  Coordinate charitable relief in cases of extreme 
deprivation 
 Authority to step in where the (typically female) 
guardian cannot cope 
 Generally indifferent/ambivalent 
 Taxes dedicated to finance  poor houses, and then 
Provincial Lunatic Asylums  
 Province steps in when communities not 
inclined/able to meet their obligations 
(minimal/residual support) 
Institutional Option  Never depicted as a positive option  Initially intended as a last resort when families could 
not fulfill their responsibility 
 Over time, promoted as in the best interest of the 
individual, family and community 
REFORM PHASE 
How Their Stories are Told  Prevalence of life stories being told by other 
characters who know them 
 Narrator‘s story and the disabled character‘s story 
are intertwined 
 
 More external expertise consulted in order to inform 
a policy of institutional reform 
 Family perspectives are acknowledged as 
contributing to a shift in policy emphasis 
 Advantages of community living are portrayed 
explicitly in terms of enhanced quality of life for 
people with mental disabilities; implicitly also 
advances a policy objective relinquishing 
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responsibility for a costly system of direct care 
Family Roles  Family connections nonexistent or dysfunctional 
 More ambivalent portrayal of mothers and maternal 
figures:  absence of a nurturing mother figure 
contributes to the vulnerability of the mentally 
disabled individual 
 Medical model emphasizes the expertise of 
professionals and institutional care as most 
appropriate; family relations undermined, as a result 
 Growing grassroots ―community living‖ movement  
is lead by parent activists 
Community Roles 
 
 
 
 Nonexistent, or complicit with political agenda 
 Social conformity/intolerance of difference a 
contributing factor to mental disability/madness 
 Increasing emphasis on community‘s 
role/responsibility in supporting people with 
disabilities 
Institutional Option  Rarely depicted as a positive option, but sometimes 
a necessary asylum in a cruel and intolerant world, 
or from family dysfunction 
 Fosters dependence 
 Mixed messages: need for reform of the institutional 
system acknowledged and increasing emphasis on 
community integration even while institutional 
capacity continues to expand until mid 1970s 
 Targets established for transfer to community living 
spaces, downsizing begins 
DISMANTLEMENT PHASE 
How Their Stories are Told  Stories set in all phases on the Institutional Cycle, 
depicting the cultural/societal values of the time 
from the author‘s contemporary perspective 
 More first-person voices, complex characters who 
change over time  
 In their relationships with the mentally disabled 
individual, the personal limitations of all characters 
are exposed 
 Pains are taken to demonstrate direct consultation 
with people with mental disabilities and their 
caregivers to enhance legitimacy of policy 
objectives 
 A policy of ‗normalization‘ of people with mental 
disabilities begins to cede to an environmental 
theory  of disability that acknowledges and aspires 
to address ways that community structures disable 
others 
Family Roles  Essential to the stories of disabled characters 
 Personal struggles to meet the needs of their children 
 Well intended, but human and fallible 
 Recognized as an/the expert in determining the 
disabled person‘s best interests 
 Care-giver role acknowledged but limits to supports 
inadequately supported/compensated 
Community Roles  Ambivalent:  sometimes well-intended, sometimes 
indifferent 
 Community can exploit and be dangerous for people 
with mental disabilities 
 Emphasis on the community role/responsibility in 
supporting people with disabilities 
 Advocating community living, but with limited 
resources 
 Encourage family trusts & DSPs 
Institutional Option  Never depicted as a positive option  No longer a viable option 
 
 representations of mental disability are in conflict.  In addition, changes in the narrative 
construction of disability between phases of the Cycle tend to reflect changing political 
priorities.  In some cases, political initiative influences a corresponding shift in cultural 
values.  At other times, changes in social attitudes compel political change.  The 
following discussion identifies dominant planning and disability theories, along with 
recurring narrative themes that, taken together, define the Establishment, Reform and 
Dismantlement phases of the Institutional Cycle.     
 
Establishment Phase 
At the beginning of the Establishment phase the novels generally depict a greater 
degree of acceptance of the mentally disabled individual in society than is implied in 
policy from the same time period.  Especially in rural locations there seems to be a place 
for ‗naturals‘ and ‗idiots‘, as long as their presence does not jeopardize the prevailing 
social order.  Therefore, it makes sense that Dickens and Gaskell set their stories back in 
time, in small villages where families are long established, community ties are strong, and 
not yet affected by creeping industrialism.   
Rapidly changing systems of production affected the social fabric of Canadian 
communities in similar ways as in England.  Rice and Prince explain that after 
Confederation, as people left the farm for work opportunities in the growing  
          towns and cities, they found that their lifestyles changed.  There was less  
          allegiance to, and reliance on, primary groups.  The separation from the family and  
          the farm created new situations, which required new ways of meeting one‘s needs.  
          Gone or declining were the rural communities with their single, unambiguous  
          social structures.  Gone was the sense of community that had seemed to naturally  
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          protect the individual or family.  Going or gone was the reliance on a self-sufficient  
          environment. (37) 
Structural economic change called for corresponding radical social change, and the 
establishment of the institutional system to replace the function that extended families and 
communities provided is indicative of this transition.  The idiots and naturals that once 
had evoked a paternalistic response, at least in literature, came to be perceived as a 
burden on society where the individual‘s status became increasingly dependent on his or 
her capacity to participate in the waged labour market.   
Barnaby Rudge and Willie Dixon are known in their communities and enjoy a 
degree of acceptance and support that many have struggled to attain since the institution 
was established as the dominant response to mental disability.  Not surprisingly, the more 
directly involved that the mentally disabled character is in the life of the community, the 
more he or she engages with other characters who contribute additional dimension to their 
life story.  Dickens‘ Barnaby Rudge is the most complex character considered in the 
Establishment literary sample because he is an active member of his community and can 
communicate a self-narrative that is proud rather than pathetic.   
This ability to contribute a self-narrative is an important distinction that sets 
Dickens‘ idiot apart from Brontë‘s Bertha Rochester and Gaskell‘s Willie Dixon who are 
comparatively under-developed characters.  The inability to speak for themselves leaves 
Bertha Rochester and Willie Dixon isolated and vulnerable to having their personal 
stories misrepresented by others who have a vested interest in their own versions of the 
lunatic‘s or the idiot‘s life story.   
The isolation experienced by Bertha Rochester in Jane Eyre leaves her 
particularly vulnerable and unable to produce a life narrative to counter the one given by 
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her husband and jailor.  Because no one even knows of her existence, there is no one to 
advocate on her behalf.  The only character in a position to challenge Rochester‘s version 
of his wife‘s life-story is her brother Mason who tries to maintain an interest in his sister‘s 
well-being.  However, by drawing his character as weak and susceptible to the same 
genetic taint that is perceived as responsible for Bertha‘s madness, Mason‘s advocacy for 
his sister has very little influence.  Bertha Rochester‘s extreme marginalization speaks to 
the isolation of many people with mental disabilities who are dependent and vulnerable to 
abuse and exploitation at the hands of caregivers as well as strangers.   
 Each of the disabled characters from the Establishment novels epitomizes the 
moral model for constructing disability.  The mental deficiencies of Barnaby Rudge and 
Bertha Rochester are both attributed to the sins of their parents.  Even though Willie 
Dixon is not marked by the sins of morally degenerate bloodlines, he still is closely linked 
to a pastoral tradition that constructs the idiot as a child of nature and an eternal innocent 
who has the right to make claims upon the goodwill of the community.   
Brontë‘s Bertha Rochester is portrayed as more depraved and morally 
reprehensible than either Dickens‘ Barnaby Rudge, or Gaskell‘s Willie Dixon.  Even 
though the lunatic tends to be portrayed less sympathetically than the idiot, they tended to 
receive better institutional care.  The institutional plan in Ontario was designed to 
separate the lunatics from the idiots, as the former were perceived to have some potential 
for cure and reintegration into society.  Dr. Charles Duncombe chaired a committee 
whose report resulted in the 1839 Act to establish Upper Canada‘s first lunatic asylum.  
Historical analysis finds that  
         if the Upper Canadian policy-makers thought at all about mental retardation, they  
         probably shared the conventional view that idiots were basically incurable.  Since  
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         contemporary lunacy policy was directed toward curing the insane, it is easy to  
         understand why idiots were excluded from their [the Duncombe committee‘s]  
         report and from the policy that emerged from it. (Simmons 3)   
It was not until the late 1870s that incessant pressure to expand the asylum system, 
together with the growing perception that people with mental disabilities were responsible 
for the major social problems of the time, that the asylum model began to be replaced 
with a custodial system of care.  From this point, ―[m]entally ill and retarded people were 
no longer going to be protected from society, rather, society was to be protected from 
them‖ (Simmons 22).  Although this analysis confines itself to the beginning of the 
Establishment phase of the Cycle, by the turn of the twentieth century a growing eugenics 
movement further accelerated the expansion of the institutional system in Ontario, as well 
as in England, Europe and the United States.  The medicalization of disability eventually 
came to supplant the authority of parents and other informal caregivers, as mental 
disability increasingly became defined as a social scourge that needed to be professionally 
managed within the institution.
 62
   
This approach to planning most closely resembles Barclay Hudson‘s synoptic 
theoretical framework to the extent that it was expert-driven, and designed with the 
stability of the overall social system as paramount, rather than the individual needs of 
mentally disabled people (389).  However, at least in hindsight, any reference to a rational 
framework for disability policy planning at this point in the Cycle is severely undermined 
                                               
62
In his historical overview of Ontario‘s institutional system, Williston found that the ―attitude of staff from 
central office right through to ward staff was, ‗We can take care of the retarded better than their families—
that‘s why they were sent to us… families should release their children to us and not interfere with our 
management.‘‖ (29).  This medical model of disability contributed to further estranging families from 
participating in the lives of institutionalized women and men.     
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by the flawed science and subjectivity that experts relied upon in the diagnosis and 
treatment of idiocy and lunacy at that time.  Despite the absence of consistent, objective 
criteria for diagnosing idiocy and lunacy this theoretical foundation dominated  policy 
planning and the development of the institutional system in Ontario until the Reform 
phase of the Institutional Cycle.      
 
Reform Phase 
 As a de-institutionalization movement gained momentum in the 1960s families 
were turned to again as key sources of support.  Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that 
familial advocacy was key to inspiring political determination to reform the institutional 
system.  This advocacy also provided the Ontario government with moral ground to 
justify a political objective of reducing and eventually relinquishing direct responsibility 
for the care of people with mental disabilities.  Therefore, to the extent that Advocacy 
planning, as defined by Hudson‘s SITAR model (ch. 4) evolved at this time, it cannot 
automatically be assumed that social welfare planners were advocating exclusively in the 
interests of people with mental disabilities.   
 The renewed focus on family and the community as the preferred locations for the 
provision of care also fails to consider how an entrenched medical model for responding 
to mental disability had informed a longstanding policy of segregation and 
professionalization of daily living supports, which had estranged many individuals from 
their families.  A substantial number of people leaving the institution had no intact family 
systems to which to return.  In addition, by the end of this phase of the Cycle the decision 
in Clark v. Clark (1982) challenged the presumption that family members are necessarily 
the best interpreters of another‘s life and its potential.  The fact that when Reform-era 
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novels do depict family systems they are often portrayed as dysfunctional or unequal to 
the task of supporting the mentally disabled character further reinforces this finding.        
 By the time policy-makers became motivated to reform the institutional system, 
novels that criticized the institution also often emphasized the need for asylum from a 
society that is unaccommodating and even intolerant of  diversity and mental difference.  
The Reform-era novel is increasingly considering disability as a category of identity that 
intersects with social class, ethnicity, gender and sexuality.  Rhys, for example, shows  
Antoinette Cosway  as prey to such problems.  Antoinette embraces the convent to escape 
from the persecution that she experiences in her community, and she is subsequently  
reluctant to leave this asylum to assume her prescribed role in society as a matrimonial 
bargaining chip.  A social justice theory of disability influences the storyline of Wide 
Sargasso Sea, as the novel demonstrates how policy founded on patriarchal and 
colonizing traditions contribute to the mental deterioration of Mrs. Rochester and even 
creates the ‗madwoman in the attic‘.   
 In Kesey‘s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, McMurphy is astonished to learn 
that most of his fellow patients are voluntary inmates who prefer the routine persecution 
that they experience on the psychiatric ward to the marginalization and violence they 
encounter in the outside world.  The novel implicitly critiques a medical model of 
disability and, instead, gives credence to an environmental approach that suggests that 
societal attitudes contribute to disabling people by resisting the inclusion of people who 
do not conform to social norms.  Several of the patients in the ward are casualties of 
structural discrimination in society that is shown to break down people who are not white 
and not heterosexual.  The ―therapeutic community‖ is in place to realize the functional 
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theoretical objective of teaching people with mental disabilities to emulate the norms of 
mainstream society so that they may succeed outside of the asylum.  
 Even at the end of the Reform phase, when the community living movement is 
well underway,  some popular fiction continues to presume that people who cannot be 
taught how to live independently in society are better off  in the institution.  Krantz‘s 
Princess Daisy was a best-selling novel in the early 1980s, but the narrative does not even 
consider that a mentally disabled young woman could live more successfully in society 
than in a segregated asylum.  Money determines Danielle Valensky`s security and the 
quality of life she is able to enjoy in a private institutional facility.  Most of the novel‘s 
storyline revolves around the heroine‘s efforts to support and maintain her sister in the 
institution.  Daisy Valensky‘s efforts are portrayed as an act of loving selflessness to 
protect her secret twin from a world that is depicted as obsessed with beauty and glamour.     
 The social critique contained in the Reform novels offers a striking contrast to the 
optimism of Reform policy regarding the capacity of communities to accommodate and 
care for people who would otherwise spend their lives in an institution.  This is apparent  
in Ontario‘s Provincial Secretary for Social Development`s response to Williston`s report 
where Robert Welch asserts that ―[a]s a necessary precondition to a life of normalcy, in 
both institutional and community settings, mentally retarded persons must be encouraged 
and allowed to make their own decisions and determine their own needs, as far as this is 
possible‖ (9 emphasis in original).  Welch believed that society was prepared, in 1973, to 
accommodate the needs and life choices of people who would otherwise live in 
institutional facilities.   
 Williston was more cautious.  In fact, he never called for the complete 
dismantlement of the institutional system.  Instead he recommended that the large 
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institutions be ―phased down as quickly as is feasible‖ (65).  His primary reason for not 
urging outright abolishment was concern about community capacity to accommodate 
people with the most profound intellectual disabilities, as well as the viability of 
community re-integration for those who had already spent many years in an institutional 
environment.  Other reasons for maintaining at least a small scale institutional presence as 
part of a continuum of services and supports for people with mental disabilities emerges 
from an acknowledgment that ―[i]t is too much to expect that a family can indefinitely 
look after a person who can never learn routine habits of daily living‖ (Williston 69).  
While the significant financial savings that would result in closing the institutions 
enhanced the appeal of a community living movement at a political level, this was not 
part of Williston‘s rationale for endorsing a scaled back institutional system.  He further 
adds that the ―furnishing of the basic necessities and support to enable a person to 
function in society must be recognized as a basic human right to be provided at public 
expense and not discharged as a matter of chance or charity‖ (4).  He recognized that 
putting the necessary community supports in place would take time, and that it would also 
take time to educate members of society about the citizenship rights of people with 
mental disabilities.  For these reasons, Reform policy was implemented incrementally to 
maintain stability in the system.  Enhancing community capacity was planned in 
coordination with the gradual erosion of resources dedicated to the institutional system in 
a series of trade-offs and stakeholder negotiations communicated through a rhetoric of 
human rights and community integration. 
 Despite the gradual progression of reform, however, this stage of the Institutional 
Cycle is defined by striking conflict between the rhetoric of Reform policy and the 
dominant representations of disability and society in novels.  This contributed to a degree 
McCauley… 
 
283 
of social confusion and ambivalence about how to include people with mental disabilities 
in mainstream society, which is apparent in the novels and policy discourse in the final 
phase of the Cycle.    
 
Dismantlement Phase 
The conflicting representations of community in Reform novels and policy 
anticipate the uncertain successes of the Dismantlement phase:  the political objective of 
closing down Ontario‘s institutions is accomplished, but there are many people living in 
poverty and without access to a comprehensive range of daily living supports that are 
necessary in order to participate in their communities in meaningful ways.  An 
incremental approach to planning persists, despite policy rhetoric that in recent years has 
promised a ―transformation‖ (Government of Ontario 2006; Parsons 2006) of services for 
people with developmental disabilities.  The transformation being proposed entails a shift 
to more individualized planning and designated resource allocation.  However, to date, 
the overall trend has been in the direction of diminished political commitment that is 
apparent in terms of the erosion of systemic supports, and diminished enforcement of 
high standards of care for vulnerable citizens.  Even the Government of Ontario has 
acknowledged that the necessary spectrum of services and supports are not equally 
accessible in all regions of the Province (2006, 34).
 63
   
                                               
63For example, the North Eastern Mental Health Centre (NEMHC) recently expressed its support of the 
Northeast Ontario Local Health Integration Network‘s (NE-LHIN) decision to relocate 31 long-term 
psychiatric beds from North Bay to Sudbury.  The region contained within the boundaries of the NE-LHIN 
is several hundred kilometres, containing many communities.  In its release, the NEMHC submission 
includes the following recommendation:  ―The North East LHIN should make the quality and effectiveness 
of programs and services the first priority.  Although the delivery of services as close to home as possible is 
an important factor for some patients, it should not be the first priority.‖ (NEMHC para. 11-12)    
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Community integration is dependent upon the provision of resources necessary to 
allow persons with mental disabilities to participate in the life of the community.  
Marginalization is compounded when people continue to experience segregation in 
mainstream society.  Dismantlement novels depict  how issues of segregation that were 
once considered in relation to residential facilities are now debated in schools or day 
programs where the rhetoric of inclusion sometimes co-exists with enduring habits of 
paternalism and discrimination.  For example, in Haddon‘s novel Christopher Boone‘s 
father has to advocate for the opportunity for his son to take university qualification 
exams because the principal does not want to treat him differently from the other students 
in a school dedicated to ‗special needs‘ students.  This speaks to a problem in policy that 
distinguishes people with disabilities from the mainstream population, but fails to 
recognize the diversity of ability and need within a demographic that comprises 4.4 
million Canadians who have some form of disability (Prince 2009).
64
      
Dismantlement novels set in previous phases of the Cycle speak to contemporary 
community living issues that still resonate in a post-institutional era.  In the sample 
considered for this research, Findley portrays the asylum system in Ontario in 1918, and 
Edwards depicts an American institution in 1964.
65
  Yet these novels, together with 
Haddon‘s contemporary story about an autistic boy living in a suburb of London, are 
speaking to contemporary challenges in communities that continue to struggle to facilitate 
the inclusion of all people.  In Findley‘s The Piano Man’s Daughter Lily Kilworth and 
                                               
64 As reported by Statistics Canada, based upon most recent (2006) data.  Ontario‘s Ministry of Community 
and Social Services indicates that ―about one per cent of Ontarians have a developmental disability‖ (3 
August 2010), and that 30-38 per cent of people with mental disabilities also have a ―mental health 
disorder‖ (MOHLTC & MCSSS, 3). 
65 In addition to Findley‘s and Edward‘s novels, other fictional narratives set in Reform or Establishment 
phases of the Cycle include: Hegi, Stones from the River (1994); Rubio, Icy Sparks (1998); Bender, Like 
Normal People (2000); Clark, J.,  An Audience of Chairs (2005).  
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her son are insecurely housed.  They move from rooming houses and hotels because one 
of the symptoms of Lily‘s disability is the recurring compulsion to ―escape‖ from the 
internal voices that persecute her.  The only thing that keeps her from being homeless or 
institutionalized is the financial and personal support that her mother is able to provide.  
When Lily can no longer live safely in the community, and the family‘s financial 
resources have declined,  the institution becomes Lily‘s only residential alternative.  This 
is a storyline that is familiar to many individuals with mental disabilities who are 
languishing in prisons, hospitals and long-term care facilities in Ontario today.     
 The personal challenges associated with moving from family to other supported 
living arrangements is portrayed in Edwards‘ The Memory Keeper’s Daughter.  Caroline 
Gill‘s anxiety for her daughter, Phoebe, as she transitions into adulthood depicts the fears 
that many parents have for their mentally disabled adult children once they want to live 
on their own, or when the time comes that parents are no longer able to provide daily 
living care.  Currently, when this happens often the only option available is long-term 
care facilities for the sick and elderly.  In 2007 the Toronto Star reported that the 
institutional dismantlement process had resulted in 1600 developmentally disabled adults 
being ―moved into Ontario nursing homes with people often twice their age‖ (Crawford 
16 Feb. 07, para. 1).
 66
  Such findings suggest that the elimination of one institutional 
system has only put additional pressure on others, and as communities continue to 
struggle to care for people who require intensive personal supports, the influence of the 
institution lingers.   
                                               
66 The appropriateness of attempting to integrate younger adults into long-term care facilities designed for 
elderly people with dementia and other acquired disabilities was brought under even closer scrutiny  
following the death of Keith Croteau who was killed by his roommate following an altercation over the 
television remote control in February 2007, in Sudbury.  Laura Stradiotto (Feb. 6&7, 2007) reports that the 
assailant and Croteau both had developmental disabilities and were residing in a facility not equipped to 
address with their specific living and personal security needs.   
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 The Institutional history in Ontario has been conceived here as a Cycle that begins 
with the Establishment of the first Provincial Lunatic Asylum in Upper Canada, in 1839, 
and concludes with the closure of the province‘s final institutions in 2009.  However, it is 
perhaps more accurately conceived as a spiral.  Representations of mental disability in 
policy and literature are more informed and complex than they were at the outset of the 
Cycle.  Certainly, many positive changes have evolved over the course of the Institutional 
Cycle in terms of society‘s understanding of the human rights of all citizens, including 
people with mental disabilities.  Canada has some of the most comprehensive human 
rights legislation in the world that specifically identifies people with disabilities as a 
population whose citizenship claims must be assured.  Rioux and Frazee conclude that  
          [t]here is, perhaps, some cause for optimism as the Canadian human rights and  
          disability rights perspectives continue to mature and as litigation strategies build  
          upon our Supreme Court‘s growing recognition of the nature and extent of  
          disadvantage experienced by disabled persons, and of the imperatives of inclusion, 
          autonomy and human dignity. 
          The goals of justice, equality and diversity are inextricably linked and  
          strongly resonant in the recurring themes of Canadian disability law. (185-186) 
A social justice theory of disability argues that people are disabled by policy that 
discriminates against marginalized groups.  However, rights in theory are meaningless if 
they are not enforced, and if the resources required to realize citizenship rights are not 
accessible (Goar, 29 May 09).  This discourse analysis of texts that represent the rights 
and the stories of people with mental disabilities finds that the realization of citizenship 
claims has not been a linear process; and that gains, once achieved, are not assured over 
the long term.   
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Chapter 10- Limitations 
 
 There are several limitations to this research project that suggest opportunities for 
further inquiry.  These limitations pertain to: conceptual limitations of the Institutional 
Cycle framework; limited analysis of other theoretical models that have influenced the 
representation of people with mental disabilities, particularly a medical model of 
disability theory, which has been dominant over most of the course of the Cycle; and 
limited representation of the diverse population who have disabilities that limit or 
preclude the ability to speak for themselves.   
 The decision to confine the analysis, in the Establishment phase, to novels and 
policy produced close to the inception of Upper Canada‘s first lunatic asylum, in 1839, 
excludes a number of significant texts for consideration.  While the timeline for the 
Establishment phase reflects the course of the institutional system‘s long period of 
expansion, the reasons for this expansion changed over time.  Ontario‘s first provincial 
lunatic asylum was established as a residual welfare policy of last resort.  However, over 
time an increasingly dominant medical model of understanding disability invigorated the 
expansion of this system.  By the turn of the century, an evolving eugenics movement 
contributed to a notion of a scourge, or  
          fear that mentally retarded persons would soon overpopulate the land.  It was  
          repeatedly stated that the great majority of the feeble-minded came from family 
          stock that transmitted feeble-mindedness from generation to generation.  Some  
          even contended that feeble-mindedness was an important factor as a cause of  
          juvenile delinquency, adult crime, sexual immorality, prostitution, the spread of  
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          venereal disease, illegitimacy, vagrancy, and almost every other form of social evil  
          or disease.  It was widely believed that every intellectually impaired person was  
          likely a delinquent and that most criminal offenders had an intellectual impairment.  
          (Williston 23-24)   
Further research into dominant literary and policy discourses from 1900-1960 could 
introduce an additional phase of ―Expansion‖ or ―Entrenchment‖ into the existing Cycle.   
 The policy and literary discourses that comprise the sample do not address the 
positive ways that a medical model of disability has contributed to enhanced life 
opportunities for some people with severe mental disabilities.  Indeed, it is noteworthy 
that, apart from Kesey‘s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, this dimension of mental 
disability is largely ignored in the sample.  The role of medication and other therapeutic 
interventions has been a contentious issue for many disability scholars and advocates who 
perceive the medical model of disability as primarily a negative framework for 
understanding disability in terms of its focus on individual impairment and deficiency.  
However others, such as Oliver Sacks and Margaret Somerville, speak to ways that 
medical science may make a wider spectrum of living options feasible for some people 
when this knowledge is used to advance individual choice in a society that values all 
human beings.         
 Regarding the validity of the data sample, it is important to acknowledge that  
novels can only be one more secondary source to access in bridging the gulf between the 
individual‘s self-narrative and the one that is reconstructed from a range of other sources, 
including the expertise of policy planners, medical professionals, and family members.  
Appealing to novels, or literature generally, does not solve the problem of speaking for 
others.  However, novels are useful to policy planners and other social workers for 
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bringing ―potentially universalizable concrete prescriptions‖ (Nussbaum 8) to bear on 
specific situations.  This research shows that literary fictions dealing with mental 
disability can be a valuable resource for informing planning with for people with mental 
disabilities by depicting how abstract policy objectives impact personal life narratives, 
and by representing a wider spectrum of ability and oppression experienced by people 
with mental disabilities than is typically perceived by the reading public.   
 Even when people with mental disabilities are able to communicate their life-
stories in a coherent and reliable fashion, this is not a homogenous population who share 
identical experiences and aspirations.  In addition, while this research has aspired to 
examine stories about people who have mental disabilities that compromise their ability 
to speak for themselves, it needs to be noted that in most of the novels considered for  
analysis the characters have communicative abilities that far exceed those of many people 
with severe disabilities.  Almost all of the characters have some facility in language, or at 
least caregivers who know them intimately and try hard to advocate for their best 
interests.  In reality, many people with complex mental disabilities have few personal 
resources.  Ongoing analysis of diverse perspectives contained in fiction and nonfiction 
narratives, together with archival research of legislation, commissioned reports, program 
reviews, media reports, journalism, and personal papers that fall outside the parameters of 
this current research will continue to enrich the integrity of these initial findings.   
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Chapter 11- Recommendations 
 
How May an Interdisciplinary Analysis of Literary and Policy Discourses Inform 
 Policy  Planning and the Provision of Services for People with Mental 
 Disabilities in Ontario?  
 At the beginning of a post-institutional era the findings of this interdisciplinary 
research reflect upon the dominant planning assumptions and storylines that have defined 
the phases of the Institutional Cycle.  This research has looked to the past to better 
understand the life stories of people with mental disabilities today, and the following 
conclusions identify policy priorities for the future that draw from the learning that the 
Institutional Cycle has to offer.  The following recommendations address those locations 
of intervention that have been found to most directly influence the life stories of people 
with mental disabilities:  family, community, and policy systems.   
 
Family Supports 
In the novels considered in this research, across all phases of the Institutional 
Cycle, all of the characters who succeed in society have substantial family supports to 
draw upon.  To varying degrees, the novels also depict the personal toll that caregiving 
takes on family members, especially in the absence of structural supports.  It has taken a 
long time for policy makers to acknowledge Williston‘s observation that ―[t]he presence 
of a mentally retarded person can cause great strain on the family as a whole.  The 
families which care for the mentally retarded are heavily penalized both materially and in 
their social life… Social isolation and rejection may ensue as a result of the reduction in 
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social contact‖ (71).  Contemporary novels critique Dismantlement policy in storylines 
that depict how the responsibility of care for children with complex disabilities competes 
with the other roles, duties and dreams of caregivers.  The caregivers, in turn, may 
become so exhausted and isolated that they become estranged from the very communities 
that they are trying to access for their children.  Resources need to be made available to 
significantly enhance the amount and the range of supports available for families trying to 
support relatives with mental disabilities.         
There is overwhelming evidence that families require more comprehensive 
supports to fulfill the caregiving roles that current social policy assumptions depend upon.  
As the Dismantlement phase has progressed the Ministry of Community and Social 
Services has increasingly emphasized policy that promotes system sustainability through 
personalized planning to facilitate ―better management of funding pressures‖ 
(Government of Ontario, 2006, 12).  However, Pedlar and Hutchison point out that one of 
the risks associated with personalized planning is the commodification of care that 
promotes  
          [p]rivatization, contracting, negotiating… [These] are signs of restructuring of   
          human services that are driven by a competitive, business ethic, rather than a  
          human rights and community ethic.  In this climate, disability becomes a  
          commodity, as agencies determine the value of servicing the individual and  
          establish whether or not sufficient dollars will accrue in committing to serve the  
          person.  (645) 
If the government of Ontario is going pursue an agenda of individualized planning for 
people with mental disabilities, then supports should realistically meet the needs of the 
individual.   
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 Currently, the bureaucratic labyrinth that families must navigate to obtain 
resources is discouraging, and often only adds to the demands associated with care-
giving.  Ian Brown explains that, in Ontario,  
          [t]here are some tax deductions available, but both Johanna and I work, so our  
          income is generally too high for us to be eligible, we discover after we fill out the  
          schedules.  There are programs to cover the costs of assistive devices, but they  
          require mountains of paperwork, not to mention background checks:  the  
          government seems to think I might have reason to scam a netted bed and an IV  
          stand.  Just what I always wanted!  In any event one of us ought to fill out these  
          forms—but both of us are working and looking after Walker full-time.  When we  
          both begin to freelance, to give ourselves more flexible hours, the forms do get  
          filled out—Johanna spends four hours a week on paperwork—but we make less  
          money, whereupon we can apply for those tax deductions. (86) 
Another integral part of a personalized planning approach encourages parents to make 
long-term investments for the care of disabled children through trusts and disability 
savings plans (DSP) to finance ongoing daily living support throughout the lives of their 
adult children (Government of Ontario, 2006, 27).  Yet again, the onus is being placed on 
families to assume lifelong responsibility for children or siblings who will never be able 
to care for themselves.  Tax breaks may be helpful for some, but given how much of the 
general population cannot afford to contribute to a retirement savings plan (RSP), a DSP 
is not going to be a viable long-term security option for many.   
 In addition, respite services should be made accessible and affordable for family 
caregivers on a regular basis.  Currently, home-care agencies offer predominantly low-
paid, contract employment, and turnover is common (Brown 85-86).  Access to qualified 
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developmental service workers, who are employed  full-time through local Community 
Care Access Centres might reduce demand for the scarce residential spaces available for 
people with complex needs.  Furthermore, paying these professionals a wage that reflects 
the responsibility attached to their work
67
 is still a cheaper alternative to supporting 
people in long-term care facilities and group homes that continue to segregate people with 
mental disabilities on the margins of communities.  Introducing respite care as a stable 
and consistent feature of community living would allow individuals with severe mental 
disabilities and their families to build rapport with qualified caregivers and approach a 
better balance between caregiving and other roles and responsibilities that people pursue 
to realize personal fulfillment.   
In recent years, the provincial government has taken pains to demonstrate how 
their planning for people with mental disabilities has been informed by consultation with 
families.  Unfortunately, over the course of stakeholder consultations in the 
Dismantlement phase, Parsons found that there ―appears to be a perception by some 
parents that the government possesses unlimited funding for supports.  Indeed, a 
significant number expressed the belief that ‗we have cared for our children for years, 
saving the government millions, and now it‘s the government‘s turn to pay us back‘‖ (13).  
In fact many familial caregivers feel that they have been poorly supported in terms of 
meeting the financial and personal costs of caring for relatives with complex disabilities.  
                                               
67 A Toronto agency advertised the following job description for a personal support worker (PSW), the 
lowest professional qualification for caregiving work:  ―Provide personal care services and ensure that 
clients are emotionally, spiritually and physically comfort [sic.] and safety of clients are met to the greatest 
possible extent; provide personal care including skin care, hair care, bathing, bowel and bladder care, 
positioning and movement, exercise, basic wound care, feeding including special diets, and assistance with 
medication administration and oxygen; perform specialized, client specific procedures for which recognized 
training and current competency can be demonstrated; observe and document client conditions according to 
company standards; monitor and report unusual changes in client condition…; understand and implement 
infection prevention practices.‖ (working.com, 9 July 2008).   
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As Hudson defines a transactive approach to planning, the process must entail a 
commitment to mutual learning, and a willingness to work for the objectives that 
constituents identify (389).  Too often, however, consultation amounts to recording an 
inventory of unmet needs that government concedes are important, but not economically 
feasible.  When families are too overwhelmed by their responsibilities to advocate for 
people who cannot advocate for themselves, social workers have a role to play in working 
to make these individuals and families visible in their communities and to make their 
stories known.      
Currently many families are trying to coordinate fragmented community services 
and committing themselves to constantly being on-call.  Crisis management becomes a 
way of life.  In a Globe and Mail feature, published in the same year that Ontario closed 
its last  institutions, John Allemang reports on the life and death of Alexandra Smith: a 
woman diagnosed with severe learning and mental disabilities, who never successfully 
found her place in the community.  Allemang learned the story of Alexandra‘s life 
through interviews with her immediate family, who were also her care network and found 
that   
          [w]e‘ve let the mentally ill out of their institutions, because it‘s seen as the humane 
          thing to do, or because it saves money, or because it scores a political point.  But a  
          family‘s perspective when one among them is mentally ill is different:  Their  
          compassion for these lost souls—or failing that, their responsibility to foresee the  
          worst—is obligatory, whether they like it or not. (2009, F1)   
Policy-makers continue to insist that they recognize how ―[c]aring for an individual with 
a developmental disability can be exhausting, placing unreasonable strain on relationships 
within families‖ (Parsons 9), and that ―families often need help‖ (Government of Ontario, 
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2006, 17).  Still, for many families the help that is available is woefully inadequate to 
their needs.   
    
The Community Institution 
There are at least two major assumptions associated with the concept of de-
institutionalization that need to be interrogated.  First, it is important to determine if 
people are living better lives in the community than they did in institutional facilities.  
The second assumption that social workers and other advocates need to reflect upon is the 
belief that all people want to integrate into mainstream society.   
Most people with severe mental disabilities cannot afford the costs of 
comprehensive daily living supports, and those people who do not have access to trust 
funds, Disability Savings Accounts or other personal insurance provisions are almost 
certain to be poor.  Poverty marginalizes people from mainstream society, and it 
compromises both health and self-esteem.  When the benefits of community integration 
are discussed, the ways that poverty contributes to social exclusion and compounds 
disability are not adequately considered.  Without money, a person‘s sphere of activity is 
inevitably small.  Twenty-two years after the publication of the Challenges and 
Opportunities planning vision, John Allemang published the life story of a young woman 
whom her mother described as ―‗terribly angry… She just hates the way she is.  We have 
this idea that people like this can live in the community, but what is her community?  She 
doesn‘t leave her room except to get coffee and cigarettes‘‖ (Allemang F6).  Alexandra‘s 
life-story, as given by those who knew her, demonstrates that physical relocation from 
institution to an apartment does not satisfy the objectives of community living.    
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It is hard to visit some behavioural group home residences and not wonder how 
the structure and the regimen of these ―homes‖ differ from typical descriptions of 
institutional life, except perhaps in scale.  Indeed, contemporary research finds that  
          [r]elocation to community-based services is not sufficient to overcome isolation:   
          services and residents also need contact and interaction with outsiders….  Where  
          individuals have little contact with family, friends or advocates, are in out-of-area  
          placements or receive all their support within a single service, they are isolated  
          from the support and vigilance of others and standards of care receive little  
          monitoring, increasing the risk of abuse and of abuse remaining undetected. 
          (White, Holland, Marsland & Oakes, 7)   
When planning documents describe ―[p]ermanent accommodation for adults with 
persistent high-risk behaviour who require ongoing specialized support… a safe, secure, 
therapeutic, long-term home‖ (Government of Ontario, 2006, 26), how is this different 
from the institutional facilities that have just been officially decommissioned?  
 The Developmental Services Act was the legislation that governed the operation 
of nonprofit supported living facilities until it was replaced in 2008 by the Services and 
Supports to Promote the Social Inclusion of Persons with Developmental Disabilities 
Act.
68
  Part V of the Developmental Services Act delineated ―Rules Governing 
Facilities‖.  These rules set minimum standards for maintenance, staff training, and 
regular inspections in order to ensure that ―adequate supervision is provided at all times 
for the security of the residents and the facility‖ (V.11n).    
 Today, ―[m]inistry-funded homes for adults with a developmental disability are 
not licensed by the province… each provider of residential services must complete a 
                                               
68 This legislation is being phased in and has not yet been fully implemented.   
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checklist of requirements focused on the personal health and safety of people living in 
ministry-funded homes‖ (Government of Ontario, 2006, 29).  However, the question of 
enforcement of standards is not clearly addressed in the most recent legislation.  The new 
legislation is less specific in defining criteria for standards of care in supported living 
facilities.  Part VI of the new Act addresses ―Rules Governing Services Agencies‖, but 
these do not legislate a specific set of resident rights, or a regular reporting protocol, only 
that a ―service agency shall, (a) make a report to the Minister whenever the Minister 
requests it, in the form and containing the information specified by the Minister, and (b) 
comply with such other requirements as may be prescribed‖ (VI-25).  To date such 
protocols have yet to be prescribed.  The Ministry of Community and Social Services did 
acknowledge in its consultations about the new legislation that the developmental 
services sector has not had to operate under the same rigorous standards as residential 
facilities for children and seniors.
 69
   Parsons pledges that as the government ―moves 
forward with the transformation of the developmental service sector consideration must 
be given to developing a regulatory and legislative framework to ensure that clients are 
getting the services they require to improve their quality of life in the community.  There 
is currently a lack of regulation regarding these operations‖ (Parsons 12).  The 
implications of this ―lack of regulation‖ are worth dwelling upon.   
                                               
69 Trish Crawford (3 April 2009) reports that resident deaths that occurred in provincially-run facilities 
triggered a mandatory investigation, but this is not necessarily the case in community facilities where 
serious injury and even death are at least perceived as being more easily attributed to natural causes.  
Specifically, Crawford is reporting on the case of June Elliot who died in a residential group home 
following her transfer from the Huronia facility, where she had lived for thirty-five years.  Crawford reports 
that ―intellectually disabled adults in group homes do not have the same protection—such as regulated 
staffing, nutrition and hours of care—as the elderly in nursing homes or children in day care‖ (A4).  The 
article further reports that in the first four months of 2009 there had been 53 deaths in group homes:  most, 
according to MCSS, as a result of natural causes, although no breakdown is given, citing privacy concerns.   
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In his analysis of contemporary disability policy planning, Michael Prince points 
to how the community living movement continues to call for the closure of institutions in 
Canadian jurisdictions where they still exist (186) despite case evidence that indicates that 
many people are not only unhappy, they are unsafe in environments where they cannot 
count on access to round-the-clock care and life planning.  However, stories of 
intimidation, exploitation and abuse are reported on sporadically, and often not at all.          
 Allemang‘s report on the life and death of Alexandra Smith is just one example from a 
file that is thick with news articles collected over the course of this research:  People 
living in hospitals and nursing homes because an appropriate supported living space just 
doesn‘t exist for them (Crawford 16 Feb 2007; ―A Hospital is Not a Home‖ 25 Aug 2008; 
―Time to Address Needs of Disabled...‖ 19 Feb 2009); people suffering and dying from 
neglect and other forms of maltreatment at the hands of family members not equipped to 
support their daily living needs (Mitchell, 13 Oct 2007, A11;  Mitchell 20 June 2008; 
Russell AA7).  Sometimes people die as a result of living in a long-term care facility for 
the elderly that does not have a mandate or the staffing to meet the needs of people with 
distinct mental health needs (Crawford 3 April 2009, A4; Stradiotto 6 Feb 2007, 7 Feb 
2007).  People have died in conflict with the police when crisis-intervention services have 
not been coordinated and enabled to intervene in time (Morrow 9 Oct 10).  There are 
people stranded in hospital emergency rooms with nowhere else to go because their group 
home won‘t take them back (―System Fails Man Left in City‘s ER…‖ 1 Dec 2007); 
people languishing in jails because other secure, supported living options do not exist 
(Adams A11; Crawford 14 April 2008; ―Death by ‗Therapeutic Quiet‘‖ A20; Picard L1, 
L4; Walton A8); and there are people living ―independently‖ in the community who are 
easy prey for others to abuse and exploit (Friesen A1, A4; Morse 20 Feb 2009).   The 
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stories of people with limited or no ability to directly influence their living conditions in 
should be very important to social workers and all citizens.  The Institutional Cycle 
demonstrates that policy change tends to occur in response to an individual tragedy that 
raises community awareness, and subsequently reveals systemic crises.  Vulnerable 
people living in private homes, small apartments and rooming houses, or in small 
nonprofit agencies trying to optimize the quality of life for residents with very complex 
needs on very tight budgets easily become invisible.   How is the care of vulnerable 
people regulated in far flung communities with inconsistent access to specialized services 
and supports necessary to support the daily living needs of all?   
Given the diversity of need and the demonstrated limitations of policy and 
community capacity, planners need to consider whether the ambitions and social norms of 
mainstream society are being imposed upon people who may aspire to something else.  At 
the outset of the Dismantlement phase, the Opportunities and Action Initiative articulated 
a vision of  ―fairness and equity‖ for people with developmental disabilities that will 
―[c]reate opportunities in everyday life that are the same, or as close to as possible, to 
norms and patterns that are valued in the general mainstream society‖ (Government of 
Ontario, 2006, 15).  Such an objective assumes that all people aspire to replicate the 
―norms and patterns that are valued in mainstream society‖.  It is the rhetoric of a policy 
of normalization and assimilation that is reminiscent of the Combine in Kesey‘s, One 
Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest.   
In the drive to make community integration possible for people with all kinds of 
mental disabilities planners may be labouring under the false assumption that everyone 
wants to be a part of the kind of society that is being made available to them.  In The 
Piano Man’s Daughter, Findley portrays a heroine who disappears periodically to escape 
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a world that confuses and hurts her:  ―The first time Lily escaped, she was gone no more 
than a minute before it occurred to her that, going into hiding, she had found a way to rid 
the world of others—and to claim it for herself‖ (Findley 109).  Near the end of Haddon‘s 
The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-time, Christopher Boone describes a 
recurring dream about living in a world where most of the population has been killed off 
by a computer virus: 
          And eventually there is no one left in the world except people who don‘t look at  
          other people‘s faces… and these people are all special people like me.  And they 
          like being on their own and I hardly ever see them because they are like okapi in  
          the jungle in the Congo, which are a kind of antelope and very shy and rare.   
         And I can go anywhere in the world and I know that no one is going to talk 
          to me or touch me or ask me a question. (Haddon 198-199) 
Christopher‘s dream world is one where he is almost entirely alone and able to move 
wherever he wants to go, free from the stress that human contact poses for him.   
 Such passages give pause and invite one to reconsider whose needs are the 
policies of Dismantlement prioritizing.  Ian Brown also has a dream of a society that he 
envisions for his son, Walker:   
          In my fantasy, Walker and people like him live in a L‘Arche-like community, with  
          the help of assistants.  It‘s a beautiful place, in a beautiful spot, with a view of the  
          sea or the mountains, because for once, in this place, it isn‘t just those who can  
          afford them who have access to the best views, but people who might need beauty  
          even more, because they live with so much less.  In my fantasy, this village is  
          owned and inhabited by the disabled, on their schedule, at their pace, according to  
          their standards of what is successful—not money or results, but friendship, and  
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          fellow feeling, and companionship.  In my fantasy, it is the rest of us, the normals,  
          who have to be ―integrated‖ into their society, who have to adapt to their pace and  
          their place. (Brown 270-271; emphasis in original)       
Brown sees this fantasy-community as a place where people like him can go to live for 
weeks, or months at a time; bring their work or their research and just allow themselves to 
learn from people whose work is to just be in the world and remind the rest of us about 
the fundamentals of being human.  Christopher Boone and Ian Brown talk about 
community in ways that take the emphasis off integrating people with mental disabilities 
into environments that just cannot accommodate them.  
Allemang concludes his story about the life and death of Alexandra Smith by 
deciding that ―for someone whose violent tendencies were enhanced by an inability to 
sense the subtle details of daily life, independence finally became a burden‖ (F6).  It is 
unclear how many are struggling in circumstances similar to Alexandra‘s where, in the 
words of her father, ―‗[w]e say it‘s good for her to be in the community.  But the 
community damn well doesn‘t want her‘‖ (Allemang F7).  It is clear that the claims of the 
Challenges and Opportunities Initiative that ushered in the Dismantlement phase were 
premature.  It was not true in 1987 that the ―efforts of government, community agencies, 
developmentally handicapped people and their families have proven that all can work 
together towards realization of the dream of full participation of all developmentally 
handicapped citizens in Ontario‖ (Government of Ontario, 9).  Instead, today many 
people are segregated in group homes and rooming houses without adequate resources 
McCauley… 
 
302 
and other supports to actively participate in the community on a regular basis.  Many 
others are unable to claim even that much space in society.
70
   
Brown suggests that living in a segregated environment, at least part-time, offers a 
better environment for his son to develop his personal confidence than the wider 
community can provide.  From his journal notes documenting his son‘s transition to 
residential care, Brown observes how ―it’s his emotional confidence that’s leaping 
forward.  Living only in our world, I’m sure, he saw his limitations everywhere.  In his 
new vacation home, as I think of it, surrounded by his peers, he’s as solid as anyone.  I 
hope that is the gift we gave him by giving him up” (109).  It is notable how Brown 
avoids using the typical language of residential care, preferring to think of his son‘s new 
place as a ―vacation home.‖  Given the notorious legacy of the institution, it not 
surprising that any model of long-term residential care is difficult for many people to 
contemplate as a positive care option for some people.   
However, de-institutionalization outcomes should prompt planners to revisit the 
findings of the report that policy makers have continued to invoke to justify the 
elimination of the institutional option.  Williston believed that limits should be placed on 
freedom in the interests of personal security.  He recommended a spectrum of supported 
housing options ranging from group homes, to specialized foster care, half-way or 
transition housing, and long-term care facilities (75-80) that collectively provide a better 
range of community living options and personal supports to meet individual needs than 
are currently available in most communities.  Getting beyond an either/or dichotomy of 
                                               
70 Among the recommendations of the coroner‘s inquest examining the circumstances leading to the death 
of Byron Debassige who was shot in a confrontation with police, on Feb. 16, 2008, ―were that the province 
[of Ontario] should assess the need for more supportive housing for those with mental illnesses and 
addictions, [and] fund more psychiatric care in the community…‖ (Morrow A24) 
McCauley… 
 
303 
institution or no institution is the first step to transforming services for people with mental 
disabilities in a meaningful way.  Recognizing that residential care does not need to 
resemble the institutional model that was abandoned for very good reasons is the next 
step.  Realizing that the future does not need to look like the past takes planning further 
down a road of personalized supports that are flexible enough to offer community living 
and personal security.   
 
Policy Coordination and Standards of Care 
 The literary sample considered for this research rarely challenges specific policies 
directly.  However, the nine primary literary sources, along with several other novels that 
reinforce dominant narrative themes, collectively depict the lack of coordination of 
services and inconsistency in programming and resources across jurisdictions.  In March 
2010 Canada ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, yet currently there are no national standards of care or inclusion for people 
with mental disabilities in Canada.  In 1998 the federal and provincial governments 
(excluding Quebec) collaborated on the In Unison accord, which attempted to re-assert 
the citizen rights of people with disabilities in Canada that were already enshrined in the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and provincial human rights legislation.  While some 
disability theorists point to the limitations of the Accord in terms of how it defines 
disability as a problem to be solved (Michalko 146-148; Titchkosky 49-63), others saw it 
as a foundation upon which to build a Federal Disability Act to set national standards for 
daily-living supports for Canadians with mental and physical disabilities.
71
  However, this 
                                               
71 See The Canadian Council of Disabilities.  ―A Federal Disabilities Act: Opportunities and Challenges‖.  
(2006) http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/socialpolicy/fda/1006#background  
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initiative ultimately has not translated into any meaningful coordination of policy 
between the federal government and provincial jurisdictions.   
 That being said, the existence of national standards has not meant more consistent 
and comprehensive services for people whose disability is defined in terms of mental 
illness either.  The recent coroner‘s inquest into the death of Byron Debassige concluded 
that ―Ontario must do a better job of sharing records on mentally ill people between 
agencies and create a single organization to coordinate all mental health and addiction 
services‖ (Morrow A24).  The Canada Health Act defines criteria to which all provincial 
health insurance plans must adhere.
72
  However, the Kirby Commission found that the 
coordination of mental health policy in this country is just as complicated and confused as 
the ad hoc system of services for people with mental disabilities, across provincial 
jurisdictions.  The Commission‘s detailed report found that the mental health system in 
this country continues to be mired in ―‗confusion, misdirection and discrimination‘‖ 
(Kirby xvii).  This confusion is further compounded by the fact that the distinction 
between mental illness and disability, as well as eligibility for services, continue to be 
inconsistent across and within jurisdictions.     
 Given that social policy design and service delivery is primarily a provincial 
responsibility, perhaps working from the bottom up is the most effective approach to 
establishing a comprehensive and consistent national system of community living 
supports.  Improving coordination of inter-ministerial mandates at the provincial level has 
been contemplated in the past, but to little affect.  In 1971 Williston commented upon the 
                                               
72 ―In order that a province may qualify for a cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a fiscal year, the 
health care insurance plan of the province must, throughout the fiscal year, satisfy the criteria described in 
sections 8 to 12 respecting the following matters: (a) public administration; (b) comprehensiveness; (c) 
universality; (d) portability; and (e) accessibility.‖ (Canada Health Act, Sec. 7) 
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inefficient coordination of planning between ministries responsible for promoting the care 
and social inclusion of people with mental disabilities:   
          The effectiveness of Government policy-making and its implementation as it  
          affects handicapped persons is seriously impeded by the number of Departments  
          and Branches which are independently trying to deal with one overall situation.   
          This division of responsibility has had a deleterious effect upon policy, the use of  
          resources, public accessibility, accountability, and co-ordination. (90) 
In his report, written two years later, Welch acknowledged that effective delivery of 
services for people with mental disabilities required the coordination of no fewer than six 
ministries (6).  However, he also suggested that there are limits to the extent that 
streamlined planning for disability services and supports could be achieved: 
          the Government of Ontario is currently structured to provide services by ministries  
          organized according to function.  The need to coordinate functional services to  
          meet the needs of various groups, including the mentally retarded, was one of the  
          reasons for the reorganization of government into policy fields.  An alternative  
          organization into ministries serving client groups begs a more difficult task of  
          coordination of function.  Creation of a ministry for the handicapped would, in  
          itself, be a form of institutionalization segregating handicapped residents from  
          other citizens of Ontario. (19)       
At federal and provincial levels of jurisdiction, government ministries have been 
dedicated to promoting the interests of designated populations, including Aboriginal 
peoples, children, women, veterans.  Therefore, dedicating a ministry to the 
administration of policy for people with disabilities does not have to be problematic, 
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especially if it results in a more streamlined bureaucracy for people who currently access 
mental-health and disability supports.     
 At the beginning of the Dismantlement phase, the Ministry of Community and 
Social Services acknowledged that communities had  ―not yet provided sufficient 
resources to meet the service requirements of:  people with both developmental and 
psychiatric handicaps who require services from both the health and social welfare 
systems; [and] medically fragile children and adults with multiple disabilities‖ 
(Government of Ontario, 1987, 21).  Given the enduring confusion around distinguishing 
between mental illness and disability, coordinating policy just within the two ministries 
with primary responsibility for these populations-  the Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care and the Ministry of Community and Social Services-  could better serve the 
substantial population of people with dual diagnoses, and make more efficient use of 
finite resources.  To that end, in 2006 the Ministry of Community and Social Services did 
propose addressing the issue of policy coordination in Ontario through  
          a strategy to promote cross-sector planning, service partnerships and learning by 
          developing a protocol with the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care.  The  
          strategy is intended to clarify expectations, roles, responsibilities and decision- 
          making for transition planning.  The purpose of the strategy is also to provide more  
          consistency in how the policies are applied with regard to meeting the needs of  
          people with a dual diagnosis (i.e. people with both a developmental disability and a  
          mental health problem) and older individuals with a developmental disability who  
          are moving to long-term care.  (Government of Ontario, 2006, 25)   
In 2008, the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC) and the Ministry of 
Community and Social Services (MCSS) did update an existing ―Joint Policy Guideline 
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for the Provision of Community Mental Health and Developmental Services for Adults 
with a Dual Diagnosis‖.  However, as this is a ―guideline‖ rather than an enforceable 
policy, a Vision where ―[c]ommunity mental health and developmental services for 
persons with a dual diagnosis and their families will be integrated, coordinated and 
operate responsively and proactively both within and across sectors‖(1) is essentially 
aspirational.   
 Still, there are recent examples of inter-ministerial collaboration to realize the 
objective of making communities more accessible for people with physical and mental 
disabilities.  The Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005 (AODA) is 
administered by the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration (I.2e).  Under the auspices 
of this Ministry, services and agencies across ministerial jurisdictions seem to be coming 
together effectively to realize ambitious accessibility targets that must be met by all 
persons or organizations that ―(a) provides goods, services or facilities; (b) employs 
persons in Ontario; (c) offers accommodation; (d) owns or occupies a building, structure 
or premises; or (e) is engaged in a prescribed business, activity or undertaking to meet 
such other requirements as may be prescribed‖ (Sec. 3).  What sets the AODA apart from 
most disability policy is that it seems to consistently set the needs of people with 
disabilities as paramount over what is perceived to be feasible on the part of other 
stakeholders.  In an era where social welfare provisions have been eroded
73
 and the 
                                               
73 A recent editorial in the Toronto Star suggests that current economic priorities undermines the Ontario 
government‘s rhetorical commitment to community inclusion:  ―it is troubling to learn that in its 2010 
budget, brought down in March, Ontario cut $22 million that had been expected by some 380 organizations 
supporting people with developmental disabilities… The government knows the difficulties Community 
Living groups and other service providers face just keeping existing programs going, let alone expanding 
them to reduce the lengthy waiting lists.  Indeed, while freezing the providers‘ base budgets, the 
government found $20 million to continue development of  ―transformation‖ plans.  But it makes little 
sense to fund planning for a fairer and more sustainable system in the future while throwing the same 
organizations into a budgetary crisis today.  If the government does not restore the $22 million in funding, 
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commodification of services for people with mental disabilities has increased (Pedlar & 
Hutchison 642-645), policy that re-affirms the rights of all citizens to access and 
participate in their communities is vital to the realization of interesting and rewarding life 
outcomes.   
                                                                                                                                            
some organizations will be forced to cut off vital services and lay off staff.  …And the situation threatens to 
get worse, as a majority of those with developmental disabilities on the wait lists have parents over the age 
of 70. (Unkind Cut for the Disabled, para. 2-4, 6)   
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Conclusion 
 
 Policy planners interpret life narratives to construct a rationale for policy.  Then 
new stories demonstrate how policy plays itself out in individual lives.  It is a cycle unto 
itself.  Of course, dominant policy narratives cannot speak to each individual life story.  
Therefore, policy designed to support people with diverse abilities and needs must be 
flexible and offer a spectrum of services.  Furthermore, social workers engaged in service 
delivery and planning need to realize that   
          [t]here are few presumptions in human relations more dangerous than the idea that  
          one knows what another human being needs better than they do themselves.  In  
          politics, this presumption is a warrant to ignore democratic preferences and to  
          trample on freedom.  In other realms too, the arrogation of the right by doctors to  
          define the needs of their patients, of social workers to administer the needs of their  
          clients, and finally of parents to decide the needs of their children is in each case a  
          warrant for abuse. (Ignatieff 11) 
When people are perceived as being incompetent or unreliable self-advocates, they are at 
risk of being excluded from a shared social or cultural definition of humanity.  Bringing 
these women and men back from the margins of society requires social workers to do 
more than recognize the right to equal access to the necessities of life.  Social planning 
needs to acknowledge and validate what makes people different from each other, as well 
as what we have in common.   
 Reading stories helps social workers engaged with individuals, organizations or in 
planning to gain access to worlds we otherwise would not be able to experience.  Several 
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researchers have found that people who read literature tend to have a greater capacity for 
empathy (Mar & Oatley 181).  Social workers are trained to listen to life narratives and 
seek out opportunities to revise personal storylines, drawing from many disciplines and 
theoretical traditions.  At the same time, disability is a social construction that is informed 
by a range of natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities.  Therefore, social 
workers should have some facility in undertaking an interdisciplinary approach to 
informing their practice from a range of theoretical discourses.   
 We turn to other people‘s stories, fiction and nonfiction, to help us make sense of 
our own (Tobin para. 1-4).  Ian Brown and his wife, Johanna Schneller, slept alternate 
nights in order to provide round the clock care to their son.  Yet Brown found his ‗off‘ 
nights were more often spent reading than catching up on rest:   
          if he was asleep and I could stay awake, I could read, and did, voraciously.  I have  
          never appreciated words and books and time and the life of my mind more than I  
          did on those stolen late nights.  Dante, The History of Mental Retardation, books  
          about deafness and about stuttering, novels about cowboys and reprobates, diaries  
          of diplomats, Casanova‘s memoirs…  Certainly I collected stories.  I read    
          Chesterfield‘s letters to his son, and Chesterton‘s dull detective novels, and  
          anything that took me away:  Elmore Leonard and Chandler and Roth and Updike,  
          books about fathers and collecting and obsession, essays about any variety of inner  
          life, lives of artists and millionaires, and of course every scientific paper about    
          CFC.  And newspapers. (Brown 49-50)   
Reading from all kinds of sources and stories, Brown learned about different ways of 
being in the world.  Perhaps all that reading helped him to be more certain about the 
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existence of Walker‘s own inner narrative, even if his son could not communicate it 
directly.   
 Critical reading teaches us that realizing more interesting and successful life 
outcomes for people with mental disabilities requires further community change.  Jean 
Vanier believes that changing simplistic assumptions about the capacity of people with 
mental disabilities happens ―[a]s we start to really get to know others, as we begin to 
listen to each other‘s stories, things begin to change.  We no longer judge each other 
according to concepts of power and knowledge or according to group identity, but 
according to these personal, heart-to-heart encounters‖ (83).  Vanier is alluding to a 
transactive planning process of mutual change, where social workers are not only 
contributing their expertise to solve a problem, they are open to revising their own 
relationship to the issue and their assumptions about the constituency with whom they are 
engaged.  This can occur when social workers have the opportunity to form close working 
relationships with their clients.  
Vanier speaks to the moral and ethical responsibility of knowing others, but there 
are also pragmatic reasons for working harder to obtain more complete stories about lives 
that are not easily accessible.  Indeed, when it comes to working for people whose first- 
person narrative is difficult to access, a close relationship is a prerequisite to making an 
informed contribution to the planning process.  The first step in constructing more 
meaningful life stories is to gather rich data.  Social workers have a professional 
responsibility to create and maintain detailed case files to inform individual life planning, 
but also so that they may bring evidence-based data to program evaluations and policy 
planning.  This should be obvious, but although there is often substantial bulk to client 
case histories, they tend to be very deficit-based and lack vital descriptive narrative that 
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depicts times and places where the individual has been happy in life.  Reading widely 
allows social workers to ―gather better data to strengthen planning capacity‖ 
(Government of Ontario, 2006, 12) and design more effective supports.  Informing 
professional practice by reading from many different discourses, including novels, 
enhances our facility at recognizing inconsistencies and gaps in life stories and insight to 
try to fill them.   
  Being a critical reader also promotes reflexive professional practice that engages 
the social worker in an ongoing process of assessing how our personal values determine 
the possibilities that we can imagine for the people we serve.  If no one can ever truly tell 
another‘s story, social workers need to at least aspire to be reliable witnesses.  Vanier 
says that ―to witness is to tell our story‖ (90); and it is important for social workers and 
other advocates to recognize that the most informed perspective that we bring to a case 
note, a program design or a policy is based upon our understanding of other people‘s 
needs.  The translation may never be complete, but that does not absolve planners from 
the responsibility of considering as many sources as possible to inform a creative vision 
that is rich in potential, and backed by a commitment to advocacy to attain the supports 
required to realize it.   
There is a tremendous amount of responsibility attached to speaking for the needs 
of people who are not able or empowered to speak for themselves.  Michael Ignatieff 
concludes that ―[o]ur needs are made of words: they come to us in speech, and they can 
die for lack of expression.  Without a public language to help us find our own words, our 
needs will dry up in silence.  It is words only, the common meanings they bear, which 
give me the right to speak in the name of the strangers at my door‖ (142).  However, 
people who have the opportunity to form relationships with others who have little or no 
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language know that, in fact, needs are not made of words.  Words are the most efficient 
tool that we have for communicating need, but needs are also expressed through a much 
more complex spectrum of human behaviour.   
          We need storytellers to continue to try to translate nonverbal experience into 
words.  We need storytellers with the imagination to construct a narrative alternative that 
is more original than the tired either/or dichotomy of the sinister and oppressive asylum 
and the, for many people, unrealized objective of meaningful integration and security  
within the wider community.  We need new storylines badly because the questions 
surrounding the interests of people with mental disabilities are not going to go away.   
 In fact, despite the ethical debates surrounding the potential ‗extinction‘ of people 
with certain mental disabilities, as a result in advances in pre-natal testing and genetic 
sciences, the number of people with disabilities is only going to grow (Government of 
Ontario, 2006, 24).  Many people today have disabilities that are more complex, and they 
will live longer lives than ever before; longer than their caregiver parents, which rarely 
used to happen.
74
  Many more people will live long enough to acquire mental 
impairments in old age, and will require similar kinds of supports to navigate their lives 
as people who are born with disabilities.  Indeed, the expansion of the long-term care 
system for seniors and the ethical debates about the quality of care that have accompanied 
it recall some of the debate that once surrounded the institutionalization of children with 
disabilities.  The institutional debate is not over.  It is just moving into a new phase.  How 
                                               
74 Referring to journal notes that he‘s kept over the years since his son was born, Brown finds that the ―real 
problem is structural.  Until recently, no one—certainly no part of the government-funding apparatus—was 
willing to admit that a child could be loved and still too difficult to be cared for by his or her parents.  
Because until twenty years ago, children this medically complex didn’t exist.  They didn’t survive.  High-
tech medicine has created a new strain of human beings who require super human care.  Society has yet to 
acknowledge this reality, especially at a practical letter” (96-97).    
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it continues to evolve will depend upon the stories we tell ourselves, and the policy that 
these narratives inspire.   
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